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Abstract 
Background 
Retrospective review of the care of patients who have suffered unanticipated clinical 
deterioration often reveals that there have been errors in their management. Many of 
these patients show minor changes in their physiology as premonitory evidence of 
catastrophe. This can be used as an Early Warning Score to secure earlier 
involvement of clinicians experienced in managing critical illness. Such systems have 
not been consistently associated with improved patient outcomes and audit has 
revealed that in as many as 60% of cases, where the trigger score is exceeded, junior 
doctors do not review the patient in person as required by the protocol. 
Aim 
To investigate how issues between professions, issues between disciplines, and 
authority patterns affect the medical and nursing team’s responses to critical 
events in the context of formalised protocols for the management of adult patient 
deterioration.  
It was hoped that this would help explain why clinical staff do not follow the 
protocol.  
Method 
The sample included doctors, nurses and healthcare assistants (n=40) who used an 
Early Warning Score. Sampling was initially purposive and restricted to clinical staff 
but was extended to include ward and trust managers in response to the early 
interviews. Data was collected by semi-structured interviews over a nine-month 
period starting in January 2015. The methodology was qualitative, using 
constructivist grounded theory. It was characterised by iterative development of 
interview questions, simultaneous data collection and analysis and theoretical 
sampling. Data was held in NVivo for Mac version 11.4 and analysed for themes, 
from which core concepts emerged, allowing the construction of theory. 
 
iv 
Findings 
A number of major categories emerged. Prominent amongst these was the theme of 
conflict between the requirements of the rapid response system and other aspects of 
the first-responder doctors’ work. Another concept emerging was a disjunction 
between the medical and nursing teams in their understanding of the Early Warning 
Score. The doctors use the score as an indicator of the severity of disease, in order to 
help them manage their overwhelming workload, whereas the nurses and healthcare 
assistants use trigger events to secure the assistance of the medical team in resolving 
uncertainty. If the outcome of a call is an unchanged management plan the doctors 
consider this to be a wasted effort whilst the nurses see it as a positive contribution to 
care. 
Conclusion 
Discussion includes consideration of the idea that this dichotomy comes from the 
medical and nursing teams having different mental models of practice, and 
epistemologies of patient care. The importance of dissimilar mental models and 
philosophical paradigms in the context of teamwork is discussed. Such disjunctions 
may occur in other situations where different professions cooperate in clinical teams. 
Models of practice may differ between professions and reflect their different roles in 
patient care.  
  
 
v 
Acknowledgements  
I thank my supervisors Reverend Professor Pauline Pearson and Dr Alison Steven for 
their constant support, advice and encouragement. At the start I was a total novice in 
qualitative methods. They guided me and helped me develop understanding of these 
new ideas and stayed with me until the end. To Mr. Hugh Gallagher, my thanks for 
supporting me through the lengthy process of obtaining clinical access to undertake 
this research and for convincing his colleagues that participating was worthwhile. I 
am very grateful to these doctors and nurses who gave interviews so frankly and 
honestly. Finally thanks to my family: my husband David for his advice and support 
and my children Alice, Tom and Daisy for their unquestioning faith that I was capable 
of accomplishing this work – even when things were not going well. 
 
 
 
 
 
Writing in the first person  
Medical, Scientific writing is conventionally in the passive voice and third person. 
Goodman and Edwards have commented that this results in ugly unwieldy English 
(Goodman and Edwards 2014). Webb has argued that in the case of qualitative 
research the use of the third person obscures the role of the researcher in constructing 
the data (Webb 1992). This position has been endorsed by Guba and Lincoln (Guba 
and Lincoln 2005). In accordance with this advice this thesis uses the first person and 
the active voice whenever appropriate. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  2 
 
2 
1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1 
This study is an exploration of the perceptions and reflections of the members of the 2 
medical and nursing teams who used the Modified Early Warning Score to attempt to 3 
differentiate the few patients on the threshold of unexpected deterioration, from the 4 
many whose progress was uncomplicated.  5 
The chapter comprises: 6 
• An explanation as to why I chose to conduct this study. 7 
• An introduction to the mechanisms of EWSs and RRSs. I will describe the use 8 
of ‘Track and Trigger’ Early Warning Systems and Rapid Response Systems to 9 
attempt to improve the management of unexpectedly deteriorating patients on 10 
general wards; and explain that the evidence that these interventions improve 11 
patients’ outcomes is inconsistent. 12 
• Adoption of RRS as a national policy 13 
• The failure of the RRSs to improve patient outcome 14 
1.1 Why I Undertook This Study 15 
“It is hard to think of an intervention in the last two decades that has been 16 
implemented in such a widespread fashion, and so effectively, but with so 17 
little evidence, as Rapid Response Systems.” (Buist and Mahoney 2014) 18 
During the course of my career I have had many opportunities to see first-hand how 19 
patient-management is complicated by hierarchies and professional boundaries between 20 
individual team members.  As an ICU sister with responsibilities for coordinating the 21 
management of complex patients, requiring advanced therapies and multi-professional 22 
cooperation. I observed that, on some occasions, delayed responses due to problems 23 
with communication contributed to the severity of illness seen in the unit. One 24 
particular incident, which resulted in the death of a 58 year-old man, had a critical 25 
influence on my career. As a member of the cardiac-arrest team I was called to a ward 26 
to see a patient at 07.00 on a Sunday morning. The patient had been transferred to an 27 
orthopaedic ward earlier in the weekend after a period in Intensive care following a 28 
motorbike accident. Ten years previously he had had a laryngectomy for a carcinoma 29 
that had left him with a tracheostomy. On arrival on the ward I saw two Pre-Reg (year 1 30 
of practice) House Officer, doctors trying to do an oral endotracheal intubation and 31 
failing to ventilate the patient.  This was a terrible error, as the patient’s pharynx was no 32 
 
3 
longer connected to the trachea. Ventilating the tracheostomy would have easily 1 
resolved the difficulty, in seconds. The ward nurses had quit the scene when the cardiac 2 
arrest team arrived, so there was no one present to tell the doctors about the patient’s 3 
history. This case went to the Coroner’s court and as a member of the team I was cross- 4 
examined by the families’ barrister. This experience was sobering, and has stayed with 5 
me. I realised that there was inadequate team organisation around the resuscitation 6 
attempt. Had the ward nurses stayed, they would have told the doctors that the patient 7 
had a tracheostomy, and the major error of attempting oral intubation would have been 8 
avoided. Why had the ward nurses, who raised the alarm, left the scene as soon as the 9 
cardiac arrest team arrived? Was it because the resuscitation protocol did not allocate 10 
them a role in the resuscitation team? This incident helped direct my interest towards 11 
education and practice development on the ICU.  12 
At this time, circumstances within my Trust demonstrated how troublesome lack of 13 
professional cooperation could be. Following a trust merger, the state of transition, 14 
required changes to staffing, and the development of joint management protocols and 15 
standards.  The resulting tensions often delayed progress.  Problems arose amongst both 16 
the medical and the nursing teams, precipitated by the need to work on two sites. Staff 17 
were asked to develop joint working practices. Joint management arrangements were 18 
developed to support this ‘whole Trust’ approach, with little time for staff to adjust. It 19 
was around this time that I began to understand how factors relating to staff 20 
relationships, teamwork etc could affect the progress of appropriate clinical care. Once 21 
more I observed that unclear responsibilities across hierarchies and between professions 22 
interfered with the management of patients. 23 
One reason for these organisational changes was the introduction of a key NHS 24 
guidance – ‘Comprehensive Critical Care’ (DoH 2000). The re-classification of patient 25 
dependencies in Intensive care with the publication of this advice called for all staff in 26 
general wards to be educated in high-dependency skills. As part of the local trust 27 
response to I was appointed as a lecturer-practitioner with the brief to introduce inter- 28 
professional. Introducing a Trust-wide physiological observation chart with an 29 
integrated early warning score demonstrated, again, the impact poor inter-professional 30 
cooperation had on patient care, and introduced me to the concept of ‘track and trigger’ 31 
monitoring. 32 
 
4 
I came to understand that implementing change successfully required that it be deeply 1 
understood by the staff involved. I also arrived at a significant conclusion: that, no 2 
matter how beneficial a change of practice can be demonstrated to be, clinical teams 3 
will often resist it. I saw that this resistance was greatest where a new system of 4 
working cut across existing patterns of responsibility, and that an important factor in 5 
this was to be found in the sociology and culture of the groups of staff involved. A 6 
major change would cut across numerous teams and the dynamics of these would differ, 7 
so a good solution in one area would be unacceptable in another - for reasons that had 8 
little to do with efficacy. Ten years later, when I began to read about the failure of RRSs 9 
to work as expected, I was not surprised, and immediately suspected that a major reason 10 
would be the complexities of multi-professional teamwork.  11 
Another aspect of my career that has shaped my approach to this research topic is my 12 
experience of the investigation of clinical errors. In 2009 I was appointed as a portfolio 13 
manager in the Northern Strategic Health Authority’s Patient Safety Directive. My work 14 
involved reviewing reports of clinical errors with senior trust managers. The 15 
opportunity to review these cases in the Trust’s context gave me a vital insight into 16 
system failure at micro and macro levels. In my investigative role I liaised with Trust 17 
governance departments and I often found that they would be resistant in giving the 18 
details of incidents. These experiences have taught me that, at the individual, middle 19 
management and corporate level, unpalatable truths about responsibility for errors will 20 
be denied.  21 
At the national level I have also had experience of the investigation of clinical incidents 22 
through my work representing the Royal College of Nursing on the Steering Committee 23 
of the National Confidential Enquiry Into Patient Outcome And Death (NCEPOD). The 24 
literature relating to the assessment of missed deterioration, discussed at length 25 
throughout this thesis, almost always relies upon a third party, ‘outsider’ team deciding 26 
where clinical errors have occurred and defining their importance. I believe, on the basis 27 
of my experience, that the ‘home team’ will often not accept the designation of ‘error’, 28 
and will reject the conclusions of many investigations. This makes audit adversarial and 29 
the learning of lessons becomes a slow process.  30 
Throughout my career I have also observed that managers supporting quality initiatives 31 
become obsessed with the system, and its application, rather than concentrating on 32 
 
5 
clinical outcomes. The Quality Care Commission has confirmed my beliefs, about the 1 
investigation of clinical mishaps, by finding that not one Trust in the UK was dealing 2 
adequately with the investigation of unexpected deaths (CQC 2016, NHE 2016). 3 
I have set out these experiences in detail, both to show how they have prompted my 4 
investigation, and also to make clear at the outset that I came to these topics with 5 
significant experience of the field. I will explain the difficulties this can present for a 6 
researcher and describe the decisions I made to resolve these (Section 3.4.1.2). 7 
When early investigations of the outcome of RRSs found little change this was 8 
attributed to technical issues in using the protocol. More recently some analyses have 9 
suggested that socio-cultural and professional issues might be affecting its function, in 10 
ways that I had myself observed on the wards. I hoped by this study to contribute to 11 
these understandings. 12 
1.2 Early Warning Scores and Rapid Response Systems 13 
1.2.1 What Is ‘Unexpected’ Deterioration? 14 
The problem that the RRS seeks to address is that of patients, who were not expected to 15 
have problems, but who suddenly and unpredictably deteriorate. This deterioration is 16 
sometimes not recognised or is incorrectly managed. This is thought to worsen the 17 
prognosis.  18 
Deterioration is the situation where a patient’s condition worsens. In the context of 19 
Rapid Response Systems ‘significant’ deterioration is a major worsening of the patients 20 
status, which usually requires prompt intervention to prevent further decline. Patients 21 
known to be at greater risk of deterioration are generally more closely watched, whether 22 
on general rewards or specialised units. The context of this investigation is those 23 
patients whose progress is expected to be one of gradual improvement. As such they are 24 
customarily managed on general wards. Their level of dependency is 0-1. 25 
1.2.2 Early Warning Scores, Rapid Response Systems and Medical Emergency 26 
Teams 27 
In order to attempt to ensure rapid mobilisation to counter incipient deterioration, 28 
physiological scoring systems and associated algorithms have been developed. Over 30 29 
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different early warning scoring systems have been reported, and there are many more 1 
unreported local variations. The second step, the ‘calling criteria’ are also extremely 2 
varied. The EWS and calling criteria comprise the afferent side of the system and define 3 
how staff are alerted to a patient at risk.  4 
1.2.2.1 Early Warning Scores 5 
The early warning score is aggregated from vital signs data. When one or more criteria 6 
are exceeded the system ‘triggers’ and the nursing staff on the spot are required to 7 
inform the medical team. These systems are often called ‘track and trigger’. 8 
1.2.2.2 The Rapid Response System 9 
The efferent limb of the RRS determines who will respond to a trigger event. This may 10 
be the doctor who is first alerted by the nurses. They may in turn call their  ‘home 11 
medical team’, a nurse specialist led ICU outreach team or a specialised team with 12 
members experienced in recognising and dealing with critical illness. Figure 1 shows 13 
the elements of an EWS and RRS. 14 
Figure 1 The Components Of An Early Warning System 15 
ts  16 
 17 
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1.2.3 Which Patients ‘Trigger’? 1 
Figure 2 presents a diagram of the possible outcomes of patients who are being 2 
monitored by an EWS 3 
 4 
Patients whose EWS reaches the calling criteria are a heterogeneous group. Some 5 
patients should not have been considered for resuscitation, and should have had a ‘Do 6 
not attempt resuscitation’ (DNAR) order in place. Some patients should have had their 7 
calling criteria changed, because some pre-existing condition means that they reach 8 
trigger values too soon. Some patients should have had their calling criteria modified to 9 
prevent a further alert following a trigger and review. Some patients are in the early 10 
stages of a potentially remediable deterioration and it is these individuals on whom the 11 
system is targeted. 12 
1.2.4 Experience with EWSs and RRS 13 
It was expected that a system that identified patients at an early stage of deterioration, 14 
thus permitting early intervention, would lead to better outcomes. However, audit of 15 
mortality, length of ICU admission and length of hospital stay has not shown consistent 16 
improvement. The literature relating to outcome is discussed in Chapter 2.4. 17 
Figure 2. The Possible Outcomes For EWS Monitored Patients 
Patients who do not 
trigger 
Patients who never deteriorate 
Patients 
who 
collapse 
without 
ever 
triggering 
Need changes to the treatment plan 
Patients who trigger 
Patients who recover spontaneously 
Patients who should not have been monitored by the 
MEWS system 
True MEWS 
positives 
Need changes to the treatment plan 
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1.3 Recommendations to use EWS in practice 1 
In the United Kingdom the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence has 2 
recommended that a standard, appropriate Early Warning System (EWS) be universally 3 
adopted in acute care (NICE 2007). The Royal College of Physicians has led calls for a 4 
standard system to be adopted by all hospitals, and has endorsed a National Early 5 
Warning Score (NEWS) that is largely derived from the Modified Early Warning Score 6 
(MEWS) - the subject of this study (Royal College of Physicians 2012). The National 7 
Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death (NCEPOD) is an authoritative 8 
medical charity that undertakes targeted reviews of healthcare practice and has, for three 9 
decades, been a major driver for the improvement of care. It has recommended that an 10 
EWS be used in the day-to-day management of acute medical and surgical care. 11 
(NCEPOD 2012, NCEPOD 2015). 12 
In the USA similar advice has been given in a national campaign called “Save a 13 
Hundred Thousand Lives” (McCannon, Hackbarth et al. 2007) and in Australia as 14 
“Essential Element 3” in the management of acute care (Jones, George et al. 2008, 15 
ACSQHC 2010). In these days, when such store is laid on evidence, it is surprising that 16 
EWS and RRSs have been so widely endorsed in the absence of consistent evidence that 17 
they lead to improved outcomes.  18 
Recently, however, it has been suggested that the use of EWSs and RRSs is supporting 19 
a model of care that is fundamentally unsound (White, Scott et al. 2015, Wendon, 20 
Hodgson et al. 2016). Indeed, one of the consultant intensivists interviewed in the 21 
course of this research expressed the opinion that the MEWS diverted attention from the 22 
real issue: that doctors who look after unstable patients do not possess the necessary 23 
knowledge and skills to recognise and treat the problems. She saw RRSs as a poor 24 
second to better staffing, and better education – a position that finds support in 25 
NCEPOD’s 2002 report on cardiac arrests. 26 
“It is inappropriate for the referral and review of a critically ill patient to be 27 
at SHO level or lower, and in such a situation, telephone advice without 28 
examining the patient is unacceptable.”  (NCEPOD 2002)  29 
1.4 The Evolution of RRSs 30 
In 1997 Morgan published a very short paper (only 350 words), reporting the 31 
observation that many patients who suffered catastrophic deterioration on general wards 32 
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had abnormalities in their vital signs that portended the event (Morgan, Williams et al. 1 
1997). The paper described a simple scoring system, based on routine vital signs 2 
monitoring, that was claimed to give warning of adverse events. One of its virtues was 3 
that, as it used data that was already being collected, so the process of recording and 4 
calculating the early warning score took less than 30 seconds (Morgan, Williams et al. 5 
1997). Since then a great deal of effort, and resource, has been directed into identifying 6 
the optimal scoring system and the most efficient and effective way of responding to 7 
patients who show high scores. A variety of algorithms for detection and treatment have 8 
been devised, implemented and audited. They all comprise a scoring system for 9 
identifying ‘trigger events’, with associated instructions about reporting (The Afferent 10 
Limb), and a system for responding to alerts (The Efferent Limb). 11 
Research publications and editorials from the years following Morgan’s description 12 
reveal that many critical care specialists believed that a major cause of inadequate 13 
management of serious illness was that their specialty was not involved at an early stage 14 
(McQuillan, Pilkington et al. 1998, Buist, Jarmolowski et al. 1999, Goldhill, 15 
Worthington et al. 1999, Goldhill, Worthington et al. 1999, Walshe 1999). 16 
EWSs and RRSs have disappointed the expectations that consistent, significant 17 
improvement of outcomes would follow their implementation. (Devita, Bellomo et al. 18 
2006, Gao, McDonnell et al. 2007, Subbe, Gao et al. 2007, Winters, Pham et al. 2007, 19 
Chan, Jain et al. 2010, Jansen and Cuthbertson 2010, Karvellas, de Souza et al. 2012). A 20 
recent editorial in Intensive Care Medicine reiterates this lack of certainty that RRSs are 21 
effective (Wendon, Hodgson et al. 2016). Workers in the field have been puzzled by 22 
this limited success for Rapid Response Systems, as measured by outcome data, such a 23 
death rates, days in ITU, and hospital stay (Hillman, Chen et al. 2005).  24 
Some have rejected the research on the grounds that it is methodologically flawed 25 
(Winters and Pronovost 2013). Others have noted that often the required response to a 26 
trigger situation does not occur, and have explored reasons for this (Litvak and 27 
Pronovost 2010). In 2005 Hillman and Chen reported that a third of patients meeting 28 
review criteria were not referred to the RRS (Hillman, Chen et al. 2005). More recently 29 
Shearer has reported that the RRS is only called to half of the patients who should 30 
trigger a review (Shearer, Marshall et al. 2012).   31 
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A prospective study comparing the outcome of timely and delayed referral to rapid 1 
response teams, found that, though the protocol required staff to call the RRS, they 2 
often failed to do so. Doctors were less likely than nurses to call for support from an 3 
emergency response team (Boniatti, Azzolini et al. 2014). Using focus groups for a case 4 
study approach it has been found that possible reasons for delay included differing intra- 5 
professional decision making pathways in medicine and nursing, and inter-professional 6 
communication barriers between doctors and nurses (Kitto, Marshall et al. 2015). Kitto 7 
Marshall et al describe the RRS as: 8 
“….a set of formal rules that attempt to shape the behaviour of healthcare 9 
professionals.” 10 
From this perspective it is easy to see that RRS is just one of many influences on the 11 
healthcare professionals behaviour and how they actually behave will depend on how 12 
they resolve competing influences. 13 
1.4.1 The RRS as a protocol 14 
A protocol is a system of rules that explain the procedures to be followed in formal 15 
situations, and in the current context, a plan for a scientific experiment or for medical 16 
treatment (NHSII&I 2008). Having an agreed, standardised way of performing a task is 17 
intended to make a process repeatable and reproducible. The EWS and RRS are an 18 
attempt to make the detection of patients at risk of deterioration a mechanical exercise, 19 
taking the decision away from the junior medical staff and nurses.  20 
A guideline is an indication or outline of policy or conduct. Guidelines for clinical 21 
practice are “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient 22 
decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances” (Field and 23 
Lohr 1990). Their successful implementation should improve quality of care by 24 
decreasing inappropriate variation and facilitating the application of effective advances 25 
to everyday practice (Cabana, Rand et al. 1999). Whilst clinical protocols and 26 
guidelines are similar, the use of the term ‘protocol’ implies that the routine must be 27 
followed whereas a guideline allows more room for personal judgement (NHSII&I 28 
2008). 29 
The EWS is coupled with a protocol that determines the action that the medical and 30 
nursing teams should take in response to a ‘trigger’ score. If a protocol is understood as 31 
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described above by Kitto et al (2015), as a means of changing behaviour, then it is 1 
easily seen that, though it will be a factor in determining the doctor or nurse’s 2 
behaviour, other influences may play a part.  3 
Wolf (1999) discussed the pros and cons of guidelines and protocols (Woolf, Grol et al. 4 
1999). The expected advantage is improved and more consistent patient care. 5 
Guidelines also influence local and national health policy, as the existence of a 6 
guideline is a driver for organising and funding its implementation. Improved outcomes 7 
following the introduction of protocols have been demonstrated in carefully conducted 8 
investigations, but it is not clear whether such improvements are seen with more general 9 
use (Grimshaw and Russell 1993).  10 
Protocols also help clinicians by offering a clear course of action when they are 11 
uncertain how to proceed. This benefit might be expected of the EWS protocol. 12 
Inexperienced nurses and doctors are able, by calculating the score, to identify patients 13 
at risk and are provided with a clear course of action. It has been observed, however, 14 
that the clinical teams often do not follow the protocol (Shearer, Marshall et al. 2012, 15 
Guinane, Bucknall et al. 2013, Tirkkonen, Yla-Mattila et al. 2013). Cabana et al have 16 
discussed why, in view of their potential benefits, doctors fail to follow protocols and 17 
guidelines (Cabana, Rand et al. 1999). Seventy-six articles were found that described 18 
barriers to the use of guidelines. Within these articles 293 potential barriers to the use of 19 
the guideline were found! There was little consistency between surveys and the authors 20 
conclude that it is not possible to find general reasons why doctors do not use guidelines 21 
as they vary significantly with contexts. Others have found that distrust of guidelines is 22 
widespread, and in many cases guideline developers have been shown to favour their 23 
vested interests in their recommendations (Lenzer 2013, Ransohoff, Pignone et al. 24 
2013). A recent paper demonstrated that more experienced physicians are more likely to 25 
use other sources of knowledge in conjunction with guidelines to make clinical 26 
decisions (Mercuri 2015). 27 
Berg (1997) has analysed the reasons why clinicians may not follow guidelines (Berg 28 
1997). He identifies factors relating to knowledge, attitude and behaviour and represents 29 
these diagrammatically (figure 3). He argues that there is an order in which change can 30 
occur progressing from knowledge to attitude and finally to behaviour, and that the 31 
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factors that influence a clinician not to use the guideline can operate at any of these 1 
levels.  2 
3 
 
13 
 1 
Figure 3.  Reasons For Not Following Protocols (redrawn from Berg, 1997) 2 
 3 
Systems using ‘Track and Trigger’ alerting are customarily formulated as protocols. 4 
These pre-empt clinical decision making by individuals and cut across existing 5 
hierarchies. The complexities of pre-existing systems may interfere with the expected 6 
mechanisms of a new, formalised way of working. This research project will present 7 
evidence that staff resist such impositions. The Australian Commission on Quality and 8 
Safety in Healthcare has described the ways in which systems can be constructed to 9 
comprise a RRS (Figure 4).  10 
11 
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 1 
Figure 4. The Variety Of Structures That Can Be Used In A Rapid Response 2 
System (ACSQH 2008) 3 
 4 
1.5  Failure of the RRS Protocol to Improve Outcome 5 
Explanations given for the inconsistent benefit of RRS have included: 6 
• The scoring is not correctly performed (Chellel, Fraser et al. 2002).  7 
• Triggering scores are not always reported (Curry and Jungquist 2014).  8 
• The expected assessment by a doctor does not take place (Yiu, Khan et al. 9 
2014).  10 
• Staff do not follow the protocol (Shearer, Marshall et al. 2012). 11 
Research evidence exists for the occurrence of all these but the question of the relative 12 
importance of factors is unanswered. In response to the final point there is little 13 
evidence about why staff fail to follow the protocol. These issues are discussed in 14 
Chapter 2 (2.4.4.2). 15 
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1.6 How The Care of Critically Ill Patients Is Organised 1 
The idea underpinning the use of EWSs and RRSs is that the early involvement of 2 
doctors and nurses experienced in the care of critical illness, and earlier transfer to ICU 3 
care (if necessary), will improve patient management. The protocols are also intended to 4 
standardise how the care of deteriorating patients is handed on from generalist to 5 
specialist teams. Some consideration must therefore be given to what these 6 
interventions imply and to the way that the medical and nursing teams are organised. 7 
It has been estimated that the average ICU patient requires more than 180 decisions on 8 
their care every day (Gawande 2009). All these requirements cannot be met by one 9 
group of carers. Acute care in hospitals is therefore multi-professional and multi- 10 
disciplinary, and only by the use of complex teams can safe care be provided (St Pierre, 11 
Hofinger et al. 2008). This care is not in the hands of one professional group. There may 12 
have been a time when doctors ‘decided’ and nurses ‘cared’ but this simple division of 13 
responsibility has probably not existed for a hundred years. Greenfield discussed the 14 
development of the modern nursing role in the USA and showed that nurses and doctors 15 
have long cooperated in diagnosis, treatment and care (Greenfield 1999). 16 
1.6.1 The Nursing Staff Who Operate the MEWS 17 
The basic care of patients is the responsibility of the nursing team.  The carer at the 18 
bedside has responsibility both for satisfying the patients ‘domestic’ needs; to be fed, 19 
watered, helped to keep clean and go to the toilet; but also for carrying out a large range 20 
of functions to identify and manage the patient’s clinical needs. These primary carers 21 
have frequent, intimate contact with patients and are well placed to see how the 22 
patient’s condition is changing. They are also wholly responsible for the periodic 23 
measurement and recording of the patient’s vital signs.  24 
In the UK those undertaking this role have a wider variety of backgrounds than might 25 
be supposed. Given that a nursing career can last forty years or more, qualified 26 
registered nurses working today may have been trained in a variety of ways.  Eaton 27 
provided a history of Undergraduate Nurse Education for the Willis Commission (Eaton 28 
2015) that describes the many changes in nurse education that have taken place in the 29 
last thirty years. Many older nurses studied in hospital-based schools of nursing and 30 
undertook the Nursing and Midwifery Council’s Registered Nurse Exam to become 31 
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State Registered Nurses. Some undertook a shorter two-year training to become State 1 
Enrolled Nurses. More recently nurse training has been University based with less 2 
clinical time on wards. Students gained either a Diploma or Degree level qualification. 3 
Recently, the diploma-level courses have been closed and all training for Registered 4 
Nurse status has led to a Degree. Most State Enrolled Nurses have been able to extend 5 
their training to obtain RN status. The Willis Committee has recently reviewed the 6 
future direction of undergraduate nurse education and endorsed a policy of graduate 7 
status for all Registered Nurses (RNs) (Willis 2012).  8 
The curriculum for nurse training has also changed during the working lifetime of many 9 
nurses currently in practice.  The teaching of medical sciences has latterly been given 10 
less emphasis (Willis 2012). A registered nurse may thus have a wide variety of training 11 
and experience. In addition, many of the nurses working in the UK trained abroad. Their 12 
credentials must be recognised by the Nursing and Midwifery Council, but are diverse.  13 
The ‘qualified’ nursing workforce is augmented by a large number of healthcare 14 
assistants. These workers often undertake the same role in patient care as the qualified 15 
nurses. In many wards they undertake most of the day-to-day care, with the qualified 16 
nurses acting as supervisors and managers. There are no mandatory education standards 17 
for healthcare assistants, and they are not, at present, subject to national regulation. 18 
Trusts have generally developed their own standards and training requirements 19 
(Spilsbury and Meyer 2004). 20 
In general, it is the unregistered care assistants and the most junior qualified nurses who 21 
monitor the patient’s vital signs. These least experienced and least knowledgeable 22 
nurses have the crucial task of recognising impending patient deterioration. The 23 
diversity of primary carers means that the staff’s very different knowledge bases 24 
complicate any educational intervention, accompanying a planned development. A very 25 
recent cross sectional study by Griffiths, Ball et al (2016) is claimed to demonstrate that 26 
hospitals with higher numbers of Registered Nurses have lower all cause mortality rates 27 
(Griffiths, Ball et al. 2016). In an interview on ‘The Today Programme’ on the 16th 28 
November 2016 the lead author associated this with the fact that Registered Nurses are 29 
better trained to understand and recognise critical illness.  30 
There have also been changes in the UK ‘specialist’ nurse workforce. Nurse-Specialists 31 
have training and experience that prepares them for more advanced roles. This is 32 
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important in the situation of crisis management on the wards, where the ward team often 1 
calls nurse-specialists in ICU outreach. Outreach is the term used to describe a system 2 
of liaison between ICU and ward. The outreach team will advise whether a patient 3 
needs to be transferred to level 2 or 3 care and also follow up the progress of patients 4 
being discharged from ITU. 5 
More recently the UK workforce has been augmented by the development of Advanced 6 
Practitioners. Most Advanced Critical Care Practioners (ACCPs) are drawn from 7 
nursing but may have other backgrounds such as radiology, physiotherapy and 8 
pharmacy. They undertake a two-year course leading to an Advanced Postgraduate 9 
Diploma and Master’s Degree. ACCPs do not have general nursing duties and 10 
contribute directly to patient management under the supervision of the medical team. 11 
1.6.2 The Medical Staff Who Operate the MEWS 12 
Consultants who specialise in the care of acutely ill patients come from a number of 13 
medical sub-specialities. These include – critical care medicine, anaesthetics, acute 14 
medicine and emergency medicine. In the UK doctors who manage critical illness, 15 
whatever their parent specialty, train for eight years following their five years at medical 16 
school. They have deep understanding of the basis of disease. Patients are often not 17 
admitted directly to the care of a specialist in acute care and many patients develop 18 
critical illness unexpectedly during their treatment, so a difficulty arises as to how and 19 
when their management is passed from the consultants initially responsible for their 20 
care to those specialising in the management of critical illness. 21 
Undergraduate medical training has seen less fundamental change than nursing. There 22 
have, however, been significant changes in the organisation of general and specialist 23 
postgraduate training (GMC. 2012).  24 
25 
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Table 1. Medical Training Framework for Specialist practice 
Medical Student 4 or 5 years  
Foundation Programme of two years F1 & F2 
Core Training Programme of two or three years CT1, CT2 
Specialty Trainee of five or more years ST3, ST4, ST5, ST6, ST7 
The most junior doctors undertake a general ‘foundation’ programme that has a fixed 2 
two-year span. Full registration with the General Medical Council follows successful 3 
completion of the first year. Subsequent training is specialty based and usually lasts 4 
eight years (see Table 1). Doctors who fail their exams or assessments will ultimately 5 
leave the training ladder and may work in a variety of non-consultant roles. At the end 6 
of training successful doctors will be registered as specialists and can apply for 7 
consultant posts (Health Education UK 2014). 8 
This rigid training framework has the consequence that all trainees are, at a given stage 9 
of training, similarly experienced and in command of a similar knowledge base. 10 
It is the least experienced doctors (the foundation doctors) who are most frequently 11 
responsible for the immediate medical needs of the ward. They undertake the routine 12 
clinical care, such as admissions and discharges, organising investigations and 13 
prescribing treatments. They would also deal with any emergency situations that 14 
develop. These trainees are typically grades F1 and F2 – in their first and second years 15 
of clinical practice. More senior trainees supervise these junior trainees and more senior 16 
trainees or consultants supervise them. Such ladders of responsibility are typical in UK 17 
acute care.  18 
1.7 Structure Of This Thesis 19 
Chapter 2:  20 
Literature Review 21 
The literature review is divided into four sections.  22 
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The first section of the review discusses the rationale behind the literature search and 1 
explains the search strategy. There follows a discussion of the incidence of unexpected 2 
deterioration.  3 
In the second section the history of the development of RSS is given, to set the various 4 
schemes in context and EWS parameters and calling criteria are discussed. 5 
The third section of the review comprises a discussion of the validity and reliability of 6 
EWS, in predicting deterioration. 7 
In the fourth section the literature relating to the outcome of patients following the 8 
introduction of RRSs is discussed. It is noted to be inconsistent and reasons for its 9 
unreliability are identified. 10 
Chapter 3:  11 
Methodology, Methods and Analysis 12 
The methodology chapter explains the approach adopted in designing and implementing 13 
this study. The first section describes the choices I made in adopting a methodology; 14 
this includes a consideration of the theoretical perspective and my epistemological 15 
positioning. My academic ‘journey’ is described and consideration is given to how this 16 
influenced the study. 17 
The choice of an interview method is explained and the sampling choices are described. 18 
The difficulties encountered over ethical approval and clinical access are discussed. 19 
There follows an explanation of how the interview participants were approached and the 20 
measures undertaken to obtain informed consent. The chapter closes with a discussion 21 
of problems and weaknesses. 22 
This chapter describes the system of analysis used to code the data and how the codes 23 
were used to define major categories. The major categories are each discussed in detail. 24 
Chapters 4   25 
The Findings 26 
The findings are discussed in this chapter. Firstly concentrating upon the opinions 27 
perceptions and activities described by respondents. This reveals how they use the EWS 28 
and how they incorporate it into their work routines.  29 
Chapter 5  30 
What is revealed about interpretations of the EWS 31 
This chapter discusses how the EWS team interprets its use. 32 
Chapter 6  33 
The Effect of EWS on Team Dynamics 34 
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This chapter focuses on the way the EWS influences team dynamics and the 1 
conversation about patient care. 2 
Chapter 7: 3 
Discussion 4 
In Chapter Eight the various theories developed from the findings are discussed in more 5 
detail and placed in the context of existing research. The reasons why doctors use 6 
MEWS as a severity score are considered. This is then developed in a discussion of 7 
models of practice and the epistemology of nursing and medical practice. Consideration 8 
is given to the effect of new protocols on existing team dynamics. 9 
Chapter 8: 10 
Conclusions And Reflections 11 
In this chapter the importance, and applications, of the insights from the study are 12 
discussed. Consideration is given to what can be learned about the planning and 13 
introduction of technical measures to improve working systems when these are deeply 14 
influenced by socio-cultural and inter-professional dialogues. 15 
1.8 Conclusion 16 
Many patients who suffer unexpected deterioration have been found to have precursors 17 
in their physiological vital signs for some hours prior to their worsening condition being 18 
identified. Review of these patients by expert panels has consistently found that 19 
mistakes in their care have been made, and it has appeared that referral to critical-care 20 
specialists at an earlier stage might have avoided many of the subsequent problems. 21 
Retrospective review has shown that the deterioration of many of these patients could 22 
be predicted by a variety of early warning scoring systems but implementation of EWS 23 
and RRS has not shown consistent significant benefit in terms of improved outcome. 24 
Efforts to improve the accuracy of vital signs recording and the calculation of scores 25 
have had little impact. Adjustments to scoring systems to improve validity and 26 
reliability have also been disappointing in terms of outcome. Attention is now turning 27 
towards the problems of using a technical algorithm to try and change the behaviour of 28 
team members, and it is to this that this present investigation is directed. Recently, some 29 
authorities have suggested that a major cause for RRSs not improving outcomes is the 30 
failure of staff to follow the protocol as required following a trigger event. It has been 31 
twenty years since I was first shocked to see how chaotic multi-professional teamwork 32 
could be. I have had extensive, often frustrating, practical experience of attempting to 33 
improve these deficiencies by the organisation of teams, by education and training, by 34 
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the introduction of protocols and by critical analysis of adverse events. In this study 1 
experiences of managing patient deterioration were discussed with ‘front-line’ staff, in 2 
the hope of developing theory relating to the operation of the MEWS. 3 
 4 
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2 CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW  1 
Much qualitative research is essentially interpretative, and reflects decisions made by 2 
the researcher (Willis, Jost et al. 2007) p203. Glaser (1992) insisted that, when 3 
conducting grounded theory research, the researcher must set aside their beliefs and 4 
attempt to minimise his or her influence (Glaser, Strauss et al. 1967, Glaser, Strauss et 5 
al. 1968, Glaser 1992). As part of this process he recommended delaying any literature 6 
search to a later stage of the project, at which point emerging categories would be 7 
compared with existing knowledge (Glaser, Strauss et al. 1967).  However, when using 8 
a grounded theory methodology with a constructivist perspective the prior experience of 9 
the researcher, and even their personality are considered to be useful influences in the 10 
way the research is interpreted (Breckenridge, Jones et al. 2012). This may be obvious 11 
as in the case of politically influenced interpretations such as Marxist or feminist, but 12 
even in more neutral research paradigms the position of the researcher will intrude and 13 
must be explained. Charmaz (2008) has stated that the researcher must understand the 14 
‘baggage’ they carry with them and both understand it themselves and make their 15 
positions clear to their reader (Charmaz 2008).  16 
In part because of my existing knowledge of the topics, I adopted the more recent 17 
practice of doing literature review early. Charmaz wrote that it was wrong to imagine 18 
that researchers were a blank slate and too open to influence. She advocates beginning a 19 
literature review early to orientate the enquiry, but concludes:  20 
“The disputes over when to conduct the literature review miss a crucial 21 
point: any researcher should tailor their final version of the literature 22 
review to fit the specific purpose and argument of his/her research.” 23 
(Charmaz 2014)p 307). 24 
This chapter is divided this into four sections because the exercise fell naturally into 25 
four tasks: 26 
• Planning the literature review 27 
• The development of RRS 28 
• Review of Early Warning Systems 29 
• Review of reports of patient outcome from Early Warning Systems 30 
CHAPTER 2 THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
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2.1 Defining what to search for 1 
The process of searching the literature accumulates an enormous reading list and some 2 
system must be used to make sense of the kaleidoscope of ideas presented (Fink 2014). 3 
There are several methods available to undertake a structured review of currently 4 
available evidence. Grant and Booth (2009) identified the approaches and appraised 5 
them using the SALSA framework, examining the methods used for search, appraisal, 6 
synthesis and analysis to identify strengths and weaknesses (Grant and Booth 2009). 7 
They found fourteen methodologies. 8 
For this project it was necessary to define core knowledge, but also to research some 9 
themes that initially seemed marginal to my research question. Grant and Booth suggest 10 
undertaking an initial rapid review (or rapid evidence appraisal), using systematic 11 
review methods, to understand the existing published research (Grant and Booth 2009). 12 
A preliminary search of the Ovid Medline database – restricted to the terms Early 13 
Warning Score and Rapid Response System – found about 80 publications of particular 14 
relevance. Reading these provided a background against which to perform more 15 
extensive searches. 16 
The aim of this study was to investigate how issues between professions, issues between 17 
disciplines, and authority patterns affect the medical and nursing team’s responses to 18 
critical events in the context of formalised protocols for the management of adult patient 19 
deterioration. In order to address this question it was necessary to discover what was 20 
already known about the topic. In particular, the way healthcare workers approach the 21 
use of RRS, what their expectation of it is and how previous researchers have 22 
interpreted the effect that the behaviour of doctors and nurses has upon the operation of 23 
the protocol. 24 
The processes of identifying patients needing transfer to Intensive Care Units (ICUs) 25 
has led to a diversity of approaches that can be categorised as either:  26 
• Educational – teaching systematic methods to identify and manage patients at 27 
risk (Smith, Osgood et al. 2002) 28 
• Clinical support services to assist the ‘home team’ manage critical illness – 29 
outreach from ICU, Emergency Medical Teams (EMTs) 30 
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• Identification of patients likely to deteriorate unexpectedly from an 1 
interpretation of their routine vital signs observation – Early Warning Systems 2 
Even apparently similar reports show diversity because there is national variation in the 3 
processes for recognising and managing deteriorating patients within the definition of 4 
an RRS.  5 
2.1.1 Deciding on the years to be searched 6 
EWSs are a relatively recent development. It is generally agreed that Morgan published 7 
the first report in 1997 (Morgan 1997).  It was not necessary to search prior to that date.  8 
2.1.2 Sources of Literature 9 
There are many databases containing literature that may be relevant to the detection and 10 
management of deteriorating patients. A search of Wikipedia in February 2012 revealed 11 
129 searchable, electronic literature databases some of which are shown in Table 2. 12 
Table 2 Some Databases of Relevant Publications 
Ovid Medline 
The Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 
PubMed  
Journals@Ovid Ovid Full Text  
Allied and complementary medicine database (AMED)  
British Nursing Index (BNI) Cochrane library  
Cumulative index to Nursing and Allied Health literature (CINAHL)  
Proquest Nursing and Allied Health Source  
Health, Social Work and Education (HSWE)  
Emerald  
Health & Medical complete  
Health management  
Google  
Google Scholar  
2.1.3 Search Strategy 13 
The literature was divided into three categories: 14 
• Review articles – with a division between systematic reviews and others 15 
• Reports of original research 16 
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• Discussions such as editorials 1 
My starting point was to find and read systematic reviews of EWS and RRS, reading 2 
these articles first in order to immerse myself in the accepted understanding of the topic, 3 
and to identify issues about which there was controversy.  4 
I then undertook a systematic search using MESH terms. Many themes produce tens of 5 
thousands of references and by combining terms, using the Boolean terms ‘and’ and ‘or’ 6 
the most relevant reports can be extracted. 7 
Search Terms 8 
The search terms used are shown in Table 3. 9 
 10 
Two Advanced Ovid-Medline searches where undertaken in November 2012 and have 11 
been repeated at six monthly intervals to bring the data up to date. The most recent 12 
search being in January 2017.  The first search combined terms to find literature relating 13 
to Early Warning Systems whilst the second targeted Medical Emergency Teams. 14 
Similar queries were implemented for the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, 15 
PubMed, BNI, CINAHL and Google Scholar. 16 
A further search was made for additional papers by key authors, and the reference lists 17 
of all the papers I reviewed were checked for additional material. The database of 18 
papers was held in Endnote. By reading the summaries of these papers I was able to 19 
select those relevant to my theme and select those papers to read in full.  20 
As my work proceeded I began to understand more clearly why Glaser and Strauss 21 
delayed the literature search until analysis was almost complete (Glaser, Strauss et al. 22 
Table 3 Search Terms Used 
• Early warning score* • Track and trigger 
• Rapid response system*  • Emergency Medical Team 
• “Early warning system”  • Outreach 
• Deteriorating patient  • Patient outcome  
• Patient deterioration  • Survival 
• Rapid Response System*  • Team* 
• “MEWS” • “Teamwork”  
• “NEWS”  • “Human factor*”  
• “Track and Trigger” • “Human Error*”  
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1967, Glaser, Strauss et al. 1968). As they predict, the process of analysis opens new 1 
avenues, and searches of the literature relating to these becomes important. Figure 5 2 
shows how the literature search was organised. 3 
Figure 5 Flow Diagram Showing How The Literature Search Was Organised 
 4 
2.1.4 Review Strategy 5 
In order to make sense of the large volume of potentially relevant literature a number of 6 
questions were asked and the relevant literature has been referenced in an evaluation of 7 
each issue. 8 
2.2 The Development of EWSs and RRSs 9 
The History of EWSs and RRSs has three phases:  10 
• Morgan’s (1997) finding that patients who will suffer catastrophic deterioration are 11 
identifiable by early physiological changes was exciting as it offered the opportunity 12 
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for early intervention and the prospect of averting collapse (Morgan, Williams et al. 1 
1997). The early phase literature reflects this excitement, and by 2007 Gao, 2 
MacDonnel et al were able to find 36 reports of 25 different ‘track-and-trigger’ 3 
systems (Gao, McDonnell et al. 2007).  4 
• In their second decade of use it was discovered that expected improvements in 5 
outcome were not being found. This led to a search for EWSs with higher validities 6 
and scrutiny of the operation of systems.  7 
• More recently the emphasis is shifting to how staff use the information that a patient 8 
might be at risk. This is leading to inquiry into the motivations and actions of nursing 9 
and medical teams that can be shown not to follow the protocols. 10 
Morgan, Williams and Wright (1997) were the first to describe an EWS for detecting 11 
the early deterioration of patients outside of Intensive Care Units (Morgan, Williams et 12 
al. 1997). They allocated values to physiological disturbances in patients’ vital signs 13 
and added these up to provide a patient score. Patients whose score breached a ‘trigger’ 14 
value were reported to medical staff.  The purpose of their system was to predict the 15 
possible deterioration of a group of patients who appeared otherwise well (Morgan and 16 
Wright 2007).  Though they do not state why they chose their parameters, it is likely 17 
that practicalities directed them. Observations were limited to the vital signs already 18 
recorded for all patients. The trigger value was decided upon by applying the scoring to 19 
a historic cohort of patients. Morgan’s group did not publish any data on patient 20 
outcomes. 21 
Goldhill, Worthington et al (1999) described developing a ‘patient-at- risk team (PART) 22 
that was called to see sick patients on the ward. The team was called if a threshold was 23 
breached in three of seven physiological parameters measured (Goldhill, Worthington et 24 
al. 1999). Their data suggested that patients reported to the PART had lower cardiac 25 
arrest rates, and lower severity of illness scores on admission to ICU. The score did not 26 
however reliably identify patients who would subsequently need ITU care. 27 
In 2000 Stenhouse, Coates et al published a report of a modified early warning Score 28 
(Stenhouse, Coates et al. 2000). Following a trial period using Morgan’s score (Morgan, 29 
Williams et al. 1997), the authors describe modifying the EWS by reducing the scoring 30 
sensitivity for temperature and adding a factor for urine output. No explanation for the 31 
changes is offered. Their grounds for asserting that the system is beneficial was that 32 
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patients admitted to ITU during the 9-month research period had lower average 1 
APACHE II (severity of illness) scores than the patients admitted during the preceding 2 
year. This they took as an indication that critical illness was being referred earlier.  3 
Subbe, Kruger et al (2001) reported a modified EWS that they investigated in medical 4 
admissions to ICU (Subbe, Kruger et al. 2001). Again, no rationale is provided for their 5 
choice of parameters, scores or trigger criteria. They based their scoring and weighting 6 
on those previously published by Morgan, (Morgan, Williams et al. 1997) and 7 
Stenhouse (Stenhouse, Coates et al. 2000). They claim validity for their scoring system 8 
on the grounds that, in a cohort of 709 acute medical admissions, scores of 5 or more 9 
were associated with increased risk of death, ICU admission, and HDU admission.  10 
Hodgetts, Kenward et al (2002) described an attempt to identify the risk factors for in- 11 
hospital cardiac arrest, and to select those factors that would best identify patients in 12 
advance of their arrest. They also sought to define the sensitivity and specificity of the 13 
system by calculation of the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) (See 2.3.7.2). 14 
Analysis of the data of patients suffering cardiac arrest found three positive 15 
associations: abnormal breathing, abnormal pulse and abnormal systolic blood 16 
pressure. ROC analysis showed that a score of 4 has 89% sensitivity and 77% 17 
specificity for cardiac arrest; a score of 8 has 52% sensitivity and 99% specificity. All 18 
patients who scored more than 10 suffered cardiac arrest. (Hodgetts, Kenward et al. 19 
2002). This data demonstrates the difficulty of setting a trigger threshold to capture 20 
most significant events without large numbers of false positives creating an 21 
overwhelming workload. 22 
Goldhill, McNarry et al published a report of their system in 2005 (Goldhill, McNarry 23 
et al. 2005). They followed the outcome of patients with abnormal physiology scores to 24 
identify what level indicated high-risk patients. They recorded data from adult non- 25 
obstetric inpatients on a single day (respiratory rate, heart rate, systolic pressure, 26 
temperature, oxygen saturation, level of consciousness, urine output for catheterized 27 
patients, age and inspired oxygen). They also recorded the care required, and care given. 28 
Twenty-six patients (6%) died within thirty days. Mortality was shown to increase with 29 
the number of physiological abnormalities (P<0.005). Statistical Modelling identified 30 
level of consciousness, heart rate, age, systolic pressure and respiratory rate as 31 
important variables in predicting outcome.  32 
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Booth (2003) reported using an EWS, but was unable to draw any conclusions on 1 
outcome. He noted that the sample size was too small and that the data was incomplete. 2 
Once again there is no discussion of the choice of parameters (Booth 2003).  3 
Duckitt et al (2007) developed The Worthing EWS (Duckitt, Buxton-Thomas et al. 4 
2007). Respiratory rate, heart rate, arterial pressure, temperature, oxygen saturation, and 5 
conscious level were recorded for a cohort of 3184 unselected patients. Multivariate 6 
regression analysis showed that ventilatory frequency > or = 20 min, heart rate > or 7 
=102 min, systolic blood pressure < or = 99 mm Hg, temperature <35.3 degrees C, 8 
oxygen saturation < or = 96%, and disturbed consciousness were associated with an 9 
increase in mortality. This was then prospectively applied to a further 1102 patients. 10 
Excluding age from the score yielded a system with what they describe as ‘good’ 11 
discrimination, with an area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC) 12 
of 0.74, which was better than the performance of Morgan’s system (AUROC 0.68) 13 
(See 2.3.7.2 Below). 14 
2.3 Reports of EWSs and RRSs 15 
2.3.1 Reviews of Early Reports of EWS 16 
In 2007 Gao and McDonnell et al. undertook a systematic review of these early reports 17 
of track and trigger systems. First published as a conference report (Gao, Harrison et al. 18 
2006) a more complete evaluation followed (Gao, McDonnell et al. 2007). They 19 
identified 17 reports of ‘track and trigger systems’ and all were judged to be 20 
methodologically unsound. They considered that no conclusions could be drawn about 21 
the efficacy of the various systems (Gao, McDonnell et al. 2007). The major difficulty 22 
was the heterogeneity of the systems, and of their outcome measures. Of five papers 23 
explaining the development of a ‘track and trigger system’ only one, the report by 24 
Hodgetts, Kenward et al, was judged to provide an appropriate statistical approach to 25 
the identification of trigger parameters and values. 26 
In a similar review Jansen and Cuthbertson (2010) concluded that track and trigger 27 
systems showed low sensitivity, low positive predictive values, and high specificity. 28 
They often did not adequately identify patients who would deteriorate and could not be 29 
shown to improve outcomes (Jansen and Cuthbertson 2010). 30 
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2.3.2 Development of RRS 1 
Further development and research into RRS was influenced by the failure of systems to 2 
adequately discriminate the patients at risk of deterioration. Curry and Junquist (2014) 3 
have described the rationale of “Track and Trigger” as three-fold. Firstly, it helps ward 4 
staff to recognise that a patient is deteriorating (even though they already measure and 5 
record abnormal vital signs). Secondly, it makes communication between ward staff and 6 
‘first responders’ systematic, as this often fails where they are not provided with a 7 
simplified language to describe a patient’s status. Thirdly, it raises the importance of 8 
routine monitoring, which may improve compliance (Curry and Jungquist 2014).  9 
The ‘Track and Trigger’ may be used to alert existing specialist groups – such as the 10 
cardiac arrest team or ICU Outreach. Alternatively, a Medical Emergency Team may be 11 
organised to respond to hospital wide ‘Trigger’ events. The literature on ‘Track and 12 
Trigger’ is closely associated with that relating to these emergency response teams 13 
because they are often developed together (McNeill and Bryden 2013). This makes it 14 
difficult to know how much any change in patient outcomes is consequent upon the 15 
tracking and triggering, and how much it is consequent upon the activities of the 16 
response team.  17 
There are a large number of similar, but different, “Rapid Response Systems” systems, 18 
many of which are institution and researcher specific, and about which little or no 19 
research has been published. McGaughey, Alerdice et al (2007) reviewed outcomes 20 
from Rapid Response Systems that combined EWSs with ICU Outreach Teams for the 21 
Cochrane Collaboration (McGaughey, Alderdice et al. 2007). They searched for reports 22 
where outcomes, using the combination of outreach and an EWS, were compared with 23 
outcomes in the absence of such services. Despite finding nearly 5000 reports, only two 24 
trials met the review criteria. These were both cluster-randomised controlled trials: an 25 
Australian trial randomised at hospital level (23 hospitals) (Hillman, Chen et al. 2005) 26 
and a UK trial randomised at ward level (16 wards) (Priestley, Watson et al. 2004). 27 
Neither trial demonstrated an improved patient outcome, in terms of mortality or length 28 
of hospital stay, from the use of an EWS and outreach service.  29 
McGaughey, Alerdice et al draw attention to issues complicating the evaluation of EWS 30 
and RRS:  31 
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• The ‘scoring’ of patients focuses attention on their management plan and may 1 
lead to them being re-categorised as being unsuitable for attempted resuscitation, 2 
unsuitable for escalation of care or suitable for palliative care only. These 3 
decisions may lead to fewer attempts to resuscitate without a reduction in 4 
cardiac arrests, and less admissions to ICU without a reduction in the numbers 5 
of patients developing critical illness.  6 
• This possible effect on the number of admissions to ICU may free up beds and 7 
permit earlier admission of deteriorating patients. 8 
• The organisation of an RRS usually results in an increase in the number of 9 
doctors available. These are usually specially experienced in the management of 10 
critical illness. Improvements in outcome may simply be due to more staff being 11 
available, rather than being a direct result of the EWS and RRS protocols. 12 
• The parameters used as outcome measures are often affected by subjective 13 
decisions by the medical and nursing teams. “Number of unplanned ICU 14 
admissions” and “length of stay in ICU or hospital” are measures that are greatly 15 
affected by workload and the availability of beds. 16 
• Patient’s care may be changed as a result of concerns other than a trigger score. 17 
Doctors and Nurses may become very worried about a patients progress, despite 18 
a low EWS. These patients are unplanned ICU admissions without high EWSs. 19 
2.3.3 The Classification of Alerting Scores for Track and Trigger Systems 20 
“Track and Trigger” calling criteria can be classified as Single Parameter, Multiple 21 
Parameter, Aggregated Weighted, or Multiple Scoring Systems depending on the 22 
criteria for issuing an alert. A UK Department of Health paper provided a classification 23 
of systems with examples of each (Department of Health and The Modernisation 24 
Agency 2003). Examples of the types of EWS are provided in Appendices A to E. The 25 
variety of systems used reflects the difficulty of designing a system with appropriate 26 
sensitivity and specificity. 27 
2.3.3.1 Single Parameter Track and Trigger 28 
Single parameter systems track multiple parameters but call for intervention when any 29 
one of these exceeds a trigger value (Department of Health and The Modernisation 30 
Agency 2003). 31 
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2.3.3.2 Multiple Parameter Track and Trigger Systems 1 
In a Multiple Parameter Scoring System similar observations are made but the trigger 2 
event occurs when two or more parameters are outside their normal range (Department 3 
of Health and The Modernisation Agency 2003). 4 
2.3.3.3 Aggregate Weighting Scoring Systems for Track and Trigger 5 
An Aggregate Weighting Scoring System allocates points for level of derangement 6 
across several physiological parameters and triggers a response when a certain total 7 
score is exceeded. The Modified Early Warning Score is an example of an aggregated 8 
system and has been widely adopted (Morgan, Williams et al. 1997). 9 
2.3.3.4 Combination Early Warning Scores for Track and Trigger Systems 10 
Combination Early Warning Scores have elements of a single or multiple parameter 11 
system combined with an aggregated scoring system (Department of Health and The 12 
Modernisation Agency 2003).  13 
2.3.3.5 The National Early Warning System 14 
A working party of the Royal College of Physicians (RCP) of England has published a 15 
revised MEWS score in an attempt to bring about some consistency in the systems used 16 
to detect critical deterioration in UK hospitals. (Royal College of Physicians 2012). The 17 
RCP has urged UK hospitals to use the National Early Warning Score (NEWS) in order 18 
to provide standardised care. None of the hospitals involved in this study had done so.  19 
2.3.4 Validation of Early Warning Scores 20 
There has been surprisingly little research validating EWSs. A number of questions 21 
arise.  22 
• How and why were the parameters chosen? 23 
• How were the limits set to derive a point-score for each parameter? 24 
• How was the trigger score decided? 25 
• What was the sensitivity and specificity of the trigger score? 26 
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2.3.5 What Parameters, what weighting and when to trigger? 1 
Early developments of EWS were discussed in section 2.2.1 above. 2 
The UK National Early Warning Score (NEWS) uses six parameters: Respiratory Rate, 3 
Oxygen Saturation, Temperature, Systolic BP, Pulse Rate and Level of Consciousness. 4 
These were decided upon using an expert group consultation process (Duckitt, Buxton- 5 
Thomas et al. 2007). This recommended omission of urine output as a parameter 6 
because EWS systems are intended to forestall serious deterioration and many 7 
uncomplicated patients do not have urinary catheters in place. Monitoring urine output 8 
by spontaneously voided urine involves waiting for several hours before it becomes 9 
evident that urine flow is critically low – too late for an acute scoring system. 10 
Oximetry was included despite the fact that many hospitals do not routinely monitor 11 
SaO2. The expert group felt that including oximetry at the time of monitoring was an 12 
insignificant increase in work, that most units now possess at least one oximeter and 13 
that oxygen saturation measurements should be done routinely (Duckitt, Buxton- 14 
Thomas et al. 2007). 15 
A number of possible additional parameters have not generally been used in EWSs.  16 
‘Age’ was investigated by Smith, Prytherch et al. (2008) and correlated with higher 17 
MEWS scores (Smith, Prytherch et al. 2008). They recommended adding an age related 18 
score to MEWS. The RCP working group developing the NEWS, did not add an age 19 
factor, partly because of the fear that it would generate many ‘false positives’ in the 20 
elderly and partly because biological and chronological age are often poorly related 21 
(RCP 2012). The RCP also noted that pregnancy is associated with many abnormalities 22 
of physiological parameters but felt that scoring systems for pregnant patients should be 23 
specific. They recommended that the NEWS should not be used in pregnant patients 24 
(RCP 2012). 25 
2.3.6 Reliability, Validity and Specificity 26 
Many Track and Trigger systems have been reported, and even more locally developed, 27 
unreported systems are, or have been, in use. Amongst the most widely used in the UK 28 
are the Modified Early Warning Score (MEWS) and the UK National Early Warning 29 
Score (NEWS). In Australia single and multiple parameter systems have generally been 30 
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preferred to aggregate systems. The staff who operate RSSs are much affected by the 1 
validity and reliability of the systems. 2 
2.3.6.1 Reliability 3 
Is the score repeatable – intra-rater reliability? Is it affected by who does the scoring – 4 
inter-observer reliability? Are the measurements subject to interpretation by the 5 
observer? Does it vary significantly if the observations are repeated immediately – 6 
retake reliability?  7 
Subbe, Gao et al. (2007) studied the intra-rater and inter rater reliability of three EWSs 8 
(Subbe, Gao et al. 2007). They found there was significant variation in the 9 
reproducibility of physiological track-and-trigger warning systems used by different 10 
health care professionals. All three systems examined showed better agreement on 11 
triggers than individual scores. Simpler systems such as the single parameter MET alert 12 
had better reliability than the more complex MEWS assessment.  13 
Miller (2015) used a scenario-based evaluation to test the inter-rater reliability of 14 
NEWS and demonstrated high reliability amongst nurses and personal care assistants 15 
(Miller 2015). 16 
The ideal EWS would have a trigger threshold that was reached by 100% of patients 17 
who were going to suffer a serious deterioration and by none of those that were not. 18 
This raises the problem of how to define ‘a deterioration’. Much of the research and 19 
audit work surrounding EWSs and Track and Trigger uses data that relates only to 20 
patients who have suffered a major deterioration and been sent to the ICU, and omits 21 
data regarding the outcome of those left on the ward. These issues relate to the 22 
sensitivity and specificity of the trigger. Clinically a false negative is much more 23 
significant than a false positive. The former results in an unanticipated deterioration – a 24 
potential catastrophe – whilst the latter results only in an extra assessment of a patient 25 
who remains well. The track and trigger needs to have high sensitivity and its specificity 26 
is less critical. 27 
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2.3.6.2 Validity 1 
The score must have face validity. It must measure what it is supposed to measure. The 2 
EWS is intended to draw attention to incipient deterioration that is influencing vital 3 
signs observation in a patient who still appears well. Are patients with deranged scores 4 
more likely to deteriorate than those with normal scores? From the perspective of users 5 
an EWS has low face validity. Only about one in ten of alerts genuinely presage clinical 6 
deterioration (Bell, Konrad et al. 2006, Campello, Granja et al. 2009, Bucknall, Jones et 7 
al. 2013, Kim, Koh et al. 2014). Doctors and nurses faced with a large number of 8 
apparently fruitless calls may begin to doubt its efficacy (Niegsch, Fabritius et al. 2013, 9 
Curry and Jungquist 2014). 10 
2.3.7 Statistical Analysis of Track and Trigger Systems 11 
2.3.7.1 Regression Analysis 12 
The EWS is a composite of individual scores for six or more vital signs parameters. 13 
How well does each parameter correlate with the overall EWW score and how much 14 
does each parameter contribute to the scotomes  15 
Burch (2008) used multivariate regression analysis to define the contribution of factors 16 
to the likelihood of hospital admission and mortality in a hospital emergency 17 
department. Five independent predictors of hospital admission were found: systolic 18 
blood pressure < or =100 mm Hg, pulse rate > or =130 beats per minute, respiratory rate 19 
> or =30 breaths per minute, temperature > or =38.5 degrees C and an impaired level of 20 
consciousness. Independent predictors of in-hospital death were: abnormal systolic 21 
blood pressure (< or =100 or > or =200 mm Hg), respiratory rate > or =30 breaths per 22 
minute and an impaired level of consciousness. This paper does not however provide 23 
evidence about the use of the EWS to predict unexpected deterioration in ward patients 24 
(Burch, Tarr et al. 2008). 25 
2.3.7.2 Area Under the Receiver Operator Curve (AUROC) and the C Statistic 26 
The performance of the Track and Trigger depends upon the extent to which the score 27 
and calling criteria jointly predict patient deterioration. This function depends on the 28 
number of true and false positives as well as the true and false negatives. 29 
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Figure 6. Sensitivity and Specificity 1 
 Patient Deteriorated Patient Didn’t Deteriorate 
Trigger Value 
Exceeded 
True Positive 
(Sensitivity) 
False Positive 
(Specificity) 
Trigger Value Not 
Reached 
False Negative True Negative 
Sensitivity:  The sensitivity of the test is the proportion of patients who will suffer a 2 
deterioration who exceed the trigger value of the EWS score. It is a measure of the true 3 
positive rate. 4 
Specificity: The specificity of the test is the proportion of patients who exceed the 5 
trigger value but do not suffer a subsequent deterioration. It is a measure of the false 6 
positive rate. Figure 6 shows the relationship between sensitivity and specificity for an 7 
EWS. 8 
The Area Under the Receiver Operator Curve (AUROC) is a statistical manoeuvre that 9 
is used for demonstrating the sensitivity of a test (Cook 2007). If the system is perfect, 10 
plotting sensitivity of the test against specificity will produce a straight line at 45 11 
degrees through the axis. False positives will result in a plot that is deviated upwards. 12 
The AUROC is the area under the plotted curve divided by the area under the ideal 13 
curve and is called the C-statistic. A relationship with no false positives will show a 14 
value of 1. The closer the AUROC is to 1 the better the test is at predicting true 15 
positives. The use of the C-statistic to evaluate the validity of an EWS has been 16 
criticised on the grounds that it is unreliable in situations where the prevalence of the 17 
observation being studied is very low. In this situation random variations in the 18 
observed rate of occurrence are amplified and can produce erratic values for the C- 19 
statistic. Romero-Brufau, Huddleston et al. reported the prevalence of unexpected 20 
deterioration as very low at about .02 per patient day (Romero-Brufau, Huddleston et al. 21 
2015) and authors suggest that statistics such as the positive predictive value and the 22 
number needed to evaluate are more appropriate to the interpretation of an EWS than 23 
the C-statistic. Most publications that discuss the validity of EWSs have used the C- 24 
statistic to compare systems. 25 
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2.3.8 Validation of Calling Criteria 1 
Morgan’s seminal report of an EWS (Morgan, Williams et al. 1997) set the trigger score 2 
by examining a historic cohort of patients who had been admitted to ICU, and finding 3 
the level of score that captured most of these. This was used to set the sensitivity. No 4 
details of the maths are provided. The EWS and trigger score were subsequently applied 5 
to a small group of 100 surgical admissions to ensure that it did not generate an 6 
overwhelming load of false positives.  7 
Subbe, Kruger et al (2001) developed a Modified Early Warning Score and investigated 8 
whether it would discriminate medical patients at risk of catastrophic deterioration in 9 
medical admission and Emergency Departments (Subbe, Kruger et al. 2001). Data was 10 
collected on 709 emergency admissions in the Medical Admission Unit. They 11 
concluded that MEWS scores of 5 or more identified patients at risk of deterioration - 12 
who require increased levels of care in the HDU or ICU. Subbe, Slater et al (2006) then 13 
went on to audit patients admitted to ICU and HDU from the Emergency Department 14 
and concluded that using an EWS added little to current triage systems (Subbe, Slater et 15 
al. 2006) 16 
Smith and his team from Portsmouth, UK, have developed a large database of vital 17 
signs that they have used to examine the characteristics of EWSs (Smith, Prytherch et 18 
al. 2008, Smith, Prytherch et al. 2008, Smith, Prytherch et al. 2013). They undertook a 19 
systematic review, and used their database to investigate the performance of single 20 
parameter and Aggregate Weighted Scoring Systems (Smith, Prytherch et al. 2008, 21 
Smith, Prytherch et al. 2008). The systematic review found 72 reports of Aggregate 22 
Weighted Scoring Systems. A second separate review found 39 reports of single 23 
parameter systems. The various models were used to discriminate between groups in the 24 
real dataset of vital signs. The performance of many of the systems was ‘poor’, though 25 
36% discriminated ‘reasonably well’. The authors comment that further work is needed 26 
to improve the performance of both AWSS and SPSS. Their most recent evaluation 27 
submitted the National Early Warning Score (NEWS) to the same analysis and found it 28 
to be a little more effective at distinguishing patients at risk than its predecessors 29 
(Smith, Prytherch et al. 2013). 30 
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Santiago et al. reviewed the performance of the more common EWSs to investigate 1 
whether automated warning systems linked to the patient record system would be 2 
useful. They used a database derived from 34,898 consecutive patients. The EWS was 3 
applied to the data to see how accurately it predicted unexpected events: emergency 4 
resuscitation calls, RRS calls and unanticipated admission to the ICU. The positive 5 
predictive value of the EWS ranged from 0.01 to 0.21 and sensitivity ranged from 0.07 6 
to 0.75. MEWS would have generated up to 50,446 false positive calls. The authors 7 
calculated that these would correspond to between 1040 and 205,020 false calls a year 8 
and that a better-performing EWS is needed before machine generated emergency calls 9 
could be used! More generally, however, whilst the best predicting EWS would have 10 
two true positives per ten patients reaching trigger value, it would not detect 92% of 11 
patients who would suffer deterioration.  12 
2.3.9 Response Teams – the ‘efferent’ limb 13 
The heterogeneity of RSSs is added to by the variety of ways of responding to a trigger 14 
event. The first EWSs were used as a screening tool to alert the patient’s carers to the 15 
fact that they might be on the point of deterioration. These teams often do not have the 16 
more advanced resuscitation and critical care skills that are required and this has led to 17 
the development of specialised response teams. These developments have tended to 18 
differ between countries.  19 
2.3.9.1  Outreach Teams 20 
In the UK there has been an emphasis on the ‘Critical Care Outreach Team’. Outreach 21 
teams generally use specially trained Intensive Care Nurses for first contact. They work 22 
with the ICU Medical Team – to whom they go for advice, and to organise the 23 
admission of patients to ICU or ITU. Outreach teams are much more Nurse led and 24 
nursing orientated than the other emergency teams.  25 
In 1999, the Audit Commission report Critical to Success gave a “highest-priority 26 
recommendation” that acute hospitals “develop an ‘outreach’ service ... to support ward 27 
staff in managing patients at-risk” (The Audit Commission 1999). 28 
In 2000 the DoH published a review of Critical Care Services by an expert working 29 
party. One of the recommendations was: 30 
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“Integration – A hospital wide approach to critical care with services that 1 
extend beyond the physical boundaries of intensive care and high dependency 2 
units that house designated beds to provide support to and to interact and 3 
communicate with the range of acute services including specialist services.” 4 
(Department of Health 2000) 5 
This led to the development of a number of systems for widening the clinical influence 6 
of intensive care – amongst which was the development of Nurse Led Critical Care 7 
Outreach Teams. Specialist nurses are usually the first responders in outreach teams. 8 
Many centres have reported the beneficial use of Outreach Services (Fox and Rivers 9 
2001, McArthur-Rouse 2001, Ball 2002, Goldhill and McGinley 2002). However, a 10 
review and meta-synthesis of reports undertaken by Endacott, Eliott and Chaboyer 11 
(2009) was unable to identify whether ICU outreach services had, per-se, a beneficial 12 
effect on outcomes, because of the wide variation in the organisation and activities of 13 
the services reported (Endacott, Eliott et al. 2009). Amongst the questions they asked 14 
was “What structures and activities underpin the role of the ICU liaison nurse?” They 15 
found that few reports attempted to detail the activities, and their list of activities 16 
supporting critically ill patients on the ward does not mention the role of responding to 17 
the EWS trigger or forming part of the MET team. It is therefore, not possible to say 18 
how widespread the use of an outreach team as EWS responder is. 19 
2.3.9.2 Medical Emergency Teams 20 
As long ago as 1967 it was suggested that, such was the urgency of the situation for a 21 
patient with shock, defined as severe hypotension, the doctors should come to them in 22 
the ward, rather than bringing the patient to a specialised care area. (Frank 1967). This 23 
historic article describes many of the principles of critical care that remain important 24 
today. The concept of a Medical Emergency Team was developed at the Liverpool 25 
Hospital in Australia in order to rapidly identify and manage seriously ill patients at 26 
risk. Hillman et al, in 1996, reviewed the charts of 1,027 patients in an Australian 27 
teaching hospital and identified 9 patients (0.8%) whose observations met their criteria 28 
for intervention (Hillman KM 1996). This, they concluded, was a workload that could 29 
be addressed by a specialist team. Also, there were sufficient patients in that category to 30 
make a specialist team worthwhile. Publication of these data was delayed and therefore 31 
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appeared after the publication, by Hillman’s group, of the first implementation of the 1 
Medical Emergency Team (Lee, Bishop et al. 1995).  2 
Goldhill et al (1999) published a description of a “Patient at Risk Team’ (PART) that 3 
operates in a similar way to the MET (Goldhill, Worthington et al. 1999). The PART 4 
comprised the ICU consultant or deputy, a senior ICU nurse and the duty medical or 5 
surgical registrar as appropriate.  6 
In subsequent correspondence the Australian team explained that a major development 7 
of the MET had been an extension of the calling criteria to allow a ‘Worried’ category. 8 
This had had a worthwhile effect on the effectiveness of the service (Fletcher and 9 
Flabouris 2000). The Medical Emergency Team is generally medically led and a typical 10 
constitution is: Intensive Care Registrar, Medical Registrar, Intensive Care nurse trained 11 
in ALS and a second Intensive Care nurse (Lee, Bishop et al. 1995). This group will 12 
assemble and attend immediately if called to a problem on a general ward. The team has 13 
the expertise to immediately manage critical illness.  14 
2.3.9.3 The Rapid Response Team 15 
As part of its 5 Million Lives Campaign the US Institute for Healthcare Improvement 16 
encouraged American hospitals to implement Rapid Response Teams. Many hospitals 17 
have done so and they have become an established standard of care (Dacey, Mirza et al. 18 
2007, Halvorsen, Garolis et al. 2007). A Rapid Response Team is a specialised group of 19 
healthcare clinicians who can be assembled quickly to deliver critical care expertise. 20 
They differ little in organization or purpose from Emergency Medical Teams. Rapid 21 
Response Teams may consist of any of the following: a physician (senior resident or 22 
intensivist or hospitalist), a physician’s assistant, a critical care RN, a clinical nurse 23 
specialist or respiratory therapist (Dacey, Mirza et al. 2007, Halvorsen, Garolis et al. 24 
2007). Some of these roles are not found outside the USA. The team, however 25 
constituted, must be available immediately when called and possesses very advanced 26 
Critical Care Skills relative to most outreach or Medical Emergency Teams. 27 
2.4 Patient Outcomes 28 
In the previous section I have reviewed the literature surrounding the development and 29 
validation of RRSs. In this section the literature relating to the efficacy of EWS/RSS in 30 
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terms of patient outcome is explored. These issues of effectiveness form the context of 1 
this research project. 2 
2.4.1 The Incidence of Unexpected Patient Deterioration 3 
The incidence (on general hospital wards) of physiological instability that reaches the 4 
criteria for calling for assistance is around 4%. Bell, Konrad et al audited physiological 5 
data in a large Scandinavian hospital and found that 4.5% of patients fulfilled the 6 
criteria for calling the Medical Emergency Team (Bell, Konrad et al. 2006). Shearer 7 
found a similar figure of 4.04% of ward patients (Shearer, Marshall et al. 2012). 8 
Flabouris, Nandal et al found a prevalence of 4.1% (Flabouris, Nandal et al. 2015). 9 
Many such patients are known to be unstable. Unexpected deterioration is much less 10 
common, probably between 0.1% and 0.4% as estimated from cardiac arrest data 11 
(Nolan, Soar et al. 2014) and data relating to the unexpected admission of patients to 12 
Intensive Care Units (Bapoje, Gaudiani et al. 2011). Accurate estimation of incidences 13 
is complicated by the fact that most authors quote the number of incidents but do not 14 
provide a denominator. 15 
2.4.2 Does Physiological Instability Precede Collapse in a Significant Number of 16 
Patients? 17 
After Morgan’s initial publication of an early warning score in 1997 (Morgan, Williams 18 
et al. 1997) a number of audits and research projects confirmed that many patients had 19 
had altered physiology for some time before their collapse. This topic has only been 20 
studied by retrospective review of patients who deteriorated unexpectedly. Unexpected 21 
deterioration is a subjective issue and the patients are usually selected as those who 22 
suffer sudden unanticipated cardiac arrest and those who are unexpectedly admitted to 23 
ICU. There are no cohort studies that prospectively compare the vital signs of a group 24 
of patients who can be defined as suffering unexpected deterioration with those who 25 
progress well. The studies of the antecedents of collapsed patients demonstrate that their 26 
physiology is disturbed, often for hours before their collapse. 27 
Buist, Jarmolowski et al (1999) reviewed the vital signs data of 120 patients who 28 
suffered unexpected cardiac arrest outside of the ICU. Sixty percent of the cardiac 29 
arrests were preceded by a number of abnormalities of vital signs (median 2, range 1-9) 30 
that indicated physiological instability. The median duration of instability before a 31 
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cardiac arrest was 6.5 hours (range 0 – 32 hours), and in that time a number of medical 1 
reviews took place (Median 2, range, 0-13). They concluded that cardiac arrest might 2 
have been predicted in a high percentage of patients and that early transfer to ICU might 3 
have improved outcome (Buist, Jarmolowski et al. 1999).  4 
Smith and Wood (1998) reviewed the physiological data of 47 patients who suffered 5 
cardiac arrest and found that 51% had preceding signs of instability, and that the 6 
mortality of this group was higher than those without preceding signs. (Smith and Wood 7 
1998) 8 
McGloin, Adam et al (1999) reviewed unexpected deaths on the ward and out of 377 9 
they identified 20 in whom resuscitation was attempted. An expert panel considered that 10 
13 showed worrying physiological instability prior to arrest that had not been acted 11 
upon (McGloin, Adam et al. 1999). 12 
McQuillan, Pillkington et al (1998) investigated the nature, causes and consequences of 13 
suboptimal care before admission to intensive care units by means of a prospective 14 
confidential inquiry into 100 consecutive ICU admissions. A panel of experts reviewed 15 
the care prior to ICU admission. Assessors agreed that 20 patients were well managed 16 
(group 1) and 54 patients received suboptimal care (group 2). The assessors disagreed 17 
on quality of management of 26 patients (group 3). In groups 1, 2, and 3 intensive care 18 
mortalities were 25%, 48% and 23% respectively. Hospital mortalities were 35%, 56%, 19 
and 31%. Admission to intensive care was considered late in 69% patients in group 2. A 20 
minimum of 4.5% and a maximum of 41% of ICU admissions were considered 21 
potentially avoidable. Mistakes in care were a cause of morbidity or mortality in most 22 
cases (McQuillan, Pilkington et al. 1998). They identified five reasons for suboptimal 23 
care: 24 
• Failure of organisational factors 25 
• Failure of cognitive factors 26 
• Failure to appreciate clinical urgency  27 
• Poor supervision 28 
• Failure to seek advice  29 
Reports that review patients who have suffered collapse often rely largely on the 30 
judgement of an expert panel. There do not appear to be any control experiments where 31 
using a control group of patients who had good outcome, and blinding the expert group 32 
to the outcome. Knowing in advance that all the patients came to harm may influence 33 
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the panel’s judgement of whether care was appropriate. If care were appropriate, as 1 
judged by the information available at the time, then the activities of the RRT would not 2 
be likely to improve matters. 3 
Hillman, Bristow et al (2001) evaluated the care of patients dying in three Australian 4 
hospitals during a 6-month period. Excluding those identified as “not for resuscitation” 5 
there were 229 deaths. Of these 22% were preceded by cardiac arrest and 160 were 6 
admitted to intensive care. 50% of the patients designated as for resuscitation 7 
demonstrated severe physiological abnormalities prior to cardiac arrest or ICU 8 
admission, and 30% had comments recorded by nurses or junior doctors expressing 9 
concern about their status.  The authors considered that hypotension and tachypnoea 10 
were common antecedents to death and that earlier intervention in the face of these 11 
findings might improve outcome (Hillman, Bristow et al. 2001). Again there is nothing 12 
to suggest that the ward staff were phlegmatic about the patients’ status and access to 13 
ICU ‘gatekeeper’ staff might have been an issue. 14 
Hodgetts, Kenward et al (2002), in the USA examined the prevalence of risk factors for 15 
cardiac arrest on general hospital wards by comparing 181 patients who arrested with 16 
132 matched patients who did not. They found that the factors most consistently 17 
associated with cardiac arrest were cardiac dysrythmias, hypotension and respiratory 18 
abnormalities and considered that identification of these factors would permit beneficial 19 
earlier intervention in some cases (Hodgetts, Kenward et al. 2002). 20 
These reports of the incidence of physiological instability prior to unexpected death or 21 
cardiac arrest are inadequate to definitively answer the question: “What proportion of 22 
ward patients who collapse unexpectedly have demonstrated physiological 23 
abnormalities for some time prior to their collapse?” The data discussed above suggest 24 
that up to 60% of patients who deteriorate suddenly do so without premonitory signs. 25 
On the other hand reports of expert audit have consistently found that patients whose 26 
death is considered to be potentially preventable have often been neglected and “under- 27 
managed” in the face of significant abnormalities (Wilson, Runciman et al. 1995, 28 
NCEPOD 1996, Vincent, Neale et al. 2001, NCEPOD 2002, McGlynn, Asch et al. 29 
2003, Baker, Norton et al. 2004, NCEPOD 2012, NCEPOD 2015). The case reports in 30 
such audits are often very shocking and have highlighted major failings of staffing, 31 
inadequate knowledge and deficient clinical skills. For medical and nursing staff they 32 
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may have been a driver towards the development of RRSs even in the face of evidence 1 
that it was not possible to identify as many as half the patients who were on the 2 
threshold of collapse.  3 
2.4.3 Does the use of an RRS improve patient outcome? 4 
There have been two approaches to this question: 5 
• Publications reporting before and after audit data, around the introduction of a 6 
RRS 7 
• Systematic reviews and meta-analyses of published reports  8 
2.4.3.1 Reports of the introduction of EWSs and RRSs 9 
In the early 2000s a number of studies were published that showed significant 10 
reductions in cardiac arrest rates following the introduction of RRSs (Buist, Moore et al. 11 
2002, Bellomo, Goldsmith et al. 2003, DeVita MA 2004, Tibballs, Kinney et al. 2005); 12 
and that it was feasible to identify patients at risk by means of a scoring system (Subbe, 13 
Kruger et al. 2001).  14 
Whilst some reports emerged suggesting that overall outcomes (mortality, length of 15 
hospital stay, time in ICU) could indeed be modified by earlier intervention (Bristow, 16 
Hillman et al. 2000, Parr, Hadfield et al. 2001, Buist, Moore et al. 2002, Bellomo, 17 
Goldsmith et al. 2003, Bellomo, Goldsmith et al. 2004, DeVita MA 2004, Priestley, 18 
Watson et al. 2004); other reports were inconclusive or negative (Booth 2003, Subbe, 19 
Davies et al. 2003, Hillman, Chen et al. 2005).  20 
Papers that record the influence of interventions on hospital-wide cardiac-arrest rates 21 
are defining a cardiac arrest as an attempted resuscitation, and this statistic depends 22 
largely on the number of patients pre-defined as unsuitable for resuscitation. Changes in 23 
this figure will reflect many factors other than improved care. Durations of stay in 24 
hospital and critical-care unit are similarly affected by subjective decision-making. 25 
Priestley, Watson et al have reported the phased introduction of a UK outreach service, 26 
led by a Consultant Nurse, randomised across 16 wards in a single hospital. Outreach 27 
was alerted by the use of a patient-at-risk score. (Priestley, Watson et al. 2004). The 28 
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authors found decreased mortality during phases of outreach intervention, which may 1 
have been associated with increased length of stay. In a review of this research 2 
McGaughey, Alerdice et al considered that the enquiry was significantly underpowered 3 
and that the presence of the outreach team may have contaminated the data by being 4 
more widely available in the hospital than the trial demanded (McGaughey, Alderdice et 5 
al. 2007). 6 
In 2005 Hillman, Chen et al reported the introduction of Medical Emergency Teams as 7 
a cluster randomised trial in 23 Australian hospitals. To be included hospitals had to 8 
have at least 20,000 annual admissions and have no pre-existing MET (Hillman, Chen 9 
et al. 2005). The MET system was introduced in 12 hospitals with 11 acting as controls. 10 
This has been the biggest, and one of the best-designed trials of an RRS. During the 11 
study period the rate at which specialised teams were called was much higher in the 12 
units with a MET (3.1 per 1000 admissions vs. 8.7 per 1000 admissions). Overall a 13 
reduction in unexpected deaths of 30% occurred between the baseline and study 14 
periods. It was not, however, possible to demonstrate a statistically improved outcome 15 
in the MET hospitals relative to controls. The relationship between events that should 16 
have triggered a MET call and the calls made was unreliable, being only 30% in the 17 
MET hospitals. In addition, it was found that the physiological data required for a 18 
timely call of the MET was missing in 62% of cases. The authors struggled to 19 
adequately explain the substantial (30%) reduction in mortality that occurred overall. 20 
One factor was the incomplete implementation of the MET system. It stretches a unit’s 21 
resources to provide such a team continuously. A commentary from The Canadian 22 
Patient Safety Institute concluded that the study was underpowered. The numbers were 23 
set to show a 30% difference with 90% certainty on the basis of a MET event rate of 30 24 
per 1000 admissions. The far lower rate observed would have required 100 participating 25 
hospitals to reach the 90% rate (CPSI 2006). A commentary by Chrysochoou and Gunn 26 
(2006) suggested that failure to alert the MET was a significant issue. They also 27 
remarked upon the fact that the use of a MET appeared to be much more complex than 28 
anticipated. (Chrysochoou and Gunn 2006).  29 
This unexpected conflicting evidence prompted further trials, meta-analysis of existing 30 
evidence and expert review to derive a consensus on action. Consensus-conferences 31 
were held in 2006 and 2010 to clarify the status of RRSs according to the evidence 32 
available at that time (Devita, Bellomo et al. 2006, DeVita, Smith et al. 2010). Some 33 
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studies demonstrated that an RRS may improve outcome, but it was unclear what the 1 
benefit could be expected to be. At this time the only randomised trials available were 2 
those of Priestley in the UK and Hillman in Australia that reported very different 3 
approaches (Priestley, Watson et al. 2004, Hillman, Chen et al. 2005). The meeting 4 
considered whether all hospitals should implement an RRS. The consensus statement 5 
recommended that hospitals should implement an RRS, which has an afferent, “crisis 6 
detection” and “response triggering” mechanism and an efferent, rapid response team 7 
which should be always available. They also recommended that the RRS should have a 8 
governance/administrative structure to supply and organise resources and an audit and 9 
evaluation system. Crucially this prestigious group did not consider the issue of the 10 
demography of sudden patient deterioration and what improvements to outcome could 11 
be expected (Devita, Bellomo et al. 2006).  12 
Bell, Konrad et al (2006) have published a study that strikingly demonstrates the 13 
difficulty of understanding the predictive valididity of an EWS (Bell, Konrad et al. 14 
2006). They sought to make a preliminary estimation of the workload for a medical 15 
emergency team (MET) by recording physiological data on all adult patients (n=1122), 16 
to investigate whether the patients with altered physiology had an elevated mortality. 17 
They then studied the sensitivity and specificity of their test by lowering the calling 18 
criteria. 4.5% of the scored patients fulfilled the study criteria i.e. exceeded trigger 19 
criteria. These patients had a 30-day mortality of 25% (confidence interval 12.7 – 41.2) 20 
as compared to 3.5% (2.4 – 5) for the patients not fulfilling the study criteria. The use of 21 
extended simplified (lower score) calling criteria revealed 8 more deaths that breached 22 
the calling criteria than did the original study. However, 123 patients – equalling 13.8% 23 
of the cohort fulfilled these criteria, as compared to the 40 patients fulfilling the original 24 
study criteria. Even these modified, and simplified, MET criteria proved to be able to 25 
single out patients with elevated mortality as compared to the rest of the hospital 26 
population, but extending the criteria significantly lowered sensitivity and would 27 
increase the MET workload enormously. Restricting the criteria led to missing 28 
mortalities where intervention could be beneficial. The results suggest that using simple 29 
physiological tests can be of help in the identification of patients at risk – but that 30 
setting a score level for the trigger is difficult. 31 
Mitchell, McKay et al reported the introduction of a track and trigger system along with 32 
a new purpose-designed ward chart and an education system (Mitchell, McKay et al. 33 
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2010). Crucially, wards were not permitted to participate in the scheme unless 50% of 1 
their nurses had attended the educational programme. They were able to show 2 
significant improvements in vital signs recording and an increase in the number of 3 
‘medical reviews’ but these were not reflected in improvements to outcome measures. 4 
Karvellas, de Souza et al (2012) reported the results of introducing an intensivist led 5 
MET between 2002 and 2008. Their study is complicated by the MET only being 6 
available some of the time, and by the fact that it did not always have an intensivist as a 7 
team member. They concluded that in their single centre trial, the initiation of a MET 8 
had not resulted in improved outcome, measured as in-hospital mortality and length of 9 
stay (Karvellas, de Souza et al. 2012). This report demonstrates the difficulty of 10 
drawing statistically significant conclusions from data obtained from the hurly-burly of 11 
busy services. 12 
Konrad, Jaderling et al reported the incidence of cardiac arrest before and after the 13 
implementation of a MET (Konrad, Jaderling et al. 2010). They compared data from 2 14 
years following introduction of MET with that from the preceding 2 years. Cardiac 15 
arrests per 1,000 admissions decreased from 1.12 to 0.83. MET implementation was 16 
also associated with a reduction in total hospital mortality by 10%.  Hospital mortality 17 
was also reduced for medical patients by 12%, and for surgical patients not operated 18 
upon by 28%. For patients who reached the EWS trigger value thirty-day mortality pre- 19 
MET was 25% falling to 7.9% following MET introduction. The authors concluded that 20 
implementing the MET team was associated with significant improvement in both 21 
cardiac arrest rate and overall adjusted hospital mortality. Thus, introduction of the 22 
MET seemed to improve outcome for all groups of hospitalized patients. The authors 23 
comment that they were unable to account for the possibility that the existence if the 24 
MET might have increased the number of patients designated as unfit for resuscitation 25 
and might have increased elective ICU admissions. 26 
Lighthall, Parast et al (2010) reported similar results in a study from the USA. They 27 
compared the incidence of cardiac arrest 9 months before and 27 months after 28 
introduction of a rapid response system. They also recorded mortality 3.5 years before 29 
the intervention and 27 months after the intervention. Cardiac arrests were reduced by 30 
57%, amounting to a reduction of 5.6 cardiac arrests per 1000 hospital discharges (p < 31 
0.01). Mortality was reduced during the intervention, but this was attributable to a 32 
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natural decrease occurring over all phases of the study. (Lighthall, Parast et al. 2010). 1 
These authors do not discuss other possible reasons for reduction of cardiac arrests. 2 
Santamaria and Tobin (2010) found that following the introduction of the medical 3 
emergency team cardiac arrest rates decreased progressively from 0.78 per 1000 to 0.25 4 
per 1000 and hospital mortality from 0.58 per 1000  to 0.30 per 1000. Only after 2 years 5 
did cardiac arrest rates achieve statistical significance, and it took 4 yrs for hospital 6 
mortality rates to change significantly. They concluded that the introduction of a 7 
medical emergency team was associated with a progressive decline of unexpected 8 
cardiac arrests within 2 yrs, and of unexpected mortality within 4 yrs. They suggested 9 
that changes to organizational practice take time and benefits may not be immediately 10 
obvious (Santamaria, Tobin et al. 2010). 11 
Schoonhaven et al (2012) considered that medical revue, prompted by an EWS alert, led 12 
to patients being electively moved to the ICU with the consequence that their 13 
subsequent collapse is not included in the data appertaining to unexpected, on the ward 14 
deterioration. Also, very sick patients were being assessed as unsuitable for 15 
resuscitation leading to increased negotiation of Do Not Attempt Resuscitation (DNAR) 16 
status with patients and their relatives. They found that other parameters, such as 17 
durations of stay, and mortality are more refractory to RRTs (Simmes, Schoonhoven et 18 
al. 2012). 19 
Howell, Ngo et al (2012) have reported the effect of introducing an EWS that alerted the 20 
patients ‘home team’ (Howell, Ngo et al. 2012). They reported a fifty-nine month 21 
period during which 1755 consecutive hospital admissions took place. They compared a 22 
baseline period of 6 months with an introduction period of 6 months and an intervention 23 
period of 31 months. During the intervention period the patient rate of unexpected death 24 
was found to have reduced relative to the baseline period (0.2% vs. 0.9%). The hospital 25 
mortality rate however was not affected. Though the p value for the observation is < 26 
.0001 the incidence of unexpected death is so low that the statistics are questionable. 27 
2.4.3.2 Reviews and Meta-analyses 28 
Gao, McDonnell, Subbe published two reviews of the use of physiological track-and- 29 
trigger systems in the UK. They found 31 systems, which differed widely. They 30 
reported that there was  31 
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“…little evidence of reliability, validity and utility. Sensitivity was poor, which 1 
might be due in part to the nature of the physiology monitored or to the choice of 2 
trigger threshold. Available data were insufficient to identify the best TT.” (Gao, 3 
McDonnell et al. 2007)p 667) 4 
Their second publication investigated the reliability of the various track-and-trigger 5 
systems and reported that of scores was poor, but the reliability of calling criteria was 6 
better (Subbe, Gao et al. 2007). 7 
Winters, Pham et al (2007) reviewed published trials of rapid response systems that 8 
provided data on hospital mortality and cardiac arrest in control and intervention 9 
groups. From 10,228 abstracts meeting their search criteria they identified only eight 10 
relevant studies. They commented: 11 
“We found weak evidence that rapid response systems are associated with a 12 
reduction in hospital mortality and cardiac arrest rates, but limitations in the 13 
quality of the original studies, the wide confidence intervals, and the presence of 14 
heterogeneity limited our ability to conclude that rapid response systems are 15 
effective interventions.” (Winters, Pham et al. 2007) p1238 16 
Chan, Jain et al (2010) reviewed reports of RRT performance between 1950 and 2008. 17 
They identified 18 relevant studies. They found that there was an average reduction in 18 
ward cardiac arrest of 38% but that this was not in proportion to the reduction of other 19 
adverse outcomes. This led them to suspect that the effect was due to the RRS revue 20 
leading to more patients being designated as unsuitable for resuscitation attempts rather 21 
than improved outcomes. They commented: 22 
 “Although RRTs have broad appeal, robust evidence to support their effectiveness 23 
in reducing hospital mortality is lacking. (Chan, Jain et al. 2010)p1238) 24 
Jansen, Cuthbertson et al (2010) reached similar conclusions in an evaluation published 25 
as a discussion article and descriptive review (Jansen and Cuthbertson 2010). 26 
Alam, Hobbelink et al (2014) have reviewed the use of EWSs in situations without a 27 
dedicated RRT in place (Alam, Hobbelink et al. 2014). They found only seven papers 28 
that met their inclusion criteria. All were before-and-after historical studies. The 29 
heterogeneity of the studies precluded meta-analysis. The studies mostly reported some 30 
positive, but inconsistent, impact on outcomes but the level of evidence was low – all 31 
being rated B on the Canadian Task Force Scale – Fair level of evidence for the 32 
recommendation (Woolf, Battista et al. 1990).  33 
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The most recent meta-analysis of studies reporting the effect of EWS on outcome is that 1 
of Maharaj, Raffaele et al. (Maharaj, Raffaele et al. 2015). They reviewed 29 adult and 2 
paediatric studies between 1990 and 2013 for the effect on hospital mortality and 3 
cardio-pulmonary arrest. They found reductions in in-hospital mortality at the 95% 4 
confidence level and similar reductions in cardiac arrest rates. Two of the controlled 5 
studies and six of the before and after, uncontrolled studies were published since the 6 
review by Chan, Jain et al, data for which ended in 2008 which may explain their 7 
different findings (Chan, Jain et al. 2010). 8 
The key messages from their review are that the presence of a RRS in a hospital can be 9 
expected to reduce the hospital mortality and cardiac arrest rates but that it remains 10 
unclear which aspects of the systems are responsible for these effects. 11 
The most recent assessment however lies with the publication of three parallel editorials 12 
in Intensive Care Medicine in April 2016. These were by researchers prominent in the 13 
field, with each expressing a different opinion: 14 
• Jones, Rubulatta et al claim that the benefits of a RRT are proven. Their 15 
argument is not that RRTs significantly improve the management of patients 16 
who are at risk of catastrophe; rather they claim that the activities of the RRT 17 
improve general management and end of life care. (Jones, Rubulotta et al. 2016)  18 
• Wendon and Hodgson et al find that the evidence is inconclusive (Wendon, 19 
Hodgson et al. 2016). They review the evidence of the Australian MERIT trial 20 
(Hillman, Chen et al. 2005) and conclude that it was statistically so 21 
underpowered that the likelihood of type 2 error was unacceptably high.  22 
• Ritesh Maharaj, the lead author on the latest review (the only review to date with 23 
positive findings in favour of RRT), reviews the findings of his own recent 24 
meta-analysis, discusses the issues and concludes that despite their attractive 25 
appearance of face validity the benefit of RRSs remains unproven (Maharaj and 26 
Stelfox 2016).  27 
2.4.4 Why is there little evidence that a RRS improves outcomes 28 
• Are the premonitory signs detected? 29 
• Are they detected but not acted upon 30 
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• Are they detected and acted upon, but the mistakes in management are made, owing 1 
to lack of capacity of the team to manage critical illness. 2 
With ten years of experience of track-and trigger it had become clear that the hoped for 3 
improvements in outcome were at best elusive. Much of the research in this area now 4 
turned to explaining this, and improving systems to improve outcome. 5 
Many reasons for outcomes not being consistently improved have been suggested, some 6 
of which are: 7 
• Omission of routine measurement of vital signs or technical problems with their 8 
measurement or the calculation of the EWS – leading to failures to detect 9 
deteriorating physiological signs. This was believed to be significant in the MERIT 10 
study (Hillman, Chen et al. 2005) 11 
• A significant number of patients deteriorating suddenly without a premonitory rise 12 
in the EWS. This may be up to 60% of patients admitted unexpectedly to ICU 13 
(Hillman, Parr et al. 2001). 14 
• The nurse/healthcare assistant or doctor may not respond as required by the protocol 15 
(Hillman, Chen et al. 2005, Marshall, Kitto et al. 2011, Shearer, Marshall et al. 16 
2012, Kitto, Marshall et al. 2015). 17 
2.4.4.1 Errors in Data Recording 18 
Van Leuvan and Mitchell (2008) performed a retrospective chart review of 1500 19 
patients and found that whilst other observations showed similar consistency of 20 
observation, respiratory observations were significantly less well recorded. Full MEWS 21 
datasets were completed between 68% and 81% of the time, depending on the type of 22 
ward (Van Leuvan and Mitchell 2008). Improved accuracy of vital signs recording was 23 
observed following the introduction of a new MEWS chart coupled with an educational 24 
programme (Hammond, Spooner et al. 2013). Still, however, 25% of vital signs sets 25 
were incomplete or missing.  26 
Handheld bedside computers have been used to collect vital signs data in the hopes that 27 
they would improve accuracy. The programme calculates the NEWS score 28 
automatically and the data is then available to junior doctors who carry similar devices. 29 
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This system hopes to prevent errors in calculating and recording the EWS and alerts the 1 
responsible medical team automatically.  2 
A study has compared the data leading to Emergency Medical Team calls in locations 3 
with electronic monitoring and those without. The availability of electronic data 4 
improved compliance but errors in monitoring in both situations led to delayed MET 5 
assessment that correlated with increased mortality (Tirkkonen, Yla-Mattila et al. 2013). 6 
A recent study involved a prospective observational study of 370 adult patients admitted 7 
to an acute medical ward. In 70 patients (18.9%) the NEWS score was calculated 8 
incorrectly. An appropriate response to the NEWS by the clinical team was observed in 9 
274 patients (74.1%). After adjusting for confounders, an increasing NEWS score was 10 
significantly associated with an inadequate clinical response. The study was also 11 
claimed to demonstrate that the team response to NEWS score triggers was significantly 12 
worse at weekends (Kolic, Crane et al. 2015).  13 
Another small, single hospital audit showed that 25% of 194 patients had incomplete 14 
NEWS data sets (Connelly and Bleasdale 2015).  15 
Many UK hospitals record their NEWS compliance statistics and this compliance may 16 
be published as quality data (NHSII&I). Generally compliance is claimed to be around 17 
the 90% mark but the numbers of cases audited is usually very small and there is no 18 
indication how complete the patient datasets are. 19 
Prytherch and Smith (2006) performed a study comparing the recording of the EWS 20 
dataset with pen and paper or with the VitalPAC™ hand held device. Errors occurred in 21 
29% of records calculated by hand compared to 10% using the VitalPAC™ (Prytherch, 22 
Smith et al. 2006). Hands, Reid et al. (2013) studied the performance of the electronic 23 
VitalPAC Early Warning System (VIEWS). They discovered that even using this 24 
electronic system significant amounts of data were missing, particularly at night. They 25 
speculated that the missing data indicated competing clinical priorities (Hands, Reid et 26 
al. 2013). 27 
In summary the literature reveals that about 25% of records of vital sign datasets are 28 
incomplete, missing or the EWS is incorrectly calculated. These errors may contribute 29 
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to the failure to detect patient deterioration. It was important for me to find out whether 1 
my subjects generally trusted the observations. If they felt they were often inaccurate 2 
this could result in them placing little reliance on the EWS. 3 
2.4.4.2 Failure to Follow the Protocol 4 
Failures of alerting when a ‘trigger’ score has been correctly recorded may occur for a 5 
variety of reasons: 6 
• The bedside nurse may fail to recognize that a ‘trigger’ has been reached. 7 
• The bedside nurse or the ward nursing team may decide not to alert the medical 8 
team. 9 
• The medical team may not respond to the alert in the way that the protocol requires. 10 
There has been little work done to differentiate possible reasons for teams not following 11 
the EWS/RRS protocols.  12 
White, Scott et al (2015) have published a comprehensive review of the current status of 13 
Rapid Response Teams and possible explanations for outcome not being consistently 14 
improved (White, Scott et al. 2015). Their analysis is particular to the Australian 15 
hospital system but their more general conclusions apply elsewhere and can be applied 16 
to other aspects of EWSs. Though they believe that the problem of unexpected 17 
deterioration was properly characterised they draw attention to glaring deficiencies in 18 
the way RRTs were introduced some of which are: 19 
• There was no preliminary testing of the systems to confirm the concept prior to 20 
large-scale implementation. 21 
• RRTs are not standardised and their variety makes comparison and large-scale 22 
studies of outcome difficult. 23 
• There are no agreed, standardised outcome measures to allow comparisons so 24 
outcome has not been rigorously studied. 25 
• Data has not been collected to adequately test theory. 26 
• There has been little search for associated adverse consequences 27 
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With regard to the question of human factors they assert that the introduction of Rapid 1 
Response Teams was not underpinned by a sound theory of behaviour change. They 2 
comment that though the number of RRT calls is increased by the use of mandatory 3 
criteria (Kansal and Havill 2012), and by the use of extra soft criteria such as nurse 4 
worry (Genardi, Cronin et al. 2008, Douw, van Zanten et al. 2016) no study has 5 
investigated the appropriateness of these extra calls. Their paper called for a 6 
reconsideration of the issues of EWSs and RRTs. They said that it was clear that many 7 
institutions had rushed to recommend adoption of a RRS on the basis of its apparent 8 
face validity and that more mature reflection on a decade and a half of research 9 
suggested that the problem of catching deteriorating patients before they collapse and 10 
reversing their decline is much more complex than it had appeared at first sight. 11 
Marshall et al. (Marshall, Kitto et al. 2011) suggest that the difficulty in establishing the 12 
effectiveness of the RRS is in part due to the failure of clinical staff to call for help 13 
when a trigger is reached. Compliance rates vary between professional groups. Boniatti 14 
et al. found that 21.4% of patients to who the RRS was called, should have had an 15 
earlier call on the basis of recorded observations.  Physicians had a greater incidence of 16 
delayed medical emergency team calls (47%) than nursing staff (29.6%). They found 17 
also that mortality at 30 days after medical emergency team review was higher (61.8%) 18 
among patients with delayed medical emergency team activation than patients receiving 19 
timely medical emergency team activation 41.9% (Boniatti, Azzolini et al. 2014). 20 
Despite patients meeting formal criteria, up to one-third of the RRS cases that should be 21 
activated are not actually called (Hillman et al., 2005), constituting a ‘missed call’. 22 
Donahue and Endacott (2010) interviewed nurses about the way they incorporated the 23 
track and trigger system into their practice in managing deteriorating patients. They 24 
found that nurses tend to rely on clinical skills to identify deteriorating patients but use 25 
the EWS to quantify their condition for discussion with the doctors. They attributed this 26 
to the nurses having less understanding of the value of the EWS. Their interpretation of 27 
the value of a ‘trigger’ occurrence was a probable cause of them not failing to report 28 
events (Donohue and Endacott 2010). 29 
Beitler, Link et al (2011) reported a fall in hospital-wide mortality rates after the 30 
introduction of a RRS (Beitler, Link et al. 2011). They used a cohort study-design with 31 
historical controls between 2003 and 2008. The RRT was alerted partly in response to 32 
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breaches of multi-parameter criteria (track-and-trigger), but 47% of alerts were 1 
triggered in response to ‘clinical concern’ about the patient. They reported statistically 2 
significant reduction in death rate (15.5 to 13.74 per 1,000 discharges), out-of-ICU 3 
mortality (7.08 to 4.61 per 1,000 discharges) and out-of-ICU cardiac arrest (3.28 to 1.62 4 
per 1,000 discharges). The authors concluded that introducing an RRT with clinical- 5 
judgement as one of the calling criteria had a beneficial effect on patient outcome. This 6 
study differs from most reported here, in that the track-and-trigger system alerted the 7 
RRS in only 43% of cases whilst 67% were due to “clinical concern”. It describes a 8 
change of manpower (the RRT consisting of a senior doctor and nurse) and a change of 9 
culture (the ready presence of the RRT expertise). The results are significant, but this is 10 
not an EWS as originally conceived – to identify patients at risk who are currently 11 
showing few signs. Rather it shows the value of additional, experienced manpower 12 
attending patients who are already in trouble. The multi-parameter alerting criteria 13 
include a heart rate of >140, respiratory rate of >30 and O2 Saturation of <90%. These 14 
criteria are quite extreme and will usually indicate a patient that has well-established 15 
deterioration rather than one on the brink. In the context of evaluating the impact of an 16 
EWS/RSS the significance of this study is doubtful. 17 
Shearer et al (2012) carried out a multi-hospital study in three parts (Shearer, Marshall 18 
et al. 2012). A point-prevalence study was undertaken on a single day by reviewing the 19 
charts of all patients (570) not in ICU or other specialised unit. Twenty-three (4.04%) 20 
patients fulfilled the criteria for an RRS call and 40% (10) of these were missed (1.75% 21 
of the cohort). A subsequent prospective study of 36,760 patients showed failure to alert 22 
the RRS in 31 (0.84%) cases who subsequently went on to cardiac arrest or unexpected 23 
ITU admission. The final part of the study was to interview the staff responsible for the 24 
patient at the time that the RRS should have occurred. The majority of staff had 25 
recognised that the RRS calling criteria had been met, and 75% of those interviewed 26 
were ‘concerned’ or ‘very concerned’ about the patient at the time. 48.2% of nurses and 27 
25.3% of doctors expressed confidence in being supported by colleagues. 13.3% of 28 
nurses and 26.5% of doctors were concerned about possible negative responses to their 29 
actions from colleagues. Interestingly 40% of doctors and 21% of nurses said that they 30 
did not call the RRS because they felt that they could deal with the situation on the 31 
ward. The authors said that a principal finding of their study was that the main reasons 32 
for staff not following the protocol are socio-cultural rather than technical failures of the 33 
scoring or failure to appreciate that a trigger situation existed: 34 
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“There are two important messages from this study. First, the main reason why staff 1 
did not follow the RRS activation protocol was not failure of cognition, but rather 2 
local socio-cultural factors and intra-professional hierarchies in the clinical areas. 3 
On this basis, we question the value of efforts to improve RRS effectiveness by 4 
making such patients more identifiable (e.g., colour-coded observation charts), the 5 
push for an increase in the frequency of RRS activation and even the suggestion that 6 
RRS protocols become mandatory. Instead, the results suggest that there should be 7 
more effort in understanding individual and bedside cultural issues that may be 8 
preventing staff from activating the RRS. For example, in this study, referral to or 9 
involvement of critical care teams, particularly when the critical care unit has no 10 
beds, may confuse the situation for the general bedside ward staff caring for the 11 
patient.”(Shearer, Marshall et al. 2012)p 574) 12 
The conclusion can be questioned on the grounds that staff were being retrospectively 13 
interviewed about a ‘mistake’ that they had made. Perhaps their responses indicate that 14 
a response of ‘I thought we could cope,’ is more acceptable to them than admitting other 15 
failings. The authors’ second finding was that RRS alerting was in the hands of 16 
relatively inexperienced staff, who did not have the confidence of their convictions. It is 17 
important to note that the RRS was not called to 40% of cases that met the calling 18 
criteria in the point prevalence study, whilst the figure is 10% for the main study. This 19 
suggests that many more trigger events would be found if the whole dataset had been 20 
screened. This study indicates that socio-cultural effects within the teams are a factor in 21 
the correct operation of the track-and-trigger and RRS. 22 
Kolic et al, (2015) in addition to reporting the high level of incorrectly calculated 23 
NEWS scores as described above, found that responses to trigger events were 24 
significantly lower at nights and weekends (Kolic, Crane et al. 2015). They also found 25 
that the response to higher NEWS scores, that call for a more senior involvement, were 26 
less likely to be dealt with as required by the protocol. Putting these two facts together it 27 
suggests that senior responders are less available out of hours and that this discourages 28 
bedside carers from making a call.  29 
Tirkkonen et al. (2013) used a prospective observational study to compare the factors 30 
that were associated with delayed MET activation and increased hospital mortality for 31 
patients in monitored beds compared to those with conventional systems for gathering 32 
vital-signs data. They found that 41% of the reviews concerned monitored ward 33 
patients. These patients’ vital signs had been more frequently documented during the six 34 
hour period preceding MET activation, compared to patients in normal ward areas (96% 35 
vs. 74%, p<0.001). Surprisingly however delayed MET activation was more frequent 36 
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for the patients in monitored beds. The authors conclude that the standard of recording 1 
vital signs is poor even though it improves with automated monitoring this advantage 2 
appears to be lost because the interventions of staff are not timely and do not follow the 3 
local MET protocol. They also found that delay in activating the MET was 4 
independently associated with increased mortality (Tirkkonen, Yla-Mattila et al. 2013). 5 
Guinane, Bucknall et al (2013) retrospectively investigated a cohort of patients to 6 
determine what happened to those having a set of vital signs observations fulfilling 7 
MET calling criteria at any time during their admission and to compare them with the 8 
outcome of patients who never reached the calling criteria (Guinane, Bucknall et al. 9 
2013). Of 568 patients, 82 (14%) exceeded the MET calling criteria at least once. The 10 
hospital length of stay for these patients was twice that of those who did not exceed the 11 
criteria (8.6 days versus 4.3 days). The MET team was called to only three patients. Of 12 
the 79 patients not reviewed by the MET, the bedside nurse escalated care for 36 13 
patients (46%) and independently initiated treatment in 23 (29%). Only 20 patients were 14 
referred for medical review (20%) and 3 were referred to the MET. MET alerts were 15 
very infrequent and the reason for this appeared to be the nurses’ decision-making. 16 
Though this research was conducted in a single centre its conclusions about nurse 17 
involvement in critical decision-making for the sickest group of patients is significant 18 
(Guinane, Bucknall et al. 2013).  19 
Roberts, Bonafide et al. (2014) conducted a qualitative enquiry, interviewing 27 nurses 20 
and 30 doctors to identify themes relating to barriers that interfere with the working of 21 
the RRS in a children’s hospital. The three principal themes to emerge were, firstly, 22 
self-efficacy in dealing with critical illness, secondly, the role of inter and intra 23 
professional hierarchies in causing delay and thirdly, the fear of personal consequences 24 
for the doctor or nurse stemming from activating the MET. The authors suggest that 25 
only by addressing such human factors can the potential of an RRS be achieved. 26 
(Roberts, Bonafide et al. 2014)  27 
In a prospective observational study Yiu and Khan (2014) sought to identify ‘patient 28 
and environmental’ factors that affect whether or not nursing staff will call for 29 
assistance, and to identify patient and environmental factors affecting escalation by 30 
nursing staff. The study was conducted during 20 night shifts. 109 patients returned 31 
NEWS scores >6 at least once and nursing staff escalated only 18 of these patients. It 32 
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was suggested that the high level of false positive alerts had led to a mindset where staff 1 
were very accepting of deviation from the NEWS protocol and that nurses who were 2 
experienced in assessing and managing patients with NEWS scores >6 would use their 3 
clinical judgment when deciding whether to call the medical team. (Yiu, Khan et al. 4 
2014) 5 
This recent literature represents a shift in the preoccupations of researchers interested in 6 
the performance of RRS, away from quantitative studies attempting to refine scoring 7 
and calling criteria towards the role of human factors in modifying the actions of staff 8 
who are following a protocol.  9 
Romero-Brufau, Huddleston et al (2014) have applied the calling criteria for an RRS 10 
call from commonly used EWSs (MEWS, SEWS, GMEWS, Worthing, ViEWS and 11 
NEWS) to a database of over 36,000 patients. They concluded following careful 12 
analysis that, if automated, they would result in between 1040 and 215,020 false 13 
positive calls per annum – depending on how the calling criteria were set. They 14 
conclude that the difficulty of sensitivity and specificity requires that staff must screen 15 
potential trigger events if an overwhelming workload is to be avoided. More work is 16 
needed before RRS activation can usefully be automated (Romero-Brufau, Huddleston 17 
et al. 2014).  18 
At the time this research was begun in 2012 there was no reference to the issue of 19 
human factors in the operation of EWSs and RRS. Since that time research has begun to 20 
emerge reporting the sociology and complex teamwork of these systems. This has led to 21 
a number of observations and suggestions. 22 
In Santamaria, Tobin et al (2010) audit of the incidence of cardiac arrest two and four 23 
years after the introduction of a MET (Santamaria, Tobin et al. 2010) the decline of 24 
unexpected cardiac arrests was progressive over 2 yrs, and of unexpected mortality over 25 
4 yrs. The authors suggest that changing organisational practice take time and benefits 26 
may be delayed. They considered that problems of teamwork and communication might 27 
be present at the introduction of a system and that these would improve with time. 28 
In Shearer and Marshall’s report (2012) that is discussed above (Shearer, Marshall et al. 29 
2012), a significant conclusion drawn by the authors came from interviewing staff who 30 
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were involved in care where a breach of the RRS protocol occurred. They found that 1 
despite organisational commitment to RRS the clinical teams were acting in accordance 2 
with local ‘cultural’ roles 3 
They make the observation that: 4 
“….implementing systems of care that significantly alter the traditional hierarchical 5 
referral model of care, regardless of their potential benefits, takes years to 6 
appropriately implement. ….we believe this may reflect the lack of ‘face validity’ 7 
that bedside staff may have for the RRS because of the perceived poor sensitivity and 8 
specificity of the activation criteria. The decision of whether to activate the RRS was 9 
often made by junior staff members who do not have the clinical experience to safely 10 
make this decision.”(Shearer, Marshall et al. 2012) 11 
This is a recognition that team behaviours may be influenced by deeply embedded 12 
sociological and cultural factors that coexist within the community. These ‘rules of 13 
behaviour’ may not be easily changed following the introduction of new practices. 14 
Mackintosh, Rainey et al. (2012) reported an ethnographic study of a RRS. A 15 
comparative case study lasted 12 months of the RRS in two UK hospitals. It used 16 
ethnographic methods, including observation; interviews with doctors, ward and critical 17 
care nurses, healthcare assistants, safety leads and managers; documentary review; and 18 
analysis of routine data. It was found that the RRS reduced variability in recording, 19 
recognition and response behaviour. The RRS formalised understandings of 20 
deterioration and provided a mandate for escalating care across professional and 21 
hierarchical boundaries. It was found however that signs of deterioration other than a 22 
high EWS were more difficult to express. It was harder for staff to escalate care without 23 
a raised the score. Junior medical staff described difficulties with referral upwards and 24 
across medical boundaries. The authors concluded that there is a need to widen the 25 
search for reasons why an RRS may fail from detection and initiation of escalation, to 26 
include social and cultural factors. (Mackintosh, Rainey et al. 2012) 27 
Roberts, Bonafide et al (2014) conducted a qualitative enquiry by semi-structured 28 
interview of doctors and nurses who work on their paediatric MET. Four themes 29 
emerged. Firstly if staff recognised evidence of deterioration they were more likely to 30 
escalate care to the MET following a trigger score. Secondly, staff reported frequent 31 
difficulty in managing inter and intra-professional hierarchies. Thirdly, staff worried 32 
about the personal consequences of criticism if they escalate care. Finally, sub-specialty 33 
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doctors were concerned about mismanagement of their specialist area if the patient fell 1 
into the hands of ICU ‘generalists’ (Roberts, Bonafide et al. 2014). 2 
Sociological and cultural issues are being repeatedly reported as influences on the 3 
function of the MET. 4 
A similar study of nurses by Massey, Chaboyer et al (2014) found four themes that 5 
influenced MET use (Massey, Chaboyer et al. 2014). The themes were:  6 
• Sensing clinical deterioration 7 
• Resisting and hesitating 8 
• Pushing the button 9 
• Support and leadership.  10 
These were all themes that included difficulties with inter-professional and intra- 11 
professional hierarchies.  12 
Kitto, Marshall et al (2015) used a method involving ten focus groups of nurses and 13 
doctors from four Australian hospitals to investigate the social, professional and cultural 14 
factors that impact upon whether or not to call the RRS. These were explored from an 15 
interprofessional and collective competence perspective. They state that: 16 
“Health professionals’ reasons for not activating the RRS included: distinct 17 
Intraprofessional clinical decision-making pathways; a highly hierarchical pathway 18 
in nursing, and a more autonomous pathway in medicine; and interprofessional 19 
communication barriers between nursing and medicine when deciding to make and 20 
actually making a RRS call.”(Kitto, Marshall et al. 2015) 21 
They reported that doctors and nurses fall back on the framework and vocabulary of the 22 
RRS when they were having problems with interprofessional communication. They 23 
described this as a form of collective incompetence. 24 
Odell (2015) audited ward practice in relation to an EWS. She concluded that 25 
compliance with procedures had improved relative to earlier reviews, but added: 26 
“The implementation of rapid response systems may have been an oversimplified 27 
solution to the highly complex problem of undetected patient deterioration”. (Odell 28 
2015) P203 29 
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Douglas, Osborne et al (2016) investigated the perceptions of medical and nursing staff 1 
to a RRS. They found that rapid response system could be failing to address a 2 
hierarchical culture and systems level barrier to early recognition, and response to 3 
patient deterioration. (Douglas, Osborne et al. 2016). A significant number of RNs 4 
(17.1%) and medical staff (7.9%) said they were reticent about alerting the RRS in case 5 
the patient was found not to be critically ill. The authors found that nurses felt that they 6 
were required to alert the RRS on criteria predetermined by physicians but were often 7 
criticised for invoking an RRT attendance. The medical staff commented that far too 8 
many calls to the RRT were being made and that this had a ‘boy who cried wolf effect’ 9 
of devaluing all calls. 10 
Stewart (2008) conducted a qualitative study of house officers (first postgraduate year) 11 
in 21 UK hospitals in a single Deanery (Stewart 2008). Her interviews reveal a highly 12 
charged atmosphere in the workplace where fear of failure, fear of looking foolish and 13 
fear of seeming ineffectual are potent influences on the young doctors decisions over 14 
whether or not to call for assistance. Stewart found that numerous factors including risk 15 
to the patients, themselves and their teams are taken into account when deciding 16 
whether to call for help. She concluded that no prescriptive protocol could have taken 17 
all these factors into account and that a system that ignored their social, cultural and 18 
professional beliefs would not be acceptable to them. This may well be the situation for 19 
F1/2 doctors using the RRS protocol.  20 
In a grounded theory study Kennedy, Regehr et al (2009) found three principal factors 21 
that influenced whether trainee doctors called for help (Kennedy, Regehr et al. 2009). 22 
These were, factors relating to the clinical question (clinical importance, scope of 23 
practice), supervisor factors (availability, approachability), and trainee factors (skill, 24 
desire for independence, evaluation). Trainees believed that requesting frequent or 25 
inappropriate support reduced their credibility and used rhetorical strategies to preserve 26 
credibility. They concluded that junior doctors consider professional credibility as well 27 
as clinical issues when requesting support from clinical supervisors.  28 
Radeschi, Urso et al (2015) used a multicentre, questionnaire based method to discover 29 
the factors underlying attitudes to the medical emergency team (MET) and barriers to its 30 
use by ward nurses and physicians. They found that the principal barrier to its use was 31 
that nurses preferred to refer to their covering physician rather than the MET. They 32 
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suggested that socio-cultural and issues of inter-professional status were influencing 1 
readiness to use the MET system. (Radeschi, Urso et al. 2015). 2 
2.4.5 Conclusion 3 
Understanding of this literature was crucial to my enquiry, as I wanted to discover 4 
whether these issues could explain some of the surprising failures of RRSs. 5 
Despite these two decades of experience it is not possible to conclude from the literature 6 
that any of the variety of track-and –trigger EWSs, METs or RRSs are having a 7 
significant impact on outcome, in terms of ITU mortality, hospital mortality, days in 8 
ICU or days in hospital. 9 
EWS, RRS and MET performance is of course determined by the validity and reliability 10 
of the instruments in detecting and responding to incipient patient deterioration. Until 11 
recently most research effort was directed towards establishing the optimum 12 
characteristics for a system. Evaluation of the performance of instruments is 13 
complicated by a lack of definitions of what constitutes an unexpected deterioration and 14 
by a lack of clarity about the status of the responses that may be made by the RRT. 15 
There is also the difficulty that many decisions (admission to ICU, changing DNAR 16 
status, length of stay in ICU) are subjective and are influenced by outside issues such as 17 
availability of ICU beds. 18 
Research has also revealed that some failures of alerting are due to errors of recording 19 
and interpreting vital sign data. Retrospective case reviews often report missing data.  20 
In the last five years attention has turned towards the operation of the system, and the 21 
social, cultural, professional and hierarchical factors that interfere with the its operation. 22 
There are probably a number of distinct factors, some of which will be specific to a 23 
particular healthcare culture or to a particular set of instruments. These factors have not 24 
been fully characterised. One critical issue appears to be the need for the medical and 25 
nursing staff to identify clinically, for themselves, that the patient is unstable – as well 26 
as observing that the trigger threshold for calling for help has been reached. 27 
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This literature review confirmed my intention to pursue a qualitative methodology in 1 
order to understand the interactions between team members that might to affecting their 2 
response to trigger situations. 3 
In Summary, there are a number of similar EWS protocols. They differ in their details 4 
but share the objective of detecting patients who are on the threshold of serious 5 
deterioration. At this point in the patients progress their precarious status may only be 6 
obvious from the score derived from multiple parameters – each showing slight 7 
derangement. This study was conducted in an environment where one specific system 8 
was in use – The Modified early Warning Score (MEWS) as developed by Stenhouse 9 
(Stenhouse, Coates et al. 2000).  10 
11 
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3 METHODOLOGY, METHODS AND STUDY DESIGN 1 
This chapter describes the methodology chosen for this study and how the study was 2 
designed. The first section describes some aspects of qualitative enquiry and why it is 3 
suitable for the purpose of the study. The second section describes the epistemology and 4 
theoretical perspective of grounded theory and describes why I chose to use an 5 
‘interpretivist’ paradigm using a constructivist methodology.   The narratives from 6 
semi-structured interviews were used to develop theory. I will explain that I believe that 7 
constructivist grounded theory is underpinned by perspectives that are relativist, 8 
pragmatic and coherent with the ideas of symbolic interactionism. On epistemology, 9 
Charmaz has written: 10 
“Postmodern challenges from without, combined with positivistic inclinations 11 
from within grounded theory, spurred efforts to reclaim its strategies for social 12 
constructionist inquiry. Those of us who adhered to a relativist epistemology 13 
never concurred with grounding grounded theory in Glaser’s mid- 20th-century 14 
positivism, and imbued grounded theory with social constructionism, whether or 15 
not we articulated epistemological reasons for our actions.” (Charmaz 2008) 16 
The rest of this chapter deal with the choice of method for data collection and the study 17 
design. It is divided into four sections. The first section deals with the choice of 18 
methods for data collection, the second section is concerned with the role of the 19 
research question, the third section describes the processes of setting up the study and 20 
the final section considers some possible weaknesses of the research and concludes by 21 
considering possible weaknesses of the approach. 22 
3.1 Committing to a Qualitative Methodology and Choosing a 23 
Research Paradigm 24 
Qualitative research seeks to describe a phenomenon. It may seek to explain 25 
the phenomenon and it may generate hypothesis regarding phenomena, but 26 
it often does not generally start from a hypothesis (Savin-Baden 2013).  27 
Pope and Mays (1995) have defined qualitative research as:  28 
“The development of concepts which help us to understand social phenomena in natural 29 
(rather than experimental) settings, giving due emphasis to the meanings, experiences 30 
and views of the participants.” (Pope and Mays 1995) 31 
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There are many qualitative methodologies that can be used to this end, and choosing 1 
how best to proceed is a difficult problem for novice researchers. The literature abounds 2 
with reports of difficult personal journeys in choosing an appropriate methodology 3 
(Giske and Artinian 2007, Ghezeljeh and Emami 2009, Markey, Tilki et al. 2014). 4 
This research study explored the effect that socio-cultural, human factors might have 5 
upon the operation of the apparently mechanical ‘track and trigger’ response system. A 6 
qualitative methodology was appropriate because I did not seek to discover what 7 
happened. Rather, I was interested in why it happened. I have no data on the efficacy of 8 
the MEWS as used by the subjects of this research. My data is in the form of their 9 
narratives of their experiences. Table 4 (p67) shows some of the paradigms that shape 10 
research methodologies. 11 
It is generally accepted that patient outcomes are less affected by rapid response systems 12 
than experts in the field had hoped and expected. My interest was not in the empirical 13 
data relating to outcomes, which have been extensively investigated, but in what the use 14 
of a MEWS protocol meant to the users. To investigate this aspect of clinical process 15 
requires a qualitative approach. Whilst quantitative studies can provide an empirical 16 
account of events; when outcomes depend upon the choices people make; this picture is 17 
incomplete, because it does not fully address all the factors influencing the way people 18 
make the choices they do (Bartunek and Seo 2002, Curry, Nembhard et al. 2009). Table 4 19 
compares some features of quantitative and qualitative enquiry. 20 
Table 4. Features Of Quantative And Qualitative Enquiry 
 Quantitative Qualitative 
Research Question Fixed in advance 
Broader, contextual and flexible 
throughout the project 
Outcome Identified in advance 
Not predefined, emergent 
research question 
Order of Phases Linear Circular 
Confounding Factors Accounted for in study design Emergent 
In this study I will gather narrative data from users of an early warning ‘track and trigger 21 
system’, and through analysis, I will attempt to construct a description of what a trigger 22 
situation means to them, how they say they behave when a trigger situation develops, and 23 
why they behave in that way.  24 
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Initially I had considered a mixed methods approach; combining qualitative interviews 1 
with retrospective data from the nursing and medical notes to assess response times to 2 
trigger alerts of real deteriorating patients. I was beginning to understand that the use of 3 
MEWS was something complex, not merely down to the individual but something that 4 
is enacted within a complex setting and influenced by many factors. After some 5 
consideration I decided to narrow my focus to exploring the general concept of the RRS 6 
protocols and the experiences of team members. I analysed the participants’ narratives 7 
to reveal how they used the RRS in practice and to discover the meaning it had for them 8 
as individuals. This avoided interviewing my subjects about actual failures and delays in 9 
alerting.  My experience in investigating mishaps (see chapter 1) suggested that this 10 
might lead to defensive, and self-justifying, accounts that did not reveal the 11 
interviewee’s real thoughts.  12 
Glaser, in his original description of grounded theory said that it was particularly useful 13 
in situations where there is little existing theory (Glaser, Strauss et al. 1968). This was 14 
indeed the situation regarding explanations of the behaviour of clinicians using RRSs.  15 
The more I read, the more convinced I became that a grounded theory enquiry stood a 16 
better chance of yielding useful theory than would an investigation of acknowledged 17 
failures and delays. The study design was discussed with senior research colleagues, 18 
who I felt could act as critics (this was prior to me being allocated formal supervision). 19 
They felt that the original mixed methods approach was very complicated and an 20 
approach that used a single methodology was to be preferred. I now understand that, as 21 
a novice researcher, moving through this phase of the study is important. Having a 22 
clearer understanding of the limitations, and the reasons why an unwieldy study is both 23 
impractical and lacks focus, is a step in every postgraduate student’s journey.  24 
The researcher must consider what they bring to their project in terms of their 25 
understanding of research in general, and their position regarding the particular issues of 26 
the study. Bias can be introduced at many stages of an investigation. Sackett (1979) 27 
described 35 ways that Bias can occur (Sackett 1979) and some of these, such as 28 
interviewer bias and assumption bias, stem from the pre-existing beliefs of the research 29 
team (Delgado-Rodriguez and Llorca 2004). In particular I was wary of allowing my 30 
personal understanding of reality to be at odds with the realities understood by others 31 
(Mays and Pope 1995). 32 
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I felt that a qualitative review of the meanings of MEWS to its users would complement 1 
the existing quantitative literature. Curry et al (2009) have argued that both qualitative 2 
methods should be used in outcomes research as well as quantitative methods because 3 
each makes unique contributions to understanding (Curry, Nembhard et al. 2009). 4 
Bartunek (2012) has emphasised that academic articles that suggest changes in practice, 5 
should be appropriately addressed to the different standpoints of the professionals who 6 
will need to implement those changes (Bartunek 2012). She suggests that qualitative 7 
research plays an important part in this process.  8 
3.2 Ontology and Epistemology  9 
Table 5. Some Paradigms That Shape Research Methodology (From 
various sources) 
Positivism: A single reality exists that is objective and can be measured. Reality can be 
discovered by experiment such as empirical observation of the world.  Positivist theory 
searches for causes and explanations and emphses generaliasiseability. Positivism 
arises from a realist ontology (Cruickshank 2012, Charmaz 2014 p229). Positivism 
dominated scientific thinking from the late eighteenth century to the middle of the 
twentieth century.  
Neo-positivism: Developed in the first half of the twentieth century drawing upon 
parallels between physical and social phenomena. Uses, or attempts to use scientific 
methodology in sociological research it therefore has a positivist epistemology. 
Problems are investigated by setting up a hypothesis for empirical investigation. 
Theories are logically developed using mathematical principles (Isajiw 2016).  
Post-positivism: The view that understanding reality requires context and that context 
free experimental design is insufficient. Based on the belief that most knowledge is 
speculation, this research paradigm stresses deductive logic in supporting theory 
generation. Post-positivism admits allows experience (for example, surveys), 
sociological or psychological experiments (where the data must be inferred from other 
phenomena) and observed human behaviour as data (Harvey 2012-16). 
Critical theory: Ideas in relation to an ideology – knowledge is not value free and bias 
should be articulated – such as feminism or Marxism. Has a political agenda. 
Kincheloe and McLaren have discussed the issue of research that they describe as 
‘Partisan in a neutral research environment’ (Kincheloe and McLaren 2002).  
Constructivism/Interpretivism: Reality is subjective. Each individual constructs 
his/her own reality so there are multiple interpretations. This paradigm arises from 
relativist ontology. Cresswell (2013) has discussed the factors that must be considered 
in choosing a constructivist approach. (Creswell 2013)Chapter 2). 
Postmodernism: Movements developed in the late twentieth century that rejected the 
principles of modernism. In philosophy it emphasises that truth is the construction of 
power relationships, personalisation and discourse.  
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The ontological and epistemic position that a researcher adopts will influence their 1 
choice of a methodology and subsequently shape the way they interpret and present 2 
their findings (Denzin and Lincoln 1998). Table 5 shows some of the paradigms that 3 
shape research methodologies. 4 
3.2.1 Ontological Stance 5 
Ontology is the fundamental belief about the way things are. The ontological stance of 6 
this study is relativist. For two thousand years the dominant perspective in science was 7 
idealism as set out by the Greek philosophers of the third century BCE. Understanding 8 
was often determined by religious belief.  For science this meant that the use of 9 
analytical thought could fully determine the nature of reality, without having recourse to 10 
experiment. In the eighteenth century science began to work to realist ontology. 11 
Realism is the belief that aspects of reality exist independent of our ideas, perceptions, 12 
language and beliefs (and of the researcher). In the twentieth century the social sciences 13 
adopted a relativist position. Relativism is the belief that absolute truth is unknowable, 14 
and that people’s interpretations of reality vary with contexts (Section 3.2.2.2.below). 15 
Today the two major ontologies of science are realism and relativism (Losee 2001)Ch 16 
18.). By acknowledging a relativist stance I acknowledge that I am open to the idea that 17 
there may be multiple versions of reality expressed within my data, in response to the 18 
differing standpoints of my participants. 19 
3.2.2 Epistemological Perspective 20 
Epistemology describes the way knowledge is sought and organised.  21 
3.2.2.1 Positivism 22 
The basis of positivist epistemology is that there is a single reality. Positivism’s tools 23 
are observation and measurement. Logical positivist theory maintains that the only 24 
meaningful propositions are those that can be reduced, through the application of logic, 25 
to basic propositions that can be empirically verified (Stevenson and Waite 2011). 26 
There exists therefore a single reality that can be verified by experiment. 27 
3.2.2.2 Relativism 28 
Relativist ontology is the view that knowledge is relative. It depends on factors such as 29 
time, place, culture and personal belief (Doppelta 1978). 30 
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According to this view there is no single account of reality, but a variety of truths. The 1 
relativist definition of theory concentrates on the interpretation of events and 2 
phenomena   3 
3.2.2.3  Interpretivism  4 
Relativist ontology is sometimes classed as interpretivist but interpretivism should 5 
properly be considered to be an epistemological perspective, within relativist ontology 6 
(Charmaz 2014). Interpretivist believe that the researcher is a social actor and that their 7 
interaction with their subjects is a critical element of research.  8 
“(Interpretists)…view theoretical understanding as gained through the theorists 9 
interpretation of the studied phenomenon. Interpretative theories allow for 10 
indeterminacy rather than seek(ing) causality and aim to theorise patterns and 11 
connections.” (Charmaz 2014)  12 
Table 6 shows the features of Interpretivism compared to positivism. 13 
Table 6. Comparison of Positivism and Interpretivism 
Assumptions Positivism Interpretivism 
Ontology Realism Relativist/Idealist 
Reality A single reality exists 
Reality is a social interpreted 
and constructed 
Research Goal 
To explain and strongly predict 
reality 
To understand reality but is 
weakly predictive 
Focus of 
Interest 
The average – statistically 
focused 
To find exceptions and 
deviations 
What comes 
from research 
Predictive rules An explanation of events 
3.2.3 Naturalistic Enquiry 14 
The naturalistic paradigm presumes that there are many interpretations of reality and the 15 
objective of researchers should be to understand how their subjects construct their own 16 
reality - this reality being influenced by the social context of their experience (Harvey 17 
2012). This research is a Naturalistic Inquiry and as such is based on a number of 18 
principles:  19 
• Phenomena were studied in their natural context without experimental interventions. 20 
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• The object was examined without pre-existing ideas in the researchers mind 1 
• The researchers findings were interpretive – despite trying to see the issue from the 2 
view of those being studied it is not possible to avoid making a personal 3 
interpretation of the findings. 4 
Lincoln and Guba have advocated a method depending on this naturalistic paradigm, and 5 
based on what is described as a post-positivist epistemology (Lincoln and Guba 1985). My 6 
experience with the dilemmas and conflicts of critical care medicine inclines me towards 7 
naturalistic inquiry as a research method but in a relativistic framework. 8 
3.2.4 Symbolic Interactionism 9 
Symbolic interactionism is a theoretical perspective to which much qualitative research 10 
is attributed. It developed from Pragmatism (See Table 7 ), and was developed by 11 
George Mead in the first years of the twentieth century. Later, his student Herbert 12 
Blumer gave it the name symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1986). It is a theory of social 13 
behaviour that focuses on the personal meanings individuals give to the experiences of 14 
life. These meanings are understood as personal symbols and social interaction develops 15 
from the interplay of these symbolic meanings between individuals. Social 16 
interactionists believe that these interactions form reality and that each individual 17 
shapes their own version of reality.  18 
Table 7. Some Of The Features Of Pragmatism (adapted from Harvey 
2012) 
Pragmatism treats knowledge, concepts and values true if they are useful. Pragmatists 
emphasise the practical function of knowledge as an instrument for adapting to reality and 
controlling it.  
The pragmatists rejected the rationalist view that reality is static and fixed and preferred a 
view of a changing, dynamic reality.  
Pragmatism is primarily empiricist inductive testing of hypotheses prioritising experience, 
although not assuming that facts exist ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered. Facts are carved 
out of reality depending on peoples’ (scientists’) interests and purposes. 
Pragmatism adopts a relative approach: truth is modified as discoveries are made and is 
relative to the time and place and purpose of inquiry. This is not to say that we cannot know 
things rather that things have a variety of meanings, which are not directly understood, rather 
an object acquires meaning through encounters with people, who define it in practice. The 
function of thought is to guide action not provide timeless abstract truths; pragmatists interpret 
ideas as instruments and plans of action rather than as images of reality.  
Thought is grounded in practical reality and has no real metaphysical significance, pragmatists 
protest against speculation concerning questions that have no application and no verifiable 
answers. They are explicitly action-oriented and instrumentalist.  
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3.3 Choosing an Analytical Method 1 
Qualitative data is often in the form of narrative. An inductive or deductive process is used 2 
to analyse the data and reveal the underlying principles. These principles may in turn be 3 
used to suggest a theory of how and why systems operate as they do (Denzin 2005). 4 
Inductive reasoning “is a logical process in which multiple premises, all believed true 5 
or found true most of the time, are combined to obtain a specific conclusion”.  6 
Deductive reasoning  “is a logical process in which a conclusion is based on the 7 
concordance of multiple premises that are generally assumed to be true. Deductive 8 
reasoning is sometimes referred to as top-down logic. Its counterpart, inductive 9 
reasoning, is sometimes referred to as bottom-up logic.” Research Methods Knowledge 10 
Base http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/dedind.php Accessed July 2016 11 
There are several methodological approaches to the analysis of qualitative, narrative data:  12 
Thematic analysis identifies themes within qualitative data with the intention to provide 13 
a description of the observed phenomena. A thematic analysis attempts to summarise 14 
data into themes that can be explained, whereas grounded theory aims to develop a 15 
theory to describe the findings (Ryan and Bernard 2000).   16 
Grounded theory The fundamental property of grounded theory is that it is inductive, 17 
and the inductive process is iterative. This means that the interpretation of the data, as it 18 
is acquired, is fed back to shape the ongoing enquiry. It has been observed that many 19 
studies published as grounded theory investigations do not use a grounded theory 20 
method at all (Denscombe 2014, Glaser 2015). Glaser’s defence of his method has been 21 
fierce and his language vitriolic as in his comments on the relationship between 22 
symbolic interactionism and grounded theory.  23 
“So the answer to Schreiber and MacDonald is two-fold. Yes, I am far more 24 
experienced than they are, and their connection of Symbolic Interactionism to 25 
GT is flawed! … Instead of their immaculate 12 page super-rethink on why 26 
GT is an SI method, they need only do a GT of the dozens of extant GT 27 
dissertations, to realize my points made ad nauseam in this chapter.” (Glaser 28 
2005).  29 
Abductive Analysis is an approach that accepts that the inductive reasoning from the 30 
data might be ineffective. The data is examined for aspects that do not fit with existing 31 
theory or are surprising. These discrepancies are then used as the starting point for new 32 
interpretations (Timmermans and Tavory 2012).  33 
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Narrative Analysis is yet another methods for analysing interviews. It differs from the 1 
previous methods in that analysis takes the stories as whole instead of dividing them 2 
into themes (Greenhalgh, Russell et al. 2005). A variety of systems for analysing the 3 
data are described (Thomson and Holland 2003). 4 
This research uses grounded theory. In particular constructivist grounded theory as 5 
described by Charmaz (Charmaz 2014) 6 
3.3.1 Grounded Theory 7 
Grounded theory was developed by Glaser and Strauss in the nineteen sixties as a response 8 
to the pre-eminence of quantitative studies in the social sciences, and in an effort to improve 9 
the scientific rigour of qualitative studies (Kenny and Fourie 2014). Glaser and Strauss 10 
sought methods to extract theory from qualitative evidence that would be as reliable as the 11 
data from quantitative studies (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Fifty years on, there are a variety 12 
of methodologies that claim to be grounded theory. The differences between them often 13 
appear abstruse to novice researchers choosing how to progress (McCann and Clark 2003, 14 
Giske and Artinian 2007) and the internet forums abound with cries for help from novice 15 
researchers (Glaser 2015).  16 
Glaser believed that theory was to be found within the data by application of inductive 17 
reasoning - theory could be discovered hence the title of his seminal paper with Strauss “The 18 
Discovery of Grounded Theory” (Glaser, Strauss et al. 1967). Grounded Theory came into 19 
being during the development, by Glaser and Strauss, of a study of the interaction between 20 
dying patients and their medical attendants in hospices (Glaser and Strauss 1966).  This was 21 
a time when qualitative research was held in low regard in sociology. The focus then was 22 
principally upon the verification of theories that were developed from prior assumptions. 23 
Glaser, in particular, felt that this was the fundamental weakness of qualitative research, 24 
making it difficult to develop new, meaningful hypothesis. He and Strauss developed a 25 
series of techniques for identifying possible theory from within qualitative data, that 26 
comprised an inductive approach to research, with the goal of conceptualisation, rather than 27 
a deductive approach to a study with the objective of verification (Glaser, Strauss et al. 28 
1967). The theory “discovered” by their technique was “grounded” in the data. 29 
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Glaser and Strauss described their method as both realistic and pragmatic (see below). 1 
Their papers have had little to say on the theory’s ontology and epistemology, but others 2 
have categorised it as post-positivist (Atkinson 1997, Åge 2011).  Post-positivism 3 
developed from the critiques of positivism of Karl Popper (Popper 1934) and Thomas 4 
Kuhn (Kuhn 1962). Popper developed the idea that propositions are unverifiable but 5 
may be disproved, and criticised the inductive derivation of theory from empirical 6 
observations. Kuhn discussed the provisional nature of theory and described how 7 
scientific theories were readjusted to accommodate observations that would not fit, until 8 
a paradigm shift occurred and a new theory replaced the old. Like Popper he believed 9 
that it was impossible to know whether a theory was true. Post-positivists believe that 10 
there is a reality, but that it cannot be fully known and must be treated as provisional. 11 
More recently, others have maintained that grounded theory is neo-positivist rather than 12 
positivist or post-positivist (Newman 2008). Neo-positivism is a philosophical 13 
perspective that favours a deductive approach. It arose from a group called the Vienna 14 
Circle in the early twentieth century (Annells 1999). Neo-positivists sought to unite the 15 
principles of enquiry of established sciences such as physics, with those found useful in 16 
psychology and sociology. They modelled their thought processes on the existing 17 
systems of positivism in particular by reducing statements about reality to their simplest 18 
form (Delanty and Strydom 2003). The arguments about the philosophical position of 19 
grounded theory have occurred partly because Glaser and Strauss were themselves 20 
unsure of its status. Glaser wrote that the struggle to fit grounded theory into a particular 21 
stance was fruitless, because the method was used successfully in many contexts and 22 
the contexts had influenced the underlying perspective. 23 
“The point is that, as I said in “Doing GT chapter 3”, the rhetorical wrestle 24 
is a waste of time regarding ontology and epistemology. There are too many 25 
different types of data involved, GT being possessed by no one theoretical 26 
perspective for any data type.” (Glaser 2005) 27 
Understanding grounded theory is made more difficult for researchers by the fact that 28 
Glaser and Strauss diverged in their interpretations, and a fierce academic argument 29 
ensued. Strauss, working subsequently with Corbin, published a book outlining his 30 
concept of grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1990). This advocated a highly 31 
systematic method of analysis, eventually leading to computer-based techniques. They 32 
subsequently summarised and refined their approach (Strauss and Corbin 1994). 33 
Philosophically, this rigorous and meticulous coding framework was underpinned by 34 
pragmatism and symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1986).  35 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY, METHODS AND STUDY DESIGN 
 
77 
“Symbolic interaction theory analyses society by examining the subjective 1 
meanings that people give to objects, events, and behaviours. Subjective 2 
meanings are given primacy because it is believed that peoples behaviour is 3 
based on what they believe, and not just on what is objectively true.” 4 
Research Methods Knowledge Base 5 
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/dedind.php Accessed July 2016 6 
Glaser however vehemently rejected the proposition that GT reflects a symbolic interaction 7 
perspective: 8 
“These authors have dealt with whatever is going on in their areas of concern 9 
with the “all is data” principal in mind, while doing laudable work as far as they 10 
can go: and being available to as many TCs as their current studies have allowed. 11 
Teasing out one particular perspective in these complex GT’s would be a waste of 12 
time with futile results. Product proof is the goal for GT as a general inductive, 13 
rigorous method.” (Glaser 2005). 14 
 15 
3.3.1.1 The Methodology of Grounded Theory 16 
Grounded theory is characterised by the use of a suite of techniques, and it is from these 17 
that a true grounded-theory method can be recognised. Glaser and Strauss believed that 18 
by having a predetermined structure for analysis they were developing a system that 19 
was “scientific”, valid and reliable. This is the feature of grounded theory that has led 20 
some to categorise it as neo-positivistic. 21 
In grounded theory: 22 
• Data collection and analysis occur simultaneously and are an iterative process. 23 
• Coding is the process of identifying items of data. 24 
• Theoretical sampling – is the process of chasing an emerging theoretical concept 25 
by recruiting data that is most likely to shed light on the issue. 26 
• Memo writing – is the process of writing down inductive thoughts that occur to 27 
the researcher and supplementing the data with these insights. (Glaser, Strauss et 28 
al. 1967)  29 
• Constant comparison – is a process of constantly looking for similarities and 30 
differences between related data. Comparison takes place within the data, with 31 
memos and with the existing literature. 32 
• Saturation  - is the process of continuing interviews and analysis until no new 33 
themes emerge. 34 
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3.1.1.2 Constant Comparative Analysis 1 
The Constant Comparative Analysis method is an iterative and inductive process of 2 
reducing the data through constant recoding (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Incidents or data 3 
are compared to other incidents or data during the process of coding. This process 4 
begins with open coding to develop categories from the first round of data reduction and 5 
further reducing and recoding allows possible core categories to emerge (Charmaz, 6 
2001; Glaser, 1978; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987). Grounded theory and its 7 
allied methodologies all start with a process of coding. Hallberg (2006) has argued that 8 
this is itself the ‘core category’ of grounded theory, and provides assurance that any 9 
theory is a valid interpretation of the data (Hallberg 2006). He writes: 10 
“The constant comparative method, which can be seen as the “core category” of 11 
grounded theory, includes that every part of data, i.e. emerging codes, categories, 12 
properties, and dimensions as well as different parts of the data, are constantly 13 
compared with all other parts of the data to explore variations, similarities and 14 
differences in data. The constant comparative method of grounded theory is strict 15 
enough to be helpful to the researcher in exploring the content and meaning in the 16 
data, but not saddled with so many strict rules to be too rigid for a grounded theory 17 
researcher.”  18 
A code is an example of the data speaking to a particular issue. It does not matter how 19 
the issue is framed, or what an opinion is. In my enquiry an example of a code would 20 
be: “Speaking about colleagues” (note the use of the gerund) 21 
All methodologies start with codes but the subsequent stages of analysis to categories, 22 
higher-level categories, core categories and theory are the subject of innumerable 23 
academic papers and can be very confusing. The codes can be analysed for underlying 24 
similarities from which a “category” can be developed. Glaser describes initial 25 
descriptive categories. Grouping these together in response to a concept reveals analytic 26 
categories.  This process of grouping similar codes together identifies some codes that 27 
grow and pervade the data – these are core categories. They are ideas that your codes 28 
can demonstrate to be widespread in the narratives. 29 
Glaser and Strauss described identifying categories of increasing abstraction by iterative 30 
revue and grouping of data. They suggested that decisions regarding data collection 31 
should not be fully determined in advance because, during analysis, the data will reveal 32 
the need for more data. In the first place gaps will become evident as the data are coded 33 
indicating need for further evidence to be collected (Glaser, Strauss et al. 1967). 34 
Secondly, during the collection and analysis of data, unexpected concepts may emerge 35 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY, METHODS AND STUDY DESIGN 
 
79 
which change the direction of the study. Thirdly, as the underlying hypothesis begins to 1 
surface, gaps in the evidence relating to this emerging theory will become evident. 2 
Glaser and Holton indicated that as the researcher is collecting, coding, analysing and 3 
categorizing data simultaneously, three levels of comparisons are taking place (Glaser & 4 
Holton, 2004; Holton, 2010):  5 
• Codes are compared with codes,  6 
• Codes are compared with emerging categories, and  7 
• Categories are compared with one another.  8 
• Memos are included in the analysis. 9 
• As the research becomes complete, Glaser and Holton suggest that analysis 10 
enters a fourth stage (that can be depicted as the fourth layer of the iterative 11 
process): (Holton 2010, Glaser and Holton 2014) - The emerging theory is 12 
compared with the literature.  13 
An important aspect of the analysis proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) is the 14 
writing of memos. These are ideas promoted by and reflections springing from 15 
consideration of the data. Glaser stated emphatically that his new method was intended 16 
to prompt the researcher to think deeply and innovatively about their data. Glaser treats 17 
these ideas as a form of secondary data. I have found this aspect of analysis to be very 18 
useful.  19 
Grounded theory offers a set of guidelines for building conceptual frameworks that 20 
specify the relationships among categories but the guidelines should be used as flexible 21 
tools rather than being seen as rigid rules (Hallberg 2006). The controversies around 22 
grounded theory have been fierce. It has been criticised on four principle grounds 23 
(Luckerhoff and Guillemette 2011): 24 
• Its lack of a theoretical framework – characterised by Glaser’s antipathy 25 
towards many of sociology’s theoretical perspectives (Glaser 2004, 26 
Glaser 2005, Glaser and Holton 2014, Glaser 2015). 27 
• The circularity of its processes. 28 
• The possible bias that comes from having prior knowledge in the absence 29 
of a research hypothesis 30 
• The danger of theoretical sampling increasing bias. 31 
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3.3.1.2 Prior Knowledge and Expertise in the Field of Study  1 
Glaser has remained firm in the belief that prior knowledge of the subject area interferes 2 
with this process of hypothesis building (Glaser 1978, Glaser 1992, Creswell 2013). For 3 
this reason he even frowns upon the conduct of a preliminary literature review. His 4 
argument is that a researcher with an existing understanding of the field will arrange the 5 
data to satisfy their conceptions and will be insensitive to new concepts emerging 6 
through the data. Glaser’s evocation of grounded theory makes central the process of 7 
identifying trends within the data. The purpose, then, of a Grounded Theory 8 
investigation, is to build an explanation or theory of why the events occur as they do by 9 
analysis of the data. Data collection, analysis and reading; by occurring simultaneously; 10 
are intended to guide further data collection and the slow development of theory. Glaser 11 
has advocated a process for minimising the effect of prior knowledge that is called 12 
‘Bracketing’. Tufford and Newman have described the processes of bracketing (Tufford 13 
and Newman 2012) and Gearing has devised a typology of methods (Gearing 2004). 14 
Creswell and Miller (2000) stress that the researcher must identify their ‘beliefs and 15 
biases early in their research and make these clear to readers. They must then suspend or 16 
‘bracket’ these beliefs, which introduce researcher bias (Creswell and Miller 2000, 17 
Glaser 2004).   18 
This stricture to set aside expertise in the field, and not to do preliminary reading or a 19 
literature search has created difficulties for many researchers. Inevitably researchers are 20 
often experts in their chosen field. That is why they want to research it. This was one of 21 
the factors that led to the development of a Constructivist version of Grounded Theory 22 
by Charmaz (Charmaz 2008). I have found the process of bracketing complex, and I 23 
value my clinical experience. I believe that my knowledge brings insight to my 24 
interviewing and I do not want to set this aside as I believe this handicaps my data 25 
gathering.  26 
3.3.1.3 Constructivist Grounded Theory  27 
Constructivist epistemology is a branch of the philosophy of science that maintains that 28 
natural science consists of mental constructs that are developed with the aim of 29 
explaining sensory experience (or measurements) of the natural world (Piaget 1967). 30 
Accordingly, the scientific community, by seeking to measure and construct models of 31 
the natural world, constructs scientific knowledge. Social constructivism is based on a 32 
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relativist epistemology (Piaget 1967) as opposed to Glaser’s positivism. Charmaz 1 
reconfigured grounded theory in line with constructivist epistemology (Charmaz 2006). 2 
In particular, she rejected Glaser’s underlying philosophy that a single reality is waiting 3 
to be discovered in the data. She believes that:  4 
“Neither the data nor the theories are discovered”  5 
and insists that: 6 
“…..we construct our grounded theories through our past and present 7 
involvements and interactions with people, perspectives and research practices”     8 
(Charmaz 2006).  9 
A researcher with a constructivist perspective attempts to construct the world with 10 
interpretations from the standpoint of an individual, or more often a group of individuals who 11 
share a perspective (Lincoln and Guba 1985). In this study I am trying to understand if there 12 
are shared interpretations of reality amongst the clinical team, and whether these 13 
understandings are broadly consistent with professional and hierarchical boundaries. 14 
Charmaz also diverged from Strauss’ highly systematic coding process perceiving it to be too 15 
restrictive (Charmaz 2006). Instead she proposed flexible “guidelines”. Thus she deviated 16 
significantly from both classic, ‘Glaserian’ and ‘Straussian’ grounded theory, both in 17 
philosophy and in coding process (Bryant 2002). Many researchers have found Glaser’s 18 
grounded theory difficult to implement (Giske and Artinian 2007, Evans 2013). Moore has 19 
described the difficulties she encountered in attempting to apply classical grounded theory 20 
and has related these to some of its philosophical roots. (Moore 2010). Breckenridge, Jones 21 
and Elliott (2012) have provided practical advice on the decision to use constructivist 22 
grounded theory and stressed that its differences from classical grounded theory are 23 
fundamental. (Breckenridge, Jones et al. 2012) 24 
The procedures of Glaser, Strauss and Charmaz differ in three principal ways:  25 
• Coding procedures (Glaser 1992) 26 
• Their philosophical positions (Kelle 2005, Aldiabat and Le Navenec 2011) 27 
• Their use of literature (Charmaz 2008).   28 
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The differences and similarities are shown diagrammatically in Figure 7 (Kenny and 1 
Fourie 2014):  2 
Figure 7. The Uniting and Differentiating Principles of GT (Redrawn from Kenny and 3 
Fourie 2014) 4 
 5 
Charmaz also deviates from the views of Glaser in proposing that constructionist 6 
grounded theory is fundamentally a form of naturalistic inquiry. Naturalistic inquiry 7 
often uses grounded theory methods of analysis to extract data (Erlandson 1993). 8 
Glaser, however, finds that the ideas of Lincoln and Guba to be in conflict with 9 
grounded theory. He emphatically rejects their naturalistic paradigm on the grounds that 10 
what they describe as ‘axioms’ are: 11 
“…..just think-ups, ungrounded in research, but honouring idols 12 
(critical theorists) that Lincoln and Guba are enamoured by. They 13 
are of no use to GT.” (Glaser 2004) 14 
Glaser’s critique of Lincoln and Guba is principally of the way they claim to extract 15 
theory from the data.  16 
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Unlike Lincoln and Guba and others, Charmaz does not describe constructivist 1 
grounded theory as having a post-positivist epistemology. She prefers to use the 2 
description interpretative, and asserts that grounded theory rests within a relativist 3 
ontology (Charmaz 2014) p231). She does not believe that it is necessary for grounded 4 
theory to be related to any particular epistemology and contends that the data collection 5 
can be positivist or constructivist (interpretivist) and that it will produce different data 6 
depending on the epistemic beliefs of the researcher. She does not appear to think this 7 
matters, as long as the researchers perspective is declared. She believes the 8 
methodology to be relatively neutral but to be influenced by the epistemic stance and 9 
theoretical perspective brought to it by the researcher. She writes: 10 
“…..grounded theory contains both positivist and interpretivist elements because 11 
it relies upon empirical observations and depends on the researchers 12 
constructions of them” (Charmaz 2014 p 232). 13 
Charmaz differs from Glaser and Strauss in her attitude to literature searches and prior 14 
experience. Charmaz accepts that the researcher may have pre-existing ideas about their 15 
topic and that these will develop during the research process. This is a process similar to 16 
the later use of emerging concepts to drive theoretical sampling. Researchers using 17 
grounded theory often have pre-existing knowledge and assumptions that alert them to 18 
certain lines of inquiry. Blumer (1969) described such influencing as sensitising 19 
concepts (Blumer 1986) and Charmaz has absorbed these ideas into its theoretical 20 
framework (Charmaz 2006) and asserts that the researcher is an active participant in the 21 
construction of theory. 22 
3.3.1.4 The Detail of Coding in Constructionist Grounded Theory 23 
Coding in grounded theory has at least two principal phases. Charmaz (2014) 24 
recommends an initial line-by-line review followed by a focused coding that is used to 25 
sort the data according to what seems most significant or frequent codes. She states: 26 
 27 
“During initial coding, the goal is to remain open to all possible theoretical 28 
directions indicated by your readings of the data. Later, you use focused 29 
coding to pinpoint and develop the most salient categories in large batches of 30 
data. Theoretical integration begins with focused coding and proceeds 31 
through all your subsequent analytic steps.”(Charmaz 2006)  32 
Charmaz starts her analysis with the key question “What is the chief concern of the 33 
participants”, and “How do they resolve this concern” (Charmaz 2014). She suggests 34 
that coding should concentrate on the actions of subjects as more important than 35 
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themes. She uses gerunds, to describe these actions because this exposes the processes 1 
the participants use, and where possible uses their own language as the code (Charmaz 2 
2014). Figure 8 shows the principal ways that these coding procedures differ from one 3 
another. 4 
Figure 8. Contrasting The Coding Procedures of Glaser, Strauss and Charmaz  5 
 6 
In the next stage of coding, those codings that “carry the analytic momentum” are 7 
elevated to categories. Subsequently theoretical sampling and memo writing are used to 8 
explore these categories. Charmaz gives memo writing special importance in bridging 9 
gaps in the data until appropriate data emerges (Bryant and Charmaz 2007). All these 10 
coding systems are ultimately dependent upon the technique of constant comparative 11 
analysis. 12 
3.3.2 Choosing Grounded Theory 13 
At the outset I was not familiar with the theoretical basis of grounded theory. I have 14 
chosen a constructivist approach because I came to this research through my 15 
observations of the understandings of colleagues as they managed critically ill patients. 16 
I saw that novice nurses and doctors struggled with the concepts of ICU, and lacked a 17 
vocabulary to explain their understandings. With time they could be seen to be adopting 18 
the ‘group-speak’ and honing it until it became similar to their colleagues. My 19 
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perception of the clinical world has been one where many interpretations of reality 1 
coexist. I am a relativist. As such, I lean towards naturalistic enquiry, seeking to 2 
understand the process by which MEWS data is interpreted by those who use it. I have 3 
described my methodology as grounded theory drawing upon the constructivist 4 
principles of Charmaz, rather than using those principles. There are so many versions of 5 
grounded theory promoted by the major authorities, each evolving with time, that it is 6 
difficult for a researcher to find a single account to follow as a recipe. The closest I can 7 
come is to say that I used a methodology principally drawing upon, or derived from the 8 
work of Charmaz (Charmaz 2014). The theoretical perspective of this study is 9 
summarised in Table 8. 10 
Table 8 The Theoretical Perspective and Research Paradigm of My 
Research 
 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Ontology Relativist 
Naturalistic Inquiry 
Symbolic 
Interactionism 
Epistemology 
Interpretivist, Social 
Constructivist 
Methodology 
Constructivist Grounded 
Theory 
Method 
Semi-structured 
Interview 
Analysis 
Iterative Coding, 
Theoretical Sampling, 
Use of Memos in 
addition to categories. 
3.4 Deciding On Methods 11 
Qualitative data for this study could have been gathered in a variety of ways: 12 
• By the observation of work 13 
• By observation whilst participating in the work 14 
• By written reports in the form of diaries  15 
• By questionnaires 16 
• By asking people about what they do (interviewing) 17 
• By asking people how they deal with typical situations (behaviour description 18 
interviewing) 19 
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The data would however vary with the method. The method must therefore be 1 
chosen in order to harvest data that is suitable for the intended purpose. 2 
3.4.1 Observation 3 
Observational techniques are frequently used in qualitative research and provide a 4 
‘thick’ description of phenomena (Geertz 1973). These start from an observation of the 5 
phenomenon, with the recording of field notes. These are then analysed. Typically, the 6 
researcher would not approach the observation with pre-determined categories or 7 
questions in mind. Because of this openness, observation in more relativist research is 8 
often referred to as unstructured. 9 
Research based on structured observations (such as counting or listing particular 10 
actions) are more likely to be carried out by those operating from a 'positivist' 11 
perspective, or who at least believe it is possible to clearly define and quantify 12 
behaviours (Curry, Nembhard et al. 2009).  Unstructured observation is more likely to 13 
be carried out by those operating from an 'interpretive' or 'critical' perspective where the 14 
focus is on understanding the meanings participants attribute to events and actions.  15 
Positivist researchers are likely to be operating from a 'realist' perspective, namely that 16 
there is a 'real world' with 'real impact' on people's lives and this can best be studied by 17 
looking at social settings directly. I believe that a reality exists: but that it is constantly 18 
re-shaped by events. I believe that the sociology of the workplace is one such factor. I 19 
could have used an observational methodology to describe the general work practices of 20 
the teams I was studying, but the phenomenon of unexpected deterioration, which is 21 
under consideration, is very infrequent and is inherently unpredictable. In order to draw 22 
conclusions about behaviour that can be generalised, many episodes of practice would 23 
have to be observed, taking many weeks or months making this option unsuitable. In 24 
addition observational techniques do not provide good data on what meaning events had 25 
for the subject. 26 
3.4.2 Participant Observation 27 
In participant observation, the researcher becomes immersed in the environment they 28 
are researching. It has been much used in anthropology research particularly in the early 29 
twentieth century where researchers lived within the societies they were describing. 30 
Howell has described the stages of conducting Participant Observer Research (Howell 31 
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1972). Participant observation was unsuitable on two major counts. Firstly, becoming 1 
part of the ward team for a significant period would have presented formidable 2 
employment and ethical issues – even though I am qualified to undertake this sort of 3 
work. Secondly, ethical approval would have required me to declare my intentions and 4 
my experience, and the presence of an experienced, senior clinician, who was also a 5 
researcher, would be likely to disturb normal behaviour. An example would be the 6 
decision whether to refer or temporise. I could be variously seen as a source of expert 7 
advice or distrusted as a management spy – with unpredictable results! 8 
3.4.3 Interview Techniques  9 
Interviews are commonly used for qualitative research and there are various ways to use 10 
them. (Legard, Keegan et al. 2003, Britten 2007)  11 
3.4.3.1 Behaviour Description Interviewing 12 
Behaviour description interviewing is a structured interview technique in which the 13 
subjects are asked to describe their normal behaviour in response to a number of 14 
descriptions of situations that occur in their normal life. It has been considered to yield 15 
data of higher validity than unstructured interviewing. In a study of applicants for jobs 16 
as sales-persons, Orpen (1985) attempted to predict future success in terms of sales 17 
achieved. He compared unstructured with behaviour-description interviewing and found 18 
that future performance was better predicted by the latter (Orpen 1985). Janz (1982) has 19 
advocated behaviour description interviewing as useful when all participants play the 20 
same role in a process (Janz 1982). I decided not to use it because of the constraint of 21 
time on the interviews as I felt it would take significantly longer than thirty-minutes to 22 
conduct useful interviews. 23 
3.4.3.2 Group Interviews and Focus Groups 24 
Group Interviews require the assembly of the group to brainstorm and respond to an 25 
interview questions as a group (Janz 1982).  As my focus is on the individual’s 26 
perceptions and actions this approach is not appropriate. I do not want the team to be led 27 
to a consensus by dominant individuals; I want to hear the opinions and experiences of 28 
individual members. In addition it fails the test of practicability. Assembling 29 
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satisfactory groups out of normal work – without funding – would be a challenge. 1 
Assembling them during work would disrupt the ward. 2 
3.4.3.3 One to one interviewing 3 
The interview in qualitative research can be used to discover what meanings the 4 
subjects ascribe to events. Brinkmann and Kvale (2014) have categorised the task in 5 
interviewing as to understand the meaning of what the interviewees say (Brinkmann and 6 
Kvale 2014). A qualitative research interview covers both the facts, and the meanings of 7 
what the subject says.  It is usually more difficult to interview so as to expose the 8 
meanings than to get at the facts (Brinkmann and Kvale 2014). 9 
Interviews are particularly useful for getting the participants interpretation of the story 10 
behind their experiences. Seidman (2014) describes some possible approaches to the 11 
interview (Seidman 2014). . 12 
• Informal, conversational interview - without predetermined questions, to remain 13 
as open and adaptable as possible to the interviewee’s nature and priorities. 14 
• General interview guide approach - the guide approach is intended to ensure that 15 
the same general areas of information are collected from each interviewee; this 16 
provides more focus than the conversational approach, but still allows a degree 17 
of freedom and adaptability in getting the information from the interviewee.  18 
• Standardized, open-ended interview - the same open-ended questions are asked 19 
to all interviewees; this approach facilitates faster interviews that can be more 20 
easily analyzed and compared.  21 
• Closed, fixed-response interview - where all interviewees are asked the same 22 
questions and asked to choose answers from among the same set of alternatives. 23 
This format is useful for those not practiced in interviewing.  24 
3.4.4 Deciding on the Semi-Structured Interview Method For Data Collection 25 
My method of data collection has been by semi-structured interview. My investigation 26 
was constrained by the time and effort my subjects are prepared to commit and 27 
particularly by the impact of my activities on the running of the ward. I discounted 28 
observation and diary techniques as unsuitable on the grounds that the subjects normal 29 
behaviour was likely to be significantly changed by knowing they were being watched, 30 
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by practical difficulties in getting a large number of staff to make the major effort of 1 
cooperating with this intrusive and time consuming work, and by the fact that it would 2 
take a long time to capture data relating to relatively infrequent events. Questionnaires 3 
and behaviour description interviewing are more appropriate to a deductive process, 4 
whereas I was hoping to use the data to develop theory by induction. I therefore settled 5 
upon interviewing to collect data. The interviews were semi-structured in that I directed 6 
the conversation towards a number of topics, but otherwise ‘open’ in the expectation 7 
that accounts were realistic, personal and nuanced. Britten has written that only if this is 8 
achieved will valid interpretation and theory building be possible (Britten 2007). 9 
3.5 The research question 10 
The research question is important in quantitative research where the philosophical 11 
stance is realist and positivist. For quantitative research, of the type that guides outcome 12 
studies for evidence-based medicine, the framing of a specific research question is 13 
crucial. In qualitative research there is much debate about the function and status of the 14 
research question. Bryman (2006) has stated that the conventional view, in many 15 
methodological discussions, is that research questions guide decisions about research 16 
design and methods. In interviews with qualitative researchers he found that there are 17 
two opinions. One group maintains that research is only valuable when a suitable 18 
research question can be framed to describe its aims whilst other researchers maintain 19 
that useful studies can follow from research – even in the absence of a formal research 20 
question (Bryman 2007). Denscombe (2014) has written that in qualitative research, 21 
conducted without a priori assumptions, the research question is still important in 22 
determining the scope of the enquiry (Denscombe 2014). Without a question in mind 23 
there are limitless ways the research may lead. 24 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) have considered whether the qualitative researcher frames a 25 
research question to fit their methodology or whether the research question determines 26 
the methodology. They dismiss this point because the answer is elusive, as the processes 27 
of choice are often unconscious, or mandated by other issues such as the researchers 28 
training, background and their potential audience (Corbin and Strauss 2008). They say: 29 
“Qualitative studies are usually exploratory and more hypothesis generating 30 
rather than testing. Therefore it is necessary to frame the research question in 31 
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a manner that provides the researcher with sufficient flexibility and freedom 1 
to explore the topic in some depth”. (Corbin 2008) p25 2 
They consider that an important function of the research question in qualitative research 3 
is to set the boundaries of the investigation. 4 
At the outset the stated aim of this project was: 5 
To investigate how issues between professions, issues between disciplines, and 6 
authority patterns affect the medical and nursing team’s responses to critical 7 
events in the context of formalised protocols for the management of adult patient 8 
deterioration.  9 
As required by a grounded theory method, I approached the work without a defined 10 
hypothesis (Glaser, Strauss et al. 1967), but with a suspicion (sensitising concept) that 11 
the workings of the system were being affected by factors relating to the interactions 12 
within the team, arising from them belonging to different professional groups, and by 13 
their various expectations of the MEWS. I have sought to investigate their perceptions, 14 
how they relate to one another in their teams and how they organise the work generated 15 
by the EWS alongside the rest of their tasks. The MEWS system is fundamentally 16 
dichotomous in that the nursing team issues the alert and the medical team responds. 17 
MEWS itself is responsible for this division because there is no provision for the 18 
nursing team to change any management of the patient prior to calling the medical team. 19 
In, “Constructing Grounded Theory” (2006) Chapter Two, “Gathering Rich Data”, 20 
Charmaz describes the processes that the researcher should go through in collecting data 21 
without explicitly mentioning a research question in the sense that is used in much 22 
quantitative research (Charmaz 2006). She has suggested that the researcher asks 23 
themselves a number of general questions about their research situation and uses these 24 
to guide their data collection. 25 
• What is the setting of action? When and how does action take place?  26 
• What is going on? What is the overall activity being studied, the relatively long- 27 
term behaviour about which participants organize themselves? What specific 28 
acts comprise this activity?  29 
• What is the distribution of participants over space and time in these locales?  30 
• How are actors [research participants] organized? What organizations effect, 31 
oversee, regulate or promote this activity?  32 
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• How are members stratified? Who is ostensibly in charge? Does being in charge 1 
vary by activity? How is membership achieved and maintained?  2 
• What do actors pay attention to? What is important, preoccupying, critical?  3 
• What do they pointedly ignore that other persons might pay attention to?  4 
• What symbols do actors invoke to understand their worlds, the participants and 5 
processes within them, and the objects and events they encounter? What names 6 
do they attach to objects, events, persons, roles, settings, equipment?  7 
• What practices, skills, stratagems, methods of operation do actors employ?  8 
• Which theories, motives, excuses, justifications or other explanations do actors 9 
use in accounting for their participation? How do they explain to each other, not 10 
to outside investigators, what they do and why they do it?  11 
• What goals do actors seek? When, from their perspective, is an act well or 12 
poorly done? How do they judge action-by what standards, developed and 13 
applied by whom?  14 
• What rewards do various actors gain from their participation? 15 
 16 
(Charmaz and Mitchell 2001) p. 163  17 
In discussing its role Bryman (2007) has also indicated a fluid approach to the research 18 
question. He believes that the initial research question will often need to be adjusted in 19 
the light of a comprehensive reading of the relevant literature, or in view of the 20 
emerging data (Bryman 2007). My intended methodology did not lend itself to a narrow 21 
research question and it was not likely to have a specific answer, rather, it sets out a 22 
basis for enquiry from which I was hoping that theory will develop that sheds light on 23 
the use of the MEWS protocol.  24 
3.6 The Influence of Grounded Theory on Study Design 25 
The adoption of a grounded theory method had a number of important influences on this 26 
study. The important feature of grounded theory, that shapes the whole study, is that 27 
theory is emergent, and its formulation occurs late, whereas in many other research 28 
methodologies theory determines the research question and is the prelude to starting 29 
work. 30 
As shown in Table 4 (p 68) the study did not begin with a hypothesis or ‘closed’ 31 
research question, the research question was broader and remained flexible throughout 32 
the project. Grounded theory calls for concurrent data collection and analysis in order 33 
that an iterative process can be used to shape the enquiry. A feature of constructivist 34 
grounded theory is that the researcher is acknowledged to influence both the collection 35 
and interpretation of data. This requires preliminary reflection upon those experiences 36 
and beliefs. The processes of analysis and coding can incorporate reflections and 37 
interpretations from the researcher in the form of memos. 38 
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The particular purpose of a grounded theory method is that it is a flexible form of 1 
enquiry that allows or encourages the researcher to change direction and shape the study 2 
in response to the findings. Concepts and theories are emergent. This aspect of 3 
grounded theory requires the researcher to ‘deeply’ understand the data and to 4 
constantly strive to understand what the data is telling them. 5 
Rigour is shown by constant attempts to ‘triangulate’ findings. That is to say, to 6 
reinforce a finding by searching for corroboration in other interviews. This is part of the 7 
basis for theoretical sampling – new participants being recruited because they will be 8 
likely to add information on a concept that is emerging from the data. Searching for 9 
reinforcement of evidence also requires modification of the interview framework. 10 
3.7 Setting up the Study  11 
My initial proposal was to perform this study within a single clinical team. As this was a 12 
study of the influences at play within a group, there was no reason to extend the data 13 
collection beyond this group – depth was more important than breadth. I did not believe 14 
that all clinical teams would have identical professional and social structures; indeed I 15 
knew from my experience that professional, clinical structures were very variable. I was 16 
not seeking to precisely define the influences on doctor and nurse behaviour. Rather, I 17 
had expectations that it would be possible to broadly define those factors. In the event 18 
the study had to be conducted in two Trusts, for reasons outlined below. Some of the 19 
concepts applying to the study are shown in Table 9. 20 
21 
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 1 
Table 9. Some concepts applying to this study 
Concept Description 
Natural Setting Data was collected in a natural environment. No control 
over subject behaviour. No experimental intervention. 
Holistic The whole was more than its parts. The effect of 
contextual factors was considered. 
Emergent Design The study design evolved with the study data 
Researcher Role Researcher was responsive and adaptive at all stages 
Saturation Complete when new information ceased to be offered by 
participants 
3.7.1 Ethical Issues 2 
There are ethical challenges for researchers face at all stages of a study, including 3 
anonymity, confidentiality, informed consent, and the researchers’ potential impact on 4 
the participants. The principal of beneficence in healthcare research calls for the 5 
researcher to always do what is best for the patients. This can come into conflict with 6 
responsibilities to the participant. The successful conduct of the research is dependent 7 
on a proper relationship between the researcher and the participant. This requires that 8 
consent be fully informed. In this study the participants were informed about the 9 
purpose of the research and about how the results would be used. It was made clear at 10 
this stage that questions might focus upon good and bad episodes of care and 11 
confidentiality of information was agreed. Participants were offered the opportunity to 12 
review the transcript of their interview. Some participants were particularly anxious that 13 
their managers did not see their opinions. All identifying information was removed from 14 
the research records and only grade and profession recorded for each interview. The 15 
date of interview was also removed. Following transcription the audio files were 16 
deleted. 17 
3.7.1.1 Impact on the Participants 18 
Clarke has described personal experiences in the pursuit of qualitative research and 19 
stresses the effect that being interviewed may have on the participant (Clarke 2006). 20 
The interviews required the participants to relate events that were sensitive and in some 21 
cases troubling. Several of the medical staff became upset as they recounted very trying 22 
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experiences where they felt isolated and unable to cope. This issue was discussed with 1 
the consultant surgeon who had oversight of my clinical access and it was agreed that I 2 
would offer a follow up interviews at the conclusion of the interview in order that they 3 
could talk through their experiences. All the medical staff were offered the opportunity 4 
to continue the discussion in the presence of the trust Clinical Tutor, who is responsible 5 
for their welfare. The members of the nursing team were also offered follow up 6 
discussions and the opportunity to discuss issues with a senior nurse who did not have 7 
responsibility for their management. Sanjaraji et al have reviewed the ethics of 8 
qualitative research and stress that such measures for dealing with emotional fall-out, 9 
must be in place prior to the study (Sanjari, Bahramnezhad et al. 2014). 10 
3.7.1.2 Confidentiality and Disclosure of Sensitive Material by Participants 11 
It was conceivable that interviews would reveal episodes of clinical malpractice and 12 
workplace problems such as bullying. At the outset of each interview the interviewer 13 
informed the participant that all material was confidential except in the case of any 14 
disclosures that related to criminal or grossly negligent events involving themselves or 15 
others. In the event of any such disclosure the course of action would be discussed with 16 
the participant before any further action was taken. It was explained that the researcher 17 
would be in breach of their professional code of conduct if they neglected to take action. 18 
3.7.2 Ethical Approval and Workplace Access 19 
It is the policy of the University of Northumbria that ethics approval needs to be granted 20 
internally, prior to applications to outside institutions. The ethics application to the 21 
University was a straightforward process. With the support of my supervisors I was able 22 
to begin the process of setting a suitably broad research question and applying a 23 
methodological approach to the study. I had chosen grounded theory as in my reading 24 
and understanding of the design I felt it offered the opportunity for me to generate 25 
theory from the grass roots of the data.  26 
I set about applying to a large NHS Trust and met with the Research and Development 27 
team. The time from application to ethical permission was stated to be approximately 28 
four weeks. The Trust I approached insisted that a nominated medically qualified 29 
consultant led all clinical research. This presented difficulties because my being seen to 30 
be ‘working for’ one of the consultants altered the power dynamic. I was fortunate to 31 
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secure the support of a consultant surgeon who was interested in the care of 1 
deteriorating patients and understood the possible importance of human factors in 2 
clinical care.  3 
The process of the Trust application and IRAS application was lengthy and, despite 4 
close contact with the Trust’s R&D department at each stage of submission, it was 5 
rejected. The Research and Ethics Committee commented unfavourably on my use of a 6 
qualitative methodology, and in particular grounded theory. It has been noted previously 7 
that grounded theory is not favourably received by committees that oversee research 8 
quality, and by grant distribution bodies (Luckerhoff and Guillemette 2011). The 9 
process had taken 10 months. I was disappointed, upset and angry. I am however 10 
tenacious and determined. I sought the reason for the rejection and within a few hours 11 
had organised a meeting with the R&D department for a review of the application.  The 12 
reason given for the initial rejection was that the Trust felt that the findings of the study 13 
might reflect adversely on its services. After negotiation they agreed to their 14 
involvement as part of a multi-site study. A problem I was encountering was that 15 
researchers were not permitted to directly present their proposals at this trusts ethical 16 
committee. I had to explain my proposal to one of the committee’s administrative 17 
assistants, who then presented it to the committee. I found this remote form of 18 
application very frustrating. Having been rejected, I was able to further discuss my 19 
proposal and it became clear that if I did the work in more than one trust - making 20 
identification less likely - then a re-application might succeed. I immediately applied to 21 
a second trust and they agreed my proposal without complication. My re-submission to 22 
the first trust was then successful and I was granted access.  23 
This process delayed my project by a year. Whilst I understand the need for trusts to be 24 
scrupulous in the research they permit, I was told directly that fear of adverse publicity 25 
was a major concern. This appeared to me to be a problematical attitude. If well- 26 
conducted research indicates that there are problems with any aspect of patient care and 27 
services then it is important for the trust to responsibly investigate in order to optimise 28 
their service. In the prevailing climate of suspicion of ‘outsider’ research such progress 29 
becomes difficult. 30 
In my second trust I was not required to work formally through a member of the 31 
medical staff and I organised access to staff through the ward manager – a senior nurse. 32 
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My entire project almost foundered on the difficulties of obtaining access and ethical 1 
approval. Reflecting upon this time has provided me with deeper insight into the 2 
difficulties of navigating ethical approval across healthcare institutions. I suspected that 3 
a quantitative study would have been given more sympathetic consideration. Part of the 4 
problem appeared to be that some members of the Research Ethics Committee believed 5 
that qualitative researchers ‘made up’ their conclusions leaving them free to make 6 
public any bee that might settle in their bonnet, whereas a quantative enquiry would 7 
stand or fall by statistical measurement of empirical data. I can appreciate the 8 
safeguarding requirements of stringent processes and, although initially frustrated I felt 9 
that it added weight to my study and strengthened my resolve. Peers undergoing their 10 
own PhD and Professional Doctorate studies asked me why I had chosen such a difficult 11 
route to a PhD. I hadn’t, not on purpose. I had chosen a topic and a question because I 12 
thought the answer was important and interesting. I would not have been able to 13 
concentrate this amount of effort on a trivial subject or one that left me cold. I felt more 14 
equipped as a result of these difficult experiences, and felt they were vital to my overall 15 
development as a postgraduate researcher.  16 
3.7.3 Securing the Cooperation of Staff 17 
The trainee medical staff, nurses and care assistants were initially cautious about 18 
participating. I presented the proposal in departmental meetings and a number of 19 
questions were asked about confidentiality. It was clear that the potential participants 20 
were fearful that issues might emerge that would result in them being criticised. With 21 
reassurance most of the staff agreed to participate. The exception was nurses recruited 22 
from the Philippines. They discussed the matter amongst themselves and all refused to 23 
participate. The effect of this decision on the validity of the data and subsequent 24 
conclusions must be considered. 25 
3.7.3.1 Sampling strategy 26 
The principles of sampling for qualitative research are shown in Table 10. This 27 
investigation focuses upon the perceptions and opinions of doctors, nurses (RGNs) and 28 
Healthcare Assistants. My expectation was that staff from different professional groups 29 
might have different opinions, and that within professional groups opinions may vary 30 
with seniority. In Charmaz’s terms these were sensitising concepts (Charmaz 2006) 31 
p32).  32 
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 1 
Table 10. Principles Of Sampling for Qualitative Research 
 
Aim To generate a sample allowing the MEWS process to be 
understood 
Technique Purposive Sampling – selection of the most productive sample to 
answer the research question. Distinguish this from statistical 
sampling where any potential subject has an equal chance of 
being selected. 
Theoretical Sampling - selection is guided by the themes 
emerging from the simultaneous analysis. 
Size Continue until new themes stop being offered. 
Time and resources will limit 
Sample size is not statistically determined 
The categories that emerge, and the theories constructed would not necessarily 2 
generalise to the whole sample - so a ‘non-probability’ sample was appropriate (all 3 
subjects did not have the same chance of being selected). The ward teams are small, and 4 
for some grades and professions a large percentage of the sub-group was interviewed. 5 
To sample such a heterogeneous group required an initial system of purposive sampling 6 
I had decided upon sets of six interviewees from each group. Selection was not 7 
randomised. The list of participants interviewed is shown in Appendix I. 8 
The grounded theory methodology requires that sampling be adjusted as theory is 9 
constructed, in order to search for confirmatory data and to fill gaps. This ‘theoretical 10 
sampling’ directs the interviewing in ways that will provide additional data in the area 11 
where theory is being tentatively constructed. Theoretical sampling cannot occur until a 12 
category is emerging that prompts the researcher to begin to construct a theory.  The 13 
researcher must not direct interviews in ways intended to confirm their developing 14 
theory, rather, they must direct the interviewing in ways that produce data relevant to 15 
the theory that may strengthen or weaken their argument. The procedure should then 16 
continue until new categories no longer emerge (saturation).  17 
Often what is described as grounded theory is an abbreviated version of the method that 18 
uses the systems of coding and sorting the data, but little else (Denscombe 2014 p77). I 19 
have used methods derived from Charmaz but sampling was constrained by the 20 
availability of participants and by time. The requirement of clinical access was that my 21 
interviewing was done with minimal impact on clinical care. This determined my initial 22 
use of quota sampling. I was keen to be flexible enough to allow theoretical sampling if 23 
the analysis so dictated but the availability of interviewees often interfered.  24 
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As my theory was constructed additional subjects were recruited.  Initially ‘purposive 1 
sampling’ was used, selecting cohorts to interview on the basis of their professional 2 
role. My justification is that the actions and responses of healthcare assistants, 3 
registered nurses and medical staff are to a large extent determined by their professional 4 
role in the team, as incorporated within the protocol. It was necessary to interview 5 
members of all the groups, because my interest lay in the group interactions. 6 
Subsequently, I increased the numbers of foundation doctors and healthcare assistants 7 
as my emergent ideas required. I had not initially intended to interview managers, but 8 
again emerging theory directed me to do so. 9 
3.7.3.2 Access to Potential Subjects 10 
All the staff in the multi-professional teams were provided with full written information. 11 
I attended four morbidity meetings at which I presented the proposed study to the teams 12 
and answered questions. 13 
The great majority of staff agreed to be interviewed. The exception was the nurses from 14 
the Philippines. Both trusts have actively recruited qualified nurses from the Philippines 15 
- about 10% of nursing staff on both wards. None agreed to be interviewed. All the 16 
immigrant doctors and those immigrant nurses from countries other than the Philippines 17 
did agree to participate.  I understood that the Philippine nurses had discussed amongst 18 
themselves whether to volunteer, and the decision was made within the group. I did not 19 
seek to discover what had led to the decision, but from some of the comments made it 20 
was clear that they were concerned that there might be adverse consequences from what 21 
they revealed in interview. The entire cohort of Philippine-trained registered nurses is 22 
therefore missing from this research. Consideration will be given later to how this 23 
influences the findings. 24 
The information sheet and consent forms are provided in the appendices I and J. 25 
3.7.3.3 The Clinical Context 26 
The study was conducted in two acute healthcare trusts in the North of England. A 27 
general surgical ward and a medical admissions ward were used. These are both places 28 
where sudden unexpected deterioration in the patient’s condition is a relatively frequent 29 
problem. Fortunately both sites used an identical system, the Modified Early Warning 30 
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Score (MEWS), alerting the patient’s ‘home’ medical team to the possibility of 1 
deterioration, with the nurse-led ICU Outreach Team as back up.   2 
The thirty bed surgical ward was organised into four bays of six with an additional six 3 
single rooms. This ward specialised in Lower Gastro-Intestinal Surgery but also had 4 
patients with other general surgical conditions that had been admitted as emergencies.  5 
In the other trust the ward was a 30-bedded Emergency Admissions unit. This ward 6 
received patients who were admitted from General Practitioners or from the Accident 7 
and Emergency Unit. They stayed in the ward for a variable period before being moved 8 
to another ward appropriate to their condition.  9 
The availability of monitoring equipment, the nurse staffing patterns and the medical 10 
cover was similar in both locations. 11 
3.7.3.4 The Effect of the Study 12 
Being the subject of a study has an effect on staff. The medical staff were very vocal in 13 
their critique of my proposal – both in preliminary meetings, and occasionally at the 14 
time of the interviews. Doubt about the usefulness of qualitative research was coupled 15 
with concerns about confidentiality and the possibility of criticism. 16 
This research project was conducted by asking participants what they felt about the 17 
MEWS and what affect it had on their work. In particular I sought to discover what 18 
where the key concerns of the different categories of team member. Was there 19 
agreement about these between professional groups? I particularly hoped to shed light 20 
on why there have been so many published reports of frequent breaches of the protocol. 21 
I had an expectation that professional hierarchies might be a significant influence on 22 
team behaviours. 23 
I chose a method using semi-structured interviews that were analysed using the systems 24 
of constructivist grounded theory. I used Charmaz’s approach (Charmaz 2014) because 25 
it best fitted my own relativist beliefs and I was more comfortable with admitting to 26 
interpreting statements to develop theory, than with believing that a theory was waiting 27 
to be discovered if I analysed the data correctly. It seems to me to be more logical to 28 
offer interpretations as being my own, and to argue their justification, than to claim 29 
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truth for my interpretation based on the manner of analysing the data. In the event my 1 
data led me in unexpected directions. 2 
3.7.3.5 How the MEWS was operated 3 
Both units used the Modified Early Warning Score (MEWS). All patients had their vital 4 
signs measured every four hours, and from those a score was calculated. Further action 5 
depended on the level of the score. 6 
In both these institutions the alerting process called the most junior doctor of the regular 7 
‘home’ medical team. It was at their discretion whether more experienced help would be 8 
sought. Three alternatives were available to the more junior doctors. They might deal 9 
with the alert themselves, they could call for help from more experienced doctors in 10 
their own team, up to and including the consultant, or they could call the Intensive Care 11 
Outreach Team. In both trusts this would result in the prompt attendance of a Specialist 12 
Nurse closely backed up by a medically qualified Intensive Care Specialist who might 13 
be a trainee or a consultant. 14 
If a trigger score were recorded the junior doctor would attend and decide upon further 15 
action. This alerting process is designed to be quite mechanical and relies solely on the 16 
vital signs. The carer who measures and records the signs is not required to make any 17 
clinical judgement about the patient and should always call the doctor if the score 18 
passes the threshold. The doctor is then expected to review the patient and make an 19 
appropriate response. 20 
3.7.3.6 Monitoring Outcome 21 
Neither trust was collecting and reviewing any detailed outcome data as a routine. Both 22 
units review patient outcomes at Mortality and Morbidity meetings at which MEWS 23 
data would be part of the information when discussing patients who suffered adverse 24 
events. There was no systematic definition or systematic means of identifying events as 25 
‘adverse’.  The review was directed towards revealing any deficiencies of staffing, 26 
training, organisation and equipment that contributed to adverse events. Major errors 27 
resulted in the generation of a “Seriously Untoward Incident” report that was reviewed 28 
by the Trusts Clinical Governance department and seen by management, including the 29 
CEO. Managers would then take steps to facilitate any changes needed to prevent 30 
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recurrence. Early interviews revealed that the actions of clinical staff might be 1 
influenced by this managerial supervision and I extended my interviews to include these 2 
Managers. This is in accordance with ‘theoretical sampling’ as described by Glaser - the 3 
sampling being extended to follow a possible theory, rather than being based upon a 4 
pre-defined attempt to sample categories equally. 5 
3.8 Data collection: understanding my position as a researcher  6 
The interviews were conducted and data collected over a nine-month period from 7 
January to October 2015. Carrying out the data collection was an interesting, dynamic 8 
process. In preparing for the data collection I carried out a number of ‘training’ 9 
interviews with colleagues, to test the semi structured interview tool, and to test myself, 10 
and my interview technique. This piloting allowed me to refine my questions, and gave 11 
me an opportunity to follow and probe the responses. I found this experience valuable 12 
but it also made me anxious. I carried out a reflective piece of writing after my initial 13 
interviews as, I wanted to capture (in addition to field notes) why it was that I felt 14 
anxious and exposed as a novice researcher.  Goffman’s (1978) book on the 15 
presentation of self, allowed me to understand in more depth what my emotions were in 16 
connection to my interviews, how I consciously and unconsciously prepared, dressed 17 
and presented myself. (Goffman 1978). I was relieved after discussion with my 18 
supervisors that these feelings were normal in their experience of supervision and 19 
research.  20 
During the data collection I was invited, by my clinical lead investigator, to attend a 21 
number of medical meetings that included a surgical morbidity and mortality meeting. 22 
The chair (senior surgeon) invited me to give a 5-minute overview of the research at the 23 
end of the two-hour meeting. My consultant sponsor of the study had arranged access to 24 
the meeting but did not attend. It had not been clear to the chair what was my role or my 25 
health background, and after a slightly confused start I was afforded the opportunity to 26 
address the meeting, and directed my attention to the group of mainly junior, trainee 27 
grade doctors. I was grateful for this opportunity, and I was able to follow up with a 28 
couple of interested junior doctors to take part in the study. However, I did feel that my 29 
status as a registered nurse carrying out qualitative research affected the level of interest 30 
shown by those present. A paper by Richards and Emslie demonstrated that the 31 
responses of medical staff to medically qualified and university academic interviewers, 32 
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are very different (Richards and Emslie 2000). My experience in explaining my study 1 
taught me a valuable lesson about my role, the response of potential interview subjects 2 
and the need for clear objectives for the study to be in place at subsequent meetings. 3 
The perceptions of others about my role of nurse researcher, real or imagined, were an 4 
issue to be addressed, and similar to those issues faced by Richards & Emslie (2000).   5 
Unexpectedly, I found that my role as a registered nurse-academic also presented initial 6 
barriers to interviewing my nursing colleagues. Senior nurses and matrons were initially 7 
defensive during interviews, which I felt was a response both to the subject area of 8 
study and also to my title as senior lecturer. Unregistered Health Care Assistants 9 
(HCAs) and newly registered nurses were deferential in their manner.  It has been 10 
difficult to negotiate those barriers and obstacles, such as nuances of behaviours that 11 
have created delays or stumbling blocks to the study. Responding positively in the field 12 
to negative attitudes, and adjusting my approaches to these attitudes, is a skill I have 13 
learned to meet these challenges, and which I will take forward in future research.  14 
Another barrier was explaining qualitative enquiry to the doctors. In preliminary 15 
meetings and in the formal interviews several doctors took it upon themselves to explain 16 
how a useful enquiry into this topic ought to be conducted - using quantitative methods. 17 
They were hostile to qualitative research and doubted its value. I have had to take this 18 
deep-rooted scepticism into account in interpreting the data. 19 
An unexpected issue that was related to feeling unsettled in my present role presented 20 
itself early in the data collection phase.  As the interviews expanded and developed I felt 21 
an increasing resonance with the clinical issues to which I was listening. I felt empathy 22 
with the nursing and medical staff, as I could relate to my own clinical experience to 23 
theirs. Anecdotally, I have discovered that other postgraduate researcher colleagues 24 
have experienced this feeling. I have not yet developed a strategy to manage these 25 
feelings; moreover, they have been useful in motivating me to make use of my findings. 26 
Approaching this study I was wary of making assumptions, but I had suspected that the 27 
medical and nursing teams might frame the controversies differently. The medical team 28 
is likely to express positivist ideas (Montgomery 2006) whilst the nurses are more 29 
naturally relativist (Baker 1997)  30 
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3.9 Possible Weaknesses Of This Research 1 
3.9.1 The Size of the Study 2 
Forty interviews were conducted. This might seem a very small sample size compared 3 
to the hundreds or thousands of patients included in many quantitative studies, but the 4 
data comprised over 20 hours of recorded interviews, amounting to many pages of 5 
transcript. Coding and evaluating this volume of data is a major undertaking. 6 
Constraints were: my time, the disruptive effect of taking staff away from normal duties 7 
for interviews, and the time and effort the interviewees were prepared to put into 8 
exploring the issues. Whilst the study was conducted in two hospitals in two trusts, they 9 
are adjacent, and the junior medical staff often rotates between them. They are also in 10 
the same Postgraduate Deanery and share undergraduate and postgraduate medical and 11 
nursing organisations. 12 
The study should be seen as a snapshot of practice at a particular time in a particular 13 
pair of hospitals. As such, care should be exercised in attempting to generalise the 14 
findings. Particular issues that may affect generaliseability are: 15 
• The staffing structures and working methods have features that reflect UK 16 
practice. 17 
• The use of an EWS without a specific response team as is common in the UK. 18 
The literature suggests that having a MET or EMT may significantly affect the 19 
dynamics of responding to a trigger event. 20 
The study does however suggest themes that are of interest and that are probably factors 21 
in the workings of any EWS and RRS. 22 
3.9.2 The refusal of the nurses from the Philippines to participate 23 
Both the ward areas used in this investigation had actively recruited nurses trained in 24 
the Philippines. They constituted about 10% of the nursing workforce and were all 25 
employed on grade 5 (the most junior RN role). None of these nurses agreed to be 26 
interviewed. I gave them extra time to think, and offered to discuss the issues with them 27 
individually. No one took up the offer, and all declined to take part.  Several of these 28 
nurses said that they would give their decision after discussions with their friends and it 29 
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became clear that the decision not to participate was a joint group decision.  The sample 1 
of nursing staff interviewed is therefore not fully representative and it is necessary to 2 
consider what affect this had on the study. 3 
3.9.2.1 Does this distort the sampling? 4 
The concern is that the whole of the group of nurses from the Philippines refused to take 5 
part. When there are significant numbers of staff that decline to take part in a study it is 6 
necessary to consider whether there is some unifying factor applicable to all and 7 
whether the lack of their evidence distorts the analysis. These nurses have a number of 8 
obvious factors in common. 9 
• They are all of the same ethnicity and nationality 10 
• They all trained overseas 11 
• They are all immigrants 12 
• They all speak English as a second language 13 
• They are a tight knit social group outside of work. 14 
I was not able to ask the other interviewees about the Philippine nurses ‘opt out’ as I did 15 
not have consent or ethical approval to conduct such a sensitive enquiry. During the 16 
interviews no interviewee referred to the overseas nurses either individually or as a 17 
group. None of the doctors, for instance, identified them as being more or less reliable. 18 
3.9.3 The narrow focus on one Type of Protocol 19 
The studied protocol, MEWS, was at the time of planning this research, the most 20 
widespread system in use in the UK. Since then, the Royal College of Physicians has 21 
led the development and promotion of the National Early Warning System (NEWS). 22 
The Trusts I studied adopted this new protocol in November 2016. There are differences 23 
in the alerting systems that will have impact upon how calls are cascaded but in most 24 
fundamentals MEWS and NEWS are very similar. Another development has been 25 
VIEWS that uses an automated system with hand held devices, and echoes the data to 26 
the medical team without the nurse having to place a call. This may have very 27 
significant impact on the dynamic between the doctor and nurse that merits additional 28 
study. The understandings and insights developed from the study are applicable to other 29 
systems than MEWS. Together with qualitative studies of the behaviour of teams using 30 
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METs they extend the understanding of the issues, personal and professional that 1 
influence the participants. 2 
Though this is a study of a particular rapid response system a very similar system 3 
(NEWS) has been recommended for general adoption in the UK. Though the prescribed 4 
responses to scores are more structured in this system the fundamental dynamic is the 5 
same. Nurses detect patients at risk on the basis of a composite physiological score, they 6 
report this to a very junior doctor who undertakes a review and decides whether to call 7 
for advice. This is likely to remain the UK pattern of care because of the costs of a 8 
dedicated response team. The interpretations I have made using MEWS are likely to be 9 
valid for NEWS. In countries where dedicated response teams are common staff appear 10 
to have greater concerns about demonstrating self-efficacy, and greater fear of being 11 
criticised. This appears to inhibit reporting of events and introduces another socio- 12 
cultural factor. This research sheds no light on this. 13 
3.9.4 Strategies to minimise these acknowledged weaknesses 14 
Some weaknesses in study design are unavoidable and cannot be overcome in the 15 
context of the research but measures can be taken to reduce the impact of others. 16 
Is This a Small Study? The amount of data needed for a qualitative study is often 17 
determined by observing a saturation of themes, i.e. as the interviews proceed, no new 18 
themes are emerging. In this study most major categories had been identified after four 19 
interviews in each major staff group. To achieve this the interviews had to be relatively 20 
lengthy. None was less than 40 minutes. The questions in the brief played a role in 21 
ensuring that all topic areas were addressed with each participant. When a participant 22 
expressed a new idea this was raised with subsequent interviewees from that group and 23 
also with other group members to allow triangulation. Charmaz (2006) suggests that the 24 
aims of the study are the ultimate driver of the project design, and therefore the sample 25 
size. She suggests that a small study with "modest claims" might achieve saturation 26 
quicker than a study that is aiming to describe a process that spans disciplines (Charmaz 27 
2006 p 104). It is not unusual for saturation to be achieved quickly where interviewees 28 
are connected by a dominant overall theme that is the focus of enquiry – in this case, the 29 
MEWS (Jette, Grover et al. 2003). Mason reviewed 560 PhD studies that used 30 
qualitative interviews and found that the median for numbers of interviews was 31 
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31(Mason 2010). By this measure the overall number of interviews in the current study 1 
is typical.  2 
Sampling: Could anything more have been done to persuade the nurses from the 3 
Philippines to take part? Withers and Snowball (2003) conducted a questionnaire 4 
survey of immigrant nurses from the Philippines at the John Radcliffe Infirmary in 5 
Oxford. They found that a minority of nurses had suffered what they saw as racial 6 
discrimination. Their response to this was not to complain, but to seek support within 7 
their Philippine peer group (Withers and Snowball 2003). In another study nurses from 8 
ethnic minorities reported similar episodes of prejudice and described avoiding 9 
situations that they feared might expose them to criticism, a response that might be 10 
relevant to this research (Kawi and Xu 2009). Yancey, Ortega et al (2006) have 11 
reviewed the problems of recruitment and retention of minority-ethnic subjects to public 12 
health research programmes. (Yancey, Ortega et al. 2006) Between 1995 and 2005 they 13 
identified 95 studies that addressed this issue and within them they found 20 themes. 14 
Four of these themes were believed to be particularly significant: 15 
• Sampling approach/identification of targeted participants 16 
• Community involvement/nature and timing of contact with prospective participants,  17 
• Incentives and logistical issues  18 
• Cultural adaptations 19 
I have no evidence on which to base any conclusions about why this ethnic group of 20 
nurses declined to take part, but a reading of the literature discussed above suggests that 21 
fear of criticism and fear of stigmatisation of their group were likely to be factors. 22 
It is disappointing that these foreign trained nurses declined to be interviewed because 23 
they could probably have provided a different outsider perspective on the EWS team 24 
operation. I do not think I had any alternative than to accept the Philippine nurses 25 
decision. Any attempts at further persuasion would have run the risk of including a 26 
group who felt coerced. I do not believe that their absence from the data is significant to 27 
the analysis and identification of themes relevant to the study. These events have 28 
flagged up a significant issue and call for further research to explain what is going on. 29 
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Generalisability - Focus on one system of EWS and RRS. Multi-professional teams 1 
working RRSs and EWSs are found in almost all wards where acute illness is managed. 2 
Each such team will have unique characteristics. These will be determined by the 3 
clinical context, team structures and the sociology of the group. The problem of whether 4 
it is appropriate to generalise theory derived from study of one sample is often 5 
experienced in qualitative research. Firestone (1993) categorised three approaches to 6 
generalisability (Firestone 1993). 7 
• Statistical generalisation is seen most often in quantitative studies. The 8 
statistical characteristics of the sample are used to support the extrapolation of 9 
findings to other populations with similar characteristics. 10 
• In Analytic generalisation the researcher attempts to generalise and apply 11 
theory developed from the findings in the study sample to broader populations. 12 
This rests upon careful scrutiny of findings to construct theory at higher levels of 13 
abstraction that can then be seen as applicable beyond the subjects and scrutiny 14 
of the initial sample (Ayres, Kavanaugh et al. 2003). Generalising to a theory or 15 
conceptualization requires identification of rich evidence in its support. This is 16 
the approach that I have used in developing theory in this study. 17 
• Transferability, or case-by-case transfer, is a process whereby the researcher 18 
provides sufficient information for other researchers to infer whether the 19 
conceptualisation is applicable in their, alternative context. Campbell (1986) 20 
described this as the proximal similarity model (Campbell 1986). Readers would 21 
need to judge whether the reported findings and context sufficiently matched the 22 
reported findings for them to be transferable. In this study I have hoped to give 23 
sufficient information, and to indicate particular features of the study population 24 
and systems to allow such judgments to be made. 25 
The findings and interpretations of this research report satisfy the criteria for analytic 26 
generaliseability and case by case transfer. This is partly secured by the richness of the 27 
evidence and verbatim quotes from interviews and partly by the care taken to describe 28 
the contexts of the data and the detail of the workplaces. 29 
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4 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 1 
This chapter describes the findings from the interviews. 2 
In the first section the process of interviewing, transcription and coding is explained. 3 
The major findings are then individually discussed. This discussion is divided into 4 
sections for each of the major categories that were constructed during coding. 5 
4.1 Overview of procedure 6 
The process for this research study is shown in Figure 9. 7 
Figure 9. Diagram showing the research process for this investigation 8 
 9 
The process of interviewing yielded a great deal of information in the form of 10 
transcripts. Analysis is a process of seeking for relationships, consistencies and 11 
discrepancies in the narratives. The analysis draws largely upon the ideas of Charmaz 12 
(2014). 13 
Corbin and Strauss have commented (2008): 14 
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“There are many different stories that can be constructed from the data. How 1 
an analyst puts together the concepts often requires many tries before the 2 
story or findings ‘feel right’ to him or her. Feeling right is a gut 3 
feeling.”(Corbin 2008) p3. 4 
Their conception of what emerges from analysis is truly qualitative. They accept that the 5 
data can tell many stories, some spurious, some relevant.  They further suggest that as 6 
analysis is both art and science. The art is constructing that interpretation of the data that 7 
feels right. Glaser has taught that the science of analysis is the task of ensuring that the 8 
analysis rests on concepts grounded in the data and not brought to the interpretation by 9 
the analyst (Glaser, Strauss et al. 1967). 10 
The interviews were digitally recorded , and transcribed for analysis. I read each 11 
transcript a number of times, making notes and annotations. The content was then coded 12 
using NVivo for Mac 10.1 (OSR International Pty). This software uses a database of 13 
fragments of text sorted under headings that it calls nodes. A number of coding 14 
strategies are available. As I had spent many hours reading and annotating the text I 15 
chose to draw up a list of nodes based on this experience. I then added new nodes 16 
whenever a topic emerged for which I had no coding. This list of nodes was used 17 
without developing a hierarchy. This was to avoid unintended imposition of my 18 
preconceptions on the data through allocating one node to be subsidiary to another early 19 
in the analysis. To facilitate analysis the list was divided into ‘topics’. It must be 20 
stressed that these in no way equate to theoretical concepts. 21 
As Charmaz suggests, wherever possible I described the node (code) using a gerund. 22 
(Charmaz 2014). The nodes were originally allocated to one of eight categories or 23 
topics. This was to bring similar pieces of information together and allowed me to have 24 
an overview of the data. My starting list of nodes was partly derived from the interview 25 
and was also influenced by my insider knowledge in the form of sensitising concepts. 26 
The Eight Original Nodes  27 
• Experience Level – allowing identification of categories 28 
• Opinion of EWS 29 
• Practical use of EWS 30 
• Team Working 31 
• Feelings and emotions 32 
• Values 33 
• Concerns about being watched 34 
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• Workload Issues 1 
NVivo permits the coding of each interview subject as a node. Nodes are equivalent to 2 
codes in non-NVivo analysis, and the process is called coding. Demographic data can 3 
then be entered to these nodes. This allows all statements, or statements within a single 4 
node, or group of nodes to be extracted for a given set of demographics such as: gender, 5 
professional group, years of experience, hospital etc. 6 
My original 8 nodes were not the same as grounded theory categories. Categories, as 7 
they emerged often included statements from several codes. 8 
In due course the refined list of nodes can be amalgamated to derive ‘categories’. 9 
Categories are more abstract and carry some theoretical ‘weight’ – they are already 10 
interpretations. These do not relate to the original ‘Topics’. The topics are there to speed 11 
the process of coding by making it easier to find the relevant node; the themes cross 12 
‘Topic’ boundaries and may, for instance, include an account of role; or events, along 13 
with comments, relating to values, feelings and reflections on team working. The 14 
challenge is to demonstrate relationships within the data. These analytic categories can 15 
then be used to draw out ideas that may constitute conclusions and lead to 16 
recommendations.  17 
4.1.1 Preliminary Reading 18 
In the course of my preliminary reading I have tried to understand deeply what I was 19 
being told. (see appendix F) The subjects were not deliberately hiding their meanings 20 
but as they talked their feelings and experience influenced what they said and how they 21 
said it. The process of being interviewed was for them an exploration of the topic, a 22 
topic about which they may not have thought deeply before, and thinking through the 23 
arguments with me they may have encountered a new insight. In this event they may 24 
return to the idea again during the interview. Many of the events discussed were 25 
associated with strong emotions and the emergence of these was an important indicator 26 
of issues that had great significance to the interviewee. 27 
Having conducted the interviews, I experienced direct contact with each subject and 28 
remember the non-verbal language, and mood, in which the interview was conducted 29 
(subsequently written in a field diary and included in the data as memos). Some of the 30 
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interviewees appeared worried about being indiscrete. They sat in a ‘closed’ position 1 
not using their faces and body to give emphasis or display their feelings. Some of the 2 
doctors in particular made clear from their manner that they did not really want to 3 
engage with the process of interview. This is important data and I have recorded my 4 
feelings about the interviewee, where appropriate, as memos. NVivo allows these 5 
‘asides’ to be entered as memos tied to the interviewee or a specific node – as required. 6 
I also listened to the interview recordings again to pick up on issues that emerge from 7 
the way the subject spoke, rather than the words they used. Generally the subjects were 8 
engaged with the topic and had opinions that they wanted to express. This allowed me 9 
to draw them into the discussion that generally made their attitude to the interview more 10 
open. Strong emotions during the interviews often appeared to lead to the interviewee 11 
being willing to openly discuss ‘risky’ issues. 12 
Some interviewees arrived for interview with a point to make. The two commonest 13 
were: firstly, to reassure me about the quality of care on their ward and emphasise the 14 
smooth working of the EWS; and secondly, to air a particular grievance against a 15 
professional group. The statements of these subjects had to be interpreted against this 16 
background. Such evidence was recorded as an NVivo memo. Involvement with the 17 
topics generally led to the interviewee dwelling less on what appeared to be their 18 
personal agenda. 19 
Comments made after the recording had finished are a difficult issue. King and 20 
Horrocks (2010) have remarked that the inhibiting effect of the digital recorder may 21 
only become evident when it is switched off (King and Horrocks 2010). I made clear at 22 
all stages of my interviewing that I would be using both the digital recording and my 23 
written notes as data for the research.  If the ‘of recorder’ remarks had been emotional 24 
or otherwise sensitive I specifically asked for permission to use them. ‘Off recorder’ 25 
data was held as NVivo memos. On many occasions the subject relaxed and finally 26 
expressed a range of other views and perceptions. This was particularly the case with 27 
more junior staff, both doctors and nurses. They revealed feelings of conflict and were 28 
laden with emotion. Two interviewees were tearful. I made contemporary notes of these 29 
comments and the subjects gave permission for these inclusions. I made ‘off recorder’ 30 
notes as soon as possible after the interview as I did not want to distract the interviewee 31 
by writing whilst they were talking. ‘After the Interview’ data is often particularly rich. 32 
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Another issue that I reviewed in my preliminary analysis is the weighting of my 1 
questions. Clearly in an enquiry of this sort the scheme of questioning is all-important. 2 
As described previously, I field-tested my questions on a number of colleagues in the 3 
university whose clinical background made them familiar with the topic area. As part of 4 
this exercise I attempted to eliminate leading questions. However, where the scheme of 5 
questions for the interview is only partly structured, the interviewee may lead the 6 
discussion into unexpected areas that take the interviewer of guard. In particular I have 7 
searched for, and found, instances where, particularly in attempting to clarify an answer, 8 
I may have put words into the mouth of the subject. Where this has happened I have 9 
reviewed the comment against the rest of the interviewees statements to decide whether 10 
to accept it as authentic. The scheme of questions is in Appendix M. 11 
Another use of memos is to hold fragments of relevant literature. If the interview 12 
prompted me to recall a relevant idea from a publication I would enter this as a memo 13 
tied to the interview. 14 
4.1.2 Coding 15 
Having conducted this broad review of the context of the interviews I proceeded to 16 
coding and constant comparative analysis. That is, allocating data to nodes/codes. 17 
Corbin recommends considering microanalysis as a start to coding. (Corbin 2008) p63). 18 
This constitutes a word-by-word consideration of the possible meanings of what is said. 19 
They assert that this provides a lever to begin breaking open the data. Charmaz 20 
advocates  “line-by-line” coding followed by focussed coding to gradually move 21 
towards constructing theory (Charmaz 2006) p 46). Charmaz uses this analysis to 22 
elevate some data to the status of “core categories” (Charmaz 2006) p111). I have used 23 
an initial sentence-by-sentence approach. My initial pre-analysis list rapidly increased to 24 
close to 100. The codes used for preliminary coding are shown in Appendix G. 25 
Grouping and regrouping my codes, and adding in the data from my interview diary and 26 
memos I identified my core categories. 27 
4.1.3 Identifying Analytical Categories 28 
A number of positive feelings were immediately apparent. Examples being: 29 
• Respondents believed that the EWS was useful – with reservations 30 
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• The nurses felt that it improved the management of sick patients 1 
• The nurses felt that it helped the communication of a problem to the medical team. 2 
A number of negative feelings were also immediately apparent. Examples being: 3 
• The protocol is not treated as mandatory 4 
• Workload interferes with the availability of doctors of all grades 5 
• There is a ‘disconnect’ between nurse management and medical management of the 6 
patients 7 
• There is a failure of communication of clinical decisions from the medical team to 8 
the nurses 9 
The further analysis of categories seeks to find additional themes but also to show how 10 
the data coded at other nodes might be contributing. I have tried to treat comments 11 
neutrally. There are two aspects to every comment. Firstly, there is the face value of the 12 
words that have a meaning. Secondly, there is often a subtext that can be inferred. For 13 
instance, a nurse’s comment that having a MEWS score available makes them more 14 
confident of their position when calling the doctor has the subtext that without it they 15 
feel less secure. Why could this be? A search of the data at other nodes may help 16 
illuminate relevant aspects of the clinical communication between the doctors and 17 
nurses. A comment from a ‘first-response’ (F1) doctor about how busy their Registrar is 18 
may indicate an acceptance of difficulty finding clinical backup and a search at other 19 
nodes may find comments about lack of support and the anxiety it provokes. 20 
4.1.4 Other Strategies 21 
I used the word search facilities of NVivo to find significant quotes within the data. The 22 
searches were often prompted by my comments in my diary or by a comment by one 23 
respondent that led to a search for similar ideas in other interviews. Word frequency 24 
searching allows exclusion of common words and therefore allows extraction of words 25 
that might be relevant to the analysis. The word collapse and the phrase sudden 26 
deterioration might occur when the practical aspects of EWS were being discussed. The 27 
programme allows the words to be followed to their occurrence in the transcript. This 28 
approach increases the amount of data in existing nodes and suggests new nodes. 29 
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS FINDINGS 
 
115 
Direct search for key words of low frequency such as ‘fear’ were used to find 1 
significant passages in the data. The search feature can also be applied to a node – 2 
drawing attention to the words used by all the interviewees who have commented on the 3 
issues coded to the node. 4 
4.1.5 Hidden Categories 5 
I have made particular efforts to find data relating to feelings, emotions and values. I 6 
have deliberately not asked questions about these influences but have sought to infer 7 
them from the subjects’ broader answers. Feelings of anxiety, for instance, are often 8 
discussed in response to prompts about the work. Similarly, beliefs about the quality of 9 
care, patient safety and collegiality can be found. I have been careful to avoid over- 10 
interpretation of comments. For me to accept that a comment reveals an attitude it has to 11 
be explicit. By attitude I mean that the interviewee demonstrates a predisposition to 12 
respond in certain ways to particular events and that this predisposition comes from the 13 
way they evaluate ideas, events and people. I have then attempted to triangulate the data 14 
with comments relating to other issues within the subjects interview. I have become 15 
aware that some concepts are very concrete whilst some are more abstract. It is these 16 
abstract ideas that are most difficult to see in the data. 17 
4.1.6 Constructing Theory 18 
This study started without a hypothesis and is intended to suggest further questions that 19 
need to be asked rather than to demonstrate proof of an idea that emerges from the data. 20 
For instance, it might have been found that the junior doctors overwhelmingly believed 21 
that the nurses fail to report instances of EWS values reaching the trigger threshold. The 22 
theory that the EWS system fails to improve outcome because the nurses don’t call the 23 
doctors cannot be proven from this data and would call for quantitative research to 24 
confirm the reported problem. It is however legitimate to raise such questions and 25 
formulate theory on the interview evidence. In other areas the data can generate an idea 26 
and go some way towards supporting it. For instance if all respondents volunteered the 27 
information that using EWS reduced their anxiety about diagnosing incipient patient 28 
deterioration then this would be a conclusion that could be supported from this data. 29 
How strongly it is supported would depend upon the breadth, depth and context of 30 
relevant comments. This research has suggested further follow up, both qualitative and 31 
quantitative to further substantiate the theories that are generated. 32 
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As the interviews and analysis proceeded I became aware that there were several stories 1 
in what I was being told. There was a story of the stresses of practice for inexperienced 2 
doctors and a story of the difficulty of keeping a grip on a ‘firm’ from more senior 3 
doctors. There was a story about the role of nurses in care, and a story about 4 
communication. I hoped in my analysis to do justice to all the narrative strands that I 5 
could see and at the same time bring together some ideas about how they influence the 6 
protocols for the care of deteriorating patients.  7 
I did not immediately understand what Glaser meant when he described an emergent 8 
theory being discovered as I worked with coding I came to see how the data, the 9 
insights from memos and items from the literature all came together to generate 10 
concepts.  11 
4.1.7 The effect of my role 12 
I have previously discussed my role in the dialogue with the interviewees in terms of 13 
role, experience gender etc. Many of these factors continued to operate during analysis.  14 
As part of the learning journey in gathering the interview data, I kept a field diary to 15 
make notations of all aspects of the interviews both verbal and non-verbal information 16 
from the interview process, which at times were formally presented as reflective 17 
accounts. The role of the researcher according to Charmaz work is particularly sensitive, 18 
as the researcher becomes part of the dynamic interview process. Challenges to this 19 
process included the need to support the interviewee when the subject matter became 20 
distressing (therapeutic listening) and remaining separate or outside of the process given 21 
that the instincts are to be supportive and empathetic. A small number of the 22 
interviewees did not make a move to leave after the formal end of the interview, after 23 
the recorder had been turned off, and began to talk more spontaneously. It was clear 24 
they were getting something off their chests and they spoke more personally about work 25 
and their work relationships.  26 
4.1.8 Reflecting on the Analysis 27 
The analysis is a protracted, potentially endless process. I used NVIVO for Mac©. This 28 
programme was not available for Mac on the University system so I had to buy it. I then 29 
had to learn how to use it which was not easy. I also had to organise transcription of the 30 
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interview files to Word. I was fortunate to find a secretary who was accustomed to the 1 
transcription process. The analysis process was however interesting, and learning how 2 
to do it has increased my repertoire of research skills. 3 
Learning how to code data was the most straightforward, mechanical part of the 4 
process. I then had to learn the routines of coding as used for constructivist grounded 5 
theory in order to develop themes of greater abstraction and ultimately theory. 6 
This process was perhaps the most surprising of the skills I have learned. To my 7 
surprise, unexpected theory began to be constructed. The proponents of grounded theory 8 
have asserted that this will happen and that it is the most valued part of their 9 
methodology. Nonetheless it was very surprising to find the extent to which the system 10 
was leading me to a new conceptualisation of the issues.   11 
4.1.9 Rigour 12 
Qualitative research is frequently characterised as unscientific, biased, subjective, 13 
anecdotal and person-dependent on the part of the interviewer (Kvale 1994). It is not 14 
appropriate in this study report to ignore such criticism. The methodology of this study, 15 
grounded theory, was developed specifically to bring rigour to qualitative research.  16 
Lincoln and Guba (1985 p. 290) asked, “How can an inquirer persuade his or her 17 
audiences that the research findings of an inquiry are worth paying attention to?” They 18 
compared rigour in quantitative and qualitative research and suggested that the 19 
appropriate qualitative equivalents of internal validity, external validity, validity and 20 
reliability, in quantitative research, are credibility, transferability, consistency and 21 
confirmability (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Charmaz has suggested that proper adherence 22 
to the principles of constructivist grounded theory will result in a study having the 23 
credibility, originality, resonance and usefulness, that she identifies as evidence of 24 
rigour (Charmaz 2014). Credibility represents how well the findings reflect the data. 25 
This was achieved here through the constant comparative analysis. As theoretically 26 
informed categories emerged they were tested with new participants and debated 27 
amongst the research team.  28 
Rigour also requires that there is adequate data. Dey (1999) suggested that data should 29 
be collected until theoretical sufficiency is reached. In this way the investigation ends 30 
when theory emerges and finds support in the data through the underlying concepts.  31 
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Adequacy of data rests also upon its weight and depth; and upon the claim being made 1 
on the basis of the evidence, rather than upon the number of interviews (Charmaz 2014 2 
page 215). These factors call for deep exploration of the data. The originality and 3 
usefulness of the study will be explored in the findings and discussion section below. 4 
Resonance has been demonstrated by the positive response to the theory when presented 5 
to national and international audiences of clinicians.  6 
Credibility: Lincoln and Guba (1985) write that credibility in naturalistic enquiry rests 7 
upon the production of findings that are believable and that are recognised as 8 
meaningful by the participants. The credibility of the research rests upon:  9 
• Rigorous techniques and methods for gathering high-quality data that are 10 
carefully analysed, with attention to issues of validity, reliability, and 11 
triangulation  12 
• The credibility of the researcher, which is dependent on training, experience, 13 
track-record, and status  14 
• The philosophical belief in the value of qualitative inquiry, that is, a fundamental 15 
appreciation of naturalistic inquiry, qualitative methods, inductive analysis, 16 
purposeful  sampling, and holistic thinking (Patton 1999) 17 
Rigour by itself does not assure high quality research. The topic must be worthwhile 18 
and the reporting must be sincere, demonstrating a sceptical approach, a commitment to 19 
the topic and clear concern to add to the way it is understood (Tracy 2010). Another 20 
determinant of credibility is the nature of the data. It must be sufficient and ‘rich’. 21 
Richness relates to the engagement of the participants. Does the researcher succeed in 22 
provoking them to connect with the discussion and contribute honestly to the 23 
discussion? This can be demonstrated by the use of verbatim quotes and by the 24 
researcher using memos and field notes to include information on the participant’s tone 25 
and any displays of emotion. Laughter or anger in response to a question are important 26 
evidence and can be incorporated into verbatim accounts from participants. In this study 27 
I used both a field diary and memos. Some participants became very concerned to 28 
express their views and there were several occurrences of anger, amusement and tears in 29 
response to the discussion. Quantity of data is another issue for credibility. There is no 30 
qualitative equivalent to a power calculation in quantitative research as a way to set the 31 
amount of data required. The analysis of interview data is so time consuming that the 32 
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handling of large amounts becomes unwieldy. In terms of quantitative research the use 1 
of 40 subjects is very small and for this reason those accustomed to quantitative 2 
evidence from hundreds or thousands of instances are often critical of qualitative 3 
research. The interviews in this study totalled nearly 24 hours of recordings and the 4 
transcripts stretch to nearly 300 pages. This is a great deal of evidence that must be 5 
interpreted line-by-line and paragraph-by-paragraph. 6 
In the case of this study an aspect of the method that establishes credibility (genuineness 7 
and honesty of data) and confirmability (reproducibility and stability of the data) is the 8 
process of constant comparison. (Hallberg 2006) This is undertaken concurrently with 9 
the data being collected and the findings can be fed back into the ongoing interview 10 
process. Constant comparison is between participants, between professions and with the 11 
published literature (Fram 2013). In this study constant comparison by the researcher 12 
was complemented by frequent discussion with the research supervisors.  13 
Triangulation is another method of ensuring the robustness of the data. It refers to the 14 
use of multiple methods or data sources in qualitative research to develop a 15 
comprehensive understanding of phenomena (Patton, 1999). Triangulation also has been 16 
viewed as a qualitative research strategy to test validity through the convergence of 17 
information from different sources. Denzin (1978) and Patton (1999) identified four 18 
types of triangulation: (a) method triangulation – using a variety of methods 19 
simultaneously (b) investigator triangulation – having interpretation undertaken by a 20 
number of researchers (c) theory triangulation – applying a variety of theories to the 21 
emerging concepts  and (d) data source triangulation – comparing data from different 22 
sources.. 23 
In this study data triangulation took place across participants, professions and teams. 24 
This involved seeking further evidence for something by asking similar questions of 25 
other participants. For example in this study the medical team explained that they 26 
needed to triage MEWS calls because they were very busy. Subsequent questioning of 27 
the nurses and senior medical clinicians extended the evidence. Theoretical sampling 28 
may facilitate triangulation by introducing new participants who the researcher believes 29 
will assist in clarifying evidence. In this study the nursing staff appeared to be very 30 
concerned with the possible personal consequences for themselves – of a failure of care 31 
that was principally due to actions of the medical team. The sampling was therefore 32 
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extended to management, specifically to understand why the nurses had these worries. 1 
Triangulation was used extensively in this study to compare the ideas presented by the 2 
medical team with the nursing team and between the ideas of junior and senior members 3 
of both teams. 4 
As data emerged from the coded scripts of the interviews, discrepant or outlier 5 
experiences and opinions were sought. Deviant case analysis is the process of 6 
examining such occurrences to see if reasons for the different opinions could be 7 
understood and whether this required readjustment of the ideas being constructed 8 
(Molnar 1967). Investigator triangulation was undertaken by extensive discussion of the 9 
data with the supervisors. 10 
Transferability: The transferability of the findings is facilitated by the description of 11 
the setting of the research, the function of the teams and the sampling method. This 12 
would permit researchers to repeat similar observations and analysis and allows a 13 
judgement of how the findings might apply is other contexts and environments. 14 
Transferability is helped by adherence to established methodology because this allows 15 
others, who understand and use those systems, to read the study report and fully 16 
understand the nature of data collection and analysis.  17 
Consistency:  Dependability is a method used to show consistency of findings.  18 
Qualitative researchers describe in detail the exact methods of data collection, analysis, 19 
and interpretation.  This is so the study could be auditable to describe the situation, and 20 
for another researcher to follow the study.   In the present study the PhD supervisors 21 
fulfilled the role of data auditor, following the data, findings, interpretations, and 22 
recommendations and considering whether the study is supported by data, and is 23 
trustworthy. 24 
Confirmability: Confirmability of the findings of the study is attempted through the 25 
description and critique of the way ideas developed from the data throughout the study. 26 
A common critique of research based on interview data is that the researcher, 27 
consciously or not, frames their questions and analysis to support a pre-existing idea – 28 
thus introducing bias. This problem is the basis of Glaser’s insistence on researchers 29 
presenting as a blank slate, and later development of techniques for setting aside pre- 30 
knowledge. As an experienced worker in the field of study being studied I was very 31 
conscious of this problem. In the event, my confidence in my method was boosted by 32 
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the way the data failed to support my pre-existing ideas about social and professional 1 
conflict between doctors and nurses and presented me with unexpected lines of enquiry. 2 
An element important for confirmability is the development of an audit trail both in 3 
relation to the development of the methods and in the steps from raw data through 4 
analysis to hypothesis.   The use of direct quotation from participants throughout this 5 
study helps transparency of the processes. The reader is able to see the actual words 6 
used in the interview and compare these with the interpretation being placed upon them 7 
by the researcher. 8 
It would have been valuable to be able to present and discuss the findings of the 9 
analysis with the participants either individually or as a focus group but the teams I had 10 
studied were widely dispersed by the time the analysis was complete. The data were 11 
presented informally to the senior medical and nursing members of the team who were 12 
still available and their comments were taken into account in the process of writing up.  13 
To assure rigour the researcher must adequately explain their methods and openly reveal 14 
an audit trail from data to codes and categories. As categories are constructed towards 15 
core categories and finally to ideas that can be considered as new theory the role of the 16 
researcher, their philosophical standpoint and their experiences become increasingly 17 
important. The analytic methods of Corbin and Strauss (Corbin 2008) attempt to make 18 
this process more transparent whereas those of Charmaz (Charmaz 2014) accept the 19 
increased role of the researcher.  20 
4.2 Findings 21 
Interviewee reported believing that using the MEWS score with a track and trigger 22 
system improved patient management and strongly endorsed its use. However, the way 23 
that MEWS was used was strategic, and varied with the professional role and grade of 24 
the respondent. Each interviewee reported finding something in MEWS that assisted 25 
them in doing their job. These things varied with role, and sometimes one group’s 26 
perception of a useful feature was perceived to be a weakness, or problem by another. 27 
Several interviewees volunteered that MEWS did expedite the discovery of impending 28 
deterioration. From the outset a number of themes appeared important. These along 29 
with related themes I identified as major categories. These categories along with 30 
descriptive definitions are shown in Table 11. 31 
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS FINDINGS 
 
122 
1 
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS FINDINGS 
 
123 
 1 
Table 11 Major Categories and Their Descriptive Definitions 
 Name of Major 
Category 
Definition 
Category 1: Understanding MEWS Statements relating to what the participant believes to 
be the purpose and mechanism of action of the 
MEWS 
Category 2: Responding to workload Statements relating to the impact of workload on 
clinical behaviour 
Category 3: Triaging and accepting 
delay 
Statements showing that the participant engages in 
triage of MEWS alerts and will accept delay in 
responding as sometimes inevitable 
Category 4: Responding - medical 
staff 
Statements by medical staff describing how they 
make decisions about what to do following their 
evaluation of a patient who has exceeded the trigger 
MEWS value 
Category 5: Responding – nurses 
and healthcare assistants 
Statements by nurses and healthcare assistants about 
how they act in relation to the outcome of a medical 
review of a patient who has exceeded the trigger 
MEWS value 
Category 6: Communicating Statements endorsing the value of MEWS in 
providing language to discuss deteriorating patients 
Category 7: Doubts about the 
predictive validity of the 
MEWS score 
Statements describing the dilemma posed by the low 
specificity of the MEWS score 
Category 8: Participating – 
healthcare assistants 
Statements about the role of healthcare assistants in 
the processes of detecting and evaluating patient 
deterioration 
Category 9: Monopolising the 
dialogue 
Statements relating to the fact that clinical staff are 
reluctant to accept that a patient is unstable when 
faced with a MEWS below the trigger level 
Category 10: Not communicating Statements relating to failure of the medical team to 
adequately explain their decisions to the bedside carer 
nurses. 
Category 11: Senior clinicians express 
general lack of 
satisfaction with 
systems for acute care. 
Statements indicating that experienced doctors believe 
that early warning systems are necessary because of 
other deficiencies in how acute care is organised 
Category 12: Misunderstanding the 
operation of MEWS - 
managers 
Statements from those with managerial responsibility 
for teams that indicated that they did not fully 
understand the purpose of MEWS and RRS 
Category 13: Isolation and indecision Statements relating to the negative feelings of more 
junior doctors in managing the assessment of possible 
patient deterioration 
Category 14: Differing professional 
attitudes to an 
intervention following a 
MEWS trigger event 
Statements indicating the different attitudes to 
responding to a MEWS trigger event of the nursing 
and medical teams. 
The sources of data for constructing the major categories are shown in Table 12. 2 
3 
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Table 12: Data sources for topics relating to changes in team dynamics 
 
Major 
Category 
Section 
Number 
6.1.1 MEWS provides a common language for discussing patients 
at risk 
  
Medical and nursing teams speak positively of MEWS 4,5,6 4.2.4, 4.2.5, 4.2.6 
Doctors contributions to patient care unpredictable 9,13 4.2.9, 4.2.13 
Nursing dissatisfaction with discussions with medical team about 
patient management 
9 4.2.9 
MEWS provides nursing staff with a justification for patient 
review 
6 4.2.6 
MEWS vocabulary in their language 6 4.2.6 
Medical staff report difficulty in understanding what the nurses 
calls mean 
3 4.2.3 
6.1.2 The medical and nursing teams have different objectives   
The nursing and medical teams describe their roles in different 
terms 
10 4.2.10 
MEWS calls are very time consuming 2, 3 4.2.2 
Doctors prioritise MEWS calls along with other work 3, 7 4.2.3, 4.2.7 
Doctors see many calls as false ‘positives’ 1, 7 4.2.1, 4.2.7 
Doctors have a lot of uncertainty to deal with 4, 13 4.2.4, 4.2.13 
Senior nurses will call senior doctors if necessary 4, 5 6.2.4, 4.2.5 
6.1.3 The effect of MEWS on the dialogue between doctors and 
nurses 
  
Doctors believe nurses often exaggerate to get patient seen 2, 3, 14 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 
4.2.14, 6.1.3 
Doctors want to exercise their clinical freedom 3, 11,13,14 4.2.3, 4.2.11, 
4.2.13, 4.2.14  
Doctors only want to see patients where MEWS is a true positive 3, 4, 11,14 4.2.3, 4.2.4, 
4.2.11, 4.2.14 
Nurses have difficulty getting patients reviewed 5,10 4.2.5, 4.2.10 
False positives are not a waste of time 5 4.2.5 
Nurses say medical staff are over reliant on MEWS 1, 14 4.2.14, 4.2.1 
Nursing team emphasises their clinical skill and intuition 5, 6, 8, 14 4.2.5, 4.2.6, 4.2.8, 
4.2.14 
6.1.4 Why do doctors and nurses march to different drummers   
Differing viewpoints 4, 5, 6,14 4.2.4, 4.2.5, 4.2.6, 
4.2.14 
Nurses express care perspective 5, 6,14 4.2.5, 4.2.6, 
4.2.14 
6.1.5 Multi-professional teams   
MEWS changes the way the medical and nursing teams work 4, 5, 11, 14 4.2.4, 4.2.5, 
4.2.11, 4.2.14 
6.1.6 Effect on the nursing team’s clinical process   
Downgrading the clinical role of the nursing team 13, 14 4.2.13, 4.2.14 
6.1.7 Frustration of healthcare assistants   
Healthcare assistants feel their clinical skill is disregarded 5, 8 4.2.5, 4.2.8 
 2 
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4.2.1 Category 1: Understanding MEWS  2 
Reading the transcripts it became clear that many staff did not use the MEWS system in 3 
the way its originators intended it to work.  4 
The intended purpose of MEWS scoring is to identify patients at risk of catastrophic 5 
deterioration where this is not immediately apparent to the staff undertaking their 6 
routine care. It is not intended to identify patients who have already suffered 7 
deterioration. MEWS is not designed, or validated, as an indicator of the severity of 8 
disease, or of prognosis. A very sick patient will almost certainly have abnormal vital 9 
signs that staff will usually identify. They will also have a high MEWS score, but the 10 
system is intended as an early warning of catastrophe in patients who, superficially, still 11 
appear well. Staff Nurse 3 described just such a situation. She described how the score 12 
drew the problem to her attention (as intended) but elaborates that the higher the score, 13 
the faster the medical team responds. This implies a slower response to MEWS scores 14 
just above the trigger value, and that is not how the system is intended to work. 15 
“It is good in a way, because, to look at the patient they were laughing, talking and 16 
joking on, but because of the MEWS system, and the score the patient had, you could 17 
tell you had to refer up.” Staff Nurse 3 line 100 18 
“I don't know whether they have changed the Doctors reviews because now, the higher 19 
the score the quicker they respond.” Staff Nurse 3 line 106 20 
A very junior doctor, however, emphasised using the score to decide how ill the patient 21 
is: 22 
“Do you find them personally useful, the scoring charts?”  Interviewer  23 
“Yes, I definitely do. We get a very high number of calls as Junior Doctors and hearing 24 
a number can definitely help us prioritise which patients need to be seen most 25 
urgently.”Doctor FY1 3 line 28 26 
Other F1/F2 doctors made similar comments. 27 
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The nurses were sometimes puzzled by the fact that the doctors do not seem to do 1 
anything, in response to a raised MEWS score. 2 
“At times, where someone is consistently scoring high, and we’re not seeing any 3 
improvement, you keep going to the Doctors and say, “Look they are still scoring a 10 4 
on the MEWS score, what do you want me to do?” and they will say, “Keep doing the 5 
observations hourly”. Hourly observations are fine but we are not actually doing 6 
anything.” Staff Nurse 4  line 109 7 
This nurse equated a score of 10 with the patient being very sick and needing active 8 
intervention, but for many patients such a score is consistent with being stable and 9 
adequately managed. This nurse was also seeing the Early Warning Score as a Severity 10 
of Illness Score, and believed that action should always follow a high score. 11 
More senior trainees and consultants, have a deeper understanding of the role and 12 
limitations of MEWS. A senior Intensive Care trainee described the problem: 13 
“I think that sometimes people become fixated on the precise numbers. …Often there 14 
hasn’t necessarily been much thought into why they are scoring that. So I think they 15 
(MEWS scores) are good at flagging up changes and trends with time, which is what 16 
they are designed to do. But sometimes it triggers a reflex action – a score of X. 17 
Therefore we will escalate to Critical Care; rather than – a score of X. What is going 18 
on?”Doctor ST 7 Intensive Care line 26 19 
This doctor went on to explain that his review may be triggered by the MEWS, but he 20 
then ignores the figures and undertakes a ‘ground up’ assessment of the patients status. 21 
“To be honest I don’t really pay any attention to their MEWS score when I am asked to 22 
review them.…. I often, over the telephone, go through what is going on with the 23 
patient. Go through all the observations in number terms not in terms of what they are 24 
scoring… I don’t particularly pay much attention to what the MEWS score is.” Doctor 25 
ST 7 Intensive Care line 42 26 
The senior Acute Medicine trainee was of a similar opinion. 27 
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“In my opinion a score of 4 can be as worrying as a score of 10. It depends on the 1 
patient and the context.” Doctor ST7 Acute Medicine line 35 2 
The critical care trainee was asked how he/she prioritised the response to a MEWS alert.  3 
“Are there any other factors which will determine whether you will respond 4 
immediately, given that history or the MEWS score or not?” Interviewer 5 
“There are obviously some observations, extreme hypoxia for example, or significant 6 
oxygen support, or airway compromise that will require an immediate response.” 7 
Doctor ST7 Intensive Care line 51 8 
Another senior trainee made a similar point: 9 
“The nurses don’t seem to understand that the score doesn’t correlate with how sick the 10 
patient is.” Doctor ST 7 Acute Medicine line 131 11 
In my interviews, however, junior doctors expressed this misunderstanding. 12 
“I think now people are getting very used to a number, so they will say, “There is a 13 
MEWS of 6 that you need to respond to.” But not actually say, “ I'm not that worried 14 
because they are just a little bit tachy.” It is often just a little bit of this, or a little bit of 15 
that, and you need to understand better what those numbers are telling you. So I think 16 
sometimes there is a lack of understanding about which part of that score is important 17 
for that patient.” Doctor ST 7 Acute Medicine line 53 18 
An Intensive Care Consultant described the way MEWS works: 19 
“Early Warning Systems have some usefulness in that there are a good number of 20 
patients in whom these warning scores will flag up as a problem as it happens, but they 21 
are actually not 100% sensitive, and they are not 100% specific….. It can be a useful 22 
tool but it doesn’t substitute for either the knowledge, or the experience of someone who 23 
does know what a critically ill patient is like and what is going on.” Consultant 24 
Intensive Care line 24  25 
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This consultant described the paradox of using an early warning score that has 1 
inherently low sensitivity and specificity. 2 
“I think the protocol is actually very unhelpful. The reason for using early warning 3 
charts comes unstuck because the more rigidly you apply it, the more it fails, both in 4 
missing people and in calling unnecessarily - having staff with the right knowledge and 5 
experience is a better way.” Consultant Intensive Care line 152 6 
4.2.2 Category 2: Responding to Workload 7 
A topic in discussions about using MEWS is that it adds to an already high workload. 8 
The Foundation Year doctors who look after the patients day-to-day on the wards 9 
reported very high workloads. They attributed a significant part of this to calls from the 10 
nursing team generated by MEWS. The junior doctors described a heavy and chaotic 11 
task load. 12 
“How many calls does MEWS generate?” Interviewer  13 
“I would say on an average shift on General Surgery ….I would say, between 10 and 30 14 
MEWS calls in one shift.” Doctor FY1  1line 157 15 
 16 
“There are a lot of MEWS scoring and usually we are too busy to see everyone.” 17 
Doctor FY1  2 line 27 18 
Discussing the burden of having too much to do caused several of the very junior 19 
doctors to become emotional both during recording and afterwards. 20 
The more senior doctors providing supervision had the same problem of too much to do. 21 
“As a Medical Registrar if you physically went to see everyone you got a phone call 22 
about – well, you physically couldn't do it. So you have to make a decision on who you 23 
are, physically, going to see and who you are not, physically, going to see.”    Doctor 24 
ST 7  Acute Medicine line 94 25 
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Another senior trainee accepted that, even when an urgent response is needed, other 1 
commitments precluded her immediate attendance. 2 
“Some situations require an immediate response - assuming I have the capability to 3 
respond immediately”. Doctor ST7  Intensive Care line 45 4 
Several senior trainee doctors commented, with regret, that their inability to support 5 
their juniors, because of other commitments, was stressful to their colleagues and 6 
contributed to lapses in patient care. 7 
The doctors’ heavy workload was recognised by the nurses who acknowledged that it 8 
caused them problems in responding to MEWS alerts. 9 
“Of those (doctors) that don't (attend promptly) what do you think is the factor there?” 10 
Interviewer  11 
“I think it is may be other stress factors. Say you ring up a particular Doctor there may 12 
be other things they have going on…. they might have to prioritise their work in 13 
different areas so sometimes it is a bit frustrating.” Staff Nurse 3 line 127 14 
Another staff nurse described a situation where she was unable to get a doctor to 15 
urgently attend a patient. 16 
“Did you feel frustrated trying to raise that cause for concern?” Interviewer  17 
“Yeah, it was the medical team who reviewed him. Then I actually rang the Hospital at 18 
Night (Specialist Nurse) as I was getting nowhere with the medical staff.” Staff Nurse 1 19 
line 115 20 
“Why do you think that was?” Interviewer 21 
“I think they felt they had more important things to be doing and sicker people to see.” 22 
Staff Nurse 1 line 118 23 
“I think they have got a busy role to be honest and sometimes they are stressed doing 24 
other things” Staff Nurse 5 line 86 25 
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Another nurse described the pressures on the most junior doctors and also commented 1 
that in her view support from seniors is inadequate. 2 
Sometimes their seniors, at weekends, can be operating, so the weekend is the real 3 
potential for problems. But in general they just need more support because some of the 4 
Junior Doctors are quite stressed especially when they have just come into a new job. 5 
So if surgeons are operating maybe more of a support structure is needed. Staff Nurse 3 6 
line 149 7 
The Healthcare Assistants recognised that their heavy workload does not leave them 8 
sufficient time to properly observe the patients. 9 
“Yeah, because sometimes if you’re busy you will notice if someone doesn't look well 10 
but you may not notice someone who looks OK but they are not.” HCA 5 line 85 11 
“So a Staff Nurse can potentially be looking after 8 patients you can't have someone 12 
scoring a 7 that is monitoring at 15 minute observations and it is just not possible.” 13 
Staff Nurse 2 line 64 14 
4.2.3 Category 3: Triaging and Accepting Delay 15 
Nurses and doctors both reported that the demands of patient care were heavy. The 16 
context for MEWS is a workplace where everyone is, in the words of one nurse, ‘flat 17 
out the whole time’.  18 
The response to a MEWS trigger event is expected to be mandatory – as determined by 19 
the protocol. If the score reaches the trigger value, the nurse caring for the patient 20 
should report this fact to the medical team. The involvement of the nurse team and ward 21 
supervisor should be to confirm that the vital signs are correctly taken and that the score 22 
calculation is accurate. The doctor should then attend in person to review the patient.  23 
The first response doctors described prioritising their response to MEWS along with the 24 
rest of their work. 25 
“Normally, if a patient is unwell and triggers the MEWS score I will follow the protocol 26 
on the back (of the observation chart) and normally, if the score is a 4 the Nurse will 27 
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come directly to me. I will get a bit of information on the phone. … I will normally be 1 
familiar with the patients, so I know the background already and they will explain what 2 
has triggered the score. I will get their (the nurse’s) opinion, and then I will interpret 3 
the situation and go and see the patient as soon as possible within the remit of what I 4 
am doing.” Doctor FY11 line 10 5 
In this response the junior doctor accepted the possibility of delay in seeing the patient 6 
after being briefed by the nurse. He/she would attend as soon as possible and accepted 7 
that existing work may take precedence. The trainee’s repeated use of the word 8 
normally is noteworthy. Does he/she mean ‘sometimes’ or is the reservation expressed 9 
indicative of something else? It appears to me that it indicates that his/her environment 10 
is complex and uncertainty is leading to the qualification ‘normally’. 11 
A second subject puts it differently, describing taking the score in the context of what 12 
else they know about the patient and the nurse’s opinion. Again the doctor drew 13 
attention to the difficulty of deciding what to do in such a complex environment: 14 
“I think it is very contextual actually, and it also depends on how well you know some 15 
of the other staff.….I think the best way is, when the Nurses call, to ask them whether 16 
they have concerns. The Nurses have a lot more contact with the patients than the 17 
Doctors.  And it is quite helpful when you know some of the staff. For example, if I get 18 
called to my old ward at night I know the nurses there, and how they would react to 19 
someone with a high MEWS score. So you get a slightly different feel as to whether you 20 
need to go straight away or not.”  Doctor FY1 2 line 45 21 
This doctor accepted that he/she would possibly delay attendance. He/she also indicated 22 
the role of the complexity and uncertainty of their environment that complicates 23 
decision-making. They described the importance of the MEWS score as being sensitive 24 
to its context. What he/she said indicates is that this context includes a consideration of 25 
the validity of the score in patients with pre-existing disease as well as a belief that the 26 
information provided by nurses must be interpreted. He/she appeared to believe that 27 
knowing the nurse as a colleague helps in the process of interpreting the urgency of a 28 
situation. Both these doctors described placing reliance on the nurses’ judgements. 29 
A third FY1 also described prioritising MEWS calls: 30 
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“Do you find them personally useful - the scoring charts?” Interviewer  1 
“Yes, I definitely do. We get a very high number of calls as Junior Doctors and hearing 2 
a number can definitely help us prioritise which patients need to be seen most 3 
urgently.” Doctor FY1  3 line 28 4 
Another junior doctor described prioritising responses. He/she described how they are 5 
more worried and respond more quickly if the score is high. This response indicates that 6 
they are more relaxed about scores of four that the designers of the protocol intended to 7 
be taken equally seriously. 8 
“What is your opinion of them? (EWSs)” Interviewer:  9 
“I think they are a good thing. I think it gets people’s attention for categorizing how 10 
sick someone is. So if the MEWS score is 7 you obviously get a little bit more nervous 11 
and you look a little bit quicker to respond to that.” Doctor FY2  1 line 28 12 
“So just to clarify you think depending on their physiological pattern you would be 13 
more concerned with some than others is that correct?” Interviewer  14 
“ Yes”.  Doctor FY2  1 line 36 15 
The medical and nursing teams implied that the higher the score the sicker the patient 16 
and the quicker the doctor should get to the scene.  17 
4.2.4 Category 4. Responding – Medical Staff 18 
The MEWS protocol in use during this research left it to the first responder doctor to 19 
decide whether to call for help. The more senior doctors that support them have their 20 
own schedules that include activities that are difficult to leave in order to supervise the 21 
care of a deteriorating patient. Both parties accepted that this situation as inevitable. The 22 
F1 and 2 doctors who are covering the wards do not have the skills or knowledge to 23 
independently manage a critical illness. The unavailability of help may lead to under- 24 
management of serious problems and to anxiety for nurses and junior doctors. 25 
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“So if you’re getting a persistent call because the scoring criteria says ring because it is 1 
above 3, would you want to know a bit more history before you said I'm coming?” 2 
Interviewer  3 
“Yeah definitely, because it could be something like the temperature has dropped by 0.2 4 
of a degree. That is not something we would really do anything about. If the blood 5 
pressure dropped a little bit but not a lot I will say check it again in an hour then let me 6 
know what it is then. It all depends on what else is going on, I wouldn’t necessarily go 7 
and see the patient I would want to know more than if they have just changed a little bit 8 
I will advise them to check it in an hour then let me know.” Doctor ST3 line 81 9 
This doctor emphasised the importance of change in the observations as well as the 10 
absolute level. They went on to express their own dilemma over whether to go in person 11 
when the more junior doctor calls them. They also revealed a strategic approach to care. 12 
The small drop in temperature is not of itself requiring treatment, buts its occurrence 13 
may indicate that the patient is becoming less stable and that a full review might find 14 
aspects of treatment that need to be changed. 15 
“If they give me a history of the patient, I ask them, ‘What do you want to do? What do 16 
you think you need to do?’ And then, kind of, judge where they are going with it. And 17 
often they are on exactly the right lines and I can say ‘Yes that is exactly right. Do that 18 
and get back to me if you’re worried.’ I guess it is about judging on the phone how 19 
concerned they are, and sometimes you feel that they are just really out of their depth, 20 
so I will go and see them. I mean, I have only been a Registrar for a year, so it is 21 
definitely a learning process but it is knowing when to go and see that patient and when 22 
you can just give advice on the end of the phone.” Doctor ST3 Medicine line 138 23 
MEWS is designed to ensure that senior doctors are involved in the management of sick 24 
patients but there is an acceptance that circumstances will cause delay. These delays are 25 
such that they defeat the primary purpose of improving the early care of deteriorating 26 
patients. An FY1 doctor when asked about their feelings when referring issues to 27 
consultants spoke very revealingly about the way delay occurs and described tolerating 28 
long delays when his Registrar is not available. 29 
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“What about Consultants, do you raise causes of concerns up to Consultant level or is it 1 
generally through your Registrar?” Interviewer  2 
“I would say rarely straight to Consultant level. Not almost ever. With it being a 3 
surgical job, obviously, sometimes the Surgeons are in Theatre, so it can be difficult to 4 
contact them. So I may wait an hour, obviously this is a patient who has deteriorated 5 
but they are stable, and I would try them again in may be another hour for the Registrar 6 
this is at a point where I am not concerned or I would call a Consultant”. Doctor FY1 3 7 
line 99 8 
Another FY1 doctor described similar problems in getting help and accepts an 8-hour 9 
delay as inevitable given the circumstances. 10 
“The patient over a, sort of, 4-8 hour period went from being relatively well to having 11 
some seizures - so that was what I was mostly concerned about. I wasn't concentrating 12 
on the score. The situation was that this patient did deteriorate, this was when I was on- 13 
call and the SHO and Registrar were in Theatre for an extended period of time 14 
probably about 3 hours” Doctor FY1 3 line 178 15 
They went on to describe their frantic, directionless quest for assistance. The emotion 16 
generated by these events – as recorded in a memo – was anger. The doctor was very 17 
frustrated by being in charge as things went wrong and not knowing what to do. 18 
……“We rang Outreach and, sort of, expressed our concerns, and then eventually 19 
having discussed it with Outreach they weren't impressed that the Registrar wasn't 20 
there. I am not pointing fingers, because I know that is how surgery on-calls work, you 21 
know if someone is scrubbed they cannot leave Theatre. So we discussed and called the 22 
senior on-call Anaesthetist who came and helped us, and that was when I, sort of, 23 
backed off, and this patient was still intermittently having seizures and vomiting, and in 24 
the end the Registrar did leave Theatre and came to see the patient. Neither patient had 25 
a good outcome the both good and bad example; I would genuinely not be able to say if 26 
the patient had been seen quicker if there had of been a different outcome.” Doctor FY1 27 
3 line 188 28 
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The doctor went on to blame the short staffing situation at the weekend and the 1 
demands of theatre on their senior for their unavailability and the delay. Interestingly, 2 
however, he/she made reference to his/her inexperience and suggests that they would 3 
not now tolerate that delay. They implied that it is necessary to be insistent, and push 4 
the senior doctor to attend. This is similar to the situation described by nurses in getting 5 
the first response doctor to attend. 6 
“So what do you think the factors were then? You mentioned it was at a weekend, you 7 
were on-call, and the Registrar who you tried to feed up to was actually busy in 8 
Theatre” Interviewer  9 
“Yeah those were absolutely the main factors. On-call, less staff around, only one 10 
Registrar to ring, whereas sometimes there are three. One will be in Theatre, one in 11 
Endoscopy, and one may be doing paperwork so they can come straight away. It was a 12 
little bit earlier on in my rotation as well and I think my confidence as well was 13 
pestering perhaps because now I will ring and ask if so and so is available. And if they 14 
say, “No they are scrubbed”, I will say “How long is the case going to be? Can you put 15 
the phone to their ear? I need to ask them one question.” Whereas it was very early on 16 
and I probably didn't ask those questions. I didn't get a specific time frame. Perhaps if I 17 
had of known they would be 3 hours I would have said “We need to do something 18 
quicker”, perhaps said to the Outreach Nurse “We need to ring the Anaesthetist – 19 
now”. I can't actually remember the specifics, but this was early on, and I am very 20 
confident with things like this now. Like “Would you please put the phone to the 21 
Registrar’s ear for a quick word, if they are not too busy?” If they are mid-way through 22 
dissecting a colon or something I probably wouldn't. Doctor FY1 3 202 23 
Nurses and healthcare assistants also referred to delays occurring in the management of 24 
patients who are deteriorating. 25 
“It can be hours before the doctors get a plan sorted between them and we are left not 26 
knowing what is going on. Sister 2 line 70 27 
“ What do you want the doctor to do when you phone them about a score?” Interviewer  28 
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“I want them to take it seriously. They really should come and look. I know they have 1 
got a lot on, but when a patient suddenly scores its their job to sort out” Sister 2 line 75 2 
This more senior nurse was actually more concerned about the position of the nursing 3 
staff, and being blamed for problems. The more senior nurses were generally used less 4 
sympathetic language about delay in getting the doctor, and were concerned about 5 
breaching the protocol – even if they themselves saw no sign for concern. 6 
4.2.5 Category 5: Responding – Nurses and Healthcare Assistants 7 
Responses from healthcare assistants, nurses and middle grade doctors indicated an 8 
acceptance of delay, by the first-responder junior doctors.  9 
The interviews with staff nurses confirmed that the doctors might not respond to the 10 
MEWS score as quickly, or as consistently as they would like. This nurse explained 11 
how she would go further up the chain of command but her language reveals that she 12 
did not find such a situation exceptional. 13 
“So what grade of Doctor would you generally report too?” Interviewer  14 
“Initially the F1 then if there was no response from them I would then go higher either 15 
SHO or Registrar. If it was a night time I would go to the Hospital at Night Practitioner 16 
(a specialist nurse).” Staff Nurse 1 line 25 17 
It was clear from their comments that delay in getting a doctor to attend is a cause of 18 
frustration and anxiety to the nurses. The doctors said that MEWS generated a lot of 19 
calls, few of which turn out to be a prelude to the patient deteriorating. They believed 20 
that delay is unavoidable and they appear to take it in their stride. The nurses recognised 21 
the problem but were less sanguine about its consequences. 22 
Another staff nurse did not say directly that there was difficulty getting a response from 23 
the doctors but her reference to having to ‘push’ revealed that the process of getting a 24 
doctor to attend might not always go smoothly. 25 
“So as a Band 5 Staff Nurse what role do you have in using the scoring system?” 26 
Interviewer  27 
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“Often we will be informed by a Health Care Assistant for instance they have done 1 
somebody’s MEWS and they are showing a high score, we are always informed of any 2 
MEWS they might have but if it was a MEWS of 2 or above I would then have to 3 
escalate this to the Doctors and dependent upon how high they score it would be what 4 
level of Doctor and often we are having to push if the Doctors aren't acting upon it and 5 
escalating higher or to Outreach or to other groups of Nursing that might be involved 6 
with that. If the doctor comes we can sort things out for the staff – even if there’s 7 
nothing new to do” Staff Nurse 2 line 25 8 
And again: 9 
“So of those patients that you have been personally involved in their care, have you 10 
been the person who raised that cause of concern to Medical Staff?” Interviewer 11 
Many times, on a lot of occasions we push the Doctors to come and review a patient” 12 
Staff Nurse 4 line 76 13 
“Do you often have to push?” Interviewer 14 
“Well, we don’t always push but then maybe no one comes” Staff Nurse 4 line 78 15 
“What happens then?” Interviewer  16 
“We don’t know what to think. Sometimes the patient has a score but its okay but the 17 
doctor coming helps with the relies (relatives).”  Staff Nurse 4 line 90 18 
Another staff nurse noted that the medical team was sometimes slow to respond, and 19 
attributed this to ‘stress’. She went on to explain that this stress is the pressure of work 20 
and implied that a process of prioritisation is taking place. 21 
“Of those (doctors) that don't (attend promptly) what do you think is the factor there?” 22 
Interviewer 23 
“Well I wouldn't say they don't take it on, I think it is may be other stress factors….the 24 
on-call Doctor could have other patients also scoring high, or admissions coming in 25 
and things like that. It is a bit frustrating in that way.” Staff Nurse 3 line 127 26 
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In further interviews the nurses referred to doctors needing to be reminded to come, and 1 
attributed this to work pressure. 2 
“What do you think are the factors there then when you go to the Doctors (and they 3 
don’t attend)? What level of Doctor would you say this occurs?” Interviewer 4 
“I think the factors are may be the level of Doctor and sometimes the lack of Doctors on 5 
nightshift … they are tied up with someone who is also critically unwell for a good few 6 
hours and (we) are left with a more junior down here who is may be not making those 7 
decisions.” Staff Nurse 6 line 113  8 
 “Do you think it is always busyness amongst the various grades of Doctors in their 9 
lack of response or is there something else”? Interviewer 10 
“I would say 99% of the time it is busy-ness and other demands.” Staff Nurse 6 line 139 11 
Yet another Staff Nurse mentioned delay in medical staff attending. On this occasion 12 
she believed this delay contributed to a poor outcome for the patient: 13 
“Doctors should have been called, and initially I think the Doctor had been called, but 14 
there was a huge delay between the Doctor being called and the Doctor actually 15 
attending.” Staff Nurse 6 line 158  16 
The healthcare assistants that were interviewed reported that their role was to inform the 17 
staff-nurse if a patient had a high score. They would occasionally go directly to a doctor 18 
and sometimes they report that there was delay in the doctor attending. 19 
“With the scoring going higher I had to let the Nurse and the Doctor know straight 20 
away. They were aware she was scoring an 8 but it was obviously slowly creeping up to 21 
a 10 then 11 but the doctor hadn't come and I didn't feel happy about the results so 22 
straight away I spoke to the Doctor myself as her breathing had also changed” HCA 3 23 
line 55 24 
“I was on nightshift and I kept informing the Registrar that he seemed like he was short 25 
of breath and the Reg said when he got to see him he would decide. ….eventually when 26 
he did go to see him he put him on some oxygen because I thought his sats were quite 27 
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low and he wasn't COPD or anything, I mean they were only 92 or something but it just 1 
seemed that he wasn't right. In the morning he went to the bathroom so I got the oxygen 2 
bottle and attached him to that, he said he was a bit light headed so I walked him there 3 
and pull the buzzer when you’re done so I continued doing the observations and I 4 
thought he was taking a while and I started to get a bit worried so I went to the 5 
bathroom and he was just white, clammy, sweaty and I got the chair pulled the 6 
emergency buzzer and took him back and did his observations and they were fine. The 7 
Doctor came and asked what his last observations were and I said ”The same, but I did 8 
tell you he didn't seem right and was short of breath.” We did the ECG, blood gases 9 
and an hour later he had a cardiac arrest and died. I will never forget that morning 10 
because he kept saying there was something wrong but he didn't know what it was and 11 
for all he was scoring he wasn't really scoring high it was just his sats. I don't know it is 12 
hard because we are not qualified it is as if they think we are sometimes over stepping 13 
the mark but we are not we are just trying to give our opinion. Sometimes I think a lot of 14 
Healthcares especially on this section / area they get frustrated especially if they have 15 
been here a long time.” HCA 2 line 127 16 
This incident is shown in full because it is a compelling illustration of a very junior staff 17 
member struggling to cope in the face of overwhelming difficulty. The failure to follow 18 
the protocol may have contributed to this patient’s death.  19 
One of the healthcare assistants was very articulate in expressing the dilemma that faces 20 
their grade. She described being very worried about patients and knowing that all is not 21 
well, and finding that there has been no response from the staff nurse or doctor to whom 22 
they report.  23 
“If you were doing a set of observations and you noticed a patient was becoming 24 
unwell, to whom would you report?” Interviewer  25 
“I would go to the qualified Nurse looking after that patient at the time. If I felt that I 26 
was getting nowhere with them I would approach one of the doctors.” HCA 4 line 18 27 
“You mentioned if you didn't get anywhere, what do you think happens sometimes on 28 
the Ward for you to feel that way?” Interviewer  29 
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“Sometimes it can be so busy that the qualified Nurses are listening, but they can't 1 
always take it in. So sometimes they will acknowledge that you have told them but then 2 
they might be busy with someone else so might not necessarily get to see them 3 
straightaway. They may say to me could I go and show a member of the medical team 4 
and I would go and do that. But it can be a worry if the doctors don’t come quickly.” 5 
HCA 4 line 24 6 
Another healthcare assistant described the frustration of their being no response when 7 
they reported a high MEWS score: 8 
“At the time it felt as though nobody was doing anything because you build up a 9 
relationship with a patient and it was a busy morning with lots of other jobs to do and 10 
you were having to give an awful lot of time to these two patients and you feel as though 11 
something should be done sooner than it was. It all worked out in the end but at the time 12 
it seemed an eon before anything was done.” HCA 5 line 109 13 
“Now do you think it was a big gap in time or did it just feel a long time?” Interviewer  14 
“Well it probably was a couple of hours but I didn't know what was going on at the 15 
…..we don't always get to hear that side of it because you’re the person looking after 16 
them you want something done instantly it doesn't always happen like that.” HCA 5 line 17 
115 18 
The more senior nursing staff explained that a significant part of their role in relation to 19 
MEWS is ensuring that the medical team responds to alerts. When the more junior 20 
doctors did not respond they would go over their heads to the registrar or consultant. 21 
“Then pushing the Medical Staff who can be quite dismissive especially if they think a 22 
patient is about to go home. With a patient they are discharging they don't really want 23 
to be bothered with if this patient has a bit of a fast pulse and they are sort of a bit 24 
dismissive of that. So with experience and a bit more authority means you can push 25 
situations like that. Like I have previously said I am quite happy to ring the Consultant” 26 
Sister 1 line 98 27 
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“Quite often it can be the medical staff responding where there can be a delay and I 1 
still think once they have passed that on they are still a little bit under confident with 2 
chasing that up whereas I have got no problems at all with escalating to the Consultant 3 
or speaking to Outreach.” Sister 2 line 45 4 
This Nursing Sister attributed the delay in getting a response from the doctor to 5 
inexperience and muddled priorities. 6 
“We have some very junior staff it is sometimes they can't see the wood for the trees 7 
they are thinking about so many things that they have to do they think oh I have passed 8 
that one and that one has been dealt with and before they know it time has passed and 9 
they have got on with other things and come back. So I think it is a lack of prioritising 10 
due to lack of experience really.” Sister 2 line 53 11 
4.2.6 Category 6: Communicating  12 
The nurses said that MEWS scoring was very useful and helped communication with 13 
the medical team. It appeared that this worked in two ways. Firstly, they reported that 14 
they often already recognised the signs of early deterioration, and the high MEWS score 15 
was a reassurance, enabling them to approach the medical team with confidence. 16 
“I am just generally going to ask you as a Band 5 with 2 years experience how do you 17 
feel about raising causes for concern?” Interviewer  18 
“ I think if you had of asked me like a year ago I would have said no not at all. I knew 19 
when something was wrong but I don't think I would have had the voice to say it but as 20 
you get to know groups of Doctors that really helps and they know when you are 21 
worried that it must be something as you don't ring for everything and that has helped. I 22 
do feel more confident and also I know by doing everything that is set and by protocol 23 
that I am always backed up by that because that is the Policy and I am happy to raise 24 
concerns.” Staff Nurse 2 line 131 25 
“Using the charts gives you a bit more confidence when you are raising causes for 26 
concern, because it is, like, evidence” Staff Nurse 4 line 34 27 
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“I feel more confident now in approaching the medical staff now, and I am more 1 
assertive.” Staff Nurse 1 line 126 2 
“As a first port of call if we become concerned about a patient we would go to the F1. If 3 
we felt that they were out of their depth or they weren't responding quickly enough 4 
probably the junior Nurses would go to the SHO but I would tend to go to a Registrar 5 
or a Consultant probably because I have a better relationship with them and I feel able 6 
to ring them where as other people don't.” Sister 1 line 51 7 
They felt that having a trigger level MEWS made them less likely to be criticised for 8 
raising a concern. 9 
“ Yes, because prior to its introduction it was very difficult you get Doctors to respond 10 
to your feelings, because sometimes it was a gut feeling and sometimes things weren't 11 
always obvious from the observations. They were just slightly off and just slightly out of 12 
normal limits and the Doctors weren't too bothered if they were too busy or stressed or 13 
whatever they could be very dismissive of you. Now it is less easy for them to be 14 
dismissive because you have a score written down which is backed up by policy or 15 
protocol, whatever you call it, which the Trust demands they act in a certain way 16 
according to that score. So I certainly think it has backed us up, it doesn't always mean 17 
they will do what is required of them but it gives you back up and it gives you back up to 18 
take it to a higher level should they not respond in the way you want them to respond.” 19 
Staff Nurse 2 line 42 20 
The language of MEWS had become a mutually understood expression of a patient’s 21 
general condition and the interviewees had absorbed the terminology into their 22 
professional jargon.  23 
“I think it is good because the whole team uses it. So, if you say, ‘Their MEWS is a 24 
one’, everyone understands what that means. It is a good system because everybody 25 
uses it” Staff Nurse 1 line 44 26 
Senior medical staff expressed positive opinions regarding the function of MEWS. It 27 
provided a template for expressing accurate causes for concern regarding deteriorating 28 
patients: 29 
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“Since the MEWS score coming in I think it has allowed Nursing staff and none 1 
qualified Nursing staff… it has given them a much better tool to say there is something 2 
wrong with this person they are not just a little bit off colour or there not quite right a 3 
vocabulary that was open to ridicule by Medical staff. I am trying to be honest with you, 4 
it often was inaccurate anyway so you had someone who didn't look quite right scenario 5 
and often they were fine and you got the cry wolf. Whereas the MEWS score in my 6 
opinion has been a huge step forward because it allows an actual number to be given 7 
and allows data to be tracked. I do a lot of court work and the MEWS score is 8 
particularly central to that so I think the MEWS score is fantastic” Consultant Surgeon 9 
line 32 10 
4.2.7 Category 7: Doubts about the predictive validity of the MEWS score. 11 
Doubts were not expressed about the reliability of MEWS. Nurses and Doctors both 12 
believed that the vital signs observations were accurate, repeatable and did not vary 13 
significantly between observers. However, all grades and professional groups of staff 14 
expressed doubts about the predictive validity of MEWS. The predictive validity of a 15 
scoring system is a measure of how well the prediction correlates with real outcomes. 16 
Firstly, they felt that there were significant numbers of false positives. That is, a MEWS 17 
score mandated review of the patient, but on analysis it appeared very unlikely that they 18 
were on the edge of a serious deterioration. This occurred in a number of situations: 19 
Patients with pre-existing co-morbidities tended to have high scores. It was pointed out 20 
that those with moderate chronic respiratory disease might score 4 or 5 – even at their 21 
best. 22 
Patients already known to be poorly might fluctuate backwards and forwards across the 23 
trigger score. Resulting in repeat calls. Also, this group of patients might trigger a call, 24 
be reviewed, and then re-trigger a call when their observations are repeated. 25 
Patients in the sickest group, but in whom treatment has been limited to palliation may 26 
continue to trigger calls – even those with do-not-attempt-resuscitation orders in place. 27 
“Are you saying then that these types of patients could be falsely scoring high?” 28 
Interviewer  29 
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“Yeah because they can be scoring like a 6 or a 7 but because they are COPD there 1 
sats are between 88 and 92, they’re on oxygen so their scoring for the oxygen, their 2 
resps are high because of their breathing so they are scoring high anyway if they come 3 
it at night it takes until they see the Consultant the next morning before it is picked up” 4 
HCA 2 line 47 5 
“Do you find it is always useful to use a scoring system?” Interviewer  6 
“Yes. Sometimes though I find that if a patient is deteriorating it doesn't always appear 7 
on the scoring chart because they could be retaining oxygen but their oxygen levels are 8 
still quite high you wouldn't really spot this on the scoring system.” HCA 3 line 42 9 
“So when you talk about modifying it, can you just explain that a little bit more?” 10 
Interviewer  11 
” Yeah, sometimes we have patients who might have high heart rates and that might be 12 
considered quite normal for them but for us it wouldn't be surgically so they trigger all 13 
the time and we would have to call the Doctors and get them to make sure that it is ok 14 
but sometimes it is not signed for so that will keep happening.” Staff Nurse 2 line 43 15 
“Yeah the main patients we find are the respiratory patients because of what is flagged 16 
up on the early warning scores. So for example if we have a COPD patient who is on 17 
home oxygen the very fact that they are on oxygen scores them a 2 the sats in a COPD 18 
patient you want them slightly lower so that will automatically score them a 2 or a 3 so 19 
straight away when they are at their norm and what is good for them they are may be 20 
scoring a 4 or a 5. Then if you add in a slightly low blood pressure or a temperature 21 
very slightly up and before you know it they could be scoring a 6 or a 7 which in 22 
another patient would be quite alarming but in a respiratory patient that can often be 23 
the norm for them.” Staff Nurse 4 line 38  24 
These alerts could have been avoided by using the system of making the variations that 25 
the MEWS system allows, but nurses and junior doctors felt that a major problem was 26 
the reluctance of senior medical staff to apply a variance or exclude a terminal patient 27 
from MEWS.  28 
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“Sometimes it is very hard to get a variance signed. So patients, because of the MEWS 1 
system, now tend to, whether it is right or wrong, to have observations done maybe 2 
hourly for in a tachycardic patient, because they have an idea of what it is related to but 3 
the Doctors aren't very keen to sign a variance.” Staff Nurse 3 line 39 4 
“Why do you think they are not very keen to sign a variance?” Interviewer  5 
“I think some of them think that if they sign it, and they are missing something, it is 6 
their responsibility, which is true in a way.” Staff Nurse 3 line 53 7 
“So do you find in your capacity that you have to take that into account?” Interviewer  8 
”Yeah, we have to push them if we want a variance.” Staff Nurse 3 line 54 9 
“What grade of Doctor do you find most difficult to get a variance signed or is it a 10 
standard grade on here that would sign a variance?” Interviewer  11 
“The F1s won't sign a variance at all, and the Junior Doctors say they can't do it so it 12 
gets bumped up to Registrar level I would say.” Staff Nurse 3 line 60 13 
“When they say they won't do it is it because they are not allowed to do it?” Interviewer  14 
“Well that is the impression I get. It seems to be it needs to be the next level up to sign it 15 
and they discuss it with the Registrar as well but the F1s tend not to really sign 16 
variances. I don't know whether there is a protocol in place in the Trust to say they 17 
cannot sign a variance and it has to be escalated up.” Staff Nurse 3 line 63 18 
Even if variations and exclusions were widely applied there would still remain a 19 
significant number of ‘false alarms’. Given the high workload for the first-responder 20 
doctors it is unsurprising that they seek to triage calls before deciding what to do. 21 
The nurses often thought that active treatment should be stopped. Not doing so leads to 22 
continual, inappropriate alerts. 23 
“Obviously every time that patient scores that high we are ringing the Doctor every 24 
hour because we have to, but they are aware of that. I think it is because there is a very 25 
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fine line between it has always been the case yes a DNAR (a Do Not Attempt 1 
Resuscitation Order) is signed but nobody ever seems to want to stop that active 2 
treatment.” Staff Nurse 5 line 89 3 
Another Staff Nurse described what she sees as a similar problem and remarks that 4 
constant monitoring is unpleasant for the patient. 5 
“I think maybe it is just us a culture and a society of human beings we never want to 6 
give up on anybody but sometimes I think we just need to look at certain things and say, 7 
“Right we have tried this for days, and maybe certain things aren't improving, maybe it 8 
is time to start making them comfortable”. I don't think there is anything wrong with 9 
that I just think people have to make that decision.” Staff Nurse 3 line 182 10 
“So going outside of the protocol is difficult for some.” Interviewer 11 
“Yeah I think that has may be summed it up a little bit.” Staff Nurse 3 line 188  12 
One staff nurse elaborated on this issue after the recorder was turned off. She said that it 13 
was incredibly difficult to get medical staff to respond and sign patients in the notes as 14 
needing no further aggressive treatment. The Staff Nurse said this happened quite 15 
regularly with Senior Consultants and Registrars not documenting that a patient no 16 
longer requires active treatment and active observations. This failure means that 17 
patients, as in the example given by the Staff Nurse, have to undergo hourly 18 
observations, even though there is not an active plan and everyone around them in the 19 
team knows that the patient will die. She feels that this lack of clarity makes it very 20 
difficult for the Nurses looking after the patient and the more Junior Medical Staff to be 21 
able to respond appropriately. This is because the early warning score mandates actions, 22 
and all this activity is very inappropriate in the context of a patient who is dying. She 23 
said that, when the doctors do not make the decision to move to palliative care, it is 24 
principally the patient, their relatives and carers who bear the consequences. The 25 
doctors will leave and get on with their other work. It is easier to procrastinate than to 26 
make a decision. This staff nurse explained that MEWS triggers could cause worry to 27 
the nursing staff – even if the patient looked well they worried that they could be 28 
missing something. She added that this uncertainty unsettled the patients and their 29 
relatives. 30 
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4.2.8 Category 8: Participating – Healthcare Assistants 1 
Staff reported that the majority of the routine monitoring of the patients vital signs is 2 
done by healthcare assistants (which is probably true) and they felt that this was 3 
acceptable, or even good practice. The HCAs described their role as being general 4 
patient care, but also to undertake routine monitoring. 5 
“What is your role is for caring for these acutely ill patients?” Interviewer  6 
“We kind of help with the washes, the observations, BMs if they are done and getting 7 
equipment things like that.” HCA 1 line 13 8 
“Obviously to assist the Nurse, to do observations and monitor the observations” HCA 9 
2 line 12 10 
“When they first get admitted onto the Ward the first thing we do is to check their 11 
observations which is their blood pressure, temperature, resps, sats and heart rate: an 12 
all round to check to see if they are scoring anything.” HCA 3 line 11 13 
“We would assist the qualified staff to do observations from the MEWS chart; the blood 14 
pressure, respiratory rate, heart rate, temperature; and using that to assess what care 15 
the patient needs from us. We also assist with any personal care within the day to day 16 
running of the Unit.” HCA 4 line 13 17 
The healthcare assistants themselves, and the supervising RGNs acknowledged that 18 
most of the routine monitoring for MEWS was done by healthcare assistants. 19 
“What is your particular task in using the system?” Interviewer  20 
“99% of the time we do the observations on the Ward.” HCA 4 line 31 21 
“In particular a lot, maybe most, of the time it is the Healthcares doing the 22 
observations. “ Staff Nurse 4 line 32 23 
Medical staff recognised that healthcare assistants play a principal role in monitoring 24 
patients: 25 
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“HCAs do a lot of the observations on Wards - if not all of them.” Doctor FY 2 line 142 1 
Healthcare assistants work under the supervision of an RGN who has responsibility for 2 
a number of patients. The HCAs said that they usually reported MEWS trigger events to 3 
their supervising Staff Nurse  4 
“So what is your role in using those charts and scoring systems?” Interviewer  5 
“Basically doing the blood pressure, scoring the patient and then going to the Nurse in 6 
Charge.” HCA 1 line 24 7 
“We have a blood pressure chart, so if the score is above a certain level we tell the 8 
Nurse. We tell the Nurses anyway but anything above a 2 we generally go and tell the 9 
Nurse straight away and they will then go to the Doctor to see if anything needs to be 10 
done.” HCA 1 line 20 11 
If the nurse were not available they would go straight to the doctor. 12 
“So if a patient was becoming unwell, to whom would you report?” Interviewer 13 
“The Nurse who was looking after the patient, or the Doctor - whoever is closest.” HCA 14 
1 line 16 15 
“If I observe there is something wrong with a patient I would check the observations 16 
and report straight to the Staff Nurse and if the Staff Nurse wasn't available I would 17 
report to the coordinator (more senior nurse).” HCA 2 line 17 18 
Sometimes the RGN asked the healthcare assistant to liaise with the medical team. 19 
“Sometimes it can be so busy that the qualified Nurses are listening, but they can't 20 
always take it in, so sometimes they will acknowledge that you have told but not 21 
necessarily get to see them straight away. They may say to me could I go and show a 22 
member of the medical team and I would go and do that.” HCA 4 line 24 23 
The healthcare assistants also took it upon themselves to discuss a patient with the 24 
medical team. 25 
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“I make the Staff Nurse who is involved with the patient aware first, then I go straight 1 
to the Doctor because I know now a patient who is deteriorating to go straight to the 2 
Doctor and tell them. I know the Nurse can do that as well but I like to let them know as 3 
well.” HCA 3 line 20 4 
“Have you ever spoken to a Doctor about cause for concern or has it been through the 5 
Staff Nurse always?” Interviewer  6 
“I have spoken to a Doctor about it as well” HCA 1 line 74  7 
The Foundation Year (FY 1 & 2) doctors reported a different experience. They had little 8 
experience of healthcare assistants reporting MEWS triggers, though they were open to 9 
this happening in principle. 10 
“Would a Healthcare report a concern directly to you?” Interviewer  11 
“I think not because normally. Normally a Nurse would come to me …..I think very 12 
rarely Healthcare Assistants would, even if I know them and we get on well together, I 13 
think rarely they would come straight to me, but I don't actually know how it works they 14 
have a chain of command that they have to follow.” Doctor FY1 3 line 143 15 
The FY1 and 2 doctors said that they were happy to respond to MEWS reports from 16 
Healthcare Assistants. They did not express reservations about the Healthcare Assistants 17 
ability to accurately measure vital signs and calculate the MEWS score. 18 
“How would you feel if a Healthcare Assistant did come to you and raise a cause for 19 
concern? How would you manage that?” Interviewer  20 
“The fact is a MEWS is a MEWS. Whether a Healthcare Assistant or a Nurse reports a 21 
score of 5….. So I would like to think I wouldn't take it any differently from a 22 
Healthcare. “ Doctor FY1 3 156 23 
Another doctor had not had experience of MEWS reports from healthcare assistants but 24 
has no objections in principal. 25 
“Do Healthcare Assistants directly tell you about causes for concern?” Interviewer  26 
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“No” Doctor FY 2 line 149 1 
“Why do you think that is?” Interviewer  2 
“I don't know. It may be a confidence thing, it is kind of the hierarchy in a way so I have 3 
overheard Healthcares coming back to Nurses with observations and then the Nurse 4 
will then go and phone someone but I am not sure why this happens.” Doctor FY 2 line 5 
151 6 
Doctors may not know what grade of nurse was reporting to them – particularly on the 7 
phone, but thought that their grade is immaterial. 8 
“Who reports?  Is it from Registered Nurses or Healthcare Assistants?” Interviewer  9 
“To be honest when we answer the phone calls the Nurses rarely identify themselves.” 10 
Doctor FY1 3  line 35 11 
“Do you think that is important for you being able to prioritise your workload?” 12 
Interviewer  13 
“I don't think it matters who has made the phone call or who has done the 14 
observations” Doctor FY1 3  line 40 15 
Another doctor explained that they had no experience of being phoned by healthcare 16 
assistants, but had been spoken to, in person, when they were on the ward. 17 
“Have Healthcares reported concerns to you?” Interviewer  18 
“They have, when I have been on the Ward, but I have never been bleeped by a 19 
Healthcare Assistant telling me about an unwell patient.” Doctor FY1  2 line 141  20 
The foundation doctor believed that the healthcare assistants measure vital signs 21 
reliably, but felt that they do not have as deep an understanding of the clinical situation 22 
as the registered nurses. 23 
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“Do you feel that Healthcares reporting causes for concern are generally reliable?” 1 
Interviewer  2 
“I think they are more based on numbers than actually on a patient’s clinical condition. 3 
It is not taking anything away from the HCAs because they do a fantastic job and we 4 
couldn't survive without them but I think they have less clinical experience than the 5 
Nursing staff and a lot of their concerns will be based on numbers. Saying that, if it is 6 
an HCA who has been in the job for 20 years, there is a difference.” Doctor FY1 2 line 7 
150 8 
Healthcare assistants sometimes had difficulty in getting their patient reviewed by the 9 
medical team and in that case they said they were happy to call the doctor directly. This 10 
healthcare assistant described an event where having reported a problem to a nurse, who 11 
in turn called the doctor, no one came to review the patient. 12 
“With the scoring going higher I had let the Staff Nurse and the Doctor know straight 13 
away. They were aware she was scoring an 8, but it was obviously slowly creeping up 14 
to a 10 then 11 but the doctor hadn't come, and I didn't feel happy about the results, so 15 
straight away I spoke to the Doctor myself as her breathing had also changed” HCA 3 16 
line 54 17 
Another healthcare assistant described situations in which they have reported problems 18 
to the nurse, but there is no response from the medical team.  19 
“I would go to the qualified Nurse looking after that patient at the time. If I felt that I 20 
was getting nowhere with them I would approach one of the medical team and tell them 21 
that the patient doesn't look as well as they did may be half an hour ago, or that their 22 
MEWS score had deteriorated.” HCA 4 line 18 23 
These healthcare assistants did not behave as though they only understand patient 24 
deterioration in terms of a MEWS score. They said they used experience and clinical 25 
skill to evaluate the situation in order to push for help, if they feel it is needed. 26 
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This healthcare assistant described not knowing what the medical team is planning for 1 
the patient. They did not know whether the doctors were not responding, or whether 2 
they had assessed the situation and were waiting to see what happened. 3 
“You get some patients who might be scoring a 12 or a 13 and you kind of think what is 4 
going to happen?  Are the Doctors just sitting on them, or where they are going? As 5 
Healthcares we can't really do anything. Sometimes we need to say, ‘What is 6 
happening? Are they going to do anything?’” HCA 2 line 35 7 
The healthcare assistants felt responsibility for coordinating the proper response to a 8 
patient’s problems. 9 
“How do you personally feel when you report a cause for concern?” Interviewer:  10 
“I feel like I have a responsibility to go and tell the Nurse because they might not know 11 
if they aren't checking.” HCA 1 line 68 12 
The healthcare assistants understood that MEWS is just one indication of problems. 13 
They knew that was necessary to take into account other indications of the patient’s 14 
condition. 15 
“Do you think it is just another piece of paperwork?” Interviewer  16 
“No I think it is really good. ….I think it is good, but even when you get a patient who is 17 
scoring a zero, there could still be something not right so you have still got to observe, 18 
even using the chart you can't just use the chart as the main thing.” HCA 2 line 33 19 
“Have you had much experience using this system?” Interviewer  20 
” Yes, we have used it for quite a while now…. I could do it without even putting them 21 
(the vital signs) on the form. I can tell if they are scoring just by looking at the readings 22 
now.” HCA 3 line 30 23 
Interviewer: “So do you understand the purpose of the scoring system?” 24 
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“Yeah, the Doctors and qualified Nurses use it to see what treatment they may need” 1 
HCA 4 line 36 2 
Do you feel that your causes for concern are taken seriously? Interviewer  3 
“ Yeah I have never felt like anyone has said ah it doesn't matter.” HCA 1 line 71 4 
“That's good. Do you feel they believe you when you report a cause for concern?” 5 
Interviewer  6 
“Yeah I have never felt like not. (sic)” HCA 1 line 79 7 
 8 
“I think, because the Healthcares are kind of frontline, patients are more willing to 9 
speak to us than they are to some of the Nurses, and especially the Doctors, so I think 10 
because we tend to be in the bays constantly looking after them. I think we observe 11 
more, especially when you think that person was fine this morning, now they are just 12 
lying on the bed they don't feel right but they can't put their finger on it. So you tend to 13 
go off what the patient is saying to you. Then I would do the observations and get the 14 
Staff Nurse. There have been lots of occasions where they have come round from A&E 15 
and I have recognised them from before (a previous admission) and I have thought ‘The 16 
last time they were in they were diabetic and yet there is no BM chart and not BM 17 
done,” and straight away I have done their blood sugar and it has been 2. It is just you 18 
get so used to the same patients you have got to have an understanding of the last time 19 
they were in they were totally different so I think you just learn things over the years.” 20 
HCA 2 line 20 21 
“Are you frustrated with them? Just listening to what you are saying there are you 22 
frustrated sometimes that interventions aren't made?” Interviewer  23 
“Yeah, I think just because we look after them and when you’re doing hourly 24 
observations on a patient especially through the night constantly and they are poorly, 25 
and the families are asking ,”Why do you keep doing those (observations)?” All we can 26 
say is, “We are asked to do them,” and there is no other answer we can give. The 27 
relatives think “We don't want you doing that, we can see you’re disturbing them, and 28 
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you’re causing them more pain, and it is awful.” But we just go by what we are told to 1 
do. With the MEWS charts the new ones especially because you get your COPD patients 2 
and they score for their oxygen and because their sats are going to be low and their 3 
resps are going to be high I think it would have been nice to have something on them for 4 
COPD patients or even another chart you could put in if they are COPD.” HCA 2 line 5 
47 6 
“Are you saying then that these types of patients could be falsely scoring high?” 7 
Interviewer  8 
“Yeah because they can be scoring like a 6 or a 7 but because they are COPD there 9 
sats are between 88 and 92, their on oxygen so their scoring for the oxygen, their resps 10 
are high because of their breathing so they are scoring high anyway if they come it at 11 
night it takes until they see the Consultant the next morning before it is picked up.” 12 
HCA 2: line 56 13 
4.2.9 Category 9: Monopolising the Dialogue 14 
It is the nurses, and particularly the healthcare assistants who are troubled by the 15 
problem of false-negative MEWS scores. Several of them discuss the problem of the 16 
patient that they believe is deteriorating, but whose MEWS score is low. They believe 17 
that their experience, clinical intuition and close proximity to the patient allowed them 18 
to identify some patients at risk, despite the low MEWS score. The nurses and 19 
healthcare assistants are saying things that lead to the conclusion that they believe that 20 
in these patients the MEWS score makes it more difficult for them to get their concerns 21 
taken seriously. The doctor inevitably asked what the MEWS score is, after listening to 22 
their story, and they felt that the doctor is mistakenly reassured when it is low. There is 23 
a widespread undercurrent of feeling amongst the nurses that their clinical skills, 24 
intuition and experience are ignored in the face of a low MEWS score. MEWS had 25 
become so fundamental to discussions about patient deterioration that the nurses had 26 
difficulty raising concerns about patients with low MEWS scores, when experience and 27 
intuition suggested problems were imminent.  28 
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS FINDINGS 
 
155 
“Even when you get a patient who is scoring zero, there could still be something not 1 
right, so you have still got to observe. You can't just use the chart as the main thing. But 2 
the doctor always focuses on the MEWS” HCA  2 3 
“I tell them I’m worried and they say, ‘What’s the MEWS?’And if it’s low they are not 4 
interested. It’s annoying.” Staff Nurse 4 line 100 5 
Despite their very basic theoretical and clinical education the Healthcare Assistants also 6 
display clinical intuition and understanding. 7 
Sometimes, though, I find that if a patient is deteriorating it doesn't always appear on 8 
the scoring chart – but that’s what they (the doctors) look at” HCA 2 line 59 9 
“I find sometimes as a Healthcare that Doctors don't take me seriously when I draw 10 
attention to a problem, sometimes, which I find really quite annoying.” HCA 4  11 
“Some people can look well in themselves, then you do their blood pressure and it is in 12 
their boots and you think that's not right but then other times they can look very unwell 13 
but the MEWS chart doesn't show that they are actually poorly.” HCA 4 line 41  14 
It appears that the MEWS is making it harder for the HCAs and Staff Nurses to get 15 
patients with low scores reviewed when their clinical skill tells them there is a problem. 16 
Difficulty in conveying concerns about patients who appear well, and also have low 17 
scores has also been expressed by junior medical staff: 18 
“Can I ask you now about an episode that didn't go so well?” Interviewer  19 
“Yes, it was actually on my current job. Recently we had a patient who has been, in my 20 
opinion, I would say, she has been quite unwell, however, her observation chart didn't 21 
reflect this. The kind of changes that alerted me to something being wrong were her 22 
deteriorating cognitive state and her blood tests. However, her blood pressure was 23 
maintained in a normal range and nothing else had gone off so it was a bit more 24 
difficult to ask for specific help, because she was stable from an observation point of 25 
view. It was more of a gut feeling that she wasn't quite right and that something needed 26 
to be done.” Doctor FY1 1 line 77 27 
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS FINDINGS 
 
156 
4.2.10 Category 10: Not Communicating 1 
The nurses repeatedly used language that indicated disconnect between themselves and 2 
the medical team. 3 
This can be broken down into a number of issues: 4 
The doctors did not respond by coming to see the patient when a trigger score is 5 
reached. 6 
The doctors did not keep the nurses informed about their clinical decisions. 7 
The doctors did not explain why they are apparently not doing anything to treat the 8 
patient. 9 
The doctors did not document a variation for the MEWS criteria or change the care to 10 
palliation. This results in many spurious trigger events and is unnecessarily intrusive 11 
monitoring of the patient. 12 
The nurses described what they will do when the ‘first responder’ doctor is cannot be 13 
contacted or failed to come. 14 
“So what grade of Doctor would you generally report too? Interviewer  15 
“Initially the F1 then if there was no response from them I would then go higher either 16 
SHO or Registrar. If it was a night time I would go to the Hospital at Night 17 
Practitioner” Staff Nurse 1 line 23 18 
“A lot of the time the stumbling block is actually getting them to come and look at the 19 
patient.” Sister 2 line 59 20 
“If by some miracle a Consultant appeared whilst you were concerned about a patient 21 
we would tell them straight away.” Sister 1 line 49 22 
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At some point during the interview I asked every interviewee to describe a case that 1 
went well and a case where things could have been better. I also asked many of the 2 
interviewees what constituted a good MEWS call and what constituted a bad call. 3 
The F1 and F2 doctors were satisfied with episodes where the MEWS call drew their 4 
attention to patients who had clearly developed new physical signs that required 5 
intervention. The most successful events were those where they were themselves able to 6 
make a diagnosis and organise appropriate treatment, including escalation to ICU care. 7 
These doctors were least satisfied with calls when on examination they did not find that 8 
the patient’s clinical condition had changed. They described such episodes as time 9 
wasted.   10 
The nursing team said that they hoped the patient review would be negative – for the 11 
patient’s sake - and expressed concerns about the anxiety of the patient and the 12 
relatives. 13 
“Well, when they know there’s been a call about them they get anxious. Sometimes the 14 
patient and relatives have got anxious because we have been checking and re-checking 15 
a lot. Then when the doctor comes and says its okay then its relief all round.” Staff 16 
Nurse 1 line 103 17 
“Its useful to us to have the medical team look at the patient, even when they find that 18 
there isn’t a problem.” Sister 1 line 64 19 
“Many of the repeat calls are because the docs haven’t made a variation but that’s no 20 
comfort to us in looking after the patient. They should be more willing to make 21 
variations.” Sister 3 line 32 22 
4.2.11  Category 11: Senior Clinicians express a lack of satisfaction with the systems 23 
for acute care. 24 
The opinion of the junior staff that actually use it the Early Warning Scoring system 25 
was that it was very useful, and that it improved the management of patients. They 26 
accepted it as a tool to help the most junior of medical and nursing staff to identify sick 27 
or deteriorating patients.  28 
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The opinion of the most senior medical staff as to the function and purpose of the 1 
MEWS score was also consistent. Whilst they said that it had value for junior staff, it 2 
was felt to have limitations and they cited a number of problems associated with 3 
accepting the score wholeheartedly.  The view was expressed that, whilst MEWS was a 4 
valuable tool, the systems for identifying and managing problems on acute wards were  5 
unsatisfactory because of inadequate staffing, lack of continuity and inexperience.  6 
An over reliance on the score has caused frustration in the dialogue between senior and 7 
more junior members of medical and nursing staff. One consultant’s views showed that 8 
they had the same misunderstanding of MEWS that emerged from the discussions with 9 
more junior doctors – an expectation that it quantified illness as well as being an alert of 10 
problems to come. 11 
“It is not entirely fail safe and I always want the components broken down. I think it is 12 
good but I think we get far too many calls saying this person has got a MEWS of this 13 
number and to me that doesn't necessarily mean anything because I need the breakdown 14 
of the components of it.” Consultant Acute Medicine line 18 15 
An experienced critical care consultant drew attention to this misunderstanding but did 16 
not appreciate that it extended even to senior doctors and managers. 17 
“No, I think there is a big misconception, amongst Nursing staff, but also amongst 18 
relatively Junior Doctors, and Foundation Doctors in particular, that the trigger is the 19 
be all and end all. That the patient is fine if they aren't triggering and (that they are) 20 
unwell if they are triggering and at that point somebody should come and do something. 21 
I think there is a huge lack of understanding of the idea that these don't substitute for 22 
knowing what you are doing and they are never going to be 100% sensitive by a long 23 
way.” Consultant ITU line 42 24 
The operational differences in responding to MEWS trigger events out-of-hours at night 25 
and the weekend has an impact on its effectiveness. In the hospitals studied a MEWS 26 
call requires a doctor from the patient’s care team to respond, but out-of-hours the 27 
responder may be a nurse practitioner, or a doctor with no prior knowledge or 28 
experience in that clinical area. 29 
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“No, the whole move to Hospital at Night has been a retrograde step partly because it 1 
is putting someone without diagnostic skills looking after a lot of patients. Partly 2 
because it is putting someone in care of an awful lot of patients in areas they don't know 3 
a lot about, whether they are a Doctor or a Nurse, they are coming from one particular 4 
area to cover a vast amount of specialties that are outside their normal experience.” 5 
Consultant ITU line 169 6 
Getting clinical experience under supervision, via a team approach, is seen as important 7 
in medical education. Fixed clinical teams, often referred to as ‘firms’ have disappeared 8 
with the reduction of doctors hours of work, required by the European Working Time 9 
Directive and the formalising of clinical rotations to make training experience broader 10 
and more consistent. This critical care consultant eloquently expressed the difficulty in 11 
providing feedback to juniors who did not regularly work on their team.  12 
“Also, the changes in Junior Doctors (work pattern) that puts them on shifts is 13 
retrogressive in this aspect. They see less, and they see less as part of their teams - so 14 
they learn less. When an entire team or firm was on-call, the same junior doctor was 15 
calling the same middle doctor who was calling the same senior doctor. They knew 16 
what they were doing and they knew what each other was doing, and so, very Junior 17 
Doctors often learnt because the people slightly ahead of them were the same people 18 
every time, and they knew what they could do and what they can let them do, and they 19 
were there the next day to give them feedback. Whereas, on a shift system when people 20 
are on with people they don't know and don't see them again there is no way of giving 21 
anybody any feedback.” Consultant ITU line 173 22 
This consultant returned again to the failure to recognise deteriorating patients in a 23 
timely manner out-of-hours because of deficiencies in staffing. Whether a doctor or a 24 
nurse practitioner reviews the high MEWS may affect the ensuing management.  The 25 
following transcript is in response the discussion of poor examples of identification and 26 
management of deteriorating patients. 27 
“Again I can think of lots and lots (of missed deteriorations). I can think of numerous 28 
examples where there have been enough signs during an entire night, not recognised by 29 
the people involved, -  until the next day when a relatively more senior doctor takes a 30 
look at the patient and says, “Oh my goodness!” and calls Intensive Care and we think. 31 
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“Why did nobody do something about this 5 or 6 hours ago?” You can see in the notes 1 
that people have been aware of what has been occurring, but didn’t understand the 2 
significance of it.” Consultant ITU line 71 3 
“Why do you think that is? Interviewer:  4 
“It is usually Hospital at Night, the instances I am thinking of. Usually the patient 5 
triggers on the MEWS chart. The Nurses call the Hospital at Night Practitioner who 6 
does something, usually following their algorithm. But actually that was never going to 7 
work, and they don't understand that the implications of what they are….  Sometimes 8 
there can be a couple of hours delay in sorting things out. But not a whole nights worth 9 
of delay.” Consultant ITU line 83 10 
The decision about when to contact senior staff for help has been a theme throughout 11 
this analysis. 12 
“Some of the more Junior Doctors are reluctant to call their seniors, that is very well 13 
recognised, I teach regularly on this, and when I ask “Would you call your 14 
Consultant?” 99% wouldn't, and when we talk about why, they often say, “Well maybe I 15 
should,” but then you don't know whether they will or not, so that is one issue. The 16 
issues for Nurses in particular, especially the Hospital at Night Nurses, is I think to do 17 
with not understanding actually what is wrong and what is missing. There is a concept 18 
of diagnostics that not all the Hospital at Night Nurses and Senior Nurse / Outreach 19 
Nurses understand. They are missing from their aspects of training and therefore they 20 
don't appreciate they haven't reached the answer. That actually the answer to this 21 
problem is, actually, not when this happens you do this, and when that happens you do 22 
this. It is actually when that happens you have to reach a diagnosis as to why that has 23 
happened and then you have to do something about the underlying problem because 24 
your other measures are holding measures. So that is an issue. And that is partly one of 25 
the specifics in that if you ask the Hospital at Night staff to look after a large number of 26 
specialties they don't know an awful lot about, they are never going to know about the 27 
underlying causes of that particular category of patient.” Consultant ITU line 99 28 
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This consultant was suggesting that nurses with advanced roles might have been 1 
educated in accordance with a paradigm of care that is different from the medical 2 
routine of making a decision on the basis of a full evaluation of a patient’s condition. 3 
4.2.12 Category 12: Misunderstanding the operation of MEWS - Managers 4 
The nurse managers made clear that MEWS was an excellent system, that it worked 5 
well in practice and that it had been introduced in association with excellent teaching. 6 
Furthermore they were willing to take responsibility and credit for the smooth operation 7 
of the system. 8 
“The system works very well. It was brought in with training for all staff. And we are 9 
very pleased with the levels of compliance.” Trust Quality Manager line 28 10 
“The nurses have reported some difficulties in getting a response from the doctors. 11 
Have you identified this problem?” Interviewer 12 
“I think, only infrequently. Mostly the MEWS works well.” Trust Quality Manager line 13 
60 14 
“Where do you see the Trusts policy going next?” Interviewer  15 
“The (Trust) Board has fully supported its introduction and have been very pleased with 16 
how it is working. I don’t think we will be making big changes.” Trust Quality Manager 17 
line 74 18 
The Principal Nursing Officer gave a very positive account. 19 
“The Trust has placed patient safety at the top of its agenda. The introduction of an 20 
Early Warning System has been an important development and all the evidence is that 21 
is working well. I have not heard of there being any significant problems.” Principal 22 
Nursing Officer line 38 23 
These interviewees did not voice any of the concerns that had been brought up by the 24 
staff who operate the protocol. They did not have data to show whether outcomes were 25 
being improved and repeatedly returned to their audit of compliance with the 26 
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paperwork. There did not appear to be specific quantitative audit of MEWS, whether at 1 
the ward or hospital level. What audit existed was of the quality of the documentation. 2 
Managers felt that case review in departmental specialty meetings was adequate – even 3 
though this did not include many of the staff that used the system. This enquiry has 4 
shown that Healthcare Assistants play a key role but they reported that their opinions 5 
and feedback were not sought. The lack of continuity of medical out-of-hours care 6 
means that many doctors attend discussion of patients they were not involved with and 7 
have no feedback about those they saw. 8 
“I think the Matrons have been pivotal in rolling out the MEWS Charts ……. We have 9 
done quite a lot of work around reviewing competencies of Nursing Teams across the 10 
Wards and this includes Healthcares and Staff Nurses as well. We also audit the MEWS 11 
Charts every month, so we do a selection of ten MEWS Charts per Ward every month 12 
and that is fed into the Audit Department and that would be the correct recording of 13 
observations, calculating the MEWS score and checking the correct action has been 14 
taken, so this is done as a whole system approach.” Modern Matron 1 line 45 15 
“I would like to focus now on an episode that didn't go so well. Can you think if you 16 
have ever been involved in a situation where you felt that the systems for detecting 17 
deterioration did not work as well as you would have hoped? Again please don't tell me 18 
anything that will identify the patient or the staff involved.” Interviewer  19 
“I can't think of anything specific.” Modern Matron 2 line 116 20 
The ward level managers were very aware of problems and as the interviews went on 21 
they began to disclose their knowledge of the same difficulties that are raised by the 22 
doctors and nurses who routinely use the system. 23 
“If you were called upon review a patient who is acutely unwell to whom would they 24 
report that they had a cause for concern with a patient?” Interviewer  25 
“It would be the Senior Nurse but also the on-call Doctor either the F2 or the 26 
Registrar.” Ward Manager line 46 27 
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“Right ok, so does it depend on your review of the case for who you would call or do 1 
you use something else to help guide your response?” Interviewer 2 
“So, on the Unit that would be to Medical Staff. We have a Consultant, a Registrar and 3 
F2 Doctors on the Unit. If they couldn't immediately respond to that and I felt that a 4 
patient was acutely unwell I would go back to them and say I would really like you to 5 
come and see this person. They may then say to me that I need to contact somebody else 6 
like an Anaesthetist or Outreach but I would ultimately my first line would be to go to 7 
the Medical Staff.” Ward Manager line 41 8 
 9 
“So have you found the use of early warning scoring systems quite useful in your role?” 10 
Interviewer:  11 
“I think they are only useful because the Ward Staff haven't got time sometimes to 12 
actually look at all of the parameters and I think sometimes they take away the role of 13 
the skill of the Nurse to be able to use their intuition and observation but because of 14 
time constraints and the business of the Ward they haven't really got time to use these 15 
skills. So the early warning scoring system is a useful tool but it is not the be all and end 16 
all I believe in my own opinion.” Modern Matron 2 line 51 17 
“Do you think this varies in different grades of staff?” Interviewer  18 
“Yeah I think to be honest the more experienced staff it is a complete insult to give them 19 
an early warning score they must follow because if you can't use your skill and 20 
knowledge base to actually look at a patient to say you’re not well then I think it is a 21 
disgrace. I think at grades of staff I think people are promoted far too quickly in grades 22 
anyway and they still lack the basic experience about a few years of developing their 23 
expertise and some people will stay on one Ward for all of their career and I would 24 
challenge their expertise and their knowledge and may be they need another system to 25 
be able to help them in their diagnosis and recognition of deterioration. So I don't think 26 
grades come into it as such but certainly experience yes as less experienced people need 27 
a guide where as experienced staff sometimes it is just a bit of paper which will work 28 
which they will fill in and get help anyway.” Modern Matron 2 line 60 29 
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Another modern matron, whilst being very positive about all aspects of the Early 1 
Warning System, does however make one statement that implies that the nurses may 2 
have difficulty getting the attention of the medical team. 3 
“I think the Matron role around this is very much about ‘ensuring’, and supporting the 4 
Nursing Teams to carry out procedures correctly, carry out the algorithm correctly and 5 
to support them to do their job. Again if they are worried about escalating they can 6 
come to us and we can escalate on their behalf if required. They possibly might need 7 
some support with some medics around this.” Modern Matron 1line 121 8 
It became clear from the conversation with the ward management staff that they were 9 
satisfied with its operation. They did mention the worries and frustrations of the ward 10 
nurses and junior doctors, and always suggested that the system was running perfectly. 11 
When they were asked if they had read that RSS did not improve outcomes they were 12 
sceptical that this was so. 13 
4.2.13 Category 13: Isolation and Indecision 14 
The Medical Staff 15 
The F1 and F2 doctors were quite open about the limits of their capabilities. Typical 16 
comments were: 17 
Interviewer: “How confidant is you that you will know what to do when you are 18 
called?” 19 
“I used to be very apprehensive but I am getting more confident. Sometimes it’s really 20 
difficult to know whether there is a serious problem or it’s just something like 21 
analgesics wearing off.” Doctor FY1 1 line 160 22 
 23 
“I find it difficult when I am deciding that the patient is okay. All the responsibility is on 24 
my shoulders.” Doctor FY1 3 line 117 25 
 26 
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“I think most of us feel out of our depth from time to time.” Doctor FY2 2 line 67 1 
Another difficulty for the F1 and F2 doctors is deciding when to ask for help. 2 
“The MEWS score increases the pressure I feel, because when a patient is scoring, I 3 
need to get the issue sorted, but there’s no rule about when I do it myself and when I get 4 
help. To be honest I feel I need help with all the patients. It’s a big responsibility not to 5 
get help – but I don’t want to be known as a ‘no coper’”Doctor FY1 2 line 150 6 
“The fact of a MEWS would pressure me loads because I need to decide whether to call 7 
the reg but in practice so many calls are false alarms that I get use to it.” Doctor FY1 3 8 
line 123 9 
The operation of MEWS, as intended by its designers, is critically dependent upon team 10 
communication. There are a number of prerequisites. 11 
• Staff can express themselves clearly enough to be understood 12 
• The doctor or nurse on the next step of the patient management ladder is 13 
available and open to the communication 14 
• All members of the team have the same objective 15 
The opportunity to share anxieties made the participants become progressively more 16 
open. Some very junior doctors were finding the initial clinical years very difficult. The 17 
nurses were confidantes and sharers of the doctors’ bad experiences and volunteered 18 
their opinions about the supervision of trainees even though the structure of the 19 
interviews did not lead them in that direction. 20 
Staff Nurse at the end of the interview with recorder off (Memo): The Staff Nurse felt 21 
that the Junior F1s were under incredible pressure and that she knows of an incident 22 
recently where an F1 has been very angry and very stressed and has even considered 23 
leaving the profession. Despite asking for senior support within the medical team, this 24 
apparently has been not forthcoming and the F1 is now reconsidering their future. 25 
Lack of support from senior medical colleagues was often cited as a major cause of 26 
stress for FY1 and FY2 doctors. They felt isolated, anxious, depressed and reported 27 
feeling lonely in their work. Difficulty communicating with their seniors was described 28 
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as anxiety provoking and knowing when, and how to ask for help was sometimes 1 
daunting. FY1s expressing their need for time to discuss a range of clinical problems, 2 
often complex and outside their experience or understanding, were at times frustrated by 3 
the responses from their seniors who focussed on asking, or responding to, specific 4 
questions. Whilst the more junior doctors accept the stress and busy schedules of their 5 
colleagues they feel they should be better supported. 6 
“Do you sometimes find that when you are wanting to raise causes for concern or 7 
discuss patients that you are worried about higher up the chain, is it sometimes 8 
difficult?” Interviewer  9 
“Yes it is” Doctor  FY1 3 line 125 10 
“Do you want to elaborate on that?” Interviewer 11 
“Yes, I think a lot of it is to do with Consultants approachability and how they talk to 12 
junior members of staff. Quite a lot of Consultants don't remember things that you have 13 
said to them or take in your concerns. So I think that if you know a Consultant will 14 
remember what patient you are talking about, that will help, quite often they don't 15 
(know the patient) and you have to tell them the full story. They often think they want 16 
them to answer one specific question, but a lot of the time it is not just one thing you 17 
want an answer to, it’s just general help and for someone just to come and give a 18 
general overview, and have a look at everything that has been done, and just check if 19 
we have missed anything. ….sometimes it is reassurance what we are looking for rather 20 
than we want you to do this one (specific) thing.” Doctor FY1 3 line 127 21 
“It sounds like your saying you need a little bit of time with them” Interviewer  22 
“Yeah, time and attention, I guess. And I guess, just for them to listen, and understand 23 
what we are asking for is not necessarily an answer but a bit of support in our decision 24 
making.” Doctor FY1 3 line 140 25 
In this particular interview the FY1 became very upset and cried. At this point the 26 
interview was temporarily suspended.  The contemporary Memo described the FY1, 27 
when a little more composed, as feeling lonely in the job, isolated from her peer group 28 
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because of the demands of the job, and depressed. They described feeling that they were 1 
“treading water” and unsure of whom they could ask for help when professionally they 2 
saw her more senior colleagues also stressed in their role. After ten minutes the FY1 3 
asked for the tape to be switched back on. 4 
“Would you say that is just at Consultant level or does that sometimes becomes a 5 
barrier as you are moving through the ranks.” Interviewer  6 
“I think it is at all stages to be honest. I have worked with Senior House Officers and 7 
Doctors at the grade just above me, and they will still have the same sort of guarded 8 
response when you ask for help. It is kind of like a communication barrier, when you’re 9 
trying to give them the information, …….and you kind of hoping that you will have a 10 
discussion about it. And you kind of come to the conclusion together about what is the 11 
best thing, or just for them to give you some reassurance, “Yes you have done the right 12 
things. But what we need to do now is wait”. But they come back at you with “So what 13 
do you want me to do?” rather than, “Let’s talk about this together”. I find that 14 
happens all the way up, and also happens when you speak to Registrars on the phone 15 
and in person.” Doctor FY1 1 124 16 
“So how does that make you feel?” Interviewer  17 
“I guess it makes me feel like I need to argue my case, almost to try and clarify, and I 18 
have to say it is serious, the patient is more ill I need to justify my reasons for speaking 19 
to them and I guess it gets a bit clouded from there.” Doctor FY1 1 line 126 20 
Trainees reported closed language used by senior colleagues that inhibited the junior 21 
asking for more detailed advice and physical help. The demeanour of senior colleagues, 22 
their general relationship with them, and the time of day were also noted as impacting 23 
on how readily the junior would approach the senior.  24 
“So thinking about within your own profession when you’re reporting causes for 25 
concern to more senior colleagues do you feel that your causes for concern are taken 26 
seriously?” Interviewer  27 
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“Yeah, I think most of the time yeah. I think experience shows a lot when you’re talking 1 
to senior Doctors, and obviously we are Juniors we are still learning. I will phone the 2 
Registrar sometimes and say I am worried about this and they will ask, “Why are you 3 
worried about that it is normal……in that context”.  I can't think of an example right 4 
now but that sort of thing has happened a few times. I think that if you need someone 5 
more senior to assess a patient you can be quite straight with them.” Doctor FY1 2 line 6 
125 7 
“For those occasions where you don't feel they are taking your causes for concern 8 
straight away or you’re not being listened to can you explain why sometimes your 9 
causes for concern aren't taken seriously?” Interviewer  10 
“I don't know if there is a specific context. I mean I think the main thing is the 11 
experience quite early on in a job a Registrar might say this person has got a CRP of 12 
150, they may say, “Well that is okay given their history,” I would say  “I didn't know 13 
that I just thought that was quite high.”” Doctor FY1 2 line 135 14 
“Do you ever feel anxious about raising causes for concern to more senior medical 15 
staff?” Interviewer  16 
“Initially yes. I think particularly throughout medical school you see the Consultants 17 
especially initially, when you start work here you probably pick up the phone less likely 18 
than you should, which I don't think is ideal, but I think that comes with not a fear per 19 
say but just being a bit unsure of ringing your Registrar or the Medical Registrar for 20 
the Hospital and that seems like a big deal. I have since found that it actually doesn't 21 
matter and everyone is really nice and we are there to look after the patients. So now I 22 
don't think twice if I need to ring someone I would just phone them whether it be a 23 
Registrar or a Consultant” Doctor FY1 2 line 142 24 
The stress faced by the FY1 included the high expectations they placed upon themselves 25 
in their role as a junior doctor, and had a direct bearing on when they felt when they 26 
needed to raise causes of concern with their seniors. Their perceptions of self efficacy in 27 
coping with patients who were deteriorating ranged quite widely but junior medical 28 
staff generally felt that they ought to be able to cope independently to a certain degree. 29 
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Here we have an example from an FY1 discussing cases of patient deterioration with the 1 
emphasis on unacceptable delays in senior review. 2 
“Was this overnight?” Interviewer  3 
“No it was during the day on a weekend. The patient didn't get seen as quickly as they 4 
ought. I got there quickly. I was already on the Ward. But going up the chain of 5 
command was a lot slower. Before the Registrar arrived it was hours later, but in the 6 
meantime, I had discussed with the Nurses, and we rang Outreach and sort of expressed 7 
our concerns. Then, eventually, having discussed it with Outreach, they weren't 8 
impressed that the Registrar wasn't there. I am not pointing fingers because I know that 9 
is how surgery on-calls work, you know. If someone is scrubbed they cannot leave 10 
Theatre. So we discussed, and called the Anaesthetist, who came and helped us and that 11 
was when I sort of backed off. And this patient was still intermittently having seizures 12 
and vomiting. In the end the Registrar did leave Theatre and came to see the patient. I 13 
would genuinely not be able to say if the patient had been seen quicker if there had of 14 
been a different outcome.” Doctor FY1 3 line 85 15 
“So what do you think the factors were then? You mentioned it was at a weekend, you 16 
were on-call, and the Registrar who you tried to feed up to was actually busy in 17 
Theatre” Interviewer  18 
“On-call, less staff around, only one Registrar to ring, whereas sometimes there are 19 
three. It was a little bit earlier on in my rotation as well, and I think my confidence 20 
about pestering was lower, perhaps, because now I will ring and say “Is so and so 21 
available?” and if they say, “No they are scrubbed,” I will say “How long is the case 22 
going to be? Can you put the phone to their ear? I need to ask them one question.” 23 
Whereas, because it was very early on, I probably didn't ask those questions. I didn't get 24 
a specific time frame, or perhaps if I had of known they would be 3 hours, perhaps I 25 
would have said we need to do something quicker, perhaps said to the Outreach Nurse, 26 
“We need to ring the Anaesthetist now.” I can't actually remember the specifics, but this 27 
was early on and I am very confident with things like this now.” Doctor FY1 3 line 202 28 
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“So I take from you that you were a little bit apprehensive sometimes at the beginning 1 
of the job. Now how do you feel about seeking senior help? Do you still feel 2 
apprehensive now? How do you feel about raising causes for concern?” Interviewer  3 
“It is not like the hierarchy system that I was used to in my last job. There I’d have got 4 
the observation chart laid out in front of me because if they ask me what the 5 
temperature was three hours ago, I don't want him to shout at me because I don't know 6 
straight away. I have perhaps done other jobs where when I rang Registrars where this 7 
would be the case. For example, if I rang the Orthopaedics Registrar, I would have 8 
everything laid out perhaps, typically if you don't have everything there, you waste their 9 
time - and you will get an earful. Whereas, that would never ever happen here. ….. It is 10 
nothing personal against me, I always try to get everything ready, but I wouldn't not 11 
call them because I was worried about being told off, or making a fool of myself. I 12 
would just be a little bit more prepared for certain Consultants, if you like. And that is 13 
probably the same, wherever you work, for people higher up than.” Doctor FY1 3 line 14 
229 15 
Immediately following the close of the interview (and captured in the field notes and 16 
Memo), the FY1 became emotional and described feeling very anxious in raising 17 
concerns to senior registrar and consultant levels at night. They felt that they should 18 
have greater coping abilities, and did not want to appear stupid or lacking in experience. 19 
Additionally, the FY1 felt that when they reported MEWS scores to the registrars and 20 
consultants their attitude was often dismissive. The FY1 stated that they often didn’t 21 
know how to ask for help without ‘loosing face’. Self-efficacy, and how to understand 22 
what they were expected to manage alone was a recurring theme amongst the most 23 
junior doctors. The very junior doctors were frustrated by the fact that their decision 24 
making was judged by the outcome without adequate guidance about what their limits 25 
of independence should be. This was complicated by their perception that they were 26 
expected to be continually pushing and extending those limits – but without making any 27 
mistakes. There was a culture that good trainees were those who acted alone and weak 28 
trainees were cautious. 29 
The more senior medical staff, when called upon to give advice and guidance, offered 30 
an alternative view about supporting the junior. Interestingly the language used reflects 31 
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the narrative of an FY1 doctor expressing frustration at getting a more open dialogue 1 
with their senior.  2 
“Yeah, time and attention I guess and I guess just for them to listen and understand 3 
what we are asking for is not necessarily an answer but a bit of support in our decision- 4 
making.” Doctor FY1 1 line 118 5 
“I try to always be friendly and open. If they give me a history of the patient I ask them 6 
“What do you want to do? What do you think you need to do?” and then kind …..judge 7 
where they are going with it, and often they are on exactly the right lines, and I can say 8 
“Yes that is exactly right. Do that and get back to me if you’re worried.” I guess it is 9 
about judging on the phone how concerned they are. And sometimes you feel that they 10 
are just really out of their depth, so I will go and see them. I mean I have only been a 11 
Registrar for a year, so it is definitely a learning process, but it is knowing when to go 12 
and see that patient and when you can just give advice on the end of the phone.” Doctor 13 
SpR 3  14 
The Nursing Staff 15 
The nursing staff described situations where they were left feeling insecure about 16 
planning. The difficulties they experienced in getting doctors to attend have been 17 
described above, as has been the problem of subsequent communication failures, which 18 
leave them not knowing what has been decided or even whether a decision has been 19 
made.  20 
Nurses described how the MEWS call is itself a cause for concern, and explained how a 21 
medical review helps reassure everyone. 22 
“I sometimes think that the medical staff don’t appreciate what the nurses do to look 23 
after the patients, and the MEWS is a way to get them involved.” Staff Nurse 1 line 81 24 
4.2.14  Category 14: Differing Professional Attitudes To An Intervention Following 25 
A MEWS Trigger Event 26 
A theme that emerged from the interviews was that the doctors and nurses had different 27 
expectations of outcome when calling a doctor to a patient following a MEWS trigger 28 
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event. The attitudes are revealed by what the staff say, but also by what they do not say! 1 
When asked about their role in the care of the deteriorating patient the members of the 2 
medical team give very similar responses. Typical of these was: 3 
“We are normally the first responder to a situation when a patient is unwell, I see my 4 
role as initially stabilizing the patients, going through an A, B, C, D approach, making 5 
sure I have done everything I can to get the most information about how unwell the 6 
patient is - and potentially what might be going wrong, before trying to put together a 7 
working diagnosis or a more specific management plan.”FY1 1 line 11 8 
” I feel my role alongside the F1 is to assess the patient, perform initial investigations; 9 
to do whatever I can to stabilize the patient for example put oxygen on pain relief. Like I 10 
say get the initial investigations together and coming up with an idea of what is going 11 
on before phoning the Registrar.”FY2 1 line 11 12 
Neither the medical nor the nursing teams mentioned joint evaluation of patients and 13 
joint treatment planning.  14 
Asked if the nurse is involved in evaluating and planning for the patient one doctor 15 
responded: 16 
“No not in that situation. I think Nurses assisted by putting oxygen on the patient, but 17 
otherwise I don't think they helped on the decision making process at all.”FY1-1 line 18 
128 19 
The doctors described how they received a call from the nursing team and it then 20 
becomes a matter for the medical team. Three doctors described asking the nurse for 21 
their opinion but all these examples related to their efforts to determine a priority for the 22 
call and appeared to be motivated by a desire not to respond in person unless there was 23 
what they perceived as a real problem. They indicated that a genuine problem was one 24 
that required them to take action. Such action may be to increase the frequency of 25 
monitoring, make a clinical change to treatment or to seek additional advice. If no such 26 
problem is found they would often rate the nurse’s call as being due to inexperience, or 27 
the fact that the nurse was ‘covering their back’.  28 
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“Nurses very often want Doctors to take responsibility for patients who are constantly 1 
scoring and I feel that I am under pressure to review patients every time they do their 2 
obs. These calls are unnecessary.” Doctor FY1 3 line 76 3 
“The nurse is sometimes covering their back. They know there’s no change but still 4 
make the call.” ST1-1 line 128 5 
“But again I don't think they look at the at the parameters. For example, on the Ward 6 
the other day there was a patient with a really high temperature, but that only meant 7 
they were scoring a 1 which meant repeat observations in so many hours, but actually it 8 
had been useful to know that - because we could do blood cultures on them. The nurses 9 
were stuck on the MEWS and didn’t call. So sometimes it would be useful if they looked 10 
at the parameters more than just the score. That way they would not make unnecessary 11 
calls.” Doctor Doctor FY2 1 line 56 12 
The nursing staff seemed to accept the same implicit division of nursing and medical 13 
responsibility but they voiced wider concerns. These fell into three categories: 14 
Lack of information about the ‘medical plan’  15 
The need for information in order for the wider nursing team to shape their care for the 16 
patient 17 
The need for information in order to reassure and inform the patient and their relatives 18 
The nurses said that even a review that finds nothing changed or no cause for concern is 19 
useful. The medical staff never referred to the nurses role in care and did not mention 20 
that reporting a MEWS trigger even might cause the nurse anxiety when he/she cannot 21 
see a cause for concern, both because they might worry that they are missing something 22 
and because it leaves them unsure of how to counsel the patient and their family. 23 
In terms of anxieties expressed, the junior members of the medical team expressed 24 
concern about the problems of referring to more senior colleagues. 25 
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“Do you sometimes find that when you are wanting to raise causes for concern or 1 
discuss patients that you are worried about to doctors higher up the chain, is it 2 
sometimes difficult?” Interviewer  3 
“Yes it is”FY1 3 line 123 4 
“Do you want to elaborate on that?” Interviewer  5 
“Yes, I think a lot of it is to do with Consultants approachability and how they talk to 6 
junior members of staff. Quite a lot of Consultants don't remember things that you have 7 
said to them or take in your concerns, so I think if you know a Consultant will 8 
remember what patient you are talking about that will help, quite often they don't and 9 
you have to tell them the full story. They often think they want them to answer one 10 
specific question but a lot of the time it is not just one thing you want an answer too it is 11 
just general help and someone just to come and give a general overview and have a 12 
look at everything that has been done and just check if we have missed anything. If it is 13 
one question we are junior staff we haven't been in these situations, patients are 14 
complex and sometimes it is reassurance what we are looking for rather than we want 15 
you to do this one thing.” Doctor FY1 3 line 127 16 
“Would you say that is just at Consultant level or does that sometimes becomes a 17 
barrier as your moving through the ranks?” Interviewer  18 
“I think it is at all stages to be honest, I have worked be Senior House Officers and 19 
Doctors at the grade just above me and they will still have the same sort of guarded 20 
response when you ask for help. It is kind of like a communication barrier when you’re 21 
trying to give them the information.” Doctor FY1 3 line 145 22 
The nurses, on the other hand, said they were unconcerned about calling the medical 23 
team and described other anxieties due to not knowing what the plan is and being 24 
unable to explain the situation to relatives. Even negative reviews are reassuring. 25 
“Its useful to talk to the doctor when they do a review, even if they don’t find anything, 26 
because I can tell the family what’s happening and also I am reassured that I am not 27 
missing something.” Staff Nurse 5 line 126 28 
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4.3 The Process of Developing Theory 1 
The general purpose of qualitative enquiry is to develop ‘theory’. Charmaz has defined 2 
theory: “A theory states relationship between abstract concepts and may aim for 3 
explanation or understanding.” (Thornberg, Perhamus et al. 2012) p41) Theorists and 4 
users of grounded theory have disagreed about what theory means. Abend has 5 
enumerated seven meanings that have been given to theory and emphasises that 6 
definitions of theory are strongest when they allow latitude in the epistemological 7 
perspective of the researcher (Abend 2008). Timmermans has discussed theory in the 8 
context of grounded theory and urged that the process of development should be 9 
abductive rather than inductive (Timmermans and Tavory 2012). They note that 10 
inductive reasoning does not lend itself to discovering novel insights. Abduction refers 11 
to a creative inferential process aimed at producing new hypotheses and theories based 12 
on surprising research evidence (as discussed in chapter 3 Section 3.3). Charmaz 13 
(Charmaz 2000)and Glaser (Glaser 2004) have both written that the processes of 14 
analysis in grounded theory are relatively neutral relative to the epistemological beliefs 15 
of the researcher and that it is at the late stage of theory construction that the positivist / 16 
relativist division arises and that this is a continuum rather than a dichotomy. 17 
“Interpretative theory aims to: 18 
• Conceptualise the studied phenomenon to understand it in abstract terms 19 
• Articulate theoretical claims pertaining to scope, depth, power and relevance of 20 
a given analysis. 21 
• Acknowledge subjectivity in theorizing and hence recognize the role of 22 
experience, standpoints and interactions, including one’s own. 23 
• Offer an imaginative theoretical interpretation that makes sense of the studied 24 
phenomenon.”(Charmaz 2014)p231) 25 
Charmaz particularly emphasises the intuitive imaginative aspect of developing theory. 26 
She says that “Theories flash illuminating insights and make sense of murky musings 27 
and knotty problems. The ideas fit” (ibid p233) 28 
In analysing the interviews in this study I have selected those concepts that the 29 
participants have appeared to value. These have been those to which individuals have 30 
returned in their interviews and those that have recurred in several of the interviews. I 31 
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have also taken note of ideas to which participants have attached importance and to 1 
those ideas that have occurred to me as I read and re-read the evidence. This has been 2 
the process through which I have elevated minor categories to major categories and the 3 
reason has been because I suspected that these concepts would be used in theory 4 
building. By which process I mean the process by which I would understand what I was 5 
being told and perhaps start to explain how and why things happen as well, as well as 6 
what and when. I have chosen not to use more formal methods of theory development 7 
such as framework analysis (Ritchie and Spencer 2002) because the method is not 8 
consistent with the methods of constant comparison and simultaneous analysis and data 9 
collection that are called for in grounded theory. Chapters 5 and 6 describe the concepts 10 
that I have proposed from analysis of the interview data. 11 
12 
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5 WHAT IS REVEALED ABOUT INTERPRETATIONS OF 1 
THE EWS 2 
The discussion of the findings of this study is carried across three chapters. In this 3 
chapter: 4 
• In the first section key ideas from the narratives, relating to the use of the early 5 
warning score are discussed 6 
• The second section relates to the MEWS impact on the medical and nursing 7 
teams.  8 
• The third section considers whether, from the narratives provided, MEWSs and 9 
RRTs are really addressing the problem of delay in treating patient deterioration. 10 
The literature relating to RRSs, reviewed in Chapter 2, indicated that its failure to 11 
improve outcomes has been a disappointment to enthusiasts. Recent publications have 12 
been tentatively working round to the conclusion that human factors may be significant 13 
in determining how deteriorating patients are managed (Marshall, Kitto et al. 2011, 14 
Shearer, Marshall et al. 2012, Buist and Mahoney 2014, Kitto, Marshall et al. 2015, 15 
White, Scott et al. 2015). My suspicion, borne of my experience of managing critically 16 
ill patients, and of undertaking official investigations into errors, was that social and 17 
cultural issues, and misunderstandings between medical and nursing teams, would be 18 
important. I have accepted this hunch as a sensitising concept as identified by Charmaz  19 
(Charmaz 2006) p11). The theories I have been able to construct from the data, and will 20 
describe in this chapter, contribute to this debate, and are consistent with the view that 21 
in this complex clinical situation too high an expectation is placed upon a planned, 22 
mechanical response system.  23 
5.1 Human Factors and Teamwork 24 
I discovered from the interviews, that, as previously found in a number of studies 25 
(Tirkkonen, Yla-Mattila et al. 2013, Yiu, Khan et al. 2014, Douglas, Osborne et al. 26 
2016), the use of MEWS by my study teams does not always lead to the earlier 27 
involvement of doctors and nurses experienced in the care of critical illness. Both the 28 
nurses and the doctors described how a trigger event leads to the most junior doctor 29 
being called. All the nursing interviewees believed that ‘if the patient triggered’ the 30 
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doctor was called. It was evident that this call did not necessarily lead to the required, 1 
in-person, review by the doctor. It was also evident that the MEWS protocol did not 2 
help this junior doctor decide when to ask for more senior assistance. It was clear from 3 
the interviews that the high rate of false positive alerts undermined the trust the doctors 4 
have in the system.  When a trigger is reported to them the MEWS is little help in 5 
resolving their principal dilemma: whether to seek help. As this research progressed I 6 
realised that the lack of concrete guidance on calling for help, and the lack of a formal 7 
RRT, complicated their decision making and was a weakness of this system as used in 8 
the UK.  9 
With a formal RRS such as a Medical Emergency Team (MET) the doctor is required to 10 
call that team, solely on the basis of the trigger. Studies have shown that with a MET or 11 
RRT the doctors’ desire for self-efficacy is a factor that influences how they respond 12 
(Fein, Mackie et al. 2016). Without a MET the situation becomes even more 13 
complicated as the doctor does not have automatic recourse to advice. 14 
An EWS and a RRS use a multi-professional team to manage incipient patient 15 
deterioration. The separate medical and nursing teams both have hierarchies, and it has 16 
been suggested that rigidity of these structures might interfere with the operation of the 17 
whole system (Shearer, Marshall et al. 2012, Kitto, Marshall et al. 2015). In 2014 Buist 18 
and Mahoney wrote in an editorial in the journal ‘Resuscitation’: 19 
“The whole issue with proving RRS efficacy is quite simply that the RRS is not an 20 
intervention amenable to most traditional forms of analysis. This is because the 21 
intervention is not ‘Clean’. A RRS is very much a cultural system of change that is 22 
superimposed on a system of hospital care that is meant to be homogenous, but in 23 
fact has tremendous variation with respect to time, staff and geography.”(Buist and 24 
Mahoney 2014) 25 
In Kitto and Marshalls (2015) investigation of the behaviour of RRS teams, they 26 
suggested that the RRS attempts to shape the behaviour of healthcare professionals by 27 
formalising the ‘rules of engagement’ for dealing with deteriorating patients. What sets 28 
their investigation apart from others who have made similar observations is their 29 
conclusion that professional backgrounds and cultures are various, and will have 30 
different influences. They found that nursing was more hierarchical than medicine and 31 
the nurses in their study felt more pressure to report problems up their management line 32 
than did the medical staff. In my study the interviews with more senior nurses and 33 
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managers revealed that meeting audit benchmarks for monitoring and reporting was 1 
their principal concern. They did not expect to be asked to intervene or help, and they 2 
did not understand any of the difficulties that junior staff was experiencing in managing 3 
MEWS. Their understanding of its role was shallow and their assessments had a ‘rosy 4 
glow’. The problem appeared to be that MEWS was a new innovation and their role had 5 
been in implementation and education, without them having the opportunity to have 6 
practical experience of using it in the management of individual patients. I found no 7 
evidence that intra-professional reporting was causing delay in managing deterioration, 8 
and staff reported that it speeded recognition of problems. This was probably because 9 
there was no MET to call - an action that inevitably raises the stakes for the reporter. 10 
All the junior doctors and nurses interviewed in this investigation said that the MEWS 11 
system was very useful and simplified their work, (Sections 5.1.1, 5.2.1) but the 12 
explanations they gave showed that many of the ways they found the system useful 13 
were outside its intended purpose (Sections 5.2.1, 4.2.2). The RNs and healthcare 14 
assistants expressed fewer reservations about MEWS than the medical staff. This 15 
finding is in line with the quantitative studies of Sarani, Sonnad et al who found that 16 
both nurses and doctors believed the RRS to be useful but that the nurses held this belief 17 
more strongly than the doctors (Sarani, Sonnad et al. 2009), and of Douglas, Osborne et 18 
al. who also found nurses significantly more positive than medical staff (Douglas, 19 
Osborne et al. 2016). It is also in agreement with the findings of Cherry et al (2015) 20 
who studied the attitudes of qualified nursing staff to MEWS. All their respondents 21 
believed that the MEWS was beneficial, despite there often being difficulty in getting 22 
medical staff to review the patient, even if the MEWS score was significantly high. 23 
(Cherry and Jones 2015). Similarly my respondents felt that a qualified nurse's seniority 24 
or ‘the colour of his or her uniform’ can affect the attitude of the medical staff and can 25 
mean the difference between the patient being reviewed or not (Section 4.2.5)  26 
The medical team consultants’ attitudes were more complicated. They agreed with their 27 
juniors about the value of the system but from time to time questioned the very model 28 
of care that it represents (Section 4.2.7). 29 
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5.1.1 Team members believe the MEWS data is reliable 1 
The healthcare assistants perform the bulk of the vital-signs observations and calculate 2 
the MEWS score. The healthcare assistants themselves, and their supervising nurses, 3 
believed that the observations were done reliably, on time, and that the MEWS 4 
calculation was accurate. This is at odds with the quantitative literature where, upon 5 
review, many observations are found to be missing and there are significant numbers of 6 
miscalculations (Van Leuvan and Mitchell 2008, Hammond, Spooner et al. 2013, 7 
Hands, Reid et al. 2013, Connelly and Bleasdale 2015, Kolic, Crane et al. 2015). All 8 
that can be said about this is to remark that it is surprising that staff felt this confidence 9 
in the observations without the benefit of an audit programme. The nursing team were 10 
also satisfied that those making the measurements were properly taught and skilled in 11 
the task. The nurse managers stated that the system was reliable because of the care that 12 
had been taken to ensure that staff were properly trained.  13 
5.1.2 Team members believe that trigger events are customarily reported as 14 
required 15 
A consistent finding from both the medical and nursing interviews was that all grades of 16 
team member believed the nurses were conscientious in reporting high EWS scores to 17 
the medical team (Section 4.2.5). The nurses described being persistent in making 18 
referrals (Section 4.2.5), and no member of the medical team suggested that nurses were 19 
exercising discretion over whether or not to alert the medical team. This again is 20 
contrary to what is reported in the literature, where nurses dealt with the majority of 21 
alerts in some systems without medical review (Guinane, Bucknall et al. 2013). An 22 
important factor may be the relatively informal alerting structure that appears to have 23 
less possibility of adverse professional and socio-cultural effects on the alerter than does 24 
calling in a formal MET. 25 
The teams that I studied had a very simple reporting structure. No METs were available, 26 
and staff described a tangled web of possible lines of escalation (Figure 10) There were 27 
no firm guidelines as to what seniority of nurse should report an EWS trigger event 28 
(Section 4.2.4). Nor was there guidance on what grade of doctor to alert (Section 4.2.5). 29 
The recruitment of the outreach ICU team was equally haphazard. The nursing team 30 
sometimes consult it without alerting their home medical team. The National Institute 31 
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for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has recommended that doctors below the grade 1 
of Registrar should not undertake the assessment of sick patients (NICE 2007) but in 2 
this study it was found that many trigger events would stall at the F1 level, often 3 
without the doctor seeing the patient. The participants described a variety of possible 4 
routes for reporting and escalating a trigger event (Figure 10)  5 
Figure 10. The Tangled Lines for Escalation of Care used by The Nursing and 6 
Medical Teams 7 
 8 
A recent study of nursing attitudes to MEWS also found that nursing staff were 9 
frustrated by the difficulty of getting what they considered to be an adequate response to 10 
their alerts (Cherry and Jones 2015).  11 
During the interviews it emerged that the nurses and healthcare assistants will report a 12 
high MEWS to the doctor who is most immediately available. This will often be their 13 
‘first responder’ foundation doctor, because they spend a lot of time on the ward, but 14 
they would also report to the registrar or consultant if they were passing (Section 4.2.6).  15 
Healthcare assistants and junior nurses would alert their home medical team, without 16 
consulting their own clinical supervisors. Some junior nurses also implied that they 17 
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occasionally developed ‘special relationships’ of trust with some of the doctors and 1 
would more readily call these doctors directly (Section 4.2.6).  The nurses found 2 
reporting to these doctors less threatening (Section 4.2.6). They did not say that they 3 
believed these doctors to have superior clinical skills. This issue of clinical trust did, 4 
however, influence reporting lines. Several nurses - including all the senior nurses - 5 
described situations in which they did not trust the clinical judgement of foundation 6 
doctors and would ‘go over their heads’ to get more senior assistance (Section 4.2.6). 7 
It is difficult to comment on the possible impact of this informal reporting structure on 8 
the operation of the MEWS. On the one hand it makes the response to a trigger event 9 
inconsistent. On the other hand the flexibility may be empowering nurses to exercise 10 
their clinical judgement. Another theme that I shall develop later in this discussion is the 11 
way that the high rate of false positive alerts affects responses. The impression from the 12 
nurse interviews was that they informally triage trigger events, and they may be 13 
jumping to a registrar referral when they have genuine concerns about a patient. 14 
5.1.3 Hierarchies 15 
Both medicine and nursing are hierarchical professions and it has been suggested that 16 
the rigidity and inflexibility that this introduces causes problems with RRS (Kitto, 17 
Marshall et al. 2015). Each tier of the medical and nursing teams has some 18 
responsibility for clinical supervision and if the reporting structure bypasses them they 19 
may feel offended that their ‘junior’ has decided that they do not have a useful 20 
contribution to make. This aspect of working relationships may perhaps be seen more 21 
often when the RRS involves a MET rather than the patient’s home medical team. It 22 
would clearly embarrass the home team to find that the MET has been called without 23 
them knowing. It is also a professional threat to give another team sight of the plan they 24 
have been following. There seems to be evidence from the literature that RRSs requiring 25 
immediate referral to the MET are associated with delayed alerting. Examination of the 26 
data in such cases shows that these delays are often instances of the home medical team 27 
being called and then trying to manage the patient themselves (Boniatti, Azzolini et al. 28 
2014, Roberts, Bonafide et al. 2014, Kolic, Crane et al. 2015). Given the high level of 29 
false positives generated by the EWS this filtering through the home team may be 30 
making the work of the MET manageable. Delayed MET referral is nonetheless 31 
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associated with increased mortality (Calzavacca, Licari et al. 2010, Boniatti, Azzolini et 1 
al. 2014, Barwise, Thongprayoon et al. 2016). 2 
In this study there was no evidence of hierarchies interfering with referral, or causing 3 
problems within the nursing team (Section 4.2.10). None of the nurses and healthcare 4 
assistants reported having had difficulty with reporting directly to the medical team 5 
without consulting their nursing supervisors. More senior nurses said that they had 6 
confidence in their juniors and that they did not expect to be told about every trigger 7 
event (Section 4.2.8). This is a significant finding as it suggests that the nursing team 8 
sees decisions about patient management as belonging to the medical team and indicates 9 
a fracture line between the medical and nursing teams. 10 
The role of healthcare assistants in my study was more complicated. They do not 11 
normally take it upon themselves to telephone the doctor. They do, however, call the 12 
doctor when told to do so by their supervising RN. Healthcare assistants will report 13 
directly to doctors without telling their supervisor if the doctor is immediately available 14 
in the ward (Section 4.2.8). Again, these relaxed attitudes seem to have developed 15 
because as many as eight out of ten alerts are not harbingers of collapse and need no 16 
changes to the treatments. 17 
The medical team came across as being more concerned with its own hierarchy than that 18 
of the nurses who called them. The ‘first responders’ for the medical team were largely 19 
unconcerned about the grade of nurse that alerts them to a trigger situation. Some 20 
respondents said that they had no experience of being called by healthcare assistants and 21 
felt that this should not happen because the nurses had their own hierarchy of 22 
supervision (Section 4.2.8). All three doctors who said this added that they didn’t think 23 
this would be problem anyway, because “a MEWS score is a MEWS score”, whoever 24 
reported it, and contacting a doctor did not need any special skill or judgement (Section 25 
5.7). In any case they also said that they did not know whether the person on the phone 26 
was a nurse or a healthcare assistant. 27 
Several foundation doctors reported very stressful situations regarding reporting 28 
(Section 5.14.1). These stories always related to previous placements! Either their 29 
current relationships were better, or they were being guarded about what they said 30 
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because of fears over confidentiality. As three of the foundation doctors became 1 
emotional during the interview when talking about stress and isolation this is a 2 
significant issue. The problems were threefold. Firstly, self-efficacy; they had high 3 
expectations of themselves and experienced a sense of failure when they needed help. 4 
Secondly, there were problems in finding a more senior doctor who could help them and 5 
they sometimes felt out of their depth. Thirdly, the senior doctors were sometimes 6 
critical of them for asking for help (Sections 5.14.1, 5.15). The informality of the 7 
reporting system in action meant that the most junior doctor must decide whether to ask 8 
their senior for help, and they are not protected from criticism by a mandatory reporting 9 
system. So stressful were these situations for the foundation doctors that two doctors 10 
were in tears over their problems and a third was clearly emotional. This is in line with 11 
the findings of Stewart (2008) regarding the influences on junior doctors decisions 12 
about calling for senior assistance (Stewart 2008). She found that the doctors had to 13 
balance the imperative of safe care against the possible negative consequences of calling 14 
– which included criticism of their actions. Stewart concludes that their decision 15 
making: 16 
“was a dynamic process exemplified by the need to create counterbalances 17 
between multiple consequences. As a result, no prescriptive action could have 18 
allowed PRHOs (F1s in today’s nomenclature) to deal with the numerous 19 
configurations they faced and took into account.” 20 
The RSSs is an example of such a prescriptive system failing - as predicted by Stewart. 21 
Lack of support from senior medical colleagues was cited often as a major stress for 22 
foundation doctors (Section 5.14). Whilst they accept the stress, and understand the 23 
busy schedules of their colleagues, they nonetheless felt isolated, anxious, depressed, 24 
and reported feeling lonely in their work. Difficulty communicating with their seniors 25 
was described as anxiety provoking. Knowing when and how to ask for help was 26 
sometimes daunting. The foundation doctors expressed their need for time to discuss a 27 
range of patient needs, often complex, and outside their experience or understanding. 28 
They often felt that they didn’t know exactly what questions to ask their registrar 29 
(Section 5.14.1). This was made more of a problem by the responses from their seniors, 30 
who were focussed on asking or responding to specific questions to solve the problem 31 
as quickly as possible – preferably without having to attend in person. 32 
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Another problem reported by foundation doctors was that their home team registrars 1 
expected to be consulted before the outreach team – despite their unavailability. 2 
Shearer, Marshall et al have written: 3 
“….implementing systems of care that significantly alter the traditional hierarchical 4 
referral model of care, regardless of their potential benefits, takes years to 5 
appropriately implement” (Shearer, Marshall et al. 2012). 6 
They believe that, in the case of RRS, the resistance is substantially due to the apparent 7 
low face validity of the EWS in predicting deterioration. The perceived gain for staff in 8 
witnessing improved patient outcome is small, whilst the socio-cultural factors that 9 
stand in the way of change are large. 10 
5.1.4 Workload 11 
All grades of doctor were very busy (Sections 4.2.2, 5.4). The foundation doctors were 12 
responsible for many patients. Out-of-hours this included many patients about whom 13 
they knew very little.  14 
The foundation doctors estimated that MEWS calls resulted in up to 30 reports in a 15 
shift. Many of these were repeat calls. Were they to attend each call, dealing with this 16 
workload would occupy a lot of their time. They judged this to be both unnecessary and 17 
unachievable. This led them to deal with many calls by phone, and to call upon the 18 
clinical skills of the nurse on the spot to guide them (Section 4.2.3). As few as one in 19 
ten patients suffer deterioration following a MEWS call, so in practical terms this triage 20 
would seem reasonable. It will however have adverse consequence for the minority of 21 
patients because delaying the involvement of experts in critical illness is known to be 22 
associated with increased mortality  (McArthur‐Rouse 2001, Cardoso, Grion et al. 2011, 23 
Bing-Hua 2014). 24 
The registrars were also occupied with their own work and were often not immediately 25 
available. Consultants reported that they were not available for most of the time. One 26 
consultant expressed very forcibly the frustration caused by being unable to closely 27 
supervise the team (Section 4.2.11). They were also concerned that often, when they 28 
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were on the ward, they found a problem that was being under managed. They worried 1 
that such under-management might be common. 2 
5.1.5 The interface between the medical and nursing teams 3 
As has been said, the nurses believed they were conscientious in reporting trigger events 4 
to the medical team. Close questioning showed that by this they meant that they either 5 
spoke directly to a doctor who was in the vicinity, or they telephoned the foundation 6 
doctor who had responsibility for that patient. This situation was insecure. The 7 
healthcare assistants described their reporting system via their RN supervisor (Sections 8 
4.2.5, 4.2.8). If no doctor were in the immediate vicinity the healthcare assistant would 9 
discuss the patient with the RN. This nurse would then either telephone the doctor or 10 
ask the healthcare assistant to do so. The doctors believed that they were being spoken 11 
to by the RNs but added that they would not necessarily know what grade of team 12 
member they were speaking to. This system has a major disadvantage. If the doctor 13 
failed to attend, as was frequently reported in the nurses’ interviews, the RN who had 14 
reported to them would not necessarily know, as it was the healthcare assistant who 15 
continued to care for the patient (Section 4.2.10). The healthcare assistants explained 16 
their frustration with this state of affairs. They were left not knowing what was going 17 
on. They did not know whether the RN had agreed with the doctor that he would delay 18 
seeing the patient or whether the doctor had forgotten to come.  A further complication 19 
for the nursing team was that the foundation doctor might consult their supervising 20 
registrar and decide that no action should be taken. This information might not be 21 
passed to the RN and they in turn might not tell the healthcare assistant. These 22 
arrangements led to a system where the nursing team were not surprised that a doctor 23 
had not arrived to deal with an alert, and might not remind the foundation doctor. 24 
Sometimes these problems would lead to a delay of many hours before a doctor saw the 25 
patient. The nursing team would chivvy the medical team to attend in those cases about 26 
which they were concerned. If the factor of nursing and medical shift change is added to 27 
the mix it is unsurprising to find that many MEWS alerts never had a medical 28 
evaluation as has been reported (Marshall, Kitto et al. 2011, Shearer, Marshall et al. 29 
2012, Kitto, Marshall et al. 2015). 30 
It was clear from the interviews that the interface between the medical and nursing 31 
teams was haphazard and was very likely to undermine the whole RRS. 32 
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5.2 Is MEWS an appropriate way to deal with the problem of 1 
unexpected deterioration? 2 
5.2.1 Inappropriate MEWS monitoring 3 
A recurrent theme in the nurses’ interviews is that of inappropriate MEWS monitoring. 4 
They identify three problems (Section 4.2.5). A number of categories of ‘false positive’ 5 
alerts are identified by staff (Figure 11). 6 
• Firstly, some patients are not having active treatment and their terminal state has 7 
been recognised by all concerned. These patients may have been classified as not for 8 
resuscitation but they are monitored for MEWS. This results in additional work for 9 
the nurses, interference for the patients, and anxiety for the families.  10 
• Secondly, many patients with co-existing diseases have chronic MEWS scores of 1 11 
or more. A relatively trivial change of condition takes them over the calling criteria.  12 
• Thirdly, many patients trigger a review and then re-trigger every time their 13 
observations are done. The nurses complain that the doctors are reluctant to set a 14 
raised threshold for further review. 15 
Figure 11. Categories Of Patients Who Trigger MEWS 
True Positives False Positives 
Patients whose 
high MEWS 
presages 
deterioration and 
who need a 
change in their 
care 
Patients who 
exceed trigger 
criteria and 
improve 
spontaneously 
Patients who 
should have had a 
variation in 
calling criteria 
because of 
coexisting disease 
Patients whose 
treatment should 
have been limited 
& DNARs 
 
These problems contribute to the workload generated by MEWS. The issues are not 16 
easily dealt with. There can be no straightforward protocol for excluding a patient from 17 
MEWS monitoring; it requires consideration of the individual circumstances.  18 
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5.3 Are the responding doctors experienced enough? 1 
NICE recommends that very junior doctors do not evaluate patients with critical illness 2 
(NICE 2007). The MEWS system in this study allocates foundation doctors to that role. 3 
In fact, this assessment task is more complicated than the evaluation of critically 4 
deranged physiology. Here the question being asked is, “Is this patient who has a minor 5 
physiological abnormality on the verge of a catastrophic collapse?’  This decision 6 
requires experience of many similar situations and it is a mistake to expect the 7 
foundation doctor to be competent to make it. Other systems either alert a properly 8 
skilled MET (Hillman, Chen et al. 2005) or call more senior doctors if the EWS score 9 
falls into a higher band as exemplified by the NEWS more complex calling criteria 10 
(RCP 2012).  11 
5.4 Conclusion 12 
The junior medical and nursing staffs that use the MEWS system state that it serves a 13 
useful purpose. The way they use the system is however significantly different from the 14 
original MEWS conception. The interviews reveal that nurses, healthcare assistants, 15 
senior medical staff and the F1 and F2 doctors themselves all believe that the workload 16 
of the F1/F2 doctors is very heavy. The F1/2 doctors describe strategies for making it 17 
manageable that includes triaging MEWS calls and dealing with many without seeing 18 
the patient. They use the MEWS score as an indication of urgency and severity – 19 
thereby negating its purpose: to draw attention to impending deterioration in patients 20 
who appear well and have scores just above the trigger value. The problem for these 21 
very junior doctors is that they perceive themselves as too inexperienced to reliably 22 
make a judgement of risk. They constantly strive to demonstrate self-efficacy by getting 23 
the decisions right. In this environment it is questionable whether ‘a false call’ for 24 
senior assistance or a ‘missed deterioration’ are the greater concern to them. Their 25 
decision is weighted in favour of inactivity because only about one in ten patients who 26 
trigger subsequently deteriorate. In the absence of a MET and with only relatively 27 
informal instructions about how to elicit assistance the MEWS does little to help the 28 
doctor decide what to do. In fact, it generates a great many tricky clinical decisions that 29 
tax these junior trainees to the full. 30 
31 
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6 WHAT IS REVEALED ABOUT TEAM DYNAMICS 1 
This chapter provides an analysis of the team dynamics surrounding the operation of the 2 
MEWS system, as revealed by this enquiry. I have investigated what members of the 3 
clinical team feel about using the MEWS protocol and how they understand its use. It 4 
might be assumed that professionals would all comprehend and use a clinical protocol 5 
in the same way – irrespective of their occupational background. This analysis suggests 6 
otherwise. There is a striking difference between the nurses and the junior doctors in 7 
how they interpret and use the MEWS protocol. This finding is consistent with the 8 
report from Kitto, Marshall et al (Kitto, Marshall et al. 2015), who found such a 9 
disjunction and suggested that it might be due to the differing decision-making 10 
hierarchies of medicine and nursing, or to communication difficulties in reporting and 11 
responding to alerts. I agree that these aspects are important, but suggest that a further 12 
underlying cause is that the doctors and nurses have fundamentally different 13 
expectations of the protocol. I suggest that this is an aspect of a wider phenomenon of 14 
doctors and nurses working to different models of patient care resulting from the 15 
differing epistemologies of medical and nursing practice.  16 
6.1 How the MEWS affected the team discourse about the 17 
patient’s condition and the actions needed 18 
The respondents reported that the MEWS had changed the discourse between doctors 19 
and nurses about patients at risk of deterioration, but also beyond that, it had changed 20 
the shared understanding of how to manage sick patients. This was partly due to the 21 
scoring system but also resulted from a more formalised expectation that more senior 22 
members of the team should see the deteriorating patient. 23 
6.1.1 MEWS provides a common language for discussing patients at risk 24 
Respondents liked using the MEWS because it provided them with a common language 25 
for discussing patients at risk. This language was not available to them previously and 26 
they find it very helpful.  MEWS was doing more than identify a group of patients at 27 
risk; it was changing the discourse between the nurse, who is caring for the patient, and 28 
the first responder in the medical team (Sections 4.2.4, 4.2.5 4.2.6.)  29 
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Issues of status, education, gender, knowledge, hierarchy and style may impede 1 
communication between doctors and nurses (Coombs 2004). In his inaugural address to 2 
the American Surgical Association, Greenfield discussed the history of relations 3 
between doctors and nurses and presented an investigation of the attitudes of doctors 4 
and nurses to the nurses’ role in patient management (Greenfield 1999).  He found that 5 
doctors were much more satisfied with doctor/nurse communication than were nurses. 6 
Using a sequence of group discussions about patients’ care he had found that the 7 
doctors dominated early discussion, but that the medical and nursing contributions 8 
became more equal in later exchanges. He recommended that protocols for patient 9 
management should insist on daily discussions of care between the medical and nursing 10 
teams to improve mutual understanding.  11 
Thomas, Sexton et al (2003) discovered similar differences in the relationships between 12 
doctors and nurses. They undertook a survey of doctors and nurses in an ICU, and 13 
investigated the perceptions of each group concerning the nurses’ contribution to patient 14 
care (Thomas, Sexton et al. 2003). They described the beliefs of the two professional 15 
groups as ‘discrepant’. Whilst the doctors largely thought that their attitudes towards 16 
nurse participation were positive, the nurses reported a more difficult climate in which 17 
to make contributions.  18 
In my interviews I found that the doctors’ contributions to patient care were 19 
unpredictable, and that the nurses input to medical management decisions was 20 
inconsistent. (Sections 4.2.9, 4.2.13) The nursing team were dissatisfied with their 21 
discussions with the medical team, about patient management. (Section 4.2.9) The 22 
medical team did not make any comments that suggested that they would welcome the 23 
nurses being more pro-active and were suspicious of the motives of the nursing team 24 
when they pressed for a medical review (Section 4.2.14)  25 
Endacott, Kid et al (2007) sought to identify the cues that nurses and doctors use on 26 
acute wards to recognise patient deterioration, and to study their subsequent assessment 27 
and quality of communication (Endacott, Kidd et al. 2007). They used a mixed methods 28 
case study design (chart review and interviews) for cases admitted to ICU from general 29 
wards and found that doctors and nurses relied firstly on vital signs for initial 30 
identification of patient deterioration. Subsequently nurses used assessment of the 31 
patient's physical capabilities and activities, whilst doctors put their faith on clinical 32 
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investigations. The authors found that referral to more senior clinicians was often 1 
delayed. As in most such studies the authors found that 76% patients had well 2 
established clinical markers of physiological instability prior to ICU admission and 56% 3 
had these markers for >2h in the previous 24h. It is interesting that this study identified 4 
a similar dichotomy between the nursing and medical teams as I have found in my 5 
research. 6 
Robinson, Gorman et al (2010) have used a process of expert buzz groups to identify 7 
factors that make doctor/nurse communication efficient. They found that effective 8 
communication depended on having a precise and clear message, verification of the 9 
message and joint involvement in problem solving (Robinson, Gorman et al. 2010). 10 
Discussions about MEWS meet the first 2 criteria but the RRS protocol may obstruct 11 
the joint involvement in problem solving. The nurses felt that they were often left not 12 
knowing what the medical team planned to do with the patient after a MEWS alert. 13 
Doctors may respond to a nurse’s suggestions aggressively or scornfully, making 14 
colleagues wary of approaching them for fear of ridicule. (Greenfield 1999, Rosenstein 15 
and O'Daniel 2005, Castel, Ginsburg et al. 2015) These factors have been shown 16 
previously to contribute to breaches of a rapid response protocol (Marshall, Kitto et al. 17 
2011, Shearer, Marshall et al. 2012). Azzopardi, Kinney et al (2011) investigated a 18 
paediatric EWS (Azzopardi, Kinney et al. 2011). Using a questionnaire they found that 19 
the MET system was highly valued for obtaining urgent assistance for the seriously ill 20 
patients by 85% of nurses and 83% of doctors. However, they discovered a number of 21 
barriers to MET activation including; a preference to contact the covering (attending) 22 
doctors, by 80% of nurses and 45% of doctors; active discouragement of them 23 
activating a MET by 41% of nurses and 12% of doctors; and fear of criticism by team 24 
when it attended (if the patient was not deemed seriously ill), by 17% of nurses and 9% 25 
of doctors. They found that less experienced staff were significantly more likely to 26 
report barriers to calling a MET. This accords with the findings of Hart, Spiva, et al 27 
(2014) that nurses self-confidence in dealing with deteriorating patients correlated with 28 
their experience (Hart, Spiva et al. 2014). Both nurses (24%) and doctors (6.5%) 29 
described being criticised by MET members. Failure to recognize serious illness was 30 
revealed by the unwillingness of 47% of doctors and 32% of nurses to activate MET 31 
when activation criteria were attained, and by the retrospective realization by 30% of 32 
doctors and 15% of nurses that they had failed to activate MET when needed. The 33 
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authors concluded that cultural and behavioural barriers to MET activation, and inability 1 
to recognize serious illness might explain, in part, the failure of a MET system to 2 
completely eliminate unexpected cardiac arrest and death.  3 
The nurses interviewed in my investigation did not describe negative attitudes, or fear 4 
of criticism. Indeed Healthcare Assistants and Nurses often said that MEWS reduced 5 
the chances of them being criticised by medical staff, by providing them with a 6 
justification for asking for a patient to be reviewed. (Section 4.2.6) When disagreement 7 
arose between the medical and nursing teams it usually originated in their different 8 
objectives in patient management (Section 4.2.10).  9 
As remarked above, MEWS has provided team members with a new language. In my 10 
study the medical and nursing teams had absorbed a vocabulary of MEWS into their 11 
language (Section 4.2.4). They described patients in terms of a MEWS score and used 12 
the ungrammatical phrases ‘the patient is scoring’ and ‘the patient has a MEWS’, to 13 
indicate patients who reached the calling threshold. Both teams understood the 14 
language. The nurses found that it gave them a way to describe a patient at risk, and a 15 
way to justify calling the doctor about a patient (4.2.6). Some of the healthcare 16 
assistants explained how they had previously had difficulty in putting their concerns 17 
into clinical language and that the MEWS reduced this difficulty (Section 4.2.8). The 18 
foundation doctors found similar value in discussions with senior colleagues.  MEWS 19 
has thus empowered nurses in their dialogue with doctors and gone some way towards 20 
providing a mental model of the detection and response to patient deterioration that the 21 
two professions can share (Section 4.2.6). MEWS generated calls are frequent, and 22 
provide opportunities for doctor/nurse dialogue that are welcomed by the nursing team. 23 
Whilst being effective in promoting doctor/nurse discussion, it is probably less effective 24 
in formalising doctor/nurse exchanges than the use of the very structured SBAR 25 
framework (See page 204).  26 
These conclusions accord with those of Andrews and Waterman (2005) who conducted 27 
a study of the ways nurses arrive at an understanding of deranged physiological 28 
observations. In the course of this they made the observation that the use of the MEWS 29 
was providing them with a language and conceptual framework that improved their 30 
communication about problems (Andrews and Waterman 2005).  31 
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6.1.2 The medical and nursing teams have different Objectives  1 
The patient care responsibilities of doctors and nurses are structured differently. The 2 
nursing team is divided into smaller units, each team being responsible for a small 3 
group of patients (between four and eight). These teams are focused on the continuing 4 
care of the patient, they are close to the patient and continuously responding to their 5 
needs. The nurses described their relationships with patients and relatives in terms that 6 
reflected involvement of their concerns, and their feelings (Section 4.2.10). One staff 7 
nurse said: 8 
“If the patient knows we are flapping about re-doing observations they will get 9 
worried and that’s something we have to deal with as well as what’s clinically 10 
going wrong” Staff Nurse 2 line 169 11 
The doctors are managing up to sixty patients and they are less engaged with 12 
individuals. Those patients may be widely distributed around the hospital and are being 13 
cared for by many different nursing teams. Out of hours the most junior doctor will be 14 
responsible for even more patients, often over a hundred. The MEWS protocol required 15 
‘first responder’ doctors to see all patients in person as soon as possible when a trigger 16 
score is reached. In this study they did not do this. None of the doctors attempted to 17 
excuse this. They saw it as a self-evident necessity, imposed by their overwhelming 18 
workload. They described skill in triaging patients who ‘trigger’ as an asset. If the 19 
doctors’ estimates of the frequency of calls (Section 4.2.2) is correct, and each call takes 20 
ten minutes to sort out, they would spend up to five hours in a twelve hour shift dealing 21 
with MEWS trigger events. They do not think this is feasible or worthwhile, as their 22 
experience (and the literature) indicates that as few as ten percent of alerts require 23 
intervention. It emerges from their interviews that MEWS calls must take their turn in 24 
the queue in accordance with the priority the doctor allots.  25 
Medical staff identify a number of influences that may be relevant in their attitude to 26 
MEWS triggers:  27 
• Firstly, they have a lot of calls upon their time (Sections 4.2.2, 4.2.3). They are 28 
overcommitted and need to prioritise. It appears from the interviews that MEWS is 29 
not given automatic priority because so many of the alerts are not followed by 30 
patient deterioration. The doctors see calls that do not result in changes of 31 
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management as low priority, or even unnecessary. In their view MEWS generates 1 
few high priority alerts at the cost of many ‘low priority’ tasks. The literature on the 2 
development of MEWS makes limited reference to additional workload, or its 3 
interaction with existing ways of working (Morgan, Williams et al. 1997, Goldhill, 4 
Worthington et al. 1999). Bellomo et al described the introduction of an electronic 5 
alerting system for MEWS (Bellomo, Ackerman et al. 2012). The trigger value was 6 
pragmatically set to 5 because they discovered that an overwhelming workload was 7 
generated with the level set to 4. The MEWS system I investigated was triggered by 8 
a count of 4 and the workload reported is in line with the findings of Bellomo, 9 
Ackerman et al (2012). Bellomo provides a more detailed description of his methods 10 
on a proprietary webpage (Bellomo 2012). 11 
• Secondly, in the doctors’ responses in the interviews, there are references to the 12 
difficulty of understanding the clinical world around them. Their statements indicate 13 
an awareness of complexity and uncertainty that complicates the process of deciding 14 
what to do (Section 4.2.4). One doctor expressed this very clearly: 15 
“I think most of us feel out of our depth from time to time.” Doctor FY2-2:  16 
• Thirdly, there is reference by the medical staff to the difficulty of interpreting the 17 
messages that they get from the nurses. They seem to believe that some nurses are 18 
shaping their reports in order to direct their (the doctors’) actions (Section 4.2.3).  19 
That doctors and nurses try to influence one another to meet their own narrow 20 
objectives was recognised by Stein nearly fifty years ago (Stein 1967). In this landmark 21 
paper he made the observation that nurses act out a passive role in a way that attempts 22 
to manipulate the doctor. Revisiting the issue thirty years on, he concluded that the 23 
situation had changed, and attributed this to nurses having an improved clinical 24 
knowledge and confidence (Stein, Watts et al. 1990). The nurses in my investigation 25 
clearly expressed their need to ‘direct’ the doctor’s action and described a context in 26 
which they did not have power to do this. 27 
The senior nurses described using the respect they received from the consultants as a 28 
lever on more junior staff  (Section 4.2.5).  29 
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“Probably the junior Nurses would go to the SHO, but I would tend to go to 1 
a Registrar or a Consultant probably because I have a better relationship 2 
with them.” Sister 1 line 52 3 
A complex game was being played out between the teams as well as between 4 
individuals. 5 
6.1.3 The effect of MEWS on the dialogue between nurses and doctors 6 
The environment in which MEWS operates is complex. Introducing MEWS and RRSs 7 
introduces a significant cultural change. Buist and Mahoney (2014) commented that the 8 
impact of this change on the attitudes, relationships and culture of staff has been largely 9 
ignored (Buist and Mahoney 2014).  10 
The medical team members understood that the nursing team need to see them respond 11 
to a MEWS trigger, but did not appear to respect that need (Section 4.2.4). They 12 
repeatedly expressed the fear that Nurses exaggerate symptoms in order to ensure that 13 
they will visit the patient (Section 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.14). Their comments show that they 14 
feel that some nurses blindly follow the MEWS protocol and are unsympathetic to the 15 
doctor’s need to prioritise calls in order to make their workload manageable. They want 16 
to be free to respond to a call in the way that they feel is appropriate, based on their 17 
clinical judgement, and do not want to work to a rigid protocol. No doctor seemed to 18 
consider that recording a high MEWS would, in itself, cause the nurse to be anxious, or 19 
that the anxiety would be compounded if the doctor appeared to be taking no action. In 20 
addition, no doctor suggested that their involvement would have a positive impact on 21 
the patient’s management beyond the task of managing their medical needs. 22 
Because of the pressure on their time doctors would like to see only those patients in 23 
whom a review leads to a change in treatment (Section 4.2.7). They are willing to see all 24 
‘triggering’ patients about whom the nurses are worried, but would prefer not to see 25 
those about whom the nurses have no concerns (Section 4.2.3). This stance ignores the 26 
fact that many patient crises are presaged only by a pattern of minor physiological 27 
disturbances that may not be recognised as significant if the patient’s progress is not 28 
systematically reviewed. The junior doctors believed that many of the calls were false 29 
alarms, generated partly by the lack of sensitivity of the scoring, and partly by nurses 30 
exaggerating urgency in order to ensure a response from the doctor. They are aware that 31 
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nurses are not expected to be flexible in interpreting the protocol but find this frustrating 1 
(Section 4.2.2). Doctors want to do a good job, but their immediate focus is on getting 2 
through their personal task-list. They use MEWS as though it were a severity of illness 3 
score, a purpose for which it is neither designed nor validated (Ho 2013). If they only 4 
review the group of patients with seriously deranged physiology they will miss the 5 
patients in whom signs of impending crisis are subtler.  6 
Nurses expressed three major frustrations: 7 
• Firstly, they have difficulty getting the medical team to review the patients (Section 8 
4.2.5). They believe that doctors should abide by the protocol. They, themselves, are 9 
expected to do so, and they worry that when the medical team does not visit the 10 
patient, as required by the protocol, some of the blame for any subsequent clinical 11 
mishap will be unjustly laid at their door. Nursing practice is hierarchical and 12 
breaches of protocols are apt to lead to disciplinary action - they expect the doctors 13 
also to follow the protocol (Castel, Ginsburg et al. 2015). It causes them anxiety 14 
when they have correctly identified and reported a MEWS trigger event, and 15 
nothing appears to be happening.  16 
• Secondly, they did not consider medical reviews to be wasted effort when they do 17 
not lead to changes in treatment (Sections 4.2.13, 4.2.14). They believe that the 18 
closer involvement of the medical team provides reassurance for the nursing team, 19 
relatives and patients. They see benefit in a joint nursing/medical review of the 20 
patient, even when this confirms the existing plans, or rules out a new complication. 21 
A medical analysis of the MEWS protocol might deplore the high incidence of false 22 
positive calls, whilst a nursing review may see these calls as useful teamwork, 23 
increasing the doctors’ involvement in the problems of patient care.  24 
• Thirdly, they believe that medical staff are over-reliant on the MEWS score, and are 25 
unsympathetic towards a nurse’s opinion that a patient is unstable, despite a low 26 
MEWS score (Section 4.2.14). Many nurses see themselves as experienced 27 
professionals who use clinical intuition in evaluating patients, and trust that intuition 28 
even when the MEWS score is low.  They are using their ‘tacit’ knowledge as 29 
described by Michael Eraut (Eraut 2000). A recent study has demonstrated that 30 
using the criterion of ‘nurses worry’ increased the validity of the EWS as measured 31 
by the area under the Receiver Operator Curve (Douw, Huisman-de Waal et al. 32 
2016). The nurses interviewed in the present study did not believe that the medical 33 
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team understands that they are skilful in understanding a patient’s condition. They 1 
find that doctors are reassured by the low MEWS score and are likely to disregard 2 
the nurse’s concerns (Section 4.2.14). 3 
6.1.4 Doctors and nurses march to different drummers? 4 
The medical and nursing teams’ different understandings of MEWS may be a reflection 5 
of the different viewpoints of the two groups, each seeing MEWS in the context of their 6 
own profession. Whilst both try to comply with the demands of MEWS by achieving 7 
the narrow practical objectives demanded of their own job, it may also reflect the 8 
different perspectives of ‘care versus cure’ often attributed to medicine and nursing 9 
(Baumann, Deber et al. 1998). 10 
It has been suggested that a reason for the medical and nursing teams having different 11 
approaches to MEWS is the more hierarchical nature of nursing (Shearer, Marshall et al. 12 
2012, Kitto, Marshall et al. 2015). This appears to me to be unfair. Medicine has been 13 
described as having a history of tolerating individuality, whereas nurses are expected to 14 
abide by the rules (and fear being disciplined if they don’t) (Mason and Mason- 15 
Whitehead 2003). Schneider has discussed the relative merits of doctor and patient 16 
autonomy (Schneider 1998). He found that patients are prepared to set aside some of 17 
their rights because they understand that to function optimally the clinician must have 18 
some freedom of action. He believes that this freedom is ‘in the fabric’ of medical 19 
practice and this leads to a tolerance for individual expression by doctors. The medical 20 
literature of evidence-based medicine includes many critical analyses of the way it 21 
impedes this sort of personal clinical judgement (Fins 2016). These views are less 22 
apparent in the nursing literature (Rolfe, Segrott et al. 2008). Nevertheless the 23 
interviews with the nursing team reveal criticism of the doctors for departing from the 24 
protocol. McDonal, Waring et al (2005) undertook a review of the attitudes of 25 
consultants, junior doctors and nurses to the use of clinical guidelines and protocols. 26 
They found that whilst doctors had mixed feelings the nurses were critical of failure to 27 
observe the ‘rules’. 28 
“Doctors’ views about the contribution of guidelines to safety and to clinical 29 
practice differed from those of nurses. Doctors rejected written rules, 30 
instead adhering to the unwritten rules of what constitutes acceptable 31 
behaviour for members of the medical profession. In contrast, nurses 32 
viewed guideline adherence as synonymous with professionalism and 33 
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criticised doctors for failing to comply with guidelines.” (McDonald, 1 
Waring et al. 2005) 2 
The nursing team repeatedly expressed these attitudes in this enquiry.   3 
6.1.4.1 Multi-professional Teams 4 
Medicine and nursing usually have different roles in healthcare. The use of 5 
protocols may affect traditional roles and ways of working (Section 4.2.4, 4.2.5, 6 
4.2.11, 4.2.14). 7 
6.1.5 The Effect on Nursing’s Clinical Process 8 
The use of MEWS is changing the clinical process of nursing. Without MEWS the 9 
process of identifying patients at risk was one of clinical decision making.  10 
Without MEWS scoring, both the nurse at the bedside and their clinical supervisor are 11 
required to make clinical judgement about the patient. They will call the doctor if they 12 
feel that the patient requires a medical evaluation, or adjustments to treatment that only 13 
the medical team can deal with. Introducing the MEWS and its calling criteria changes 14 
the working practice (Section 4.2.13). The nurses now call the medical team in response 15 
to a score without needing to understand the changing clinical situation. The nursing 16 
team were frustrated by the fact of having to call the doctor even if they felt that they 17 
could cope, and by their reduced opportunity to use their own clinical judgement, whilst 18 
at the same time welcoming the authority to call that a trigger event conferred upon 19 
them.  20 
The study interviews revealed a number of consequences that followed from the 21 
protocol driven reporting of trigger events: 22 
• The bedside nurse does not need to evaluate their patient and is required only to 23 
report the MEWS to their senior (Section 4.2.5). 24 
• The supervising nurse does not need to evaluate the patient and is only required to 25 
report the MEWS to the doctor (Section 4.2.6). 26 
• The supervising nurse does not need to assess whether their team can cope with the 27 
problem without the doctor’s help and does not need to plan any changes of 28 
management (Section 4.2.2). 29 
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Thus using a MEWS downgrades the clinical process for nurses (Section 4.2.14, 1 
4.2.13). This would be desirable if there were any evidence that the nurses’ miss 2 
incipient patient deterioration; but this is not the case.  On the contrary, adding ‘nurse 3 
worry’ to the criteria for calling a MET has been reported to improve its validity 4 
(Douw, van Zanten et al. 2016). In this study the medical and nursing teams were often 5 
using the judgements and intuitions of the nurses to decide whether the doctor should 6 
physically attend to see the patient following a trigger event, regularly undermining the 7 
protocol by negotiating an understanding that the doctor would not attend, despite the 8 
trigger event. Figure 12 shows the nurses actions in the case of a deteriorating patient 9 
with and without the MEWS. 10 
Figure 12. The Nursing Clinical Process 11 
 12 
6.1.6 The Frustration of healthcare assistants 13 
The issue of lost clinical autonomy also applies to healthcare assistants. Healthcare 14 
assistants often have many years experience of the care and monitoring of patients. 15 
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They are not registered, or regulated, nationally. In their interviews the healthcare 1 
assistants expressed frustration that their experience was disregarded (Section 4.2.8). 2 
They described how they understood the patient’s condition from the physical findings 3 
and also from experience and intuition. They felt that their status as healthcare assistants 4 
made it more difficult for them to express concerns when the patient’s state was not 5 
reaching the trigger criteria. They also found that, though they were at the bedside, 6 
talking to the patient and their relatives, they were often in the dark about what the 7 
senior nurses and doctors had decided. Healthcare assistants repeatedly made the point 8 
that their role in care gave them the best opportunity of tracking changes in the patient’s 9 
activities and capabilities. 10 
6.2 Constructing Individual Narratives 11 
A wide range of opinions and attitudes were expressed by the respondents but within 12 
grades and professions there emerged a consistent narrative. This has enabled me to 13 
construct stories relevant to each grade. These brief sketches highlight the issues that 14 
dominate each professions preoccupation in using the Modified Early Warning Score. 15 
This is useful in providing a view of the operation of the RRS from the various 16 
perspectives of the professions and grades. 17 
6.2.1 The F1/2’s Tale 18 
My day is dominated by my heavy workload and by the worry of clinical inexperience. 19 
I believe that the MEWS system, as used on my ward, is useful and effective. It is 20 
useful, when it brings to my notice patients who require changes to their treatment. I can 21 
also use the MEWS as an indicator of the severity of illness. I believe that a higher 22 
MEWS indicates a sicker patient.  23 
MEWS flags up many patients who do not need medical review and do not 24 
subsequently deteriorate. Such ‘false alarms’ are usually a waste of my time. When I 25 
attend a patient in response to a MEWS call my priority is to detect situations that are 26 
amenable to treatment. If I can find nothing specific to treat I will usually adopt a wait 27 
and see policy and will endeavour to review the patient after an appropriate interval. I 28 
find false alarm calls a real problem because they fragment my working day and make it 29 
difficult for me to organise my work in a logical manner. 30 
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MEWS also generates many repeat calls. Attending to MEWS alerts constitutes a major 1 
workload. My workload is a great problem for me. The calls upon my time are many 2 
and various and it is necessary for me to prioritise my activities. I understand that a 3 
MEWS alert ought to be a high priority call and that the protocol actually requires me to 4 
attend all such patients, but the value of attending most alerts is low. I have a choice as 5 
to whether to treat MEWS calls as urgent emergencies or to attempt to sort out problems 6 
through the nursing staff. If I attended all patients triggering a MEWS call other tasks 7 
that I know are urgent and important would be neglected. I really have no alternative 8 
than to prioritise calls by discussion with the nurse. I will discuss with the nurse 9 
whether the MEWS score is backed up by her clinical judgement about the patient’s 10 
condition. I will also try to understand whether the raised value is likely to be largely 11 
due to the patient’s prior condition. 12 
I do not yet have much clinical experience I often feel unsure of what to do. I am able to 13 
ask my senior’s for help. Often, however, they are occupied with other important work 14 
and are unable to help. I am very inexperienced - I recognise that myself, but I try to 15 
appear to know what I am doing. I don’t want to get a reputation for being an unsafe 16 
pair of hands with my seniors. I find that being trusted builds my confidence whereas 17 
being doubted makes me dither even when I am fairly sure that I am doing the right 18 
thing. 19 
I am also conscious of being under scrutiny by the nurses, many of who have seen much 20 
more than I have. It undermines my self-confidence when the nurses look dubious about 21 
what I am doing. I feel that the nurses have a more straightforward task. They have to 22 
call me for all trigger events. They know that many are false alarms but I think that 23 
many of them don’t try to help me by volunteering that they are not worried about the 24 
patient. I also believe that many nurses will exaggerate their concerns, believing that 25 
this will get my attention. 26 
I am frequently out of my depth, and MEWS adds to my problems by drawing attention 27 
to a large number of patients, only some of who will deteriorate. When a patient I have 28 
seen does suffer a subsequent collapse I am in the hot seat for not having done more. 29 
This is constantly in my mind and causes me stress. 30 
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On paper I am very well supported but in practice my backups are often busy and some 1 
will be highly critical if I call them when they think it is unnecessary. I can’t win. The 2 
patient might come to harm if I don’t get help. If I do things myself and the patient gets 3 
worse – I get the blame, and if I call for advice and my senior thinks things are all OK – 4 
I still get the blame. I have good relationships with most of my seniors who understand 5 
and sympathise with my difficulties. I worry about being made to look foolish but I find 6 
that most senior doctors understand this and if I make errors they will not humiliate me 7 
in front of the team. I generally have good relationships with the nurses. They often 8 
know what action they want taken. If I disagree I have had some senior nurses go over 9 
my head. 10 
I see the MEWS protocol as a chain in which I am a link. I am called by the nursing 11 
team in response to a trigger event, which I then either deal with or pass on to a more 12 
senior doctor.  13 
6.2.2 The RN’s Tale 14 
I find MEWS scoring very useful. Most of the care of patients, including recording their 15 
vital signs, is done by the healthcare assistants and I find them very reliable. I will 16 
check the vital signs if they report a MEWS situation to me, but I rarely disagree with 17 
their findings. 18 
I will always report a MEWS trigger score to a doctor. This will usually be the F1/2 but 19 
I am willing to talk directly to the Registrar or Consultant if the junior is unable or 20 
unwilling to respond. I do not have any difficulty in talking directly to the more senior 21 
doctors and I find they respect my clinical experience. I am not usually involved in 22 
further discussion and planning when I have reported a trigger event and this is a 23 
disappointment. 24 
We all know that many of the trigger events are repetitive or due to patients having a 25 
prior abnormality of their vital signs. In that situation I am usually happy to agree 26 
further action on the phone, without the doctor seeing the patient. On the other hand I 27 
am very conscious that some of these patients may collapse and that I may be held 28 
responsible if I have not insisted on the doctor seeing the patient. 29 
CHAPTER 6:  WHAT THESE RESULTS REVEAL ABOUT TEAM DYNAMICS AND DISCOURSE 
 
207 
The patients with a raised MEWS score, but with no other indications of trouble are a 1 
particular difficulty for me because I am fearful that I am missing something. I tend to 2 
get more anxious about these than about the ones who have obvious problems. The 3 
doctor often asks me whether I have other causes for concern and this puts me on the 4 
spot. A related problem is that the patient and their relatives often pick up on the fact 5 
that something might be wrong and become very anxious. A visit from the doctor helps 6 
reassure them. 7 
The big advantage of the MEWS is that it gives me a concrete reason for insisting on 8 
the medical team seeing the patient when I am worried. Without MEWS I have to 9 
explain why I think there is a serious problem and this can lead to me being ridiculed by 10 
the doctor. With MEWS if this is happening I can just fall back on the fact that the 11 
protocol says they should come, and if they don’t the consequences are their 12 
responsibility. That said, I do see myself as a professional with experience, clinical 13 
skills and intuitions. MEWS also gives me a way to talk about the patient so that the 14 
doctor and I both understand one another’s meanings. What I feel about the patient will 15 
influence my dialogue with the doctor. I know they are very busy and I will help them 16 
to manage their workload if they engage in a proper clinical discussion. 17 
It is very frustrating that the medical teams are so reluctant to vary the criteria for a 18 
MEWS call in patients who are dying or who have underlying chronic problems that 19 
lead to high scores. This leads to inappropriate management of the patients and adds to 20 
everyone’s work. 21 
A problem with MEWS is that it can dominate the work. As carers with close 22 
knowledge of the patients, we see many who really need their treatment reviewing in 23 
order to make them comfortable, or to move forwards with management. Having a low 24 
MEWS can mean that the doctor ignores such calls for help. Many doctors don’t see the 25 
need for their involvement unless there is something specific to do, whereas lots of 26 
patients benefit from the reassurance of a medical review.  27 
I think I see the problem differently from the doctors because I spend so much time with 28 
the patients and their relatives and it falls to me to help them understand what is 29 
happening to them and how things will be in the future. In my opinion most MEWS 30 
calls to the medical team are a useful part of the patients’ care. It is obvious that they 31 
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will benefit from the discovery of unexpected problems, particularly where treatment 1 
needs to be modified. I also believe that the involvement of the junior doctor is helpful 2 
in situations where no changes are necessary. Being reviewed reassures the patient and 3 
relatives and helps develop their confidence in the team. It is also a reassures me, and 4 
the nursing team. It gives a sense of involvement and of being empowered to act on the 5 
patient’s behalf. 6 
6.2.3 The Healthcare Assistants Tale 7 
My work is dominated by the close relationship that I have with the patient and their 8 
family. As I generally deliver most of the continuing care I am in close contact with 9 
them. This enables me to recognise small changes in the patient’s condition, such as 10 
sleepiness, confusion or pain, which the RGNs and doctors are not able to see. I 11 
acknowledge that I do not have much knowledge about diseases and treatments. I do 12 
however have experience and this leads to intuitions about the patient’s progress. I am 13 
firm in my belief that I have a reliable intuition about the patient’s condition. 14 
I sometimes report a MEWS problem directly to a doctor, but mostly I tell the RGN 15 
who then calls the doctor. They are often telling the doctor what I have told them, not 16 
making their own observations and I don’t know what they said or even whether they 17 
did actually call the doctor. The doctor may discuss the patient with the RGN who may 18 
not tell me what they have said. It is a big problem for me that I don’t know what has 19 
been said, and what, if any plan has been made. 20 
Unlike my RGN colleagues and the doctors, I am with my patients most of the time. 21 
They expect me to know what is going on and to be able to explain things to them. This 22 
is why it is important that I am kept in the loop and have things explained to me. 23 
When I report that the MEWS score is high the nurse may repeat the vital signs 24 
observations but generally I am trusted and my findings are believed. I am frustrated by 25 
the fact that my opinions and judgements are not always taken seriously. I recognise the 26 
reasons why chronic abnormalities may lead to over-sensitivity of the MEWS 27 
instrument and I understand the futility of its repeated application when resuscitation is 28 
not to be attempted. These situations are very troublesome to me as the patients and 29 
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relatives will ask me why such regular observations are being made, and I cannot give a 1 
sensible explanation.  2 
6.2.4 The Registrars Tale 3 
I have two responsibilities with regard to MEWS. Firstly I supervise the F1/2s. They are 4 
often unsure whether a high score reflects a developing problem and they will come to 5 
me for guidance. It is annoying when they pester me for help in situations where they 6 
ought to be able to cope. I am sympathetic because I remember how scary it can be do 7 
have their responsibilities with little experience but I also have a very heavy workload 8 
to manage. Having a confident F grade makes a big difference to my work. 9 
When I have to see a patient with a high MEWS I tend to ignore it and try to work from 10 
first principles as I have been taught on courses about emergency care. I am not an 11 
expert in critical care and if patients are seriously ill I need the support of such 12 
specialists.  13 
Sometimes when problems arise I am not available because I am already coping with an 14 
emergency, in A&E or in the operating theatre. My F doctor may then call the ITU team 15 
directly. 16 
Even though I may not be available it makes me look bad if the F1 seeks the opinion of 17 
the consultant or calls the critical care outreach team without telling me. Sometimes I 18 
am embarrassed to find that the clinical care planned by the nurses and the F1 is 19 
criticised by the critical care team. I can’t win because if I make clear that the juniors 20 
have planned this care I am criticised for not knowing what is going on. If, on the other 21 
hand, I let them think I did know what was being done I will get blamed for making 22 
silly clinical decisions. 23 
6.2.5 The Sister’s Tale 24 
I am very supportive of the use of MEWS.  25 
I am very sure that my ward delivers a high standard of care and that MEWS has 26 
improved our outcomes. We do not do audit of this but I am confident that this is what 27 
audit would show. 28 
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I am confident that the healthcare assistants and staff nurses operate the MEWS 1 
efficiently. MEWS allows us to demonstrate that we are on the ball looking out for 2 
patients who may be a problem. Patients with higher MEWS scores are at greater risk of 3 
poor outcomes. 4 
I rarely need to intervene with the practical management of MEWS. Sometimes I need 5 
to step in to push the doctor to come and assess the patient and sometimes I need to 6 
insist that the junior doctor gets a more senior supervisor to come and help. I am able to 7 
do this because I have lots of experience and I have a feel for how well patients are. 8 
I am very concerned that my ward presents a good image to management. 9 
6.2.6 The Consultants Tale 10 
I am very supportive of the use of MEWS. The quality of care for my patients is a 11 
constant worry for me. There are several constraints: 12 
- I am too busy to provide the supervision I believe necessary  13 
- Year upon year I have to work with a smaller team of doctors and they are less and 14 
less experienced 15 
- My junior team are too busy 16 
- My trainees rotate too often, sometimes every six weeks! 17 
From time to time I discover patients with problems that are being under-managed. As I 18 
am infrequently on the ward I worry how often such patients are not identified until too 19 
late. 20 
The EWS has been a boon. It provides us with a language and it keeps the idea of 21 
deterioration and the need for vigilance at the front of people’s minds. 22 
6.2.7 The ICU Consultants Tale 23 
I am a sceptic about MEWS. In my view the answer to managing critical illness 24 
correctly is to have enough doctors who have the correct knowledge and skills and for 25 
these doctors to have time to do their work properly. 26 
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In our current system we have overworked, poorly supervised staff lacking those 1 
necessary skills. My opinion is that MEWS distracts from these fundamental 2 
deficiencies and gives false reassurance. I believe that education in the skills and 3 
knowledge for identifying sick patients is to be preferred. We need sufficient 4 
consultants to deliver a 24 hour consultant ICU service to the wards 5 
6 
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7 DISCUSSION 1 
This chapter is a discussion of the concepts and theories that I have constructed from 2 
my analysis of the respondents’ narratives. Section one summarises the reasons for this 3 
study and considers where its outcomes are placed in the continuing debate about RRTs. 4 
Section two is an account of how, and why, MEWSs is used as a severity score; a 5 
purpose for which it is not validated. There follows a discussion of the effect of the 6 
different models of practice and epistemic orientations of medicine and nursing. In the 7 
final section the relationship between existing working methods and an introduced 8 
protocol is discussed. 9 
7.1 Setting This Study In Its Context 10 
In the UK The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence has recommended that 11 
an appropriate Early Warning System be universally adopted in acute care (NICE 12 
2007). The Royal College of Physicians has led calls for a standard system to be 13 
adopted by all hospitals (Royal College of Physicians 2012) and NCEPOD has 14 
recommended EWS in its reports on acute care (NCEPOD 2012, NCEPOD 2015). 15 
However, Wendon, Hodgson and Bellomo, prominent researchers in the field have 16 
recently written: 17 
“We believe that the evidence available to support the introduction of RRTs is 18 
inconclusive and that we cannot be sure that such teams improve patient 19 
outcomes. Put in legal terms there is “reasonable doubt” about their 20 
effectiveness.”(Wendon, Hodgson et al. 2016)  21 
When I began this investigation (in 2012) much of the literature on EWS and RRS was 22 
about evaluating the evidence on patient outcomes following the introduction of EWSs 23 
and RRSs. The evidence for improvement has been mixed and in the recent words of 24 
Douglas, Osborne et al: 25 
“Despite decades of research on RRSs, systematic review findings are mixed and 26 
improvements in patient survival have fallen short of expectations” (Douglas, 27 
Osborne et al. 2016). 28 
Attention has largely been focussed on technical issues such as the accuracy of the vital 29 
signs data, the choice of parameters to score, the setting of a trigger value and the 30 
calculation of scores.  31 
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Whilst this investigation has been proceeding, two new directions of study have begun 1 
to emerge in the literature. The first of these relates to the role of human factors in the 2 
RRT’s behaviour (Christofidis, Hill et al. 2013, Wendon, Hodgson et al. 2016). The 3 
second challenges the underlying assumptions of EWSs and RRSs, and suggests that it 4 
is the underlying model of ward care that is responsible for inconsistent outcomes 5 
(Litvak and Pronovost 2010). It has also being suggested that these proposed systematic 6 
systems of working ignore the complex cultural and social underpinnings of existing 7 
work practices (Buist and Mahoney 2014). It is to this perspective of RRS that this 8 
current investigation adds. 9 
The use of EWS and RRS is underpinned by a belief that identifying deteriorating 10 
patients at an earlier stage, will lead to the more timely involvement of critical care 11 
specialists and that this will improve their care. In the face of inconclusive evidence it is 12 
appropriate, to ask whether this presumption is correct, or whether alternative 13 
approaches to care might be more successful.  14 
White, Scott et al have drawn attention to the possibility that a simple interpretation of 15 
the design and operation of an EWS may be missing problems that arise from its use in 16 
real situations and might also be ‘providing a fix’ for systemic failure of patient 17 
management. 18 
“While the concept of RRTs has considerable face validity, there is little 19 
high quality evidence of their effectiveness, and much uncertainty as to the 20 
optimal methods for identifying patients in need of RRT and calling the RRT 21 
(afferent limb) and how, and with whom, the RRT should then respond 22 
(efferent limb). Adverse unintended consequences of RRT systems and the 23 
opportunity costs involved in maintaining such systems have not been 24 
subject to study, amid concerns RRT may be compensating for other 25 
potentially remediable system of care failures (White, Scott et al. 2015).” 26 
7.1.1 What was the purpose of this investigation? 27 
It has been demonstrated in a variety of settings that major patient outcomes are often 28 
little changed by any version of a ‘track and trigger’ system, despite evidence that many 29 
major deteriorations can be detected at an earlier stage, and expert opinion that 30 
mismanagement and under-management contribute significantly to morbidity and 31 
mortality (See Chapter 4.2.1). The search for explanations for this discrepancy has 32 
largely been focused on the technical factors affecting the operation of the protocol 33 
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(Guinane, Bucknall et al. 2013, Curry and Jungquist 2014, Subbe and Sabin 2014, 1 
Tirkkonen, Olkkola et al. 2014); and the solution has been sought in measures such as 2 
automated reporting (Opio, Nansubuga et al. 2013, Huh, Lim et al. 2014, Murray, 3 
Kellett et al. 2014, Smith and Prytherch 2014). Recently it has become clear that the 4 
reasons why MEWS scores are not acted upon may lie not in the scoring, or the 5 
sensitivity of the trigger, but in factors influencing the behaviour of the team members.  6 
The latest, and arguably most thorough, systematic review of RRSs reported small 7 
improvements in hospital mortality and in cardiac arrest rates, a result at odds with all 8 
previous reviews but the improvements could not be shown to be caused by the EWS 9 
and RRS (Maharaj, Raffaele et al. 2015). Introducing such schemes focuses attention on 10 
the issue of deterioration, and usually increases the number and availability of doctors 11 
skilled in the management of critical illness. This improved staffing would probably be 12 
beneficial even in the absence of a RRS. 13 
7.1.2 What this investigation did 14 
This investigation provided a snapshot of the experiences, expectations, attitudes and 15 
responses, of two multidisciplinary teams, working on general medical and surgical 16 
wards using a version of an early warning score. It reflected team dynamics in a system 17 
where trigger alerts are dealt with by the home team, loosely supported by critical care 18 
outreach teams. Analysis of the data allowed the development of ideas to explain the 19 
phenomena described. It was undertaken because unexpected elements of individual and 20 
team working, might explain some of the disappointing results of RRS implementation. 21 
Two ideas predominated at the outset of this study. Firstly, that socio–cultural issues 22 
influenced the reporting of problems, and, secondly, that the response to the EWS might 23 
be being affected by issues arising from the other demands on team member’s time and 24 
attention.  25 
It is a feature of qualitative research using the various methodologies of grounded 26 
theory that ideas emerge from the data that may surprise the researcher. In Glaser’s 27 
original descriptions of the method he was insistent that the researcher should set aside 28 
prior understandings of the topic in order to clear the way for all possible threads that 29 
developed from the data (Glaser and Strauss 1967).  30 
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This study has been no exception. Starting from conceptions of socio-cultural issues 1 
complicating practice I have been unexpectedly led to the theory that interpretations of 2 
the goals of practice may differ according to team members professional backgrounds, 3 
and that professional backgrounds may differ in understanding practice on ontological 4 
and epistemological grounds. 5 
7.1.3 What this investigation did not do 6 
This investigation says nothing about the success of the early warning system in 7 
mitigating the effects of unexpected deterioration amongst patients being cared for on 8 
general wards. The system may be working as intended or it may be inefficient and 9 
ineffective.  10 
7.1.4 What this investigation adds 11 
This investigation confirmed and extended previous observations that doctor and nurse 12 
behaviour modifies the protocol for responding to unexpected patient deterioration 13 
(Kitto, Marshall et al. 2015). A disjunction was found between the ways that nurses and 14 
junior medical staff interpreted the protocol. This may reflect their different models of 15 
patient care.  The data has strengthened the initially tentative suspicion that EWSs and 16 
RRSs is an attempt at a technical solution to managing patient deterioration, when a 17 
major determinant of patient management may be influences from the social, 18 
professional and cultural attitudes of the medical and nursing teams. It is not clear what 19 
the relative contribution of factors is in determining behaviour. The data also supports 20 
the observation of Endacott, Kidd et al in 2007 that there is a difference between the 21 
way the medical and nursing teams evaluate patients. (Endacott, Kidd et al. 2007) 22 
7.2 MEWS is used as a severity score 23 
The work of the medical and nursing teams would be simplified if there were a score 24 
that reliably stratified the severity of disease. Junior doctors have difficulty in assessing 25 
the severity of critical illness. From the interviews it was clear that they welcomed 26 
MEWS because it appeared to serve this purpose.  27 
Most of the doctors interviewed selected which patients to see on the basis of their 28 
MEWS – the higher it was, the more likely they are to respond quickly, and in person. 29 
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One reason for this selection amongst patients who ‘trigger’ is their wide acceptance 1 
that MEWS functions as a severity of illness score. Morgan and Wright have defended 2 
their original scoring system against criticism from those who used it a severity score 3 
and found it inconsistent (Cuthbertson and Smith 2007, Duckitt, Buxton-Thomas et al. 4 
2007). They wrote: 5 
“We must re-emphasize that EWS was designed solely to secure the timely 6 
presence of skilled clinical help by the bedside of those patients exhibiting 7 
physiological signs compatible with established or impending critical illness.” 8 
(Morgan and Wright 2007) 9 
Research has demonstrated that higher MEWS scores correlate with worse outcome. 10 
This may be so of pooled data but does not apply for individual patients (Morgan and 11 
White 2007). Subbe, Kruger et al performed a study that found that MEWS scores of 5 12 
or more were associated with worse outcome (Subbe, Kruger et al. 2001). Goldhill et al. 13 
investigated the hospital outcome of patients scored with their Patient-at-Risk early 14 
warning score that differs slightly from the MEWS score (Goldhill, McNarry et al. 15 
2005). They found that in-hospital mortality rose as the score increased, but this rise 16 
was significant only for patients with scores greater than 4, whilst significant numbers 17 
of patients with scores of 1 were sent to the ICU. Oscarsson, Reini et al found similar 18 
poor outcome, again limited to those patients with MEWS scores of greater than 5 19 
(Oscarsson, Reini et al. 2008). The score is not being used, as intended, to predict and 20 
pre-empt catastrophic collapse in patients with few signs. No study has been published 21 
that attempts to validate the MEWS score, as an indicator of outcome that excludes 22 
patients who were already known to be at increased risk, or whose deterioration was 23 
already established.  24 
Le Onn Ho, Shahidah et al, however found that the level of MEWS in patients seen in 25 
the emergency department correlated less well with outcome than other research had 26 
found. They suggested this might be because their Singaporean population had different 27 
underlying medical conditions than previously reported Western studies.  (Le Onn Ho, 28 
Shahidah et al. 2013) 29 
Some researchers have published work where the level of MEWS score is used 30 
primarily as an indication of severity of disease (Cooksley, Kitlowski et al. 2012). This 31 
makes it difficult to explain to staff that they should not use the Early Warning Score as 32 
an indication of severity of disease. Morgan and Wright (2007) made this point when 33 
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they defended their original EWS against the criticism that it was unreliable as an 1 
indication of severity or outcome.  They were critical of its use for that purpose 2 
(Morgan and Wright 2007). 3 
7.3 Doctors and Nurses work to different models of practice 4 
When a patient triggers the EWS the ensuing protocol requires different responses from 5 
both the medical and nursing teams. The need for the nurses to evaluate and assess the 6 
patient is reduced and replaced by an automatic instruction to call the doctor. The 7 
subsequent cascade of difficult decisions for the doctor is little changed by the RRS 8 
protocol.  9 
Nursing has often been conceived as being founded on the principles of caring whilst 10 
medicine is concerned with curing. Such broad distinctions are not now tenable, and 11 
have not been valid for many decades; however, it is possible to see that doctors and 12 
nurses have different mental models of their practice. Commentators have sometimes 13 
characterised this distinction in the objectives of practice as an attempt to belittle the 14 
contribution of nurses and ‘put them in their place’ (Davies 1995, Allen 1997 p134). It 15 
is not that nurses cannot evaluate patients in the way that doctors do. Rather, their 16 
different experience of care leads them to place different constructions on events. 17 
Coombs conducted a study of doctor/nurse relationships in ITU through a combination 18 
of participant observation and interviewing (Coombs 2003). She observed that nurses 19 
making clinical decisions in ITU used forms of knowledge specific to nursing and 20 
unacknowledged by medicine This included, “knowledge consistent with nursing’s 21 
holistic, patient centred philosophy of care.” (op cit, p120). She suggests that, “nursing 22 
holds specific knowledge for decision making that results from being at the bedside and 23 
being with the patient on a continuous basis.” In this study, the nurses and healthcare 24 
assistants repeatedly expressed these views, and regretted that the doctors failed to see 25 
the unique value of this contribution.  26 
In their interviews the junior members of the medical team explained that a high MEWS 27 
requires them to reassess the patient’s status.  They also described how the problem of a 28 
high workload led them to consider how important such a review was. In their 29 
interviews they described drawing upon past experience, their knowledge of the patients 30 
progress and the opinions of the nurses in order to decide whether to attend to review 31 
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the patient. They described an intention to approach the patient to investigate, diagnose 1 
and treat a current problem. In all cases when asked how they use the MEWS system 2 
the medical staff described a sequence of: 3 
1. Decide whether to see the patient. 4 
2. Examine and Assess 5 
3. Investigate 6 
4. Treat 7 
The ST7 in Intensive Care is typical: 8 
“To be honest I don’t really pay any attention to their MEWS score when I am asked 9 
to review them. Although that is quite often the trigger ……I just think through the 10 
story and then the observations ……and I am trying to work out in my head what is 11 
going on and what I need to do about it. I will examine, then do whatever 12 
investigations are needed to clarify the problem” ST 7 Intensive Care  13 
The more experienced doctors described how a MEWS trigger would prompt them to 14 
do a full review of the patient according to this system. They explain that if they find no 15 
problem to treat, this reduces the priority to be given to a repeat alert in this patient 16 
(Section 6.2.1). They consider negative reviews to have been ‘false alarms’ and a waste 17 
of their time. 18 
The nurses saw the doctor’s review as part of the teamwork involved in patient care. 19 
When they call a member of the medical team they expect the doctors to follow the 20 
protocol. They described being annoyed when they didn’t. They fear for the patient and 21 
they fear adverse consequences for themselves if a serious problem is being missed. The 22 
nurses’ initial response on being faced with a high MEWS score is to respond as 23 
required by the RRS. No nurse or care assistant volunteered that the trigger would 24 
stimulate them to review the patients status. Looking carefully at the nurses’ responses 25 
however they show a broader underlying anxiety: anxiety for the patients’ wellbeing, 26 
anxiety about needing to reassure the patient, and, sometimes, anxiety about the junior 27 
doctors competence and ability to cope. No nurse describes making a systematic 28 
personal assessment of the patient in the way the medical staff do. Rather, they describe 29 
the ways that intuition and experience ,tacit knowledge (Eraut 2000),  help them know 30 
when a patient is unstable (Sections 6.2.6, 6.2.10). Figure 13 displays the different 31 
responses of the bedside nurse and the first responding doctor. 32 
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Fein, Mackie et al have discussed the importance of shared mental models in the 1 
teamwork required for the RRS. They have suggested that shared habits of thought 2 
assist in the development of a shared mental model (Fein, Mackie et al. 2016).  3 
Six habits of work (from Fein, Mackie et al) 4 
 5 
1. No surprises – principle of shared expectations 6 
2. Know the endpoints – principle of shared goals 7 
3. Back yourself – principle of self-efficacy 8 
4. Confident leaders get hard things done – principle of team leader self-efficacy  9 
5. Wisdom in asking questions – the principle of reflective practice 10 
6. The value of ‘mateship’ – principles of team cohesion  11 
The first of these habits is not seen in the operation of the EWS in my research because 12 
the nurses do not know and cannot predict what action the doctor will take in response 13 
to a call. 14 
From the outset of this research it was evident that the doctors and nurses demonstrated 15 
different priorities in using the MEWS and that there was a disjunction between the 16 
medical and nursing teams in their views of its operation. It appeared that they might be 17 
conceptualising their practice differently.  My first thoughts were that this was the result 18 
of the sociology of the team and my subsequent interviews turned towards exploring 19 
relationships, threats and fears. This led me to extend my interviews to managers as the 20 
ward nurses might see their oversight as a threat. This might influence their actions. 21 
Surprisingly, in view of other published literature on teamwork (Greenfield 1999, 22 
Rosenstein and O'Daniel 2005, Marshall, Kitto et al. 2011, Castel, Ginsburg et al. 2015, 23 
O'Connor, O'Dea et al. 2016) social issues and culture did not seem to be an issue 24 
between the medical and nursing teams in this study. In fact, as explained in the 25 
previous chapter, the nurses felt that the use of MEWS reduced the risk of them being 26 
criticised by the medical team.  27 
As discussed earlier it is widely accepted that the medical and nursing models of 28 
practice are different. Bauman, Debner et al have discussed the stereotypical statement 29 
that nurses seek to care whilst doctors seek to cure (Baumann, Deber et al. 1998). They 30 
suggest that these models are not applicable to modern practice where care/cure exists 31 
as a continuum, with most healthcare workers appropriately adopting positions between 32 
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the extremes. They acknowledge however that doctors and nurses still inhabit different 1 
ends of this spectrum. Barrow, McKimm et al used a qualitative scheme of thematic 2 
analysis to investigate conceptual differences between doctors and nurses at the bedside 3 
and reported finding a dichotomy (Barrow, McKimm et al. 2015). Nurses were 4 
predominantly collectivist, protocol and systems-driven whilst doctors were more 5 
individualist and autonomy-driven. They concluded that unless such complexities were 6 
addressed in the development of teams and the teaching of teamwork, performance 7 
would fall short of expectation.  8 
The recognition of the impact of different mental models on team communication 9 
prompted the development of a structure for communication in nursing and medical 10 
handovers between teams, known by the acronym SBAR from its component parts 11 
(Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendations). Haig, Sutton et al (2006) 12 
stressed the importance of doctors and nurses having a shared mental model of patient 13 
care and described how the use of the SBAR tool improved communication (Haig, 14 
Sutton et al. 2006). They discussed the ways in which the style of communication used 15 
by doctors and nurses differ, and how this contributes to misunderstandings. They 16 
wrote: 17 
“Many barriers can potentially contribute to communication difficulties between 18 
clinicians. A lack of structure and standardization for communications, 19 
uncertainty about who is responsible for the patient’s care management 20 
(quarterback of the team), hierarchy, sex, and ethnic background may all be 21 
contributing factors. (Haig, Sutton et al. 2006)  22 
They noted that nurses and doctors had different styles of communication: nurses being 23 
detailed and descriptive whilst doctors used brief summaries of important issues. The 24 
authors suggested that having a standardised framework for communication would 25 
improve understanding. This was the function of MEWS as reported in the current 26 
study, and the interviewees felt it improved doctor/nurse communication.  27 
De Meester, Das et al have also reported that both nurses and doctors felt that their 28 
communication had improved following the introduction of the SBAR system (De 29 
Meester, Das et al. 2013, De Meester K 2013). 30 
Mental models of practice run deeper than the style of communication. They shape the 31 
way individuals conceptualise and prioritise problems (Burtscher and Manser 2012, 32 
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McComb and Simpson 2014). In the context of MEWS, in this research project, the 1 
medical and nursing teams articulate distinctive, disparate objectives of care. Little 2 
consideration seems to have been given to the effect this has on multi-professional 3 
teamwork. Manser has discussed the literature on teamwork in the context of patient 4 
safety (Manser 2009) and with Burtscher reviewed the relevant literature in 2012. The 5 
authors comment on the paucity of studies and the confused status of methods for 6 
assessing mental models (Burtscher and Manser 2012). They discuss teamwork and the 7 
relevant mental models in anaesthesia and ward nursing. Their analysis takes into 8 
account shared knowledge of objectives, and shared technical objectives. Neither of 9 
these reviews, however, addresses the issue of whether team members understand their 10 
work and its objectives in the same way.  Brindley and Reynolds (2011) have discussed 11 
communication and safety in ICU care and stressed the importance of shared vocabulary 12 
and shared mental models but again there is no discussion of the congruency of overall 13 
objectives (Brindley and Reynolds 2011, Brindley 2014). In one study it was found that 14 
the surgeons perception of operating theatre teamwork and organisational safety was 15 
more positive than that of anaesthetists and nurses (Mills, Neily et al. 2008). The 16 
researchers considered the surgeons perceptions to be less realistic and to be founded on 17 
a narrower perspective of ‘success’.  18 
This observation finds a parallel in the present study where the doctors expressed 19 
greater satisfaction with the outcome of MEWS than did the nurses. This may reflect the 20 
fact that the doctors’ objective (to identify and deal with a possible crisis) was narrower 21 
than that of the nurses (to care for the patient in the context of their illness). I have been 22 
made sensitive to the possibility that the medical and nursing teams have distinct 23 
models of care from my experiences as a senior sister in ICU. I repeatedly found that 24 
the nursing team was sceptical about what appeared to be heroic therapy, being openly 25 
concerned about the patient’s ordeal, and believing (often incorrectly) that the treatment 26 
was futile; whilst the medical team appeared to be engrossed in the clinical problem and 27 
appeared insensitive to the plight of the patient and their relatives. Such occurrences 28 
were not uncommon and sometimes threatened to lead to confrontation between the 29 
teams. Interestingly, I saw a similar dynamic between the intensive care specialists and 30 
the even more technically focussed surgical team. I speculate that these are real 31 
examples of the separate cure/care models of practice. During this research a difference 32 
of attitude between the medical and nursing teams was evident in their attitude to 33 
palliation. The nursing staff often made reference to the doctors’ unwillingness to 34 
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accept the futility of aggressive treatment and accept a policy of symptom control. The 1 
discussion about the difficulty of getting variances signed (Section 6.2.6) shows the 2 
nursing staff accepting palliation as something positive for the patient and attributing 3 
the medical teams reluctance to go down that route as being due to them seeing 4 
palliation as ‘throwing in the towel’. 5 
May and Finch have described a process by which new patterns of work or social 6 
interaction become ‘normalised’ as routines individually and within teams (May and 7 
Finch 2009). These routines may not be understood in the same way by actors from 8 
different professions and with different roles in a team process. In this case each actor or 9 
set of actors may proceed through the stages of normalisation and develop different 10 
conceptions of the practice without any of them being aware that there are distinct 11 
interpretations. 12 
In some recent studies the teams appeared to be concerned about blame and criticism, 13 
and the effect this would have on their professional image (Kitto, Marshall et al. 2015, 14 
Douglas, Osborne et al. 2016). These studies took place in systems were there was a 15 
formal MET. The MET personnel seem to be perceived as judging the home teams 16 
performance, and the doctors and nurses feel that if their decision to alert the team is 17 
mistaken, their error will become widely known. Calling a MET is ‘going public’ and 18 
this is a threat. In my study fear of being found foolish or inadequate was less of an 19 
issue because the F1 and F2 doctors usually sought initial assistance from their home 20 
team seniors. This, of course, is their normal chain of responsibility, and they are 21 
accustomed to having their clinical practice scrutinised within the team. Several 22 
participants described being comfortable asking for advice from their home team, and 23 
being more worried about possible criticism when asking for help from ‘outsiders’. A 24 
MEWS track and trigger review is therefore not an unusual situation for the doctors. It 25 
appears that the fact that the medical team is relatively relaxed about responding to 26 
MEWS triggers also relieved the pressure on the nursing team. 27 
7.4 Differing Epistemologies of Medicine and Nursing 28 
I suggest that the reason for the different mental models lies partly in the different 29 
epistemologies of medical and nursing practice. Medical practice springs largely from 30 
the logical-positivist tradition of scientific thought (Cruickshank 2012, Wootton 2015), 31 
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whereas nursing is often said to have a relativistic, humanistic underpinning that is more 1 
open to the acceptance of multiple interpretations of reality (Rashotte and Carnevale 2 
2004). There was no discussion of philosophical perspectives during the interviews for 3 
this research but five relevant memos were generated. These all reflected the logical- 4 
positivist stance of the medical staff. There were three occasions where, before or after 5 
the interview, the doctor questioned the validity of the qualitative nature research and 6 
went on to suggest that a quantitative review of outcome would be more productive. 7 
The other two memos relate to discussions arising in my meetings with the teams to 8 
explain the research and secure consent for taking part. Again, my methodology was 9 
criticised by some of the medical staff and a quantitative approach suggested.  10 
The positivist/relativist conflict has been identified as a problem within several areas of 11 
nursing practice: in nurse education (Playle 1995), in the interface between nursing 12 
research and practice (Rodgers 2005, Warelow 2013), in the analysis of medical and 13 
nursing decision-making generally (Banning 2008), and in the context of critical care 14 
nurse practitioners (Rashotte and Carnevale 2004). This is unsurprising as the nurse is 15 
bringing their perspective into fields influenced, and sometimes dominated by positivist 16 
ideas. Banning (2008) discussed the positivist/ relativist influences on the nurses’ 17 
clinical decision making, whilst Rashotte and Carnedale (2004) were attempting to 18 
understand whether different processes were involved when nurse practitioners and 19 
doctors addressed similar situations requiring a clinical decision. Neither of these papers 20 
addresses the problem I identify: members of a clinical team, working to a joint 21 
protocol, use different models of practice, have different understandings of care and 22 
express different values.  23 
These different perspectives are not necessarily taught to doctors and nurses (Stein 24 
1986), but arise from the different way the two professions are organised and conduct 25 
their business. Indeed, an essay written by two medical students has drawn attention to 26 
the defective example shown by their seniors in the workplace and the unrealistic, 27 
idealistic content of any formal teaching on ethics and professionalism (Brainard and 28 
Brislen 2007). This phenomenon has long been characterised as “Do as I say and not as 29 
I do!” From my experience as a teacher in multi-professional situations I suspect that 30 
neither the trainee doctors nor the nurses in the study have been taught formally about 31 
the philosophy underlying their practice, or have given it much thought. It is likely that 32 
the understandings of both nurses and doctors will have been absorbed from the 33 
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attitudes of their trainers without explicit teaching about philosophy, but these 1 
epistemologies and ontologies will, none the less, be so embedded in everyday practice, 2 
that they will be almost invisible; and so taken-for–granted that they are not noticed. 3 
Seeing these different attitudes to care and treatment emerging from the medical and 4 
nursing dialogues, and following a re-reading of the literature and study of the 5 
transcripts and memos, I began to suspect that the reason for the doctors and nurses 6 
expressing different priorities in the use of MEWS lay in different ways of 7 
understanding clinical care as practiced by their teams. Not only did they have different 8 
mental models of practice, but also these models were developed from different 9 
ontologies and epistemologies. By the time this idea emerged it was too late for me to 10 
use theoretical sampling to direct enquiry in ways that might shed more light on the 11 
issue. I do not therefore know what my subjects understand about the philosophy of 12 
their practice, and the way it is understood – its epistemology.  13 
Medicine is often described as a principally scientific discipline (Pearson 2013). Its 14 
ontology is scientific realism: a real world exists separate from the mind. And it is 15 
positivistic: science can reveal the nature of the world and only that which science can 16 
demonstrate exists. This positivistic scientific method stresses empiricism and describes 17 
a deterministic discipline (Kothari and Mehta 1993). Doctors have been demonstrated to 18 
rely on a deterministic reasoning (phenomena are the outcome of causal influences) 19 
(Losee 2001, Findyartini, Hawthorne et al. 2016). 20 
The epistemology of nursing practice is by contrast broadly relativistic: knowledge, 21 
truth, and morality exist in relation to culture, society, and historical context, and are not 22 
absolute. It has for thirty years pursued a different form of knowledge from medical 23 
practice that, whilst accepting and understanding the positivism of the scientific element 24 
of practice, has emphasised the humanistic framework of the patient and their 25 
environment as the context for nursing practice (Yorks and Sharoff 2001). Some 26 
nursing research has stressed the relativist basis of nursing knowledge as distinct from 27 
the positivist basis of biological science (Mitchell and Cody 1992). Nursing process is 28 
more probabilistic (based on experience) than deterministic (Young 1987, Pearson 29 
2013, Robert, Tilley et al. 2014). Much of the practice of nursing in the UK derives 30 
from the ideas such as  “The Activities of Daily Living” as developed by Roper, Logan 31 
and Tierney, which sets the nursing agenda as to preserve the individuals capacity to 32 
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maintain normal function in the face of illness (Roper, Logan et al. 2000), Orem’s ‘Self 1 
Care Model’, stressing personal independence, and Peplau’s ‘Interpersonal Theory’ that 2 
outlines the changing nature of the nurse/patient relationship with time (Comley 1994). 3 
All these theorists expressed a broad interpretation of nursing practice. Delanty and 4 
Strydom placed care at the centre of knowledge in nursing. They claim that it is through 5 
the processes of caring that nurses come to understand what nursing means and acquire 6 
the knowledge base for its practice (Delanty and Strydom 2003). They conclude that 7 
care is the ontology and epistemology of nursing. 8 
The belief that many forms of knowledge are equally valid arose from postmodernism 9 
in the 1970s and what is known as American Pragmatism (Kagan, Smith et al. 2010). 10 
Carper has described a typology of nursing knowledge and recognises four domains: 11 
empirical, ethical, personal and aesthetic (Carper 1978). This typology has gained 12 
acceptance in contemporary nursing theory (Garrett and Cutting 2015). These issues 13 
have been considered, and incorporated, when developing competencies for nurse 14 
training; but most curricula do not explicitly teach the philosophy of nursing practice to 15 
undergraduates (Vinson 2000). There is no equivalent widely accepted interpretation of 16 
medical practice. 17 
In all likelihood the nurses and doctors participating in this investigation approach the 18 
evaluation of a deteriorating patient without overtly understanding that the medical and 19 
nursing perspectives may be different. I suggest that in the case of a possible patient 20 
deterioration both medical and nursing teams are presented with uncertainty and 21 
approach the problem in different ways. 22 
The data from this investigation indicates that medical team asks:  23 
“What evidence is there that the patient is deteriorating? Do they need changes to 24 
their management and what changes are most likely to lead to improvement?”  25 
This is a problem solving approach. It searches for empirical evidence to plan future 26 
treatment. Its first response is often to seek additional evidence in the form of other 27 
investigations.  28 
The nursing team asks,  29 
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“Why has this patients situation become uncertain and how can the uncertainty be 1 
resolved? How do the patient and their family understand this uncertain situation 2 
and how is it best managed on their behalf?”  3 
The nurses then describe observing the patient’s behaviours and capabilities, and how 4 
these are changing with time to confirm their opinion of the patient’s status. This 5 
attitude makes nurses open to palliative options in care.  6 
This difference has been commented upon previously. In their 2007 research Endacott, 7 
Kidd et al made the observation that whilst both nurses and doctors who responded to 8 
trigger events initially evaluated patients by interpreting their vital signs, the doctors 9 
then proceeded to investigations whereas the nurses refined their opinion of the 10 
patient’s condition by considering their physical capabilities – both what they can do, 11 
and how this has changed (Endacott, Kidd et al. 2007). 12 
The nurse’s approach may be considered to be one of problem setting or identification 13 
(Schön 1992). Their focus is not only on changing treatments but also on assisting the 14 
patient and their family to comprehend their situation and to adapt their understandings 15 
and expectations to the changing situation. The medical team did not express these 16 
concerns in their interviews, being more focussed on assessing and treating the patient. I 17 
interpret these differences as showing that the doctors feel a primary responsibility for 18 
outcome whilst the nurses feel their primary responsibility is how the patient travels 19 
towards that outcome. 20 
These differing points of view lead to different interpretations of the outcome of trigger 21 
events. The medical team often implied in interviews that if the patient does not have a 22 
problem that requires action, the trigger is a false positive, and a waste of time. Nurses 23 
on the other hand felt that the negative medical review had helped resolve the 24 
uncertainty: providing them, the patient and the family with reassurance.  25 
The medical interpretation leads to the conclusion that 90% of MEWS alerts are a waste 26 
of time whereas the nursing perspective is that most patient encounters serve a purpose. 27 
The doctors in the study also sometimes described the need for them to attend the 28 
patient, as being due to the nurses’ lack of clinical knowledge, and said that they, by 29 
providing an informed evaluation of the situation, would resolve it (Section 6.2.2). It is 30 
clear from the nursing interviews, however, that they do not consider the doctors 31 
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assessment to be final. They interpret that assessment along with other factors of which 1 
the doctor has little experience. These include things they have understood from their 2 
more intimate involvement with the patient and their family and things that relate to 3 
future nursing care, and their intuitions regarding the patient’s state and probable 4 
progress. It was clear that the nurses believed that their intimate involvement with the 5 
patient, experience and nursing perspective made them a partner in the clinical 6 
evaluation of the patient. A view that doctors in general were slow to accept (Greenfield 7 
1999, Hojat, Nasca et al. 2001, Thomas, Sexton et al. 2003). Spiva (2014) has discussed 8 
the importance of self-confidence in nursing decision-making and the way it develops 9 
with experience (Spiva et al. 2014). In this enquiry the demonstration of the nurses 10 
confident self-image as clinicians, was that they were prepared to question medical 11 
decisions, and re-refer a problem to a more senior doctor if they were dissatisfied with 12 
the way events were unfolding, despite the negative effects for themselves that might 13 
result from this action being seen as a challenge the doctor’s clinical competence. Lack 14 
of clinical self-confidence has previously been noted as a barrier to nurses calling for 15 
support, and it has been suggested that their decision to do so is helped by measures that 16 
increase their clinical assurance, such as de-briefing and appropriate teaching 17 
programmes (Cioffi 2000, S Astroth, M Woith et al. 2013, Hart, Spiva et al. 2014). As 18 
suggested by Spiva, it was the very experienced nurses who described challenging the 19 
medical team’s decisions, but interestingly experienced staff of all grades from 20 
healthcare assistant to ward manager volunteered that they would be willing, if 21 
necessary, to go over the head of the most junior doctors - length of experience, was as 22 
important as grade.  23 
Donague and Endacott   examined the factors used by nurses in the evaluation of 24 
deteriorating patients. They found that nurses looked at trends in the vital signs when 25 
making an assessment but used the EWS score as a means of rating the seriousness of 26 
the patients state (Donohue and Endacott 2010). This is another example of a track and 27 
trigger system being perceived as a severity score but we also see that nurses include 28 
information from their close, continuous, observation of the patient in deciding whether 29 
changes in their condition are occurring. 30 
A recently published investigation of the quality of teamwork between doctors and 31 
nurses used a critical incident technique (O'Connor, O'Dea et al. 2016). The doctors and 32 
nurses were asked to describe a situation they had been in where teamwork was poor. 33 
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The interviews were coded against a theoretical framework of healthcare team function 1 
by three psychologists, and were also rated for risk to patients, by four doctors and three 2 
nurses. Thirty-three of the scenarios met the inclusion criteria. 63.6% (21/33) of the 3 
scenarios were attributed to 'poor quality of collaboration', 42.4% (14/33) to 'poor 4 
leadership' and 48.5% (16/33) to a 'lack of coordination'. Thirteen out of thirty three of 5 
the scenarios were described as being associated with the 'lack of a shared mental 6 
model'. This would be unsurprising if the medical and nursing teams had different 7 
mental models of practice, and did not share their epistemology of practice. 8 
How could lack of a shared model of care interfere with the operation of an RRS? The 9 
use of an RRS protocol is intended to lead to rapid, in-person, review of a patient who 10 
has a score above the trigger threshold. The junior doctors know from experience that 11 
most alerts are, by their understanding, false alarms. They will negotiate with the nurse 12 
and will then decide whether to attend at the bedside. If the patient shows little evidence 13 
of being in trouble the nurse may be satisfied with this ‘telephone consultation’ - if it 14 
has provided them with a plan for advancing the nursing care. Thus both parties may be 15 
content with a negotiation that leads to a patient not being reviewed in accordance with 16 
the protocol – though the evidence from my interviews suggests that the nurses are less 17 
often happy with this outcome than are the doctors. 18 
7.5 A new protocol must be tailored to the existing work and 19 
will be interpreted by users in ways that satisfy their 20 
individual needs 21 
In the field of patient care, protocols are frequently used to make clinical management 22 
systematic, and to align it with the best evidence (Shaneyfelt, Mayo-Smith et al. 1999, 23 
Raine, Sanderson et al. 2005, Higgins 2007). The developers of guidelines and 24 
protocols often produce algorithms that affect the way that doctors and nurses work, 25 
increasing their workload and changing their work routines. Often, no consideration 26 
seems to have been given to how this will affect existing work (Cheung, Sahai et al. 27 
2014, Kavanagh and Nurok 2016). A protocol that requires staff to perform additional 28 
tests, complete extra paperwork or make extra visits to patients may disrupt the current 29 
ways of managing work. It may, indeed, overload the work schedule (Kavanagh and 30 
Nurok 2016). The ‘Evidence-Based-Medicine’ movement has provoked a large amount 31 
of literature protesting that protocols and guidelines restrict the clinical choices of 32 
doctors, and may embed practice that is in fact not well supported by evidence 33 
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(Greenhalgh, Howick et al. 2014, Fins 2016). However, scant attention appears to have 1 
been paid to the possible disruption of other work. Kavanagh and Nurok have discussed 2 
the consequences of protocols in the ICU (Kavanagh and Nurok 2016). They describe 3 
two ways that protocols can disrupt practice: misalignment and misatributation. 4 
Misalignment occurs when the protocol is developed in one circumstance and then 5 
applied in another where the context makes its use problematical. Misatributation 6 
occurs when effects are attributed mistakenly to the use of a protocol. Misatributation 7 
may be common in the literature of RRSs. Many studies have included significant 8 
adjustment of teams, education initiatives and changes in practice that may be the true 9 
cause of any change in outcome. The Hawthorne effect is the phenomenon of 10 
individuals changing their behaviour because they are being watched and the scrutiny 11 
involved in conducting an outcome trial in association with an RRS is an obvious 12 
possible precipitant. Misalignment was evident in this study when the staff believed 13 
higher MEWS scores indicated that the patient was at greater risk. Many of the studies 14 
of RRSs may be guilty of misattributing the changes in practice seen with their 15 
introduction to the protocol itself when in fact they are due to other associated factors in 16 
staff and ward management. 17 
MEWS requires the team to accord it a higher priority than other work. The doctors’ 18 
behaviour, and the way they speak about prioritising, shows that they reject this 19 
imperative. They deal with every situation on its own merits and allocate priority on 20 
perceived clinical urgency. In the words of one interviewee: 21 
I cannot put off seeing to a patient who I know has problems, to attend to another 22 
who might have (a problem). Doctor FY-1 2  23 
Cheung has discussed the risks to other work of the RRS imperative (Cheung, Sahai et 24 
al. 2014). He found that attending to alerts was very disruptive to other work but did not 25 
find any instances of patients coming to harm.  26 
In this study it became clear that the MEWS could generate an additional workload, 27 
irreconcilable with the demands of existing work, and that the foundation doctors were 28 
resolving this conflict by contravening the protocol (Section 6.2.2). They negotiated 29 
with the nurses to deal with many MEWS alerts indirectly, without seeing the patient. 30 
The formal use of EWSs and RRSs are not isolated clinical developments. They have 31 
impact on ways of working and upon the complex sociological and cultural interactions 32 
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of the nursing and medical teams. It is probable that these unanticipated effects lead to 1 
the teams not using the interventions in the way that was intended.   2 
This observation may be pertinent to the working of other protocols. Doctors who use a 3 
guideline or protocol will also have other work to do. Unless the benefit of the protocol 4 
is obvious, its users will adapt it in ways that allow them to best deal with their entire 5 
workload. Lack of time has been identified as a reason why doctors do not use an 6 
appropriate protocol (Berg 1997).  7 
Cheung, Sahai et al have studied the effect of the operation of a MET and RRS on other 8 
work (Cheung, Sahai et al. 2014). They conducted 1490 structured interviews were, and 9 
analysed 279 written questionnaires. There were 378 incidents, but they did not 10 
discover any adverse events attributable to the distraction of a MET call. The severity of 11 
the incidents was assessed using a severity assessment code and 99.5% of them were 12 
classified as minimum.  Most often these reported incidents were disruptions to normal 13 
duties, ward rounds, and patient reviews. However, 2 incidents were reported on 14 
institutional incident reporting systems. The authors concluded that disruption to normal 15 
work was significant but that this was not resulting in harm to patients. It is likely that 16 
such a high level of disruption will from time to time be associated with an adverse 17 
event. 18 
My interviewees believed they were observing the RRS protocol, but were willing to 19 
mould it to their needs. In the current situation MEWS generates many calls to patients 20 
who are relatively well and who remain well. The doctor’s find this frustrating and do 21 
not strictly stick to its instructions. In particular they minimise their input in the case of 22 
patients with low MEWS and about whom the nurses do not express concern. The use 23 
of an EWS is based on the observation that some patients exhibit a pattern of relatively 24 
minor physiological derangements before they deteriorate catastrophically. It is illogical 25 
to select a subset of patients for a less thorough review on the grounds that they show no 26 
obvious signs of impending collapse, other than a minimally raised MEWS. These are 27 
the very patients for whom MEWS was intended.  28 
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7.6 Registered Nurses and Healthcare Assistants demonstrate 1 
considerable insight into the issues of patient deterioration 2 
The opinions of the more experienced nurses and healthcare assistants demonstrated a 3 
paradox. They like the MEWS because it takes away their need to make a clinical 4 
decision - the trigger score requires them to call the doctor. They feel that the MEWS 5 
justifies the call and relieves them of the possibility of criticism for independently 6 
evaluating the patient’s condition. At the same time they stress that their experience 7 
gives them a feel for situations and is a valid adjunct to the empirical data from MEWS. 8 
This is a classic description of ‘tacit knowledge’ (Pope, Smith et al. 2003). They 9 
understand the situation and know what to do, but they can’t explain how they reach 10 
their conclusions. (Eraut 2000).  11 
It appears that the need to have recourse to MEWS makes two assumptions:  12 
• That it would be difficult, or impossible to give the bedside healthcare assistants 13 
and RGNs the necessary clinical skills to recognise problems themselves and… 14 
• …..that the most junior F Grade doctors possess these skills. 15 
Neither of these positions is supported by evidence, and NICE and the NPSA has 16 
specifically recommended that the most junior grades of doctor do not make decisions 17 
about critical illness (NICE 2007, NPSA 2007). These recommendations are largely 18 
based on the many case reviews such as those undertaken by NCEPOD in its successive 19 
reports.  20 
What effect is the MEWS having upon the clinical activities of nurses? EWS were 21 
conceived to solve the problem that critically ill patients were often discovered to have 22 
been showing minor signs that should have given cause for concern prior to the 23 
‘discovery’ of their collapse. By providing a way to aggregate these minor physiological 24 
disturbances a more reliable marker of impending clinical deterioration was presumed 25 
to be obtained. As these previously stable patients were predominantly in the care of 26 
nurses, the EWS can be interpreted as a way of circumventing the necessity for them to 27 
be able to recognise a deteriorating patient from the application of basic clinical 28 
knowledge. 29 
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 In their interviews the nurses did not accept that they were unable to identify 1 
deteriorating patients. They repeatedly referred to their clinical skills and experience as 2 
part of the team’s armamentarium in evaluating physiological instability. Surprisingly 3 
none of them volunteered the thought that MEWS was undermining them as clinicians. 4 
This may be because the junior medical staff often try to avoid having to personally 5 
assess the patient and actively seek the nurses opinions when a MEWS call is made. 6 
Some versions of MET alerting criteria actually invite nurses to participate by including 7 
the extra scoring factor ‘nurse concern’. This has been reported to improve the validity 8 
of trigger states (Douw, Huisman-de Waal et al. 2016). It is not clear from the literature 9 
what position the proponents of EWSs are adopting concerning nursing assessment of 10 
patients at risk, or whether there are a variety of views. From a nursing perspective it is 11 
not desirable to undermine the nurses contribution, or to see protocol-based care 12 
substituting for the teaching of basic clinical assessment.  13 
Griffiths and Ball have published a review of NHS data on hospital mortality and 14 
correlated it with figures for RN, Healthcare Assistant and Doctor staffing levels. They 15 
found an association of higher levels of RN staffing with reduced mortality (p=0.02); 16 
higher levels of doctor staffing with reduced mortality (p=0.01); whilst lower levels of 17 
‘healthcare worker’ staffing were associated with reduced mortality (p=0.04) (Griffiths, 18 
Ball et al. 2016). The authors write that is plausible to conclude that higher levels of RN 19 
staffing correlate with improved patient outcomes. Further, these data suggest that 20 
boosting staffing levels by increasing the Healthcare Assistant staffing at the expense of 21 
RN staffing does not have an impact on outcomes. However, none of these relationships 22 
can be shown to be causal. 23 
7.7 Alternatives to MEWS 24 
7.7.1 Do EWS and MET shore up a broken model of care? 25 
It is possible that the MEWS system is shoring up a broken model of ward care (Litvak 26 
and Pronovost 2010). All of the consultants and some of the more senior STs 27 
interviewed in the course of this research were of the opinion that the MEWS diverted 28 
attention from what they identified as the real issue: that doctors and nurses who look 29 
after unstable patients do not possess the necessary knowledge and skills. This is a 30 
position that has been expressed by both NICE and NCEPOD (NICE 2007, NCEPOD 31 
2012, NCEPOD 2015). One intensive care specialist who was interviewed for this study 32 
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was particularly emphatic. She saw RRSs as a poor second to better staffing and better 1 
education and regretted that the present focus on RRSs was diverting energies away 2 
from providing better training in the management of acute illness for doctors and 3 
nurses. 4 
In their 2015 review of Rapid Response Teams White and Scott note that they may be 5 
compensating for deficiencies in the routine standard of care, such as lack of suitably 6 
experienced clinicians (White, Scott et al. 2015). Braithwaite and De Vita (Braithwaite, 7 
DeVita et al. 2004) found that 30% of RRT calls were for deterioration resulting from 8 
medical errors. Kaplan and Maerz reported that more than 75% of calls to a surgical unit 9 
were due to what they classified as avoidable errors (Kaplan, Maerz et al. 2009). 10 
Ward patients do deteriorate unexpectedly and retrospective review indicates that many 11 
of them could have been better managed in the early stages. That they ended up being 12 
critically ill, in ICU, indicates that things did not go well and clinical reviewers have the 13 
advantage of hindsight. At the time however the outcome of a confused tangle of 14 
problems might not seem obvious. It is possible that, at the time the MEWS score rose, 15 
the necessary responses were not clear.  16 
It can be speculated, on the basis of the inconsistent evidence discussed previously, that 17 
ICU care of the patient who collapses on the ward may not significantly alter the 18 
outcome in some patients. If this is the case the EWS will not improve outcome because 19 
the key element of admitting to ICU makes little difference. In retrospective reviews 20 
such as those by NCEPOD reviewers can seize upon an apparent error in management 21 
but they cannot know whether this would have changed the outcome. Perhaps the 22 
apparent failure of EWSs and METs to improve overall outcome reflects the fact that 23 
that the subset of patients whose course can be changed is small compared with those 24 
whose decline was unavoidable, and their improved outcome is lost in the data.  25 
There is some evidence from retrospective reviews, however, that delayed activation of 26 
an MET is associated with worse outcome (Calzavacca, Licari et al. 2010, Tirkkonen, 27 
Yla-Mattila et al. 2013, Boniatti, Azzolini et al. 2014). If the argument that poor 28 
outcomes result from delay in involving the doctors with special skills in critical care is 29 
correct, then there is no consistent evidence that MEWS or MET reliably makes their 30 
involvement more timely. In the case of a MET, the evidence suggests that the ‘home 31 
CHAPTER 7:  DISCUSSION 
 
236 
team’ will delay calling whilst attempting to resolve problems themselves (Marshall, 1 
Kitto et al. 2011, Shearer, Marshall et al. 2012, Roberts, Bonafide et al. 2014, Douglas, 2 
Osborne et al. 2016). In the current study of MEWS without an MET, the doctor to 3 
whom the nurses report a raised MEWS is too inexperienced to make the necessary 4 
clinical decisions (NICE 2007). There is no empirical data to substantiate the fact that 5 
inexperience led to indecision and delay but the F1 doctors reported not knowing what 6 
to do, and were concerned about delays that occurred because they were unable to get 7 
timely advice from their seniors. The nurses also said that they were sometimes worried 8 
because the medical decision-making could be slow following a trigger event. 9 
Mews identifies a cohort of patients of whom 10% or less will deteriorate. In addition, a 10 
further large cohort of patients will deteriorate without warning. Therefore the validity 11 
of the MEWS score is low in finding those patients who will develop critical illness. 12 
Furthermore, MEWS does not necessarily deliver a suitably skilled doctor at the 13 
bedside. By formally handing the role of evaluating the patient to inexperienced doctors 14 
it may actually delay referral to critical care. 15 
The responses in this research, and reports in the literature indicate that the use of 16 
MEWS to improve and accelerate the management of patient deterioration may be 17 
flawed. It appears to be an expedient measure dictated by the lack of availability of 18 
experienced doctors and of nurses with reliable clinical skills. 19 
Kitto and Marshall have commented: 20 
“We argue that the implementation of the formal RRS into a hospital structure and 21 
clinical processes is a technical solution to a problem that actually requires socio- 22 
cultural considerations”(Kitto, Marshall et al. 2015) 23 
They analysed the behaviour of RRTs using the concept of Collective Competence, 24 
common in the education literature, but adapting it to define a collective incompetence. 25 
My findings confirm the suggestions of Kitto, Marshall et al, that a form of collective 26 
incompetence was present (Table 13) , and I suggest that the disordered teamwork came 27 
from the existence of distinct profession-based mental models of practice, underpinned 28 
by different epistemologies.  29 
 30 
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Table 13. Collective Incompetence and Collective Competence 1 
Collective Competence Collective Incompetence 
1. Making collective sense of events 
in the workplace 
1. The existence of multiple profession-based 
understandings of events in the workplace 
that drive clinical behaviours 
2. Developing and using a collective 
knowledge base 
2. The practice of multiple profession-based 
development and usage of knowledge 
3. Developing a sense of 
interdependency 
3. A prevailing sense of profession-based 
intra-dependency 
The positivist epistemology of medical practice has a tendency to prompt the 2 
development of technical solutions to problems that are deeply complex and depend, 3 
amongst other things, on the attitudes and behaviours of those who use them. Some of 4 
the ‘evidence-based medicine’ developments can be criticised in this way (Fins 2016). 5 
By their presumption that clinicians simply do not know the evidence they miss the 6 
point that even clinicians who do know the evidence will choose to respond to other, 7 
often socio-cultural influences on their practice. Timmermans and Mauk have noted: 8 
“Studies show, however, that few guidelines lead to consistent changes in provider 9 
behaviour. The hopes, fears, and mixed record of EBM are rooted in the traditional 10 
professional perspective of the clinician as sole decision-maker. Multifaceted 11 
implementation strategies that take the collaborative nature of medical work into 12 
consideration promise more effective changes in clinical practice” (Timmermans 13 
and Mauck 2005). 14 
Whenever any new development becomes generally available it will be modified and 15 
developed by third parties. Modifications and uses that can be submitted to evaluation 16 
will be more generally adopted, whereas adaptations that do not stand scrutiny will 17 
wither away. Sometimes however the users are less critical than the original developers, 18 
and it is tempting to accept research that validates a system for one purpose as 19 
validating it more generally. This is the misalignment error of protocols described by 20 
Kavanagh (Kavanagh and Nurok 2016). Measures of severity and outcome such as 21 
APACHE II were painstakingly developed and refined. They are relatively complex and 22 
time consuming, but still do not predict future progress with sufficient certainty to be 23 
used to guide the management of individual cases. It is unsurprising that analysis of 24 
MEWS scores demonstrates that patients with severe derangement of their vital signs do 25 
less well than those with minor abnormalities.  26 
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Mews is calibrated to detect these more minor signs. It is a mistake to draw any 1 
conclusion from the MEWS score other than that sicker patients do less well. Mews is 2 
doing its job when it draws attention to a patient with a score of 4, and that patient 3 
should be considered as promptly and as carefully as a patient with a higher score. In 4 
my study the medical team explained how they prioritised calls to MEWS triggers 5 
according to the figure. Two of the examples of MEWS use given by the nurses 6 
described patients that were not visited by the doctor in response to an initial low trigger 7 
score but who were subsequently transferred to ICU following a call for a higher 8 
MEWS. In these patients there had been delay in starting adequate treatment that the 9 
nurses attributed to the medical team not assessing the patient earlier. Such delays are 10 
associated with worse outcome. If such cases are common then they may contribute to 11 
the poor outcome of MEWS. 12 
The question arises as to whether MEWS is useful but has a performance that is 13 
damaged by the way it is applied, or whether it will never work satisfactorily because it 14 
is an attempt to sustain a seriously flawed system. In old-fashioned Nightingale wards 15 
the patients were unofficially stratified in accordance with how Sister perceived their 16 
risk – sickest and most unpredictable, nearest to the nurses desk! In discussing the 17 
issues of nurse staffing Rischbieth has proposed a system that allocates resources 18 
according to risk as perceived by the nursing team. (Rischbieth 2006). If the ward staff 19 
has constant sight of the sick patients and patients suspected to be unstable then their 20 
worsening condition is more likely to be noticed promptly than if they are out of sight in 21 
a single room. 22 
7.7.2 Education  23 
Rapid Response Systems are protocols that attempt to secure earlier involvement of   24 
more senior doctors, and doctors with critical care skills when a patient is at risk of 25 
deterioration.  This approach has been developed partly because nurses and junior 26 
doctors lack the necessary skills and knowledge.  An alternative approach has been to 27 
improve training in the immediate management of acute illness by institution-wide 28 
initiatives for all staff that have the responsibility for the first response. This is the 29 
rationale for teaching initiatives such as ALERT™ (Smith, Osgood et al. 2002) and 30 
FIRST2ACT (Buykx, Kinsman et al. 2011).  31 
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Originally developed in 1999, ALERT™ is a multi-professional course helping staff to 1 
recognise and treat patient deterioration. Attending such a course has been demonstrated 2 
to improve confidence in the management of critical illness (Featherstone, Smith et al. 3 
2005) but there are no reports of improved patient outcome following its introduction. 4 
In 2009 Spearpoint, Gruber et al. reported improvements in the prevalence of 5 
cardiopulmonary arrest and of outcome of resuscitation attempts following the hospital- 6 
wide introduction of Intermediate Life Support training (Spearpoint, Gruber et al. 7 
2009). Their six-year audit, however, covered a period when significant changes in 8 
management of cardiopulmonary arrest were introduced.  9 
FIRST2ACT is a simulator-based course for first responder nurses. It has been used as 10 
an accompaniment to introducing METs in Australian hospitals (Endacott, Bogossian et 11 
al. 2015,  Cooper, Team et al. 2013). The Australian teams now deliver a specialised   12 
First2Act programme to staff as an accompaniment to their use of METs (Cooper, Team 13 
et al. 2013, Porter, Team et al. 2013). Preliminary reports suggest that this is finally 14 
beginning to bring about improvements in outcomes. A recent study has reported 15 
improved performance of the RRS afferent limb when associated with a targeted, web- 16 
based educational programme (Liaw, Wong et al. 2016). Subjects showed improved 17 
knowledge after the programme and performed better at assessing patients. Kinsman, 18 
Buykx et al found improved record keeping for vital signs and pain scoring after a 19 
First2Act course (Kinsman, Buykx et al. 2012) but no change in the use of timely 20 
oxygen therapy – a crucial element of early intervention for patient deterioration. 21 
Connell, Endacott et al have recently published a review of the effectiveness of 22 
education on the management of patient deterioration. A systematic review of the 23 
literature from 2002 and 2004 was conducted. The review included twenty-three studies 24 
and concluded that educational interventions designed to improve the recognition and 25 
management of patient deterioration can improve learner outcomes. Use of medium to 26 
high-fidelity simulation in these programmes improved their effectiveness (Connell, 27 
Endacott et al. 2016). O’Leary, Nash et al found that education that included simulation 28 
improved knowledge and self-efficacy in nurses’ recognition of patient deterioration 29 
(O'Leary, Nash et al. 2016).  In another review of seventeen studies of education for 30 
detecting patient deterioration Massey, Chaboyer et al identified four themes: (1) 31 
assessing the patient; (2) knowing the patient; (3) education and (4) environmental 32 
factors. Three themes for responding to patient deterioration were found; (1) non- 33 
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technical skills; (2) access to support and (3) negative emotional responses (Massey, 1 
Chaboyer et al. 2016). 2 
Liaw and Wong have conducted a controlled trial of the effect of a web based 3 
educational programme versus no intervention, on the performance of RNs in the 4 
simulated assessment of a deteriorating patient scenario in an intermediate fidelity 5 
environment (Liaw, Wong et al. 2016). The nurses also undertook an MCQ test. They 6 
found that the nurses who had undertaken the programme were better at remembering to 7 
record vital signs and had better theoretical knowledge than the no intervention group. 8 
They did not examine whether this effect persisted – which is the major point of interest 9 
as the ‘intervention’ group were in effect told the answers before the test.  10 
Those who believe that the fundamental problem is the inexperience and ignorance of 11 
the bedside nurses and the first responder doctors favour this educational approach 12 
(Connell, Endacott et al. 2016). They point to the fact that glitches in the system and 13 
prevarication by the teams continues to obstruct the involvement of critical care 14 
specialists, even when mandatory protocols are in place. The only solution, it is argued, 15 
is to ensure that junior doctors and nurses are able to instantly recognise critical illness 16 
and fully understand the urgency of skilled intervention.  17 
Specific teaching about the management of severe illness thus improves the 18 
performance and confidence of doctors and nurses who have undertaken it but cannot be 19 
shown to change hospital outcomes in terms of mortality. 20 
Enthusiasts for RRS have observed that its efficacy improves with experience and 21 
persistence (White, Scott et al. 2015, Liaw, Wong et al. 2016). As experience with 22 
RRSs has increased, its advocates have stressed a number of issues: 23 
• RRSs must be introduced with a full educational programme for staff. 24 
• The full programme must be delivered to all new staff. 25 
• Frequent updates are needed. 26 
• Outcomes must be monitored. 27 
Figure 13 shows how the automatic protocol affects the stages of evaluation of a patient 28 
following a ‘trigger’ score. 29 
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Figure 13. The Lines Of Referral For A Deteriorating Patient.  1 
The blue boxes are stages in the process where decisions are supposed to be protocol driven. The red boxes show 2 
places where the decision is ‘high risk’ because the individual has no special experience of critical care. The green 3 
boxes are decisions by individuals  4 
 5 
 6 
7.7.3 Does a MEWS/RRS serve its intended purpose 7 
The various protocols used for RRSs are intended to draw attention to patients at risk. In 8 
hospitals that have emergency teams this should lead to the patient being reviewed by 9 
specialists in critical care.  10 
This would eliminate the need for very junior doctors to make a very difficult clinical 11 
decision for which they are ill prepared. The diagram in figure 13 (page 224) shows 12 
how, whereas a full RRS can eliminate risky evaluations of the patient by doctors and 13 
nurses with no critical care experience the system in use during my study leaves the 14 
most junior doctor in a quandary – “ Shall I get help, and if so who from?” From the 15 
evidence of the interviews in this study the medical staff are so busy they have to decide 16 
whether or not to visit the patient and then have to decide whether to refer the patient 17 
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for more experienced assistance. A protocol will not eliminate this difficult decision 1 
making, unless a trigger occurrence is treated as mandatory, and the system is well 2 
enough staffed for the junior doctor to have time to deal properly with each call, and for 3 
the specialist response team to be always available. 4 
The development of MEWS was predicated on the belief that patient deterioration was 5 
missed either because the nurse did not grasp the significance of the patients’ subtle 6 
physiological changes or did not make the necessary observations. This would lead to 7 
the signs of trouble not being reported to the medical team. There are more reasons for 8 
action not being taken than this: 9 
• Missed vital signs observations 10 
• Nurse Fails to understand the significance of observations 11 
• Nurse fails to succeed in passing the information to the doctor 12 
• Doctor does not act upon the information 13 
• Doctor does review the patient but mistakenly thinks there is no cause for 14 
concern 15 
• Doctor institutes incorrect action 16 
• Doctor fails to succeed in recruiting more experienced advice 17 
Only the nurse’s failure to understand the significance of the observations is reliably 18 
eliminated by the MEWS protocol, and even this remains a consideration because the 19 
nurse’s interpretation of the signs determines the level of urgency that is communicated 20 
to the doctor.  21 
MEWS was developed because audit showed that signs of trouble had often been 22 
neglected in patients who reached ICU. So compelling was the argument that these 23 
patients could be detected earlier, that no studies were done to determine what factors 24 
had led to staff not acting at an early stage. It is possible that the MEWS and RRS does 25 
not address these factors. 26 
7.8 Conclusions 27 
The operation of the MEWS protocols in the populations studied was very far from 28 
being a simple application of an algorithm. Both the medical and nursing teams trusted 29 
the data. There were no opinions expressed or anecdotes told about problems with the 30 
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vital signs data collection and interpretation by the carers. It might, indeed, have been 1 
patchy, inaccurate or incorrectly calculated, but this research was not able to show that. 2 
The medical team, nursing team and managers were all satisfied that it was accurate, 3 
reliable and timely and doubts about the data were not a factor that the teams considered 4 
in making their responses. This confidence in the data is probably misplaced as studies 5 
have shown a high incidence of errors (Chellel, Fraser et al. 2002, Smith and Oakey 6 
2006, Bellomo, Ackerman et al. 2012).  7 
The first-responder, home-team doctors simply ignored the mandatory nature of the 8 
protocol and debated with the nurse whether or not they needed to attend in person. 9 
They prioritised MEWS generated calls below much of their other work. This was 10 
understood and accepted by their seniors. It was understood, but was a source of 11 
anxiety, by the nursing team. 12 
The impact of a protocol on the routines of work can be profound, and the teams that 13 
develop them may not take their side effects into consideration. Indeed the effects may 14 
not be apparent prior to adoption. It is, on the face of it, reasonable to ask a doctor to 15 
drop what they are doing and hasten to help a collapsing patient. It is less reasonable to 16 
ask them to interrupt their possibly important work to hasten to the bedsides of patients 17 
with minor physiological signs who have a one in ten chance of serious deterioration 18 
some time in the next few hours. The MEWS does not appear to have high enough face- 19 
validity for the doctors to understand the necessity to prioritise it highly. The 20 
interviewees from the ward teams all supported the use of MEWS and spoke highly of 21 
its value. The actions of the doctor’s were at odds with the positive opinions and 22 
attitude they expressed. 23 
The research here reported leads to the suggestion that protocols that affect behaviour 24 
should be examined in the prior context of the attitudes and work habits of the staff 25 
affected. A new way of working, determined by a protocol, may reveal that staff has 26 
deficiencies in their knowledge and skills. At the same time the impact of the new way 27 
of working may require consideration of the systems in place. 28 
One of the important aspects of this research was the snapshot it presented of the 29 
difficulties of conducting high quality medical and nursing practice in a very busy 30 
environment. Everyone I interviewed was positive about their part in caring for 31 
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critically ill patients. They were also strikingly supportive of the contribution of the 1 
whole team. What emerged was a picture of a workplace where the junior doctors 2 
considered themselves very over-worked, a view confirmed by their consultants and the 3 
nursing team. The junior doctors also admitted that on some important occasions they 4 
were out of their depth and that it was difficult for them to get help.  5 
The lack of help reflected the fact that their clinical supervisors, the ST doctors, were 6 
themselves trying to do their own work whilst at the same time providing support. It 7 
also reflected the fact that the lines of communication and responsibility were tangled 8 
and the responsibilities imprecise. Though this project was not designed to investigate 9 
this issue it seems reasonable to conclude that a RRS cannot be expected to make good 10 
deficiencies in numbers of staff and lack of knowledge. 11 
 12 
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8 CONCLUSION AND REFLECTIONS 1 
This chapter comprises reflections on the study. The chapter is divided into three 2 
sections. The first section describes the key understandings that I have gained. The 3 
second sets out the lessons that key professionals can learn from the work. In the third 4 
section I discuss how the theory I have developed can be further explored. 5 
8.1 Theory Constructed From This Study 6 
Unexpected, sudden patient deterioration is indeed unexpected, sudden and sometimes 7 
catastrophic, rapidly becoming irreversible. It occurs unpredictably amongst the cohort 8 
of apparently uncomplicated patients. The window of opportunity for treatment may be 9 
as short as a few minutes. MEWS attempts, in advance, to identify patients, at particular 10 
risk of collapsing, and to mobilise remedies in advance of catastrophe. The 11 
epidemiology of sudden major deterioration remains unclear, but its prevalence is low 12 
so that only by mobilising teams to many patients can these few patients be caught in 13 
the act of deterioration.  14 
One of the functions of qualitative research is to generate theory. Grounded theory was 15 
developed to systematically ‘discover’ theory that was hidden within the data (Glaser 16 
1965). Qualitative analysis allows the development of concepts that help describe and 17 
explain the phenomena observed, and some of these may be examined using other 18 
methodologies that confirm or deny them (Silverman 2013). One of the criteria by 19 
which the success of a qualitative enquiry can be judged is by the questions it raises and 20 
whether new theory is offered (Charmaz 2008, Charmaz 2014). Has my investigation 21 
raised significant questions and theory? The theory developed from this study is shown 22 
in Figure 14. 23 
 24 
 25 
 26 
 27 
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 1 
Figure 14 The Theory Developed From This Study 2 
 3 
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8.1.1 A protocol can unexpectedly dominate patient care 1 
In this study the EWS protocol appeared, unexpectedly, to affect the way doctors and 2 
nurses used other evidence. For instance, general indications that a patient was giving 3 
cause for concern, such as worsening pain, were reported to be treated less seriously if 4 
the MEWS score was low. Without a scoring system the nurse and doctor would discuss 5 
the patient to decide if there was a problem. With a score to hand, the nurses reported 6 
that the doctors would ask immediately what the score was and were slow to accept the 7 
need for review if it was low. MEWS uses data that is available for all, or most, eligible 8 
patients but individual patients may exhibit other, unusual signs and symptoms that 9 
should be properly investigated and interpreted. The nurses and healthcare assistants 10 
said they were frustrated by the way their intuitions about care were ignored. Those 11 
with experience from before the introduction of MEWS said that they had more 12 
difficulty getting their views heard than they did previously. The introduction of a 13 
protocol for clinical management downgrades evidence that is not in the protocols 14 
mainstream. 15 
8.1.2 A New Protocol Disrupts Existing Patterns Of Work 16 
Introducing a protocol cuts across existing relationships, socio-cultural and professional. 17 
The major change of practice brings work covered by the protocol into a consistent form 18 
but it may disrupt areas outside its remit. This can be seen to be the case with the 19 
clinical work of nurses and care assistants. Even if the work within the protocol is done 20 
well, the fact remains that their clinical contribution to assessing patients is less 21 
regarded. For the junior doctors the MEWS appears to increase the number of patients 22 
in their care about whom there is uncertainty. Most of these extra patients will have 23 
uncomplicated courses but the protocol draws attention to them as patients about whom 24 
the doctor needs to be concerned. Thus MEWS increases the task and cognitive load for 25 
the doctor, which leads to increasing stress and anxiety. 26 
8.1.3 The Medical and Nursing Teams Have Different Models of Practice 27 
Only during the course of this research did I come to the realisation that doctors and 28 
nurses had separate perceptions of the RRS. They appear to work to different mental 29 
models. Further work is needed to discover whether they understand this disjunction. 30 
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Do they understand the mental model of the other professionals to be different, or do 1 
they believe that they have the same objectives? 2 
8.1.3.1 The Different Models of Practice Reflect Different Epistemologies 3 
It is unlikely that most doctors (Ruitenberg and Mayo 2014)page 1-4) and nurses 4 
(Bishop and Scudder 1990, Kozier 2008) page 38-49) understand philosophical 5 
concepts about the basis of the clinical practice, as there is little formal teaching (often 6 
none) about these issues in undergraduate or postgraduate education. During this 7 
research I have developed the idea that a reason for doctors and nurses working to 8 
different mental models is that there are different understandings of knowledge in their 9 
professions – different epistemologies. Nurses may hold ideas of clinical purpose in 10 
relativist terms whereas doctors hold them in positivist terms. Montgomery has argued 11 
that medicine is not practiced as a positivist, reductionist science, arguing that clinical 12 
process is much more nuanced than this (Montgomery 2006). Nevertheless the most 13 
junior doctors interviewed in this study expressed a strongly positivist response to 14 
MEWS alerts. 15 
8.1.4 RSS May Be The Wrong Answer To Managing Unexpected Patient 16 
Deterioration 17 
As discussed in Chapter 8 section recent studies and reviews have raised the issue of 18 
whether the RRS is the right answer to dealing with unexpected patient deterioration or 19 
whether it is supporting a fundamentally failing system of care. This study does not 20 
have anything to say directly about this issue but some ideas arise. From the interviews 21 
it emerged that rather than rapid referral of all patients to critical care specialists, the 22 
first responder doctors engaged in a difficult triaging exercise, for which they had 23 
neither the necessary knowledge nor experience. The number of alerts generated 24 
necessitated this approach. Researchers have attempted to improve the specificity of the 25 
trigger criteria without success. It is likely that any EWS that identifies most of the 26 
patients who are destined to deteriorate will generate a similar load of false positives.  27 
8.2 Lessons From This Study 28 
It is clear from the literature and from the evidence of the interviews in this study that 29 
national and international introduction of systems for dealing with sudden patient 30 
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deterioration are fragmented and that the local systems investigated were introduced 1 
without ongoing education and audit of their affects, both specific and in the wider field 2 
of work. 3 
8.2.1 Lessons For Junior Doctors and nurses 4 
This study has revealed something very important: doctors and nurses working together 5 
in multi-professional teams may have separate mental models of the tasks in hand. This 6 
results in them having different goals. In the case of detecting and managing incipient 7 
patient deterioration the goal of making the patient better is shared, but the nurses focus 8 
is otherwise on the continuing care and wellbeing of the patient; whereas the doctors 9 
focus is to understand the situation well enough to prescribe appropriate treatment. 10 
Postgraduate medical and nurse education should include teaching about inter- 11 
professional working. Team members must clearly understand the roles of their 12 
colleagues in cooperative working. As a nurse attending patients with cardiac arrests 13 
and other critical events on general wards, I have been surprised and annoyed by the 14 
way the ward staff fade away. There could be a variety of reasons for this and 15 
responsibility may lie with the ward staff or with the specialist team. It is unlikely that 16 
such an abrupt change of carers is in the patients’ interests and in the case I related in 17 
Chapter 1 (Section 1.1) it contributed to the patients death. 18 
8.2.2 Lessons for Senior Medical Staff and Managers 19 
When any change of practice is introduced it must be incorporated into existing systems 20 
by all professions and grades. Teaching staff to know the protocol is insufficient. They 21 
must clearly understand its objectives and how these are achieved. This will require 22 
education, planned over the period of introduction. The consequences should be 23 
audited. In the current case feedback should have been sought regarding the workload 24 
imposed by MEWS. Audit of how this was dealt with would have revealed that that 25 
junior doctors were unable to use the system as intended. 26 
In this study the senior doctors expressed doubts about the way the system worked. The 27 
senior nurses and managers did not look beyond auditing the rate of alerting following a 28 
trigger score – which they claimed to be nearly 100%. They had no data on how staff 29 
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subsequently dealt with the event. There were no ongoing programmes reviewing and 1 
auditing MEWS. Such education probably needs to continue indefinitely. 2 
8.2.3 Lessons for protocol developers 3 
Two decades ago any clinician with the inclination could produce a protocol or 4 
guideline for management and promote it to colleagues. Often specialist societies would 5 
take up the cause and recommend it to their members (Mancia, De Backer et al. 2007). 6 
With the realisation that protocols can embed bad medicine as effectively as good, have 7 
come schemes of criteria for quality controlling the processes of development (Berg 8 
1997, The AGREE Collaboration 2003 , Brouwers M 2010). When major specialist 9 
societies such as Royal Colleges and agencies with responsibility for quality of care, 10 
such as the National Institute for Healthcare Excellence (NICE) throw their weight 11 
behind recommendations their subsequent wide adoption is a big responsibility for the 12 
guideline developers. 13 
Guidelines are often associated with the move towards ‘evidence based care’ and there 14 
has been criticism that they short-circuit careful clinical evaluation of care. Whilst this 15 
can be expected to improve the average quality of care there will be losers as well as 16 
winners. What has received much less attention is the process of guideline introduction 17 
and the effect that this has on existing systems of work. Such systems have socio- 18 
cultural elements as well as established therapeutic routines. Shearer, Marshall et al 19 
(2012) recently commented upon this, in connection with METs (Shearer, Marshall et 20 
al. 2012). I suggest that protocol development should be preceded by careful 21 
consideration of existing practice, asking: 22 
• Is there a problem in existing patient care that often worsens outcome? This 23 
question should be addressed by a comprehensive review augmented if 24 
necessary by further research. 25 
• How will the new guideline/protocol affect this problem? 26 
• Is it certain that the changes in management imposed by the guideline/protocol 27 
will improve management? 28 
• How will the changed work practices affect existing professional and socio- 29 
cultural structures within the community responsible for managing these 30 
patients? 31 
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• What will be the impact of the new working practice on overall activity? 1 
Submitting EWSs and RSSs to this analysis we find: 2 
• An assumption was made that patients experiencing apparently delayed 3 
admission to ICU would fare better with earlier critical care intervention. This 4 
remains unproven – despite the high face validity of the concept. 5 
• MEWS/RRS should lead to earlier ICU involvement. After the fact analysis 6 
shows a high proportion of missed alerts. Were they predictable? 7 
• The ideal of rapid, informed review of patients was likely to be subverted by the 8 
pressure of work on all staff. 9 
• Existing work practices cause socio-cultural pressures on staff to cope 10 
independently. Professional training pushes trainee doctors and junior nurses to 11 
express and demonstrate self-efficacy. Nurses did not like being disempowered 12 
by the system. 13 
• After the fact research has demonstrated that the balance of sensitivity with 14 
specificity produces a high workload of negative reviews when the system is set 15 
to discover most patients who show minor instabilities prior to deteriorating. 16 
Protocol and guideline developers should pay attention to the socio-cultural and 17 
professional consequences of their proposals. 18 
8.3 Evaluating the Role of the Researcher 19 
A PhD study is simultaneously a learning exercise in research methods and an attempt 20 
to make original observations. The thesis itself is sometimes published as a book, but a 21 
more frequent approach is to write papers for publication in academic journals, drawing 22 
upon the materials in the thesis. In year three of my studies I was in possession of what I 23 
believed to be significant data and wanted to share my findings. This was however a 24 
rather intimidating prospect. Some of my theorising about mental models, epistemology 25 
and protocols is not represented in the literature and lies outside of my normal field of 26 
work. Presenting these ideas might be seen as presumptuous. As a nurse I was straying 27 
into fields more commonly reserved for doctors, and again I found the prospect of 28 
presenting these ideas in multi-professional forums scary. 29 
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At my first international conference in London (Dec 2014) I presented a poster and was 1 
highly commended for it. This was my first poster presentation for the study, and the 2 
experience itself was valuable. The challenging of my methodology, and the findings 3 
from the medical judges tested out my responses, and gave me insight into this arena. 4 
My confidence in my work increased as did my motivation to ‘get it out there’. At the 5 
same time I was also feeling terrified by self-doubt, that, laid bare as a novice 6 
researcher, I might make a false step or find my arguments unravelling. This PhD has 7 
been a surprising journey from novice to a position where I am prepared to stand in 8 
front of a large, knowledgeable, professional audience and offer ideas from outside the 9 
mainstream! 10 
My first attempt at a written submission to a journal met with an immediate rejection by 11 
the editor – within 24 hours. The reason given was that the journal rarely published 12 
qualitative research. This was disappointing as this journal is a major forum for articles 13 
relating to the subject field of adult deterioration from influential authors. I wanted my 14 
study to reach as broad a readership as possible. Following a further rejection by the 15 
British Journal of Anaesthesia I was invited by the editor to submit an e-letter which I 16 
did. This was later selected for journal publication. My submission of abstracts to 17 
conferences of professionals with specific interests in METs have led to invitations to 18 
submit posters but no invitation to make an oral presentation. 19 
In April 2015 I made an oral presentation at the RCN International research Conference. 20 
This experience was valuable in terms of articulating my study to a wide audience and 21 
refining my thinking and learning to defend my arguments. In May I travelled to 22 
Amsterdam to present a poster at the 11th International Medical Emergency Teams 23 
conference. As one door closed with the Journal rejection, another door opened in 24 
Amsterdam and the audience I had sought were present and encouraging in their 25 
feedback. I realised how important it has been to get this feedback in year 4 when I was 26 
still in the process of analysis. The feedback from the two journal rejections (editor and 27 
reviewers) enabled me to consider new literature as well as to test some of my 28 
assumptions of the analysis. I would recommend dissemination at this stage as without 29 
it my study risked being narrow and unchallenged. In November 2015 I presented a 30 
poster at the National Confidential Enquiry Patient Outcome and Death (NCEPOD) 31 
‘surviving sepsis’ publication launch. I was highly commended by the chair of 32 
NCEPOD and have in April 2016 being approached to submit my poster to their 33 
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website. During all of my experiences of dissemination to date I have received similar 1 
feedback to the study, that it is valuable, interesting and makes absolute sense to large 2 
organisations attempting whole systems change. 3 
I have found the difficulty of disseminating my findings very disappointing. I believe 4 
that my data has revealed a phenomenon that has not been explicitly identified 5 
previously. That is: that members of a clinical team can hold different, profession 6 
dependent models of practice. This gives some insight into why team members behave 7 
as they do. My more tentative suggestion is that these models of practice stem from 8 
professions possessing different ontologies and epistemologies. If this finding were 9 
substantiated it would have impact on the way protocols and guidelines are presented to 10 
workers and how clinical teams operate. 11 
These outcomes have been disappointing but from them I have learned that 12 
consideration must be given to how a work will be published at the time it is planned. 13 
The design must be suitable for a publication style suited for the target journal. Work 14 
from a PhD thesis is handicapped because it is designed to demonstrate proficiency in 15 
the field of research rather than to tailor make publications. I expected my findings to be 16 
as interesting to doctors as to nurses. The authors of the existing literature on social and 17 
cultural effects on EWS and RRS are predominantly medically qualified and their 18 
publications have been in journals that are considered to primarily target doctors. Such 19 
journals frequently publish nurse led research but authors are mostly doctors.  20 
My research has been in an area of multi-professional practice in acute care. Journals 21 
catering to those with such interests are quite polarised as being aimed at a medical or a 22 
nursing professionals. Reaching both these constituencies presents difficulty for an 23 
author. 24 
I remain convinced of the value of early presentation of suitable findings both in terms 25 
of the formative effect on the development of arguments within the project but also 26 
because finishing a thesis is a long technical process. Waiting until this is finished risks 27 
being overtaken by events and loosing primacy for original ideas. 28 
 29 
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8.4 Suggestions For Further Research 1 
8.4.1 Statistics and epidemiology 2 
A problem encountered during this research project was that there is insufficient data 3 
relating to the epidemiology of sudden unexpected patient deterioration. In the first 4 
place there is no clear definition of what it is. Without an accepted definition it is 5 
difficult to compare outcomes. Secondly, existing studies do not say how many patients 6 
are re-designated as unsuitable for further care, or have DNAR status agreed. These 7 
reduce the number of ICU admissions without affecting outcome. Thirdly, the number 8 
of patients suffering some sort of collapse is often given as the number of unexpected 9 
ICU admissions. No definition of an unplanned ICU admission exists and this figure is 10 
influenced by the availability of beds and also by the experience of the doctor doing the 11 
review. Inexperienced doctors are likely to admit patients if there is a bed available 12 
because they cannot confidently make the high-stakes decision not to admit. Finally the 13 
denominator figure is usually unknown, making it impossible to know the prevalence. A 14 
multi-centre study of prevalence and the use of standard definitions would clear up 15 
some controversies. 16 
8.4.2 Inter-professional Understanding 17 
Little is known about the mental models of doctors and nurses working in teams. A 18 
further project would be to interview clinical staff, asking questions about their beliefs, 19 
and to analyse the interviews for clues to how each group conceptualises the same 20 
clinical task. Having significantly different understandings of clinical knowledge, and 21 
of the clinical project, would be a complicating factor in inter-professional working. 22 
Another question would be how these understandings change with time, whether they 23 
become explicit with experience and what factors increase an individual’s insight into 24 
their relationship with other professionals. 25 
8.4.3 Protocols 26 
If my observations about the introduction of protocols can be supported they have very 27 
wide application. I think this is particularly the case in the very many occasions where a 28 
clinician develops a set of guidelines or a protocol for use in their unit or hospital. 29 
Without the authority of a national society it is very likely that the staff will subvert the 30 
intended system, using it in the ways that seem to best simplify their personal needs. A 31 
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system for assessing the likely socio-cultural and professional impact of a protocol and 1 
for monitoring its effect on these might be a useful development. 2 
8.4.4 The Nurses’ Role As Clinicians 3 
I did not explicitly explore the nurses’ role in the evaluation and management of their 4 
patients. The EWS was reported to have the effect of diminishing their responsibilities 5 
in this area. The use of automated systems such as VIEWS risks further reducing their 6 
autonomy. More research is needed to investigate the consequences of de-skilling the 7 
workforce in this way. This is very relevant in the context of the research by Griffiths 8 
demonstrating that mortality rates rise as care assistants are substituted for registered 9 
nurses (Griffiths, Ball et al. 2016). This aspect of the work of registered nurses and care 10 
assistants needs more explanation. 11 
8.5 My Claim to Originality 12 
As I have discussed above (9.1) and in chapter 3, grounded theory by its nature 13 
discovers or constructs theory from the qualitative data. At the outset of this project I 14 
had ideas (sensitising concepts) developed largely from my experience. Most of these 15 
were, in the event, not supported by the data. Analysis took me in unexpected 16 
directions. The evidence from the study helped me to interpret the literature and 17 
sometimes draw conclusions from it. Two lines of thought do not seem to have been 18 
published before – at least not in similar contexts. 19 
• There is a large literature about nurses’ mental models and a much smaller 20 
literature on those of doctors. I cannot find reference to the consequences that 21 
follow from medical and nursing teams working together to accomplish a task, 22 
but with incongruent definitions of success. 23 
• I can find no significant study of the problems of incorporating a new protocol 24 
into existing teams with well-established socio-cultural and professional 25 
boundaries. The consequences are probably similar to the introduction of 26 
advanced nursing and advanced practitioner roles that cross existing lines of 27 
responsibility. 28 
At the start of this research it was hoped to find some evidence, and a possible 29 
explanation of why doctors do not always follow the RRS protocol as required. It 30 
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was also hoped that the work would add to current understandings of why RRSs 1 
often have no demonstrable effect on patient outcomes. Following this research it is 2 
possible to say that the most significant reason for lapses in the protocol is that the 3 
doctors are simply too busy. They prioritise all their tasks, and responding to 4 
MEWS alerts takes its turn along with everything else, frequently leading to delay in 5 
attending to review a patient whose observations have exceeded the MEWS calling 6 
criteria. This negates the objective of the MEWS: to jump such patients to the top of 7 
the queue. The consequence of this will be that some patients, whose other signs of 8 
deterioration were unremarkable; will not be identified until later.  9 
The implication of this finding, taken in the context of what is already known about 10 
MEWS, is that patients who deteriorate without warning, patients whose scoring is 11 
omitted or miscalculated and patients who are not reviewed following a trigger 12 
event comprise a significant proportion of the cohort of patients who deteriorate. 13 
These groups of patients could not be expected benefit from the use of a RRS and 14 
this means that a larger overall sample would be needed to show statistically 15 
significant improvement in outcome following its introduction. 16 
Turning to why the doctors and nurses behave as they do, the most significant 17 
theory emerging from this research is that the medical and nursing teams have 18 
different mental models of practice. Their overall model is shared and they aspire to 19 
the same outcomes, but their understandings of the mechanisms of the details of 20 
practice appear to be different.  21 
I have characterised the medical approach as: evaluate then treat. The doctors’ 22 
involvement was intermittent and targeted events. The doctors’ narratives dwelt 23 
upon the difficulty of getting through the many tasks with which they were 24 
presented. These tasks involved many different activities with many different 25 
patients. Their day was very fragmented. It is easy to understand that their priority is 26 
to simplify this complexity by eliminating unnecessary activities – including patient 27 
reviews precipitated by MEWS. They described allocating higher priority to patients 28 
with higher MEWS scores and those about whom the nursing team had particular 29 
concerns. 30 
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The nursing approach emphasised the continuity of caring for the patient in which 1 
context a visit by the doctor was usually a useful contribution. For the nurse at the 2 
bedside a MEWS call and medical review was a part of a continuous process of 3 
care, and they were involved with a smaller number of patients. The nursing 4 
narratives dwelt upon the uncertainty created by an apparently well patient 5 
breaching the MEWS trigger criteria. Uncertainty creates anxiety for the nurse, the 6 
patient and the family. The nurse feels the responsibility for dealing with anxiety, 7 
and anxiety provoked by MEWS is part of this. False alarm or not, the knowledge 8 
that the doctor has been called raises everybody’s anxiety and the ensuing review 9 
will probably be reassuring – even if, in the doctor’s terms it is negative. The 10 
medical and nursing teams are both focused on a short-term objective following a 11 
trigger event but these objectives are not the same. This theory is amenable to 12 
further investigation to determine more exactly how the nurses interpret medical 13 
interventions in the context of their task of continuing patient care, and whether the 14 
doctors understand the task of nursing a patient following a MEWS trigger event.  15 
If these differences in mental models come from differing intentions of the medical 16 
and nursing teams they will represent differences in the philosophies underlying the 17 
practice of the two professions. It is not wholly true that medicine manages the 18 
patient in acute care with the aim of ultimately ‘curing’ the disease, and that nurses 19 
manage the patient to minimise their ongoing experience of the disease. These 20 
attitudes are the extreme ends of a continuum and medicine tends towards the cure 21 
end whilst nursing favours care. These tendencies may be reflections of disparate 22 
epistemologies, medicine being broadly positivistic and nursing relativistic. The two 23 
professions may have different ontologies and epistemologies underlying their 24 
clinical processes. These differences stem partly from the nature of the experience 25 
of the two professions (Reed and Watson 1994, Tanner 2006) and perhaps partly 26 
from the intentional positioning of nursing as relativistic, precisely to distinguish it 27 
from medicine (Greenfield 1999).   28 
What is the importance of this observation that medical and nursing teams may have 29 
different models of practice? Though a study of teamwork that has exposed it, it is 30 
less likely to be obvious in team situations than in less structured care. Highly 31 
structured teamwork such as that seen in cardiac resuscitation or operating-theatre 32 
practice have such clearly defined targets, and criteria for success, that differences 33 
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of approach are generally hidden. In the current investigation the differences in 1 
approach are visible because two aspects of management of the sick patient are 2 
taking place side by side: the medical staff seeking to investigate and treat, the 3 
nursing team supporting and attending to the patient. The progress is slow but 4 
steady. Suddenly, unexpectedly the vital signs call for urgent medical intervention. 5 
The tempo changes, everyone becomes anxious and the specialist team arrives. Nine 6 
times out of ten to then pack up its kit and go away! 7 
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9 APPENDICES 1 
9.1 Appendix A: Single Parameter Track and Trigger EWS 2 
 3 
A PATIENT WHO FULFILS ANY ONE OR MORE OF THE CRITERIA BELOW, OR IS CAUSING CONCERN, 
NEEDS URGENT INTERVENTION.  
 
BREATHING  
Oxygen saturation less than 90% despite oxygen 
PaO2 of less than 8KPa on an arterial blood sample despite oxygen 
CIRCULATION  
Pulse of less than 45 or greater than 125/min  
Systolic blood pressure of less than 90 or greater than 200 mmHg, or a sustained fall 
of greater than 40 mmHg from patient’s normal value  
pH of less than 7.3 
Base Excess of lower than –7 mmol/l  
RENAL  
Urine output less than 30 ml/hr for 3 consecutive hours Evidence of deteriorating 
renal function  
CONSCIOUS LEVEL  
Patient does not respond to voice Glasgow Coma Score of 8 or less  
OR  
Patient looks unwell or you feel worried about their clinical condition  
 
Single Parameter Track and Trigger System  
Princess Alexandra Hospital, Harlow in 2003 (Department of Health and The 
Modernisation Agency 2003) 
4 
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 1 
9.2 Appendix B: Multiple Parameter Track and Trigger EWS 2 
 3 
Multiple Parameter Scoring System  
Systolic Blood Pressure <101 >200  
Respiratory Rate <9 >20  
Heart Rate <51 >110  
Saturation (room air) <90%  
Urine output <1ml/kg/2 hours  
Conscious level - Not fully alert  
If a patient fulfils two or more of the above criteria OR you are worried about their 
condition BLEEP the Registrar from the admitting team and the Outreach Sister (899)  
These two parties MUST review the patient within thirty minutes  
Barking, Havering & Redbridge NHS Trust S.E.C.S. System for Evaluating the 
Critically Sick 2002 (Department of Health and The Modernisation Agency 2003) 
4 
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 1 
9.3 Appendix C: Aggregate Weighting Scoring EWS 2 
 3 
Score 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 
RR  <8  9 - 14 15 - 20 21 - 29 <30 
HR  <40 40 - 50 51-100 101 -110 111 - 129 >130 
BP <45% <30% <15% 
Normal for 
Patient 
>15% >30% >45% 
CNS    Alert 
Responds 
to voice 
Responds 
to pain 
Un-responsive 
Temp  <35  35 – 38.4  >38.4  
Urine  
<0.5 
Ml/Kg/
Hr 
 
1 
Ml/Kg/Hr 
 
>3 
Ml/Kg/Hr 
 
Trigger Value – 4 for Surgical Patients with an adjustment for medical patients 
The Modified Early Warning Score, Burton Hospitals NHS Trust (Morgan 1997) 
4 
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9.4 Appendix D: Combination EWS for Track and Trigger Systems 1 
Deranged Physiology Scoring:  maximum score = 40, minimum score = 5 
If ANY vital sign is in ‘alert’ zone or becomes significantly abnormal, complete 
Deranged Physiology Score and follow guidelines regarding specific risk band  
Score 8 4 2 1 
Risk bands  Normal Observe  Warning Emergency  
Coma score Alert 
Responds to 
Voice 
Responds to 
Pain 
Unresponsive 
Respirations 
(min-1)  
10-20 
21-30  
8-9 
31-40 
6-7 
>40 
<6 
SpO2 on air (%) >95 90-95 80-89 <80 
Systolic BP (mm 
Hg) 
100 - 180 90 - 99 80 - 89 <80 
Pulse (min-1)  
 
50 - 115 
116 – 125 
45 - 49 
126 – 140 
30 - 45 
>140 
<30 
• The most abnormal finding places the patient in the associated risk band. 
• Always seek advice if you are concerned about a patient for any reason.  
• Note re. BP: systolic BP >200 mm Hg requires consideration – is it normal for patient?  
• Is pain a factor? A >25% drop from normal systolic BP places patient in ‘Observe’ risk 
band. 
Risk band ‘Normal’  
Risk band ‘Observe’ – moderate deviation from normal.  
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Level I Action – PRHO/SHO from parent team should review in <60 mins.  
Consider level II action. Re-review in <4hours.,  
2-4 hourly respirations, SpO2, pulse, BP, temp, urine  
Risk band ‘Warning’ – significant deviation from normal.  
Level II Action – PRHO/SHO from parent team (or any available doctor) should review in 
<15 mins. Senior doctor must re-review in <30 mins.  
Consider outreach service 
hourly respirations, SpO2, pulse, BP, temp, urine ABG, FBC, U & E, ECG, ?CVP 
Consider ICU (consultant to consultant); or if not, DNAR. 
Risk band ‘Emergency’ – dangerous deviation from normal.  
Level III Action – Registrar or equivalent from parent team (or any available Doctor) should 
review immediately, and request the urgent help of more experienced Doctor. Consider 
outreach service. 
Note high risk of cardio-pulmonary arrest. Consider ICU; if not, DNAR. 
Hourly respirations, SpO2, pulse, BP, temp, urine ABG, FBC, U & E, ECG, ?CVP 
 
Combination Track and Trigger Warning System: Kingston Hospital 2003. (Department of Health and The 
Modernisation Agency 2003) 
 1 
2 
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 1 
 2 
9.5 Appendix E: NEWS (The National Early Warning Score) 3 
 4 
 5 
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 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
8 
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9.6 Appendix F Example of initial coding 1 
Interview HCA2 2 
Initial Coding Transcript 
Interviewer establishing the 
subjects position within the 
care team. 
Establishing experience 
 
 
 
Describing basic role in care 
of sick patients 
 
 
 
Noticing a problem in the 
patients condition.Responding 
by checking the vital 
signs.Reporting up the chain. 
 
 
Asserting special position in 
observing change in patients 
condition because has constant 
close contact. 
Describing benefit of close 
observation. 
 
Recognising role of intuition. 
Claiming ability to use 
intuition. 
Judging that previous care is 
defecient. 
 
Claiming benefit of experience. 
 
 
Endorsing the use of MEWS 
Hello, thank you for taking part 
What professional group do you belong too? What kind of Nurse 
are you? 
I'm a Healthcare Assistant 
How long have you been working in that role? 
Nearly 6 years 
How long have you been on this medical ward? 
About 5 and a half years 
I am going to ask you a question about your role as a Healthcare 
Assistant in caring for acutely ill patients, what is your role is for 
caring for these acutely ill patients? 
Obviously to assist the Nurse to do observations and monitor the 
observations, sometimes we do them hourly, occasionally we 
have been known to do them half hourly on here but usually ITU 
is then brought in to assess the patient.   
If you noticed a patient was becoming unwell, what would your 
role be within that? 
If I was actually looking after the patient myself because we are 
set in specific areas and I observe there is something wrong with 
a patient I would check the observations and report straight to the 
Staff Nurse and if the Staff Nurse wasn't available I would report 
to the coordinator. 
Right ok 
I think, because the Healthcares are kind of frontline patients are 
more willing to speak to us than they are to some of the Nurses 
and especially the Doctors so I think because we tend to be in the 
bays constantly looking after them I think we observe more 
especially when you think that person was fine this morning now 
they are just lying on the bed they don't feel right but they can't 
put their finger on it. So you tend to go off what the patient is 
saying to you then I would do the observations and get the Staff 
Nurse. There have been lots of occasions where they have come 
round from A&E and I have recognised them from before and the 
last time I have thought the last time they were in they were 
diabetic and yet there is no BM chart and not BM done and 
straight away I have done their blood sugar and it has been 2. It is 
just you get so used to the same patients you have got to have an 
understanding of the last time they were in they were totally 
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Stressing the use of MEWS is 
part of multiple systems for 
patient assessment. 
Wondering why medical staff 
take no action. 
Needing explanation from 
medical team. 
 
 
 
 
Understanding ‘waitand see’ 
policy. 
Uncertainty about choice 
between treat, wait and see 
and no treatment alternatives. 
 
 
 
Regreting consequences to 
patient of hesitant decision 
making by medical team. 
 
Regreting getting the blame for 
poor decision making. 
Understanding some causes of 
false positive MEWS alerts. 
Regreting that false positive 
scores are not discounted until 
consultant review. 
 
 
 
Expressing uncertainty about 
patient care in face of dilemma 
over validity of scores. 
 
Noting how change leads to 
different so I think you just learn things over the years.  
I just want to talk about the systems we have got on here for 
alerting you to the fact that someone is unwell?  
What do you think about that system?  
I think it is really good. It has changed again since I started on 
here. I think it is good, but even when you get a patient who is 
scoring a zero there could still be something not right so you 
have still got to observe, even using the chart you can't just use 
the chart as the main thing, but then you get some patients who 
might be scoring a 12 or a 13 and you kind of think what is going 
to happen are the Doctors just sitting on them or where they are 
going and as Healthcares we can't really do anything. Sometimes 
we need to say what is happening are they going to do anything 
 
Why do you think that is? 
Obviously with some patients I presume they are waiting to see if 
they pick up and improve, but when they don't improve, I don't 
know it is quite a hard one. It is that thin line isn't it whether they 
are going to become very poorly and palliative or whether they 
are going to pick up and get better.  
 
Are you frustrated with them? Just listening to what you are 
saying there are you frustrated sometimes that interventions aren't 
made? 
Yeah, I think just because we look after them and when you’re 
doing hourly observations on a patient especially through the 
night constantly and their poorly and the families are asking why 
do you keep doing those all we can say is we are asked to do 
them and there is no other answer we can give. We don't want 
you doing that we can see you’re disturbing them and you’re 
causing them more pain and it is awful but we just go by what we 
are told to do. With the MEWS charts the new ones especially 
because you get your COPD patients and they score for their 
oxygen and because their sats are going to be low and their resps 
are going to be high I think it would have been nice to have 
something on them for COPD patients or even another chart you 
could put in if they are COPD. 
Are you saying then that these types of patients could be falsely 
scoring high? 
Yeah because they can be scoring like a 6 or a 7 but because they 
are COPD there sats are between 88 and 92, their on oxygen so 
their scoring for the oxygen, their resps are high because of their 
breathing so they are scoring high anyway if they come it at night 
it takes until they see the Consultant the next morning before it is 
picked up. 
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uncertainty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Noting uncertainty about the 
relevance of changes 
 
 
 
Explaining reporting pyramid. 
 
Willing to report to junior 
doctor. 
 
Expressing professional 
distance from consultant. 
 
Expressing personal insecurity 
and resentment at treatment. 
Expressing resentment that 
their insight from consistent 
contact is unappreciated by 
consultants. 
 
 
 
Describing what she believes 
to be an appropriate use of 
MEWS 
 
 
 
 
What do you think the risks are with that? You’re obviously an 
experienced member of staff and you have looked after these 
patients for a long time so you recognise that they are going to be 
scoring / triggering. For someone who is not as experienced do 
you think there is a risk there? 
I don't know, I think it is one of those difficult things because 
most people when they come on here you do get a lot of training 
and you learn quickly on here I think you have to because the 
patients come from A&E and they are unwell when they come 
from A&E. It is one of those things it is hard because you used to 
score for not passing urine and things but you don't know which 
changes the whole scheme of it as well. 
Do you think that is a good thing? 
I think that is a funny thing as well because if you have got a 
patient, like today I have a lady who hasn't been to the toilet who 
has just been but she hasn't been since last night but she says that 
is normal for her but then is she drinking, do we know she is 
drinking. Whereas if she was scoring you would be constantly 
more aware of that because she was scoring so it is weighing it 
up. I think they thought the oxygen and things were more 
important at the time when they changed it all  
Can I just clarify now, if you were looking after a patient as you 
do day in day out who started to deteriorate who would you first 
raise your concerns to? 
Definitely the Nurse who is looking after the patient because 
obviously there who you are supposed to go to. If they weren't 
around the Coordinator, I would go to the Doctor but may be not 
a Consultant. 
Why would that be? 
Because I don't feel that they are very approachable. We have got 
a few on here that are nice because sometimes you get talked 
down to it is like you are not qualified and sometimes I think, yes 
I know a lot of people work a lot of years to become qualified but 
sometimes it is common sense and they don't see the patient from 
7.30 in the morning all the way through the day and we are 
watching the patients and you can just see when something is not 
right with someone you can just see that they haven't eaten their 
lunch or their just sleepy or they feel light headed or their getting 
agitated because they have got dementia or their in pain or their 
feeling sick I mean people will tell you they will be lying there in 
bed and you go to speak to them and they will have chest pain 
but they don't want to bother you. So it is those little things that 
we pick up on that the Consultants don't pick up on.   
I am going to ask you about an episode of care that went well 
relating to the scoring system? So have a think, anything where 
you think a case went well and particularly because of the scoring 
system being used effectively. Can you think of a patient 
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Describing her role in this 
case. 
 
 
 
Listing her responsibilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
Describing formal gaining of 
experience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Describing using MEWS to get 
the doctors to abort a plan she 
disagreed with. 
 
 
 
 
Accepting less satisfactory 
standards of working on night 
shift. 
 
 
Not accepting delay in doctor 
attending. 
Disagreeing with the doctors 
actions. 
obviously don't tell me any names of patients or staff of where 
the scoring system worked effectively and you were able to pick 
up on a patient deteriorating in a timely fashion. 
I think it happens quite a lot. There was a patient we had who had 
came round from A&E and they weren't scoring anything but I 
don't know what happened in between I think they went to x-ray 
then came round here and I did the observations but they didn't 
look right  but you know sometimes when people have been on 
A&E. The patient looked very clammy and sweaty so I did his 
observations straight away and he was scoring about a 6 or a 7 
and he was in AF but he hadn't come in with that, I can't 
remember what he had actually come in with but I know he 
ended up on Coronary Care.  
In that instance what was your role in managing the situation? 
Doing his observations, reporting straight away to the Staff Nurse 
that he didn't look right and I actually went to one of the Doctors 
and said there is something not right with him, I did an ECG and 
they saw the ECG and started straight away what they needed to 
do treatment wise.  
So in your opinion what do you think the factors were that went 
well with that patient? 
Observations just looking at the patient and then obviously doing 
their observations and they were shown as high, they have to be 
shown to the Doctors, Consultants or the Reg has to see it and we 
have a plan at the back and one thing led to another.  
So good communication 
Yeah 
Do you draw upon those experiences? 
All the time, I saws an incident that happened at Wansbeck and 
one of the Consultants did a little video on the internet and he had 
said different things that should have happened and weren't done 
and ever since then I always do peoples observations before they 
go home and sometimes people say what are you doing their 
observations for and I will say because I know when they left 
there wasn't anything wrong with them and it has happened a few 
times. I did a gentleman who was going back to a nursing home 
and his family weren't happy because he had been discharged and 
brought back in and they didn't think he should have been 
discharged anyway but they were really nice and I think we 
looked after him well and the Doctor said he could go and I said I 
will just go and do his observations before the ambulance arrives 
and he was scoring a 6. His temperature was a 9 so he was septic 
so obviously he was kept in and went to a Ward and since this 
incident I do it all the time now because I know sometimes 
people’s blood pressure can go up and down a bit but where not 
concerned about that. If this gentleman had of gone back to the 
home you don't know what might have happened between his 
going back there and ringing and ambulance to bring him back.  
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Expressing frustration about 
patient management by junior 
doctor. 
Expressing emotion about poor 
outcome. 
Expresses concern about 
‘overstepping the mark’. 
Willing to push on the patient’s 
behalf. 
Expresses frustration about not 
being taken seriously. 
 
Persisting with the doctor. 
Feeling conflict with registrar. 
 
 
 
Learning from experience. 
 
Explaining why the registrar 
was ‘sick of me’. 
 
 
 
 
Feeling that she has to take too 
much upon herself. 
Expressing apprehension 
about raising issues with RGNs 
and doctors 
 
Expressing uncertainty about 
team relationship and her role. 
Fearing humiliation. 
 
 
Can I ask you to think about an episode that didn't go so well? 
Again if you could think of a specific situation, but if you can't 
that's fine. Have you ever been involved in a situation where you 
felt the systems for detecting deterioration did not work as well 
as you would have hoped?  
Yes, I think it was a gentleman who had come in, I was on 
nightshift and I kept informing the Registrar that he seemed like 
he was short of breath and the Reg said when he got to see him 
he would decide. Obviously on nightshift everything is slower 
pace and it takes them longer and eventually when he did go to 
see him he put him on some oxygen because I thought his sats 
were quite low and he wasn't COPD or anything, I mean they 
were only 92 or something but it just seemed that he wasn't right. 
In the morning he went to the bathroom so I got the oxygen bottle 
and attached him to that, he said he was a bit light headed so I 
walked him there and pull the buzzer when you’re done so I 
continued doing the observations and I thought he was taking a 
while and I started to get a bit worried so I went to the bathroom 
and he was just white, clammy, sweaty and I got the chair pulled 
the emergency buzzer and took him back and did his 
observations and they were fine. The Doctor came and asked 
what his last observations were and I said the same but I did tell 
you he didn't seem right and was short of breathe we did the 
ECG, blood gases and an hour later he had a cardiac arrest and 
died. I will never forget that morning because he kept saying 
there was something wrong but he didn't know what it was and 
for all he was scoring he wasn't really scoring high it was just his 
sats. I don't know it is hard because we are not qualified it is as if 
they think we are sometimes over stepping the mark but we are 
not we are just trying to give our opinion. Sometimes I think a lot 
of Healthcares especially on this section / area they get frustrated 
especially if they have been here a long time.  
Because actually you had said there was something not right 
There was definitely something not right but he kept saying I am 
fine, he was so lovely. I kept saying no I want you to tell me and 
I think in the end the Reg got a bit sick of me pestering him but I 
knew there was something. Obviously there could have been 
something major gone on I didn't know and I got a bit of a shock 
obviously because I went home that morning then they said he 
had died half an hour later. Everything that happens on here that 
is like an incident it stays with me and it is in the back of my 
head trying to remember things. 
Why do you think the Reg got a bit fed up? 
I don't know if he was just having a busy night or whether too 
much, tired, sick of me pestering him because I think we do and 
sometimes you do feel sorry for them because it is just them and 
an F1 or an F2 then they may go through to A&E and they are 
stuck but you don't mind helping people as much as you can. It is 
like when you go to your GP it is like you expect them to tell you 
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Recognising the role of status 
in relationships. 
 
 
something you know what is wrong you don't expect to tell the 
GP what is wrong with you. So I don't know 
So we’re leading just onto the last section now to talk about 
communication 
Are you ever apprehensive about raising causes for concerns to 
either Registered Nurses or the Doctors? 
Definitely, this gets brought up all the time especially with the 
Sisters because we have had Healthcare training and we have just 
filled in some sheets about how we feel about implementing 
things different charts would we go and get one and with some 
people you would and others would say what you doing that for 
it's not my job your here to assist me. There are some of the 
Consultants I would approach and others I would feel they would 
just knock me down in front of people and I don't think that is 
right so I wouldn't do it because I am not that confident. I think 
there is a lack of communication and I think that is half the 
problem, but then you just think are the Consultants just trying to 
get there workload done and they just want to get their round 
done on here and I think everyone has some pressure on them at 
some point. 
Do you think sometimes it is a case of status and position? 
Definitely with some of them, I wouldn't say they are all like that 
I would say some of them are yeah.  
That was all I was going to ask you, thank you very much 
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
8 
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9.7 Appendix G: The codes after preliminary coding 1 
 2 
Experience Level  Team Relationships 
First responder Importance of personal relationships  
Patient carer Negative comments about individuals  
Role in MEWS team Negative comments about teamwork 
Supervisor of staff Positive views about individuals or professional  
Opinion of EWS  Refers to relationships 
Action when no response Speaks negatively about the team 
An example of harm averted Speaks positively about the team 
How does the EWS help management Willing to report problems 
Identifies failings of EWS system Feelings and Emotions     
Importance of also knowing the patient Describes embarrassing experience 
Misunderstands EWS Expresses Anxiety 
Negative opinions about EWS Expresses anger 
Positive opinions about EWS Expresses fear of ridicule 
Shows understanding of EWS Expresses frustration 
Practical use of EWS  Expresses pleasure 
Apparent failure to take action Expresses pride in the team or the work 
Delay in putting a plan in place Expresses sadness 
Describes difficulty attending when called Expresses satisfaction with work 
Describes using own clinical skills Fears ridicule 
EWS used as a justification for calling doctor Feels unappreciated 
Expresses personal commitment to quality Feels valued personally 
Finding unreported problems Finds work frustrating 
Inexperience Values      
Observations wrong Consideration for patient 
Prioritises EWS calls along with other work Expresses pride in work 
Staff too busy Quality of care 
Identifies successful use of EWS Safety 
Over reliant on EWS Tries to facilitate others work 
Technical failures of EWS Values collegiality 
Uses EWS as a lever to prompt action Values experience 
Willing to depart from protocol Values intuition 
Team Working  Values own clinical skill 
Attitude to hierarchy of reporting Concern about being watched      
Feelings about reporting problems Worries about audit 
How workload impacts on the team Worries about being disciplined 
Negative feelings about being called Workload issues      
Positive feelings about being called Admits departing from protocol - workload 
Who would you report to Blames delay on workload 
Bullying Comments on high workload of others 
Has difficulty getting help Has too much work 
Inability of staff to prioritise the team’s work Refers to prioritising tasks 
Refers to relationships  
Refers to team relationship's impact on 
willingness to report 
 
Refers to team relationships impact on 
willingness to report 
 
Reluctant to report problems  
3 
APPENDICES 
 
274 
9.8 Appendix H Coding from nodes to major  categories (Constructivist 1 
Approach of Charmaz, 2014) 2 
Nodes recorded in NVivo (Open Coding) Sorted into Topic areas (Open Coding) 
Action when no response Positive Opinion of EWS 
Admits departing from protocol because of workload Shows understanding of EWS 
An example of harm averted Action when no response 
Apparent failure to take action An example of harm averted 
Attitude to hierarchy of reporting How does the EWS help management 
Blames delay on workload Positive opinions about EWS 
Bullying Importance of also knowing the patient 
Comments on high workload of others Negative Opinion of EWS 
Concern about being watched      Misunderstands EWS 
Consideration for patient Negative opinions about EWS 
Delay in putting a plan in place Identifies failings of EWS system 
Describes difficulty attending when called Practical use of EWS 
Describes embarrassing experience Apparent failure to take action 
Describes using own clinical skills Delay in putting a plan in place 
EWS used as a justification for calling doctor Describes difficulty attending when called 
Expresses anger Describes using own clinical skills 
Expresses Anxiety EWS used as a justification for calling doctor 
Expresses fear of ridicule Expresses personal commitment to quality 
Expresses frustration Finding unreported problems 
Expresses personal commitment to quality Inexperience 
Expresses pleasure Observations wrong 
Expresses pride in the team or the work Prioritises EWS calls along with other work 
Expresses pride in work Staff too busy 
Expresses sadness Identifies successful use of EWS 
Expresses satisfaction with work Over reliant on EWS 
Fears ridicule Technical failures of EWS 
Feelings about reporting problems Uses EWS as a lever to prompt action 
Feels unappreciated Willing to depart from protocol 
Feels valued personally Team Working 
Finding unreported problems Attitude to hierarchy of reporting 
Finds work frustrating  Feelings about reporting problems 
Has difficulty getting help How workload impacts on the team 
Has too much work Negative feelings about being called 
How does the EWS help management Positive feelings about being called 
How workload impacts on the team Who would you report to 
Identifies failings of EWS system Bullying 
Identifies successful use of EWS Has difficulty getting help 
Importance of also knowing the patient Inability of senior staff to prioritise the team’s work 
Importance of personal relationships in the team Refers to relationships 
Inability of senior staff to prioritise the team’s work Refers to team relationship's impact on willingness to report 
Inexperience Refers to team relationships impact on willingness to report 
Misunderstands EWS Reluctant to report problems 
Negative comments about individuals or professional groups Team Relationships 
Negative comments about teamwork Importance of personal relationships in the team 
Negative feelings about being called Negative comments about individuals or professional groups 
Negative Opinion of EWS Negative comments about teamwork 
Negative opinions about EWS Positive views about individuals or professional groups 
Observations wrong Refers to relationships 
Over reliant on EWS Speaks negatively about the team 
Positive feelings about being called Speaks positively about the team 
Positive Opinion of EWS Willing to report problems 
Positive opinions about EWS Feelings and Emotions     
Positive views about individuals or professional groups Describes embarrassing experience 
Practical use of EWS Expresses Anxiety 
Prioritises EWS calls along with other work Expresses anger 
Quality of care Expresses fear of ridicule 
Refers to prioritising tasks Expresses frustration 
Refers to relationships Expresses pleasure 
Refers to relationships Expresses pride in the team or the work 
Refers to team relationship's impact on willingness to report Expresses sadness 
Refers to team relationships impact on willingness to report Expresses satisfaction with work 
Reluctant to report problems Fears ridicule 
Safety Feels unappreciated 
Shows understanding of EWS Feels valued personally 
Speaks negatively about the team Finds work frustrating  
Speaks positively about the team Values      
Staff too busy Consideration for patient 
Team Relationships Expresses pride in work 
Team Working Quality of care 
Technical failures of EWS Safety 
Tries to facilitate others work Tries to facilitate others work 
Uses EWS as a lever to prompt action Values collegiality 
Values collegiality Values experience 
Values experience Values intuition 
Values intuition Values own clinical skill 
Values own clinical skill Concern about being watched      
Who would you report to Worries about audit 
Willing to depart from protocol Worries about being disciplined 
Willing to report problems Workload issues  
Worries about audit Admits departing from protocol because of workload 
Worries about being disciplined Blames delay on workload 
Refers to prioritising tasks Comments on high workload of others 
 Has too much work 
 Refers to prioritising tasks 
3 
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 1 
Combined and expanded to 
Construct 54 Categories 15 major  Categories Constructed 
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9.9 Appendix I List of Interviewees 2 
 3 
F1 Doctors 6 
The no response from doctor scenario   
Knowing the patient and past experience   
Believes patients with low MEWS are not at risk   
Shows understanding of function of MEWS 
Category 1: 
Understanding MEWS 
Statements relating to what the participant 
believes to be the purpose and mechanism of 
action of the MEWS 
Expresses personal commitment to quality 
Believing MEWS is a severity of illness score 
Nurses frustration over doctor not responding   
Nurse left in the dark 
Category 2: 
Responding to workload 
Statements relating to the impact of 
workload on clinical behaviour 
Nursing team concerned about information for 
relatives 
Nursing team values relationship with patient and 
relatives 
Negative opinion about doctors knowledge of care   
EWS used as a justification for calling doctor 
Category 3: 
Triaging and accepting delay 
Statements showing that the participant 
engages in triage of MEWS alerts and will 
accept delay in responding as sometimes 
inevitable 
Prioritises EWS calls along with other work 
Senior doctors say juniors are over reliant on EWS 
Senior doctors going back to first principles to assess   
Disregarding the MEWS when asked to see a patient 
Category 4: 
Responding - medical staff 
Statements by medical staff describing how 
they make decisions about what to do 
following their evaluation of a patient who 
has exceeded the trigger MEWS value 
Doctors trust clinical ability of healthcare assistants 
Healthcare assistants feel neglected 
Values experience – all staff   
Values intuition – all staff speak of tacit knowledge 
Category 5: 
Responding – nurses and healthcare 
assistants 
Statements by nurses and healthcare 
assistants about how they act in relation to 
the outcome of a medical review of a patient 
who has exceeded the trigger MEWS value 
Values own clinical skill – nurses and doctors 
MEWS provides a language for discussing 
deterioration  
MEWS dominates dialogue about sick patients   
MEWS is compensating for staff and knowledge 
deficiencies Category 6: 
Communicating 
Statements endorsing the value of MEWS in 
providing language to discuss deteriorating 
patients 
Apparent failure to take action 
Attitude to hierarchy of reporting 
Other factors considered along with MEWS score   
Frustration of false positives 
Category 7: 
Doubts about the predictive validity 
of the MEWS score 
Statements describing the dilemma posed by 
the low specificity of the MEWS score 
Admits departing from protocol because of 
workload 
Comments on high workload of others 
Has too much work   
Triage and Prioritisation 
Category 8: 
Participating – healthcare assistants 
Statements about the role of healthcare 
assistants in the processes of detecting and 
evaluating patient deterioration 
Teamwork valued 
Managing a trigger event 
Who would you report to   
Importance of personal relationships in the team 
Category 9: 
Monopolising the dialogue 
Statements relating to the fact that clinical 
staff are reluctant to accept that a patient is 
unstable when faced with a MEWS below 
the trigger level 
Delay in putting a plan in place 
Describes embarrassing experience 
Expresses Anxiety, fear and anger in response to 
isolation 
  
Refers to team relationship's impact on 
willingness to report Category 10: 
Not communicating 
Statements relating to failure of the medical 
team to adequately explain their decisions to 
the bedside carer nurses. 
Reluctant to report problems 
Team Relationships 
Tries to facilitate others work   
High expectations of self Category 11: 
Senior clinicians express general 
lack of satisfaction with systems for 
acute care. 
Statements indicating that experienced 
doctors believe that early warning systems 
are necessary because of other deficiencies 
in how acute care is organised 
Safety culture 
Values own clinical skill 
Junior opinions about engagement of managers - 
negative   
Feeling unsupported 
Category 12: 
Misunderstanding the operation of 
MEWS - managers 
Statements from those with managerial 
responsibility for teams that indicated that 
they did not fully understand the purpose of 
MEWS and RRS 
No help available 
Fear of personal and career consequences 
Attitude to Protocols   
Admits departing from protocol because of workload 
Category 13: 
Isolation and indecision 
Statements relating to the negative feelings 
of more junior doctors in managing the 
assessment of possible patient deterioration 
Willing to depart from protocol 
Effect of MEWS on team relationships 
   
 Category 14: 
Differing professional attitudes to an 
intervention following a MEWS 
trigger event 
Statements indicating the different attitudes 
to responding to a MEWS trigger event of 
the nursing and medical teams. 
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F2 Doctors 6 
ST Trainees 1-3 4 
ST Trainees 4-7 2 
Consultants 4 
Staff Nurses 6 
Sisters 6 
Ward Managers 2 
Care Assistants 6 
Executive Director of Nursing 1 
Executive Director of Patient Safety 1 
Total 40 
 1 
 2 
 3 
4 
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9.10 Appendix J: Invitation To Participate In A Research Study  1 
Dear        ………… 2 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH STUDY 3 
I am investigating the way people work together to manage patients whose condition 4 
deteriorates unexpectedly 5 
You are invited to participate in this study. The study is to investigate the influence of 6 
human factors on the quality of management of patients who experience a sudden and 7 
unexpected deterioration in their condition whilst being cared for in wards not 8 
specialised for high dependency care.  Before you decide you need to understand why 9 
the research is being done and what it would involve from you.  10 
The research is not directly funded by Northumbria University however is part of a 11 
PhD. 12 
You are being invited to participate in this study because you are member of the health 13 
care team within an NHS foundation trust. The survey will include 24 people in total 14 
from clinical teams working in acute medicine, surgery and emergency care across two 15 
Trusts. 16 
Enclosed is an information sheet which details the research and what you will be 17 
agreeing to do if you agree to take part. Please read this carefully. In 2-3 days time I will 18 
contact you via telephone or e-mail to find out if you are interested in taking part in this 19 
research. If you are, I will make arrangements to meet with you to provide further 20 
information and to answer any questions you may have. 21 
You will then be offered a period of one week to consider whether you wish to be 22 
involved. If you do get involved all of the information collected from you will be held 23 
in the strictest confidence. In addition, you will be free to withdraw from the study at 24 
any time without this affecting you in any way. 25 
Thank you for taking the time to consider being involved in this study 26 
 27 
Yours faithfully, 28 
Mrs Jane Greaves   29 
Principal Investigator / Lead Researcher 30 
31 
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9.11 Appendix K: Research Study Information Sheet  1 
I am investigating the way people work together to manage patients whose condition 2 
deteriorates unexpectedly 3 
Before you decide you need to understand why the research is being done and what it 4 
would involve from you.  5 
What is the purpose of the study? 6 
The aim of this study is to investigate the influence of human factors on the quality of 7 
management of patients who experience a sudden and unexpected deterioration in their 8 
condition whilst being cared for in wards not specialised for high dependency care. 9 
Why have I been asked to take part in this study? 10 
You have been asked to take part in this study because you are a member of the Ward 11 
Team within an NHS foundation trust. 12 
Do I have to take part in the study? 13 
No, it is up to you to decide if you wish to take part. Jane Greaves will meet with you to 14 
discuss the study in more detail. You will also have an opportunity to ask any questions 15 
you may have. 16 
If you agree to take part then Jane will ask you to sign a consent form to show that you 17 
have agreed to take part. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time, without 18 
giving a reason. Withdrawal will not affect you in any way and your decision to 19 
withdraw will not be shared with anyone. 20 
What am I being asked to do? 21 
If you decide to take part in this study all the staff will be asked to:  22 
• Participate in an individual interview with Jane Greaves at a designated private 23 
space within the hospital that you work.  24 
• The interview will last approx. 45 minutes.  25 
• Prior to the interview Jane will confirm that you are willing to consent to the 26 
interview and that you have formally signed a consent form.  27 
• During the interview Jane will clarify that you are comfortable with the process 28 
of the interview and give you an opportunity to withdraw consent and 29 
participation at any time.  30 
• During the interview Jane will discuss her position as a registered nurse and the 31 
requirements of the code of professional conduct (NMC 2010) 32 
Are there any disadvantages to taking part? 33 
• There are two hospital Trusts chosen for this research study, your name will not 34 
be disclosed, and you will be provided with a unique identifier which will help 35 
to label any data generated.    36 
• You may also experience the potential inconvenience of having to take part in an 37 
interview which may last for up to 45 minutes each.  38 
What are the benefits of taking part? 39 
• You will help contribute to an understanding of how perelationships between 40 
health care professionals from different disciplines impact upon care. 41 
CONFIDENTIALITY 42 
Collecting the data 43 
The data for this study will be collected using a Digital Dictaphone Recorder during the 44 
interview. Once the interview has ended the recording will be transcribed and a written 45 
record of our discussions will be created. The data will not contain your name etc. and 46 
any paper based record will be securely stored. 47 
Storage of the interview tapes, transcripts and other papers 48 
Any paper based transcriptions will be kept in a locked cupboard at Northumbria 49 
University until the research is completed, however all digital recordings will be deleted 50 
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once the paper based transcriptions have been transcribed. These documents are 1 
anonymised and are marked by a unique identifier (allocated to you by Jane Greaves). 2 
The only individual who will have access to the tapes and papers is Jane Greaves. 3 
Any information which is produced as part of the dissemination activities associated 4 
with the project will not bear your name. 5 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 6 
The results will form part of a report which will be completed by Jan 2015. A report 7 
will be disseminated by Jane Greaves and will be made available to study participants. 8 
The results will also be published in education and health care journals and within a 9 
PhD dissertation. You will never be identified in any publication although your words 10 
may be published exactly as you said them during the interview. 11 
Who is funding this study? 12 
Jane Greaves is funding the study but is supported and sponsored by Northumbria 13 
University through its programme of staff scholarly activity 14 
Who has reviewed this study? 15 
The proposed research has been reviewed by the School Research Committee and the 16 
NHS Trust Research and Development departments where applicable. 17 
Where can I find further information about the research? 18 
In the first instance please contact Jane Greaves:  19 
If you are unhappy about this study please contact 20 
The Rev. Professor Pauline Pearson - Supervisor  21 
If I take part can I withdraw from the study at a later date? 22 
You can withdraw from the study at any time. Simply contact Jane to tell her you would 23 
like to withdraw - her details are at the end of this information sheet. When you indicate 24 
your intention to withdraw from this study Jane will ask you if you would like her to 25 
destroy all of the data collected to the point of withdrawal or whether we can continue 26 
to use it in an anonymised form. 27 
Complaints 28 
If you have concerns about any aspect of this study please speak to either Jane Greaves, 29 
or Reverend Professor Pauline Pearson research supervisor (details below) and we will 30 
do our best to address these. If you remain unhappy you may wish to contact the 31 
sponsor of this research who is Professor Olivier Sparagano 32 
Information disclosure 33 
Jane Greaves is a Registered Nurse and is governed by the Nursing and Midwifery 34 
Council (NMC), she will inform you at the initial meeting of the NMC code (2008), and 35 
also the NMC raising and escalating concerns regulations (2010) 36 
Research Team 37 
Principal Investigator: Mrs Jane Greaves, Northumbria University  38 
PhD Supervisor: The Reverend Professor Pauline Pearson, Northumbria University  39 
 40 
41 
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9.12 Appendix L Consent Form: Ward Team 1 
CONSENT FORM 2 
How do interprofessional, interdisciplinary and authority patterns affect the 3 
carers response to critical events in the context of formalised protocols for the 4 
management of adult patient deterioration? 5 
Please initial the boxes 
                       
Yes   No 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated …………    
2. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions  about the study 
and these have been answered to my satisfaction 
   
3. I am willing to be interviewed     
4. I am happy for my comments to be recorded and my words used in the research    
5. I am happy for my comments to be audio recorded and my words used in the 
research 
   
6. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I can withdraw at any time 
without giving reason. And that withdrawing from the study will not affect me in any 
way 
   
7. I understand that relevant sections of the data collected during the study may be 
looked at by individuals from Northumbria University where it is relevant to my 
taking part in this research. I give permission for these individuals to have access to 
the data.  
   
8. I understand my name and details will be kept confidential, and will not appear in 
any printed documents 
   
9. I know that because of the study sample that I could be identified and that the 
researcher will attempt to maintain anonymity when writing reports 
   
10. I agree to take part in the above study    
I    ………………………………………………    [name of participant]  
understand the information presented to me by     ……………………………  and agree to 
take part in the research 
Signature:                                                     [Participant] Date: 
Signature:                                                     [Researcher]   
 6 
7 
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9.13 Appendix M: Semi-Structured Interview Themes 1 
Preamble 2 
The interviews will be with a range of those responsible for the acute care of patients on 3 
wards and departments where a track and trigger system of recording vital signs is used. 4 
The initial focus of the work is a discussion of attitudes to track and trigger and beliefs 5 
about their efficacy supplemented by enquiry into how each individual carer perceives 6 
their role, the role of those who report to them and the role of those to whom they 7 
report. The final discussion surrounds how perceptions of others in the chain of 8 
reporting affect the working of the alerting system. 9 
These questions are prompts. The interviews will be conducted as conversations and 10 
many of the questions will emerge during the discussion. Where necessary a new topic 11 
will be prompted – not generally by asking the direct question as given below – by 12 
raising issues that should prompt the necessary reflection.  13 
The semi-structured nature of the interview allows the interviewee to use their own 14 
words and it is from their choices and emphases that their opinions will emerge. 15 
About You 16 
What professional group do you belong to? 17 
What is your present status? 18 
How long have you worked in your present capacity? 19 
About your role in caring for acutely ill patients 20 
What is your role in caring for patients? 21 
To whom would you report that a patient is becoming more ill? 22 
About your knowledge of systems for the detection of serious episodes of patient 23 
deterioration 24 
Have you heard of any systems for the timely detection patient deterioration? 25 
Do you use such a system? 26 
What is your task in using the scoring system? 27 
Do you understand the purpose of the scoring system? 28 
Have you personally found it useful? 29 
Do you think track and trigger systems are just another example of more useless paper 30 
getting in the way of your real job? 31 
About an episode that went well 32 
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Can you think of a case you were involved with where potential harm to the patient was 1 
averted by good use of the early warning system and good communication between 2 
team members? Please don’t tell me anything that identifies the patient or the staff 3 
involved. 4 
What did you feel were the risks to the patient?  5 
What in your opinion were the possible adverse outcomes. 6 
In what ways do you feel that the management of this case were successful? 7 
What do you think were the key factors that contributed to this success? 8 
What was your role in managing this situation? 9 
Have you thought about these events since they happened? 10 
How do you feel about this event? 11 
Has this experience changed your practice? 12 
About an episode that went badly 13 
Have you ever been involved in a situation where you felt that the systems for detecting 14 
deterioration did not work as well as you would have hoped? Please don’t tell me 15 
anything that identifies the patient or the staff involved. 16 
What did you feel were the risks to the patient? What in your opinion were the possible 17 
adverse outcomes. 18 
In what ways do you feel that the management of this case could have been improved? 19 
What do you think were the key factors that contributed to this success? 20 
What was your personal role in managing this situation? 21 
Have you thought about these events since they happened? 22 
How did you feel about this event? 23 
Has this experience changed your practice?  24 
 25 
About communication? 26 
Do you find that workers who report them to you usually correctly assess ‘Cause for 27 
Concern’ situations? 28 
Do you find that your reports of ‘Cause for Concern’ are taken seriously? 29 
What do you feel when you have to report ‘Cause for Concern’? 30 
For care assistants and student nurses: 31 
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Are you apprehensive about reporting problems to the nurse in charge or a 1 
doctor? 2 
Are your findings generally treated with respect? 3 
Do you feel that you are not believed because of your lack of seniority? 4 
For Registered nurses: 5 
Are care assistants generally reliable in detecting ‘Cause for Concern’ 6 
situations? 7 
If not, why not? 8 
Are you apprehensive about reporting problems to the nurse in charge or a 9 
doctor? 10 
Do you find that the Care Assistants cry wolf over ‘Cause for Concern’ 11 
situations? 12 
If not, why not? 13 
Do Doctors generally take your reports of cause for concern seriously ? 14 
Are you satisfied that they take action – even if you don’t agree with what they 15 
do? 16 
For Doctors 17 
Are nurses, care assistants, your junior medical colleagues - generally reliable in 18 
detecting ‘Cause for Concern’ situations? 19 
If not, why not? 20 
Do you find that Care Assistants and nurses cry wolf over ‘Cause for Concern’ 21 
situations? 22 
 23 
About your experience of managing deteriorating patients 24 
How much personal experience have you of early warning scoring systems? 25 
What is your role in using the system? 26 
How often do you find that the early warning system asks you to report the situation to a 27 
senior colleague? 28 
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10 GLOSSARY OF TERMS 1 
Intensive Care Unit (ICU) A specially staffed and equipped, separate and self- 2 
contained area of a hospital dedicated to the management and monitoring of patients 3 
with life- threatening conditions. It provides special expertise and the facilities for the 4 
support of vital functions and uses the skills of medical, nursing and other personnel 5 
experienced in the management of these problems (ICS/FICM 2013).  6 
Levels of Patient Dependency in Acute Care (FICM/ICS 2015) 7 
Level 0 - Patients whose needs can be met through normal ward care in an acute 8 
hospital. About 1 nurse per ten patients  9 
Level 1 - Patients at risk of their condition deteriorating, or those recently relocated 10 
from higher levels of care, whose needs can be met on an acute ward with additional 11 
advice and support from the critical care team. About one nurse per six patients 12 
Level 2 - Patients requiring more detailed observation or intervention including 13 
support for a single failing organ system or post-operative care and those 'stepping 14 
down' from higher levels of care. One nurse per two patients 15 
Level 3 - Patients requiring advanced respiratory support alone or basic respiratory 16 
support together with support of at least two organ systems. This level includes all 17 
complex patients requiring support for multi-organ failure. One nurse per patient  18 
‘Track and Trigger’ is a system where regular observation of parameters is made and 19 
where breaching a threshold invokes a pre-set response. 20 
Early Warning Score (EWS) A tool used to aid recognition of deteriorating patients. It 21 
is based on the physiological observations used for routine monitoring. The 22 
observations incorporated in this scoring system may include: temperature, pulse, blood 23 
pressure and respiratory rate, with oxygen saturations, level of consciousness and urine 24 
output. An aggregated score is then calculated from all seven parameters. There is an 25 
identified threshold score which, when reached, then activates an escalation pathway. 26 
This protocol may be categorised as the afferent limb of the Rapid Response System 27 
(RRS). 28 
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A Rapid Response System (RRS) is a team-response tool in hospitals, designed to 1 
identify and review patients with early signs of clinical deterioration outside intensive 2 
care units (RCP 2012). Referral is to a team of clinicians who respond to an alert. This 3 
may be an existing group such as the patients ‘home medical team’, the cardiac arrest 4 
team or the intensive-care outreach team. It may also be a specialised team of doctors 5 
and nurses: a rapid response team or emergency medical team. The rapid response team 6 
is described as the efferent limb of the Rapid Response System. 7 
A Rapid Response Team (RRT) is a team of clinicians, with special knowledge, skill 8 
and experience in the management of critical illness, routinely tasked to be available 9 
and respond to referrals generated by the EWS. 10 
Medical Emergency Team (MET) is a special purpose team of doctors and nurses 11 
with skills in the management of acute care that respond to an alert synonymous with 12 
Rapid Response Team. 13 
Afferent Limb of the RRS – The process by which a patient reaching a ‘trigger’ value 14 
is identified as likely to deteriorate and potentially requiring adjustments to their 15 
management. 16 
Efferent Limb of the RRS – The system used to respond to patients who reach a 17 
‘trigger’ value. 18 
 19 
 20 
 21 
 22 
 23 
 24 
 25 
 26 
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